NIV. OF
ORONTO
IBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/edinburghreviewo222londuoft

LE
E

The Edinburgh Review

or Critical Journal

JULY, 1915 —————— OCTOBER, 1915

To be continued Quarterly

Edited by HAROLD COX

JUDEX DAMNATUR CUM NOCENS ABSOLVITUR
Publius Syrus

VOL. 222

139641
27/9/16

LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO
London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras
LEONARD SCOTT PUBLICATION COMPANY, New York
1915

Contents of Vol. 222.

No. 453 — July, 1915

		PAGE
The Outlook for Capital	. . . . .	1
German War Literature	DR. A. SHADWELL	22
British Imperialism and the Problems of Peace	PROF. W. A. PHILLIPS	41
Italy and the European Conflict	AN ITALIAN	60
War Poetry in France	EDMUND GOSSE, C.B.	78
Nationality and Gardening	MRS. VILLIERS-STUART	98
Chivalry and Civilisation	J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY	118
Meredith's Odes on France	JOHN BAILEY	135
The Law of Bastardy	. . . . .	155
A German Naval Historian	WILLIAM ARCHER	173
Canada in War-Time	EDWARD PORRITT	186
Economic Endurance	EDITOR	204

No. 454 — October, 1915

The Quintessence of Austria	HENRY WICKHAM STEED	225
The Workshops and the War	. . . . .	248
Democracy, Diplomacy, and War	J. A. R. MARRIOTT	273
Christianity and War	MISS M. D. PETRE	294
'The Humanity of Modern Warfare'	DAVID HANNAY	312
The Desecration of French Monuments	EDMUND GOSSE, C.B.	330
Voltaire and Frederick the Great	LYTTON STRACHEY	351
The Crown Colonies and the War	SIR CHARLES BRUCE, G.C.M.G.	374
Greek Athletics and Military Training	F. A. WRIGHT	391
Patriotism and Agriculture	ROWLAND E. PROTHERO, M.V.O., M.P.	406
Cabinet Government	EDITOR	426

The Edinburgh Review

JULY, 1915 No. 453

THE OUTLOOK FOR CAPITAL

1. **The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot.** Edited by Mrs. RUSSELL BARRINGTON. Longmans. 1915.
2. **War and Lombard Street.** By HARTLEY WITHERS. Smith, Elder. 1915.
3. **The Nation's Wealth.** By Sir L. G. CHIOZZA MONEY, M.P. Collins. 1914.
4. **The Problem of the Unemployed.** By J. A. HOBSON. Methuen. 1896.

AT first sight there does not seem to be any doubt about it. With eight to ten millions of capital spent every day by the belligerent Powers, to say nothing of the purely wasteful outlay to which many neutrals are forced by the war, it seems to be as obvious a platitude as ever has been put forward when one says that capital will be, must be, and cannot help being dear for a long time to come.

When a huge amount of a thing that is very much wanted is destroyed its price must go up. Economic theory, common sense, and even the laws of mechanics seem to confirm such a proposition, which is so self-evident that one is almost inclined to show the thing happening in a diagram. No one can deny that capital, even before the war, was very much wanted.

All rights reserved.

Twenty years ago there was, for a time, an apparent glut of it, and Mr. J. A. Hobson evolved a theory that unemployment and its accompanying social evils were due to what he called under-consumption, and a habit, of which he accused the community, of saving much more than was good for it. Since then fact has very practically disposed of this theory, and the price of capital, as expressed by the rate of interest on good securities, has risen steadily for some eighteen years before the war came to use up perhaps three or four thousand millions of it in unproductive outlays. The best example of this rise in the price of capital is given by the debenture stocks of English railway companies, since the fact that they are irredeemable leaves them free to reflect the current rate of interest without any complications arising out of a date of maturity. In 1896 Great Western Railway 5 per cent. debenture stock touched 202, and so yielded less than 2½ per cent. to the buyer; in 1914 it was 125, yielding 4 per cent. to the buyer. Some allowance must be made for certain influences which helped this movement, such as the soothsayings of Protectionist orators, who shouted from the housetops that England was being ruined by Free Trade, and the cunning insinuations of purveyors of foreign bonds, which implied that, owing to Socialistic legislation at home, real security was only to be found abroad (to say nothing of a better rate of interest). All due allowance being made, however, there can be no doubt that the fall in the price of Great Western debentures and similar securities, and the consequent rise in the yield to the buyer, were very largely caused by the growing demand for and scarcity of capital.

If there is still any doubt about it, let us take a colonial example. No one can say that the fear of dying industries or Socialistic legislation hurt the price of Canadian credit. Canada 3 per cent. stock touched 107 in 1896, and was dealt in at 82 in 1914, although redeemable at par in 1938.

There is no need to labour the point further, because the scarcity and dearness of capital had become, in the years before the war, a journalistic commonplace, and the 'famine 'in capital' was a cause of serious misgiving to the pushing young countries whose growth depended on plentiful doses of it repeated at frequent intervals.

If, then, there was famine before the war, how can there fail

to be starvation after it ? If the price of capital, as expressed by the yield on Great Western Railway debenture stock, rose from under 2½ per cent. to about 4 per cent. between 1896 and 1914, what will it be in 1916, or whatever later date sees the end of the war ? Will it be 4 or 5 or 6 per cent.? Is there any remote chance of its being lower than 4 per cent., and travelling back towards the 1896 level ?

It would seem to be a mere waste of time to answer the question, so obvious is the reply that it will be surely somewhere well over 4, and that the extent to which it will soar above 4 depends on the length of the war, and the rapidity with which capital is poured out by the warring Powers. Nevertheless there is an adage, sometimes heard in Lombard Street, which tells us that anyone who has to base a business decision on the appearance of the Money Market will be well advised to make a very careful inference from an exhaustive study of all the available data, and then act in a manner that is directly contrary to the conclusion thus carefully arrived at. This is the cynical expression, probably first uttered by some sad-eyed bill broker whom a rise in Bank rate had caught with a full portfolio, of the fact that the conditions that sway the Money Market are, in normal times, so immeasurable and so conflicting that the more carefully they are weighed and the more overwhelming is the apparent evidence the greater is the likelihood of error.

Moreover, although at the present moment there seems to be something like agreement between theorists and business men, it must be noted that the latter are by no means unanimous. It is difficult to find an economist in these days who foresees cheap capital after the war, and this view is commonly endorsed by investors of all kinds, who will not, as a rule, look at any security unless it is definitely repayable at a certain date, which must not be too remote. This preference, of course, is based on the view that capital is going to be dear, because this view makes the investor shy of placing his money except in a stock that promises to pay it back again, and so give him the chance of reinvesting on the more favourable terms that he foresees later on. A stock, like Consols, which carries no obligation of repayment, is now completely out of favour, because, if the expected rise in the rate of interest earned on capital comes to pass, the only thing that can happen to such a

stock is to fall in price. It is against this contingency, of a further fall in undated stocks, that investors protect themselves when they cry out for something with a definite date of redemption.

Such is now the almost unanimous cry. But before now investors have been equally unanimous and entirely wrong. Twenty years ago a stock with a date of redemption was a discredited outcast, because everyone expected that when the date of repayment arrived the holders would be certain to have to reinvest at a disadvantage.

Just as in those days there were a few eccentric folk who, by luck or judgment, foresaw what actually happened, cleared out their Consols and other undated stocks and waited for the reaction, so now there is here and there a voice crying in the wilderness and telling those who will listen that it is by no means certain that capital will be dear after the war, and maintaining that there is even some ground for the belief that capital will be going begging. not because it will be plentiful, but because there will be no demand for it. The question of the price of capital after the war is important enough to make it worth while to examine this contention, and to see whether there is any means of escape for humanity from the uncomfortable prospect of paying high rates for the use of one of the essential ingredients of production.

One of the difficulties that arise when one tries to discuss this question is the vagueness that seems to confuse many minds concerning what they mean by capital. Some people tell one in these days that capital is plentiful, and if one asks them why they say so they turn up a money article in a newspaper and triumphantly point to the fact, therein chronicled, that money is unlendable, or very freely offered at nominal rates. But is this so-called money really capital ? And if not, what is the distinction ?

Money, as the term is used in the City and in City articles, is the credit that bankers are prepared to give to borrowers of good standing, on unimpeachable security, for short periods—for a day or a week, or perhaps a fortnight. The essential point about it is that, by using his funds in this manner, the banker considers that he still keeps control of it and can get it back at once, or almost at once. So much is this so that in drawing up their balance sheets bankers do not show these loans as loans,

but as cash—' cash at call and short notice ' is the term usually employed. Owing to the nature of the security and the fact that the loan is so short that the banker can still regard the money so lent as 'cash,' the rate paid for this kind of accommodation is usually lower than that earned by any other method of money-lending. ' Cash at call and short notice ' gives the banker a lower return than his investments, or his ' loans and 'advances,' or even, as a rule, than his bills of exchange, just for this reason, that it is looked on as the next best thing to cash in hand, and is the most liquid asset that the banker holds. The dearness or cheapness of it is influenced by many circumstances, but is ultimately determined on the lender's side first by the extent to which the bankers, as a whole, are losing cash—either by the demands of their customers at home for currency, whether owing to active trade, or holiday movements, or half-yearly payments ; or by the demands of customers who want gold for export—and secondly by the extent to which the bankers think fit to reinforce their holding of cash in hand by calling in cash at call and short notice and turning it into cash in hand. On the borrower's side the dearness or cheapness of this kind of ' money ' depends first on the number of bills of exchange, so far as these have to be carried by bill brokers, as their habit is, by day-to-day or week-to-week borrowings from their bankers ; and secondly on the extent of Stock Exchange speculation, so far as it is financed by the borrowings of the leading stockbrokers from one account to another.

In ordinary times, then, the price of money as quoted in the City articles is not necessarily a sure indication of the state of the market for capital. Money in this sense is merely bankers' money, which becomes cheap and plentiful chiefly owing to the quietness of trade and inactivity in speculation. A great deal depends on whether this cheapness arises from temporary causes or from influences that are likely to last. On the latter hypothesis it is likely that capital will accumulate and become cheap, because in times of stagnant trade producers are shy of putting capital into their businesses or into new ventures ; while the absence of foreign demands for gold, which was shown to be one of the causes of cheap money, probably means that we are selling more goods and services to foreigners than they are selling to us, and so we are accumulating a balance. Moreover, another cause of cheap money,

which is nearly always present in a prolonged spell of it, is the cheapness of commodities, which means that less credit is required for financing them in their inchoate stages from raw material to finished product. The effect of this is that the bankers are to a less extent pestered by their mercantile and producing customers for the 'loans and advances' which always form the biggest item among their assets. These represent the more long-dated and so less liquid loans that they make, largely to those who are engaged in productive and distributive enterprise. When this item is reduced by the cheapening of commodities—as for example when copper falls from £80 a ton to £60, so that a merchant with a thousand tons in hand only wants £60,000 to finance it instead of £80,000—then bankers are glutted with funds which they try to force upon the short loan market, and so make money cheap. But when commodities are cheap one result is that the saving classes have a bigger margin and are able to accumulate capital—which can only be done by saving—more quickly. So here again cheap money arises from a cause which also tends to produce cheap capital, if it lasts long enough.

At the present moment the cheap money that is chronicled in the City articles is produced by quite abnormal causes. Currency is wanted at home, and gold is continually going into circulation. It is true that ordinary bills of exchange are scarce, because finance bills have been killed for the time being, and only bills drawn against actual shipments of produce are to be seen; but on the other hand Treasury bills are being sold over the Bank of England's counter as fast as buyers will take them, so that the bill brokers have still plenty of stock-in-trade to finance on short loans from the bankers. It is true that Stock Exchange speculation is almost as dead as the finance bill, but on the other hand there are plenty of investors whose patriotism outran their resources and made them, greatly to their credit, subscribe for more War Loan than they could afford to pay for without assistance from their bankers. Some sorts of trade are stagnant, but as a whole the industrial activity of the country is strained to fever point to provide for the needs of our fleet and army and those of our allies. Money is only cheap because the bankers are so freely supplied with cash in hand that they could turn much more into cash at call and short notice than they have any opportunity of so using.

This surplus of cash in hand that is now giving bankers' balance sheets an appearance of bloated affluence arises from the huge creation of credit by the Bank of England in lending, during the crisis of last August, many millions to the accepting houses to enable them to meet bills of exchange against which their foreign customers were unable to remit, and since then in financing the Government, in lending against the War Loan, and, perhaps, lending to allied Governments. The net result of the stupendous operations that the Bank of England has undertaken and carried through since the beginning of the war is that it has added some £140,000,000 to its holding of securities in its banking department. By so doing it has increased *pro tanto* the amount of cash available for the community, since, by a pleasant convention which gives our monetary system its unrivalled elasticity, anyone who has a credit in the books of the Bank of England has something that he can call cash in his balance sheet, and can use, if a banker, as a foundation for further credit operations, just as if it was so much coin of the realm or legal-tender money. For when we look at the Bank of England's weekly return, we see that this huge addition to its holding of securities has been, as was inevitable, accompanied by a similar addition to its liabilities in the shape of deposits. When the Bank of England makes loans against securities, the holders of these loans seldom or never take away the money in gold or notes, but use them by making payments to creditors in cheques on the Bank of England which are paid into their banks by those who receive them and so are finally added to the bankers' balances. Thus, when the accepting houses were enabled to borrow from the Bank of England in order to meet bills drawn on them, the credit so created passed into the hands of the holders of the bills, and was by them paid into their banks, who thus increased their holding of cash at the Bank of England. In many cases the process was probably shortened by the fact that the banks were themselves the holders of the bills.

It thus follows that, if no conflicting influence had intervened, the whole of the addition to the Bank of England's holding of securities would naturally have been added to the 'other 'deposits' which include the bankers' balances. But a conflicting influence did intervene, in the shape of the policy of the Government, which has been holding up money and

keeping a balance at the Bank of England that is huge above all precedent. It is a natural inference, which is generally accepted in the City, that this action on the part of the Government was deliberately carried out in order to prevent the evil effects that were feared from the manner in which, as explained above, the Money Market was being flooded with artificially created credit. However this may be, the fact remains that, instead of behaving as a Government might be expected to behave when it is spending money with both hands and both feet, instead of paying out all that it received through taxation and loans rather faster than it got it in, the Government has been allowing funds to accumulate to its credit at the Bank of England and so keeping them out of the reach of the bankers, who had already got more than was good for them. Consequently we see that the new credit manufactured by the Bank of England has been divided between the Government and the bankers, and the Government has kept the lion's share. Compared with the figures of a year ago the Government balance showed on June 15 an increase of £95,400,000 and the 'other deposits' one of £60,000,000. At first sight it looks like bad finance on the part of the Government to borrow money and then sit on it, but no doubt it was done in order to correct the evils of an artificial state of affairs.

In spite of this policy, however, the banks are still bursting with money that is not in any sense capital, and is in fact what the City calls 'bad' money, in the sense that it is certain to be called in just when it begins to be wanted. The Bank of England made advances to accepting houses until a year after peace, so that when the war is over, and when all the measures that have been taken to help people whose resources have been tied up by the war are beginning to come to an end, and the difficult process of *post bellum* liquidation is well under way, at that uncomfortable period it will be necessary for the accepting houses to pay back those loans to the Bank of England, and so the bankers' supply of cash will be curtailed.

This disquisition on the nature of the plentiful money which has thereby been shown not to be capital has not been as irrelevant as it looks, since by means of it we have come nearer to a recognition of the real essence of capital. Of course everyone who has read the economists knows that you cannot

make capital by making entries in the Bank of England's books, or by printing pieces of paper and calling them money. But not many people read the economists nowadays, and it is a common fallacy, especially among business men, to suppose that the ingenuities of Lombard Street can call into being wealth that does not exist. All that Lombard Street can do in its most liquid and optimistic moments is to provide the means of pledging wealth, or what it believes to be wealth, and so making wealth available to borrowers, which would otherwise have been locked up and ineffective for further enterprise. By so doing it can very greatly increase the productive power of wealth; but the wealth has to be there before the monetary mechanism can mobilise and multiply its energy.

At the risk of stating elementary platitudes, let us see how the creation of capital works, and what is meant by the oft-repeated statement that the present war means the destruction per day of an appalling amount of it. The only way in which capital can be created is through the production, by an individual or a community, of more goods—in the widest sense of the term—than he or it consumes. Going back to the proverbial savage, without whom no examination of the origin of capital is complete, we find him—or imagine him—first of all living from day to day and from hand to mouth on berries that he picks or roots that he grubs up. He takes no thought for the morrow, lays up no store, and, if he happens on a week of bad luck, dies of hunger. At his next stage he has hit on the epoch-making idea of gathering, when he gets the chance, more food than he wants, and storing it. Already he has emerged into the capitalistic stage. He has something laid by for his own future consumption, and this something he can, if he finds it more convenient, barter with a hungry brother for any asset that the latter may possess. But, as it is simpler to consider the case of a completely isolated being, we can suppose that he spends the days that his store of food has left free for him in fashioning a weapon or devising a trap which enables him to slay a wild beast. Now his larder is stocked and he can provide himself with a garment, and so the process goes on. At each stage he is making or getting something that is not needed for his immediate sustenance, and is laying up resources for further acquisition and increasing

his productive power. In the course of generations we find him progressing from a root-grubber to a hunter, and so to an owner of flocks and herds, a farmer, a manufacturer and a captain of industry, with highly specialised assistants in the form of merchants and financiers.

In these days we have got so much into the habit of thinking of wealth in terms of money that capital is inextricably associated with finance, and the capitalist is usually regarded as a person with a big balance at his bank, who sits in an office and pulls mysterious strings which cause strange happenings on the Stock Exchanges and Bourses of the world. Actually the financier is only a capitalist because he, or someone else for him, has produced a number of things that he has sold and, instead of spending the proceeds on immediate personal enjoyment, has kept and accumulated them for the furtherance of future enterprise. His big bank balance is only the modern equivalent of the savage's store of berries. Capital still consists of tangible goods, and money is only a piece of ingenious mechanism which enables the capitalist to command any goods that he wants to buy.

A further complication has arisen, which makes the connexion between goods and capital still more remote to the superficial observer, since the invention of securities has made it possible for mankind to deal in pieces of paper representing thousands of millions' worth of wealth, and taught it to regard these pieces of paper as capital. In fact they are merely evidences of claim to goods and the earning power of goods. If all the bonds, and stock and share certificates, and registers of shareholders, and all the rest of the mechanism of security dealing were burnt to-morrow, mankind as a whole would not be a penny the poorer. Probably it would be so startled that it would believe itself to be ruined, and it might be shocked into such a state of panic that production might be seriously checked, and then mankind would really be poorer. But in fact all the real machinery of production would still be there, the 'fields, factories, and workshops' that make and grow the goods that we need, and the railways and ships that convey them to us. The active brains of the managers and the sturdy thews of the workers would be as active and sturdy as ever, and as long as they went on working and accumulating fresh capital there would be no pause in the production of wealth.

This multiplication of securities, however, has had the effect of making it possible to sell prospects and expectations. A syndicate can buy a piece of ground and persuade the public that it contains gold, and sell it to a company at a value that is based on the expectation of the gold that is to be won. Nevertheless, even in a case like this the security remains merely a gambling counter to be played with by market riggers until the property that it represents is definitely proved—or believed to be proved—to be a genuine asset with a more or less calculable earning power. Until it has done so it may enable a cunning share pusher to make a fortune out of gullible or greedy speculators, but it will not be touched by real investors or be treated by bankers as a serious security as collateral for advances.

In the case of Government loans there seems at first sight to be an example of something like capital that has been created by the printing press, and a mere expectation that the debtor will pay the interest due and repay the amount borrowed on the due date, if any. A French Government bond, or £100 Consols, is certainly wealth, for the owner can sell it at a price, though in the case of Consols the existence of a *minimum* price puts difficulties in the way at the present time. Yet it does not apparently represent any definite tangible goods, like the brewery and vans and stock of raw material that stand behind a brewery debenture, or like the permanent way, stations, and rolling stock on which a railway security is based. Some few Governments do actually own railways, forests, and other assets which are valued at sums which more than cover their debts ; but France and England are conspicuous examples to the contrary, and yet their credit, as measured by the prices of their securities, is at the top of the financial tree, or was until this war came and lifted the United States to the position of economic supremacy, which it may or may not hold. The reason for this high standing of French and English debts, in spite of the lack of assets definitely owned by the Governments of these nations, consists in the great volume and value of the goods owned by their citizens, and their consequent ability to meet the necessary taxation involved by the service of the debts. Once again it is a case of the goods behind the security which give the security its value. The Government does not own the goods, but it owns the right to tax the owners of the

goods, and buyers of the securities justly assess this right at a value which is higher than that which attaches to the debts of States which can, as States, show better balance sheets, but have not nearly so much wealth behind them in the hands of their citizens.

When once we have recognised that capital is not money or securities, but goods, in the widest sense of the word, we have taken a long step towards a solution of the problem of the outlook for capital, and also towards a perception of the amount of truth that lurks behind the commonly repeated assertion about the destruction of capital.

It is sometimes argued by business men, who are not, as a class, accustomed to look very deeply under the surface of the machinery that they handle, that it is wrong to talk about a destruction of capital owing to the war, because much of the money spent on war is not wasted, since it is used for feeding and clothing and paying wages to large numbers of men. The confusion involved in this train of thought is so obvious that one would hardly waste time on it were it not so frequently uttered by people who ought to know better. Of course much of the money spent on war goes in this way, but nevertheless it is, economically speaking, wasted because the men so clothed, fed, and paid are not employed in enriching the world and adding to its store of productive goods, but in killing one another. If all the belligerent Powers were to hire huge armies of men and equip them very carefully, and then set them to marching up and down their respective countries, the waste of money and of energy would be evident. As it is, they are doing something that is, from an economic point of view, much worse, and from a human point of view worst of all; for they are feeding, clothing, and paying the flower of their manhood in order that they may kill one another and incidentally destroy a good deal of property in those districts in which war is being carried on. This destruction of active young lives is a terrible economic loss; but the incidental destruction of property is probably not a very important item in relation to the total cost of this amazing war, and it is only with respect to it that we are justified in talking of the destruction of capital.

As far as England is concerned, this destruction has hardly been felt. The Germans have damaged a few bathing-places

on the East Coast, sunk a few of our warships, which were not capital in a productive sense, and torpedoed an infinitesimal proportion of our merchant navy. But these efforts have made no appreciable inroad on the store of accumulated goods which constitute our real capital. As far as we are concerned, it is not destruction of capital that is going on so much as diversion of funds which would, or might, have been used for the production of goods which would have been useful to industry, to the production of goods which are shot out of a gun, or used for the feeding and equipment of those who are doing the shooting. In this country that is the worst that is likely to happen to us, apart from the comparatively small destruction, already alluded to, of our merchant ships. It is thus not quite accurate to speak of a vast destruction of capital except in so far as the conduct of war means the actual laying waste of areas which have hitherto been productive. In their case, if they were agricultural, the ravages of war are almost immediately repaired by nature. If they were industrial, the actual destruction of factories and machinery is a serious waste that can only be made good by hard work when the war is over.

In our case, then, and in that of other warring countries which escape actual invasion, what happens to capital is that it ceases for the time being to be accumulated for productive purposes. All that we can save, and perhaps more, has to be spent on war. Instead of having been able to build new ships and railways and factories here and abroad, and brought more of the waste places of the earth into cultivation, we shall have been pouring all the goods that we have not consumed ourselves down the sink of war instead of into the bountiful lap of the goddess of production. To that extent the world's economic progress will have been stayed, and while the demands of consumers will have increased, the capacity for supplying them will have stood still or dwindled owing to the drying up of the stream of capital.

Whether we pay for the war out of our own savings or other people's will make no difference to the general supply of capital, though it will make a great difference to us. Mr. Lloyd George pointed out in a recent speech that we could, owing to our great store of funds invested abroad, pay for five years of war by selling our foreign securities. The late Chancellor of

the Exchequer did not, of course, mean to imply that this would be possible, for obviously we could not find buyers abroad at present for the 4000 millions' worth of foreign investments that we have taken to ourselves out of our past savings. He merely mentioned this fact of our colossal holding of foreign securities as an example of the tremendous staying power that our accumulated wealth gives us. But if we supposed for a moment that it were possible to sell all these securities, and if America, Argentina, Australia, India, and other countries that are selling us goods that we need for war, would take payment in the shape of our investments, the result would be that there would thereby be no change in the world's capital as a whole, but that our ownership of it would have passed to other hands. Production would go on as before, but the goods produced, instead of being shipped to us in payment of interest, would henceforward go to some other country, or stay in the country that produced them. If we wanted to get them as before, we should have to export goods to pay for them instead of receiving them in the form of interest. If the war lasted for the full five years, we should no longer be a creditor country taking toll of the produce of the world in return for capital shipped abroad in the shape of railway material and other forms of the machinery of production. The rest of the world would have paid us back our capital in the form of food and war munitions, and would so have taken control of the goods that it represented and had created.

So far we have been paying for the war, to some extent, by this process of denuding ourselves of our investments. Out of the handsome profits that America is making by selling food and war material to us and the Allies and Germany, America has been able to buy back from Europe large masses of the securities that she has sold to England and the Continent in times past. Luckily for us, this process cannot go on indefinitely, and we shall be obliged, sooner or later, to pay for the war, to a much greater extent, out of income. This the late Chancellor of the Exchequer made clear in his Budget speech at the beginning of May, when, after giving the country an exposition of the necessity that lay before it of following this sound method of financing this crisis in our history, and having convinced the listening House, with all the successful skill of a persuasive dentist, that the nation must make up its

mind at once to have every visible molar extracted, he put away his forceps with one of his winning smiles and intimated that he had only been calling our attention to something that would have to happen some day. It is greatly to be hoped that the reprieve which he has so strangely granted will be short. We cannot expect the individual consumer to begin saving suddenly unless he is made, or at least definitely told, to do so. The individual consumer does not read Budget speeches, especially in time of war. He looks in his paper to see if there are any new taxes, and if he finds that there are not he heaves a sigh of relief and turns to more exciting news. It is always difficult to bring home to any single citizen the fact that what he does with his money makes any difference to his country's economic position. He thinks, naturally enough, that when it is a question of hundreds of millions the few shillings of his daily expenditure cannot possibly count. And so he goes on muddling away his money on things that he does not really and seriously need, because he has got into the habit of having them and does not see why he should stop. The consequence is that at a time when the productive power of the nation is to some extent curtailed by the withdrawal of men into the fighting forces, and to a great extent diverted by the necessity for equipping them with weapons, the consuming power of the people is increased by high wages and big allowances to dependents of soldiers, and so we go on putting prices up against one another, and by our huge import of dear food adding to the debt to foreigners that we are piling up. Of course we are rich enough to do this and to go on doing it for a long time, but if we go on doing it we shall be much poorer at the end of the war than we should have been if we had been forced, by the pressure of taxation, to reduce our personal spending so that the national spending should be done out of present savings instead of out of past or future savings.

There is no doubt that there is even now a good deal of saving, but so far it is largely confined to the classes which in former times lived most luxuriously and extravagantly. This seems to be the case in other countries as well as this. The Americans are calculating that the sum which they usually spend on Continental travelling will stay in their own pockets this year, or be used to lend to the warring Powers to enable

them to make purchases in America. This sum is estimated at $200,000,000, or forty millions sterling. We too have been cut off the usual outlay on winter sporting in Switzerland, which is a new-fangled extravagance of the younger generation, and we shall certainly save largely on Continental holidays. There has also been a great reduction in extravagant entertaining, and some, it is stated, in the amount spent on feminine finery. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the classes which have reduced this sort of expenditure are those which have subscribed most freely to all the charitable appeals connected with the war.

As to the extent to which the working classes are saving, one hears widely divergent accounts. The truth appears to be that those members of them who were formerly accustomed to save are saving more than usual, while those who lived from hand to mouth have continued to do so, and have only been induced by high wages to spend more or work less. Evidence of saving is given by the returns of the Trustee and Post Office Savings Banks, which show receipts of £11,500,000 on balance* since the beginning of this year, against £5,500,000 in the corresponding period of 1914; and it is stated that the co-operative societies are having money poured into them by their members as fast as they can take it. On the other hand, it was frequently stated, in the discussions on the shortage of munitions, that higher wages led to slack working in some cases, because men were enabled to earn in less time the amount that they thought was enough for their worldly needs, and did not see why they should work longer.

In so far as saving has been increased since the war, the

---

* The details since the war began are interesting :—

	Net Withdrawals.	Net Receipts.
4 weeks ending Aug. 8	£2,030,818	
,, ,, Sept. 5	3,319,932	
,, ,, Oct. 3	103,779	
,, ,, Oct. 31		£1,535,384
,, ,, Nov. 28		688,311
,, ,, Dec. 26	564,156	
,, ,, Jan. 23		3,510,616
,, ,, Feb. 20		1,320,151
,, ,, Mar. 20		1,762,657
,, ,, Apr. 17		2,456,636
,, ,, May 15		1,245,475
,, ,, June 12		1,247,095

war has not caused either destruction or diversion of capital. It has merely meant that the community is spending on a fight for its national existence money that it would otherwise have devoted to extravagance, ostentation, frivolity, and unnecessary amusement or dissipation. If people entertain their friends now quietly at home instead of giving them a luxurious banquet at a West End hotel, it is at least probable that the entertainment is pleasanter, and a handsome margin is saved for paying taxes or subscribing to War Loans; and the same thing happens when we cut down, or cut off, our alcohol, tobacco, theatres, cinema shows, week-ends, and other minor pleasures, so long as we do not do so to the extent of making ourselves ill and gloomy and bad-tempered. So far, however, if one is to judge from the well-filled seats at the theatres and the activity with which advertisers are calling attention to the lure of spring fashions, the public has not done much towards meeting the cost of the war by depriving itself of the pleasures of peace.

If this be so, then the cost of the war will be largely a charge on the present and future earning power of mankind. If the whole war could have been paid for by reducing expenditure on luxuries and frivolities, it would not, from an economic point of view, have made any difference; in fact it might have been beneficial. But the enormous cost of the war makes this impossible. With a really determined Government much more might have been done, by pressure brought through drastic taxation, to bring about this result. As it is, we are proud of ourselves because we take a paltry 70 millions extra in the shape of taxation and leave the rest of this enormous outlay to be met by borrowing.

When the Government borrows instead of taxing, it admits in effect that, instead of taxing its present citizens in order to meet a national crisis, it postpones the task to some future Government, since some time or other the loan has to be repaid, unless it is to be continually renewed until the crack of economic doom, and in the meantime it will be a dead-weight debt on which interest has to be paid. What happens is that the Government needs here and now to buy certain goods and services for war purposes. It has not got the money to do so. If it taxed you and me to the whole extent of the war cost, the result would be that you and I would have to go without nearly half the things that we buy now, and hand over

the money to the Government; instead of our wants being met, the Government's needs would be provided. Since in fact it borrows, those who lend it the money can only do so either by saving it, in which case the effect on the demand for goods is the same as if the money had been raised by taxation, or by borrowing it themselves from bankers and other money-lenders, by pledging securities and other forms of property.

To take a concrete example, let us suppose that a nation has a collective income of 2000 millions and a war is costing it 500 millions a year. There are three ways in which the war can be paid for.

First, the Finance Minister imposes fresh taxation amounting to 500 millions. If then, by an effort of self-denial, the nation meets the whole of this taxation by reducing individual expenditure, the result is that the citizens spend only three-quarters of their income on themselves, and their demand for commodities is to that extent reduced, so that the commodities required by Government are produced or imported in place of those that the citizens have forgone. At the end of the war the nation has no fresh debt and can go back to its old habits with its wealth unimpaired.

Second, the Finance Minister borrows 500 millions a year, which the citizens lend to him by dint of saving the whole amount, and refraining from purchases of goods in the same way as under the first system. If all the citizens saved exactly in proportion to their incomes and were taxed after the war exactly in the same proportion to pay the interest and redeem the debt, the whole effect would be the same as if the money had been found by taxation. But as in fact some would save and some would not, those who exercised economy and lent the money during the war would be paid for so doing by receiving interest afterwards out of the taxes imposed in time of peace. But the nation's wealth would be unimpaired because its collective income and consumption would have remained in a state of balance.

Third, the Finance Minister borrows 500 millions a year and the citizens do not see why they should be bothered to save. They talk about 'business as usual,' and say that it is stupid to save because it causes unemployment, and that they ought to keep up their spirits and not take things too seriously, because it has a bad moral effect, and so on. So they go on enjoying

themselves as usual, and, in order to lend money to the Government, they have either to sell to foreigners any securities or other property that the foreigner will buy (for what they sell to one another clearly makes no difference on balance), or they have to pledge securities and property with their bankers or with money-lending solicitors. One man mortgages his house, another puts his securities in pawn, another sells his Union Pacific shares in New York. The net result of this system is that the nation, individually and collectively, is spending 2500 millions a year with a collective income of only 2000 millions.

In so far as it performs this miracle by selling securities to foreign countries, it is using up old savings and impoverishing itself for the future. In so far as it does so by pledging at home securities and property that were heretofore held by the owners under no hypothecation, it is simply manufacturing fresh currency in the shape of bank credits, which in effect transform existing property into buying power to be used by the Government. John Smith has a house, and on the security of it raises a loan of £1000 from his banker, lends the £1000 to the Government, which the Government pays out to an armament firm, which pays it into its bank. There is an increase in banking currency, which is the result not of the creation of a new asset, but of an existing asset having been mobilised into a credit with a bank. So that by this process, if carried far enough, there is a great increase in the floating stock of securities created by the warring Governments in order to get money out of their citizens, with no corresponding increase in goods behind them. The relation between the volume of securities and that of goods is much higher, and the real value behind the securities is *pari passu* lower.

It will evidently make a great difference then to the value of securities in the future if the warring nations adopt the third system of financing themselves rather than the first two. Or rather the extent to which they adopt number three—for they all must use it more or less—will be an important influence on the solution of the problem. So far England is the only country that is making any attempt to tax its citizens for the war, and its effort, in view of the wealth of the country and the tremendous issue at stake, has been very poor-spirited and half-hearted. Some 70 millions for a war which is costing us over 900 millions a year seem to be a feeble effort, when we

remember what a field for the tax-gatherer this country is in its present state of patriotic fervour, which makes its citizens send in their income-tax cheques, as Mr. Lloyd George told us in his Budget speech, with polite notes expressing their great pleasure in paying them. As usual, John Bull is a better man than his rulers believe him to be. If half the good and sufficient reasons that exist for taxing him were put before him in plain language that he can understand, he would turn his pockets inside out with hearty goodwill.

Russia has reduced taxation by prohibiting *vodka*, and Germany by abolishing import duties on food. France has imposed no new taxation. Germany's position is curious, owing to her being largely cut off from imported goods. The effect of this isolation is that her citizens are forced to economise because they have to go without most of the stuff that they used to get in from abroad. They are still, probably, importing a few things that are essential to them in warfare, for the heavy depreciation of German currency, as marked by the rates of foreign exchange, shows that claims on Germany in the hands of those who have sold goods to her are plentiful in relation to her claims on foreign countries. Nevertheless the extent to which our fleet has cut off her trade has had the curious effect of compelling Germany to a course which is economically wise, though it must be none the less galling to the War Lord, who finds himself short of copper and rubber and other things that he needs for dealing with his enemies.

Germany is piling up debt at a fearful rate, but at least it may be guessed that retrenchment among her citizens is helping her materially to meet the cost of war. Being forced to rely largely on her own productive power, she is thereby compelled to confine her total consumption more or less within its limits. Since a great deal of her productive energy is diverted to war purposes, her citizens have to go without much that they formerly consumed. In other words, they are forced to save.

We, having all the world still open to us for buying, and having plenty of property that we can pledge and plenty of credit facilities, are merrily outrunning the constable. As has been shown, we are saving to some extent ; but we could do much more if we were made to, and the fact that we are not saving nearly as much as we are spending means a multiplication of securities with no increase of goods behind them.

If, then, at the end of the war the world finds itself swamped with a flood of securities that have been created to pay for war, while during the war the productive power of the goods on which all securities must finally be based has been, if anything, lessened owing to the insufficient outlay on upkeep and the slaying of many of the best of the world's workers, is it possible to doubt that the price of securities will be low, and that consequently what is called the price of capital—the rate of interest paid by the borrower—will be high ?

Some people do so doubt, and in fact affirm that the price of capital will be low, because, they say, mankind will be so exhausted by the war that there will be a long pause in development, no new countries will be opened up, and no one will have the courage to think of using new capital, much less of asking for it from the money markets of the world. Here is the psychological problem that lurks, as it so often does, behind an economic question. And anyone who dogmatises beforehand about the feelings of mankind must have *robur et aes triplex* about his breast. All that can be said with any approach to certainty is that it will take a very long pause to allow all the present flood of securities to be absorbed so far that scarcity reigns in the stock markets, and fancy prices begin to be paid for good investments. And it must be remembered that plenty of countries are outside the war zone, and making huge profits out of the needs of the belligerents. Our American cousins will not be tired at the end of the war. They will be straining every nerve, and using every dollar of capital that is offered, to improve the great economic advantage that the war is giving them.

And there are other psychological questions that affect the outlook for capital. Will the war end in such a way that all the nations want to spend more than ever on armaments, or will the lion lie down with the lamb ? Shall we all go back as far as we can to the old habits of self-indulgence and ostentation ? Or shall we recognise that no nation can be really great while the mass of its citizens lead lives of unremitting toil and poverty, and that therefore it is our first business to turn the stream of production into fields in which it brings forth things that are really wanted ?

GERMAN WAR LITERATURE

1. **Zwischen Krieg und Frieden.** Von G. IRMER, F. VON LISZT, A. DIX, K. LAMPRECHT, u.a. Leipzig: Hirzel.
2. **Der Deutsche Krieg.** Von P. ROHRBACH, H. ONCKEN, R. EUCKEN, A. O. MEYER, u.a. Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
3. **Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit.** Von H. DELBRÜCK, A. LASSON, VON HARNACK, u.a. Berlin: K. Heymann's Verlag.
4. **Zum Weltvolk Hindurch!** Von P. ROHRBACH. Stuttgart: J. Engelhorn's Nachf.
5. **Warum wir siegen müssen.** Von WILLY HELM. Berlin: Concordia Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

NO one who knows Germany will need to be told that it has been flooded with war literature. At all times the booksellers' windows and counters display a great profusion of paper-covered pamphlets and booklets on every current topic. They seem to spring up like mushrooms in a night. At such a time as this, when there is only one topic, and that of surpassing interest, they were bound to be more numerous than usual. The prodigious pamphleteering energies of a country which daily devours more printed matter than any other two together have been concentrated on the war and stimulated to the highest pitch of production. We have done pretty well ourselves in this line, but where we produce tens the Germans produce hundreds, and that may be taken as a rough measure of the volume of their war literature. It is a pity that we have not had more opportunities of studying it. Many of our newspapers have daily supplied their readers with instructive extracts from the German Press, which have been a valuable help to serious students of affairs in following the course of opinion in Germany. But the German newspapers are too much under the influence and control of official authority to be a trustworthy mirror of public opinion. The Germans themselves believe their newspapers to be the best, the most independent and the most trustworthy in the world; but that is one of their innumerable delusions about the superiority of their own institutions. The German newspapers

are less independent than those of any other country; and though it cannot be said that they are less trustworthy than some others, their subjection to official control and their dependence on official inspiration make it necessary to discount their whole treatment of public affairs.

The lecturers and writers of pamphlets and books are more independent and more original. Indeed, they supply both the newspapers and the authorities with ideas and arguments. They are the 'intellectuals'; they create the 'isms' of the day that rule German intelligence and are the real authors and guides of public opinion. They represent intellectual authority, whose decrees are accepted not less submissively than those of the police in civil life. As somebody has said, they are the keepers of the German conscience. Moreover their medium of expression permits more deliberation than the daily newspaper, though that is more deliberate in Germany than in other countries. A self-contained pamphlet or book is more complete and coherent than a newspaper article, and the imprint of the author invests it with greater responsibility. A study of these publications is the best guide to the workings of the German spirit, which it is most important for us to understand. Unfortunately they are hard to come by and very few people here seem to have made any study of them or to know anything of them at all, except through references quoted from German papers or made by those neutral travellers who have contributed to our own papers accounts of life in Germany during the war. Through these channels the German point of view has gradually come to be better understood. The German war literature would have revealed it sooner and more fully, and the knowledge would have corrected many fallacious ideas and false expectations which have prevented a true appreciation of the nature of the struggle and are only now beginning to give place to a fuller comprehension.

Our notions hitherto have been based almost entirely on the writings of Bernhardi, Treitschke and Nietzsche, which have been translated, spread broadcast and quoted with a damnable iteration here, but are rarely mentioned in Germany. The conception of the war derived from these sources is that it is purely a war of ambition and aggression, engineered by the military party and the Kaiser, a war of rulers and diplomatists,

in which the people play at most a submissive and involuntary part if not an unwilling one. 'We have no quarrel with the 'German people' was a common phrase, and the popular notion, to which caricaturists still cling, was that the Kaiser was personally responsible for the whole thing. In some quarters the German intellectuals were specially excepted from blame and were set over against the Junkers, who alone supported the war. In general the civilian population was distinguished from the military element; and, in particular, the working classes, who form the great mass, were regarded as not having their hearts in the war, but as being the submissive tools of an iron compulsion.

The result of these notions was failure to realise the unity, determination and reserve strength of the German nation and the consequent intensity of the struggle to which we were committed. Even now they are very imperfectly realised, though a truer estimate is beginning to prevail. The other day Lord Rosebery extolled the British achievement of raising an army of two millions by voluntary enlistment as something unparalleled in history. He evidently does not know that at the beginning of the war, without any appeal or advertisement, two million volunteers offered themselves in Germany over and above the millions liable to compulsory service. There were so many volunteers that the authorities did not know what to do with them. If we have been training ours all these months they have been training theirs, and this accounts for their unexpected reserves of strength in the field, which have so palpably upset the laborious and confident calculations of the military critics. We have been ignorant of facts as well as of the mentality of the enemy. A study of German war literature might have saved us from such blunders, and from such surprises as the gas attacks. This weapon is no sudden device adopted by a desperate enemy to make good his weakness in other respects. It has been in preparation since the beginning of the war, and has only waited for complete elaboration and a favourable opportunity. German writers boasted of these things at an early date, and the technical department still has other surprises up its sleeve.

In a war of peoples like this it is peculiarly desirable to know the enemy's point of view. If part of the energy expended on explaining—for the thousandth time—the origin of the war

and on empty denunciations and foolish jeers had been devoted to studying the German state of mind it would have profited us more. However, there is one consolation, and that is the fact that the Germans are even more astray about us than we about them. The conceptions even of learned men about our history, our political and social institutions, our ways of living and thinking, and our national character betray a grotesque ignorance. But it is part of a general ignorance. They misunderstand all other peoples, as indeed the course of the war has abundantly shown. They seem incapable of understanding any other people and their war literature reveals both the defect and its cause. It is a primary, irretrievable and fatal defect, and it will be their undoing. But before dealing fully with this characteristic it is well to make some general observations on the war literature here reviewed.

It consists of some dozens of pamphlets varying in length from a short essay or article to a small book. Most of these pamphlets are by more or less eminent professors or publicists of standing and repute. Nevertheless the most striking thing about them is their superficiality. With very few exceptions they deal with some purely superficial aspect of the war, and the treatment almost always resolves itself into praise of themselves and abuse of the enemy, particularly of England. One would have expected something a little deeper and broader in view of the magnitude and character of the struggle and the many profound problems—ethical, juridical, social, political, historical, scientific and economic—which it raises. One would have expected some attempt to treat one or other of these problems—such as nationality and race, for instance, or international law or the nature of war—in a broad, dispassionate and scientific way, as some of them have been treated by the Oxford essayists. But there seems to be nothing of the kind. Even when the German writers take up some subject in a less polemical and more contemplative spirit they are unable to get away from Germany and the present war. Some essays by Professor Lamprecht, for instance, on ' Krieg und Kultur ' are agreeably calm and educative, but they are all about Germany. Similarly a pamphlet by Professor Deissmann of Berlin on ' Der Krieg und die Religion ' expressly avoids the general question of the relation between war and Christianity and deals only with the actual effect of the present

campaign on the state of religious feeling in Germany. It is a thoughtful and instructive essay within its limits, and it contains some extremely interesting evidence of the pious fervour animating German soldiers in the field; but it is all directed *ad majorem Germaniæ gloriam*. Another religious utterance—a Christmas Eve discourse by Dr. Dryander—is still narrower. The Court preacher does, indeed, allow that the God of the Germans is also the God of their enemies, and admits that they celebrate Christmas too; but he cannot refrain from sneers at their 'paid mercenaries' and from invidious comparisons. God lends a much readier ear to the superior German soldiers, of course. It reminds one of Dean Ramsay's story of two Scottish ladies in the Napoleonic wars. One of them observed that the reason why the British troops were always victorious was that they went into battle praying. The other objected that the French prayed too, which drew the delightful rejoinder 'Hoot! the jabbering bodies! Wha could understand them?'

Of course there may be some German publications of a broader and more intellectual character which have not reached this country. In time there undoubtedly will be such. But those here dealt with are typical. They had been selected for sale in a neutral country as most likely to attract attention by reason of the eminence of their authors, who are unquestionably representative of intellectual Germany; and the total absence of dispassionate thought and abstract treatment among such a considerable number is very striking to anyone familiar with the usual methods of German writers. The war has killed all the 'ismuses.' Like Aaron's rod, *Kriegismus* has swallowed the rest and holds undisputed sway. If this is shown on the negative side by what the war publications do not contain, it is still more apparent on the positive side from what they do contain. They reveal with the utmost clearness the psychological state of the German people which explains their attitude and all their proceedings. There is nothing in it absolutely new to the British public, which has recently undergone a good deal of enlightenment. But the full revelation so conveyed puts the case in a much clearer and more convincing light than occasional quotations or the impressions of travellers.

The dominant note of the German war literature throughout is the transcendent superiority of everything German

and the measureless inferiority of all other nations. Not only is this set out explicitly with the utmost emphasis and in great detail, but the consciousness of it permeates every corner and cranny of the German mind and colours the German view of everything. It is difficult to realise the full magnitude and intensity of this influence without reading through all these German publications, because the effect is cumulative. They treat many different aspects of the war but always with the same result. They touch many strings and play many tunes but the key is always the same. A neutral writer in 'The Times' has recently described the effect of travelling in Germany and hearing German talk as hypnotic. A perusal of these pamphlets has exactly the same effect. After a time one begins to wonder if one is on one's head or one's heels, asleep or awake, alive or dead. The whole world seems upside down or whirling in a mad and fantastic dance. One can understand the effect of this atmosphere on the German people. They are self-hypnotised into a state which makes them impervious to external impressions and blind and deaf to sights and sounds patent to the rest of the world. Here is the touchstone of truth which enables one to regain one's mental balance—the judgment of the world at large. A just-minded man belonging to a country at war with Germany is constrained, on realising the German view and the intense conviction with which it is held, to ask himself if he is not, after all, prejudiced by his own patriotism. The answer lies in the virtually unanimous judgment of the world, which the Germans themselves perceive to be dead against them. It does not shake their own conviction, which is unshakable, but it puzzles them.

In a way the excessive self-esteem of the Germans revealed by the war is generally recognised here. But its intensity, universality and potency are very imperfectly realised. Isolated utterances are put down to individual extravagance when they are really typical. It is at the bottom of the whole thing—the war itself, the spirit in which it is waged and the methods employed. It would, perhaps, be too much to say that nothing like it has ever been known before. That is difficult to judge. But national self-esteem has certainly never found such free and unbridled expression. The people of every country prefer their own to any other, and in their

hearts think it superior. They not infrequently say so. *Deutschland über alles* does not stand alone. We hear pretty often of 'God's own country,' *la belle France, la ville lumière,* 'see Naples and die,' 'holy Russia,' *extra Hungariam non est vita,* 'Rule, Britannia,' and the like. And the inhabitants of every chosen land secretly think themselves a chosen people. But they do not claim superiority in everything; they acknowledge some defects in themselves and some merits in other nations. They are not perpetually exalting themselves and belittling everyone else. They have some modesty and reticence. Not so the Germans. They claim superiority in every quality and every relation of life. They are, in their own eyes, all compact of merits; their opponents are a mass of defects. They are bursting with self-admiration and cannot keep it in. The war has let it loose in a vast and unrestrained flood. Taken as a whole, the German war literature is a symphonic pæan of self-exaltation. It rises and falls; there are gradations of sonority and of rhythm; some passages are marked *piano* and *andante,* others *fortissimo* and *prestissimo*; now the strings take up the theme, now the brass, now the wood wind; but it is ever the same theme—Our Noble Selves, the greatness and glory of the German people in the past, the present, and the future; the miserable character and fate of their foes.

Quotations are as inadequate to convey the full effect as selected passages from a symphony or opera; but some specimens may be given from two pamphlets by writers of distinction —the one published last autumn, the other in the spring. The first is entitled *Deutsche Art und Deutsche Bildung,* by Dr. Adolf Lasson, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Berlin. The words *Art und Bildung* have no exact equivalents in English, but they may be rendered 'moral and intellectual 'character.' Professor Lasson begins by referring to the German desire for peace, and the efforts of all the German authorities from the Kaiser downwards to maintain it—efforts which failed through the measureless hate of their enemies, who were determined to exterminate them. Nothing but embittered hate, he says, can explain the collection of so many troops and so much material in such a country as Russia 'where everything is dishonourable and depraved.' The Germans are guiltless of the horrors of the war, which was

'a planned attack, the bursting of a conspiracy against us 'prepared for years by the most powerful States in the world.' The enemy, who have 'fallen back into the barbarism of 'centuries ago,' consider the use of any and every means lawful against the Germans. But they know nothing of the Germans, who have met these hordes of barbarians in the noblest manner; they reckoned on numbers and forgot quality; they thought the Germans were in as miserable a state as themselves; but 'we decline to place ourselves on the same plane with them.' It is, however, a painful thought that the German army, 'with qualities such as no other nation can produce,' should be faced by 'raw barbarian hordes from the East and the 'military bag-men who drag their bones to market for salary 'and commission in the service of a nation of shopkeepers.' The French have a more honourable cause of quarrel, and they are an intelligent people, but they 'live on phrases and illusions 'and are run away with by imagination'; their soldiers are uneducated and 'cannot compare with ours in mind and will.' 'And with such a rabble as this must our splendid men and 'dear lads cross swords!'

He then gets on the German high horse and observes that what has set the enemy against them is the feeling—'we can't 'compete with these Germans; they are too superior to us.' He goes on, 'We may here gladly admit that the consciousness 'of German superiority, intellectual and moral, is well founded; 'this consciousness lives in us and makes us strong.' He follows up this congenial theme in detail, speaks of German manners and customs, German achievements in commerce and industry, in science and art, and names the Germans 'the foremost people of the new age.' German patriotism differs from any other; it has a higher character and significance.

'Germany is the land of the Centre, and German *Kultur* holds a central position. The whole of European *Kultur*, which is, in effect, universal human *Kultur*, is focussed as by a lens on this German soil and in the heart of the German people. It would be foolish to affect to speak on this point with modesty and reticence. We Germans represent the latest and highest product of European *Kultur* in general. On that rests our self-consciousness in all its strength and fulness.'

There follows a long catalogue of German virtues. The

Germans are no one's enemy, and they hate no one. They possess every moral and intellectual quality in its most perfect form ; they are peace-loving, patient, and gentle ; they desire no conquests ; they are universal benefactors. And so on, and so on through forty-four closely printed pages. All this solemnly addressed by a German to Germans—it is sublime.

The second example is a pamphlet of sixty pages by Dr. Ernst Schultze, entitled '*Was verbürgt den Sieg?*' 'What 'makes victory certain?' The date of publication is about six months later than that of Professor Lasson's essay, and the point of view is different. Dr. Schultze writes in the light of experience gained from the course of the war and in a more sober vein. He actually recognises some weak spots in German political life ; but the upshot is the same, and his more measured estimate of comparative merits rather confirms than weakens the impression of German self-esteem, which has remained massive, unmoved, and immovable.

He begins by recognising the heaviness of the task before the German army, but claims the certainty of victory on the ground that the test of experience has proved the possession by the Germans of qualities and forces which ensure it. Numbers are against them, and if that were decisive they must have yielded on the day when England declared war, 'with brutal disregard not only of the much-vaunted fair 'play but also of our honourable desire for peace.' But numbers are not decisive. Far more important are mental and moral qualities—'courage, endurance, will-power, bold 'determination, strong nerves and enthusiasm, able leadership, 'excellence of armament and organisation ; finally, skilled 'mastery of external conditions furnished by nature and 'art.' All these the Germans possess in a higher degree than their opponents. 'Every soldier and every officer 'surpasses the enemy in training and courage.' He then proceeds to discuss the German superiority in detail. After observing that true courage excludes arrogance and boasting, he ransacks the dictionary for laudatory epithets in extolling the bravery of the German troops. He grants a measure of courage and endurance to the enemy, but claims that it is far less, as proved by the broad events of the war and by personal deeds.

'When the English bring Captain von Müller, the commander of the "Emden," to London they will at last have an opportunity of seeing for once what a capable naval officer looks like. In their own service they have not one fit to tie his shoes for energy and perseverance.'

No arrogance or boasting here, be it observed. In the technics of war Germany's superiority is, if possible, still greater. French artillery is better than English, but cannot approach the German. England is utterly outclassed in everything—guns, airmanship, submarines, ships of war of every class, and technical staff. (Herr Willy Helm, in another pamphlet, suggests that the reason why nothing is seen or heard of the British fleet is that the crews, which consist of adventurers and criminals, cannot be trusted at sea). The feats of German submarines, which include the blowing up of the 'Bulwark,' have caused us boundless astonishment; British naval officers cannot understand how it is done. The history of our aircraft is a record of nothing but disasters, whereas the performances of the German fleet excited the wonder of the world even before the war. In fact the German superiority all round is so great as to surprise themselves, though they knew before how miserably backward England was in industrial technics.

As for Russia, she is in still worse case. For France alone has Dr. Schultze a good word, but such merits as the French possess only serve to throw German superiority into higher relief.

He then passes on to intellectual capacity, and devotes many pages to eulogising the Germans and belittling the enemy. He discourses on German science, German education, and German home influence, which 'instils into the soul of the 'German people the treasures of reverence, goodness, and 'humanity.' All the stories of German outrages are pure inventions. German soldiers are incapable of cruelty or inhumane conduct. German intellectual superiority is illustrated by their mastery of shipbuilding and wireless telegraphy, and by the illiteracy of their enemies. The war has brought out their cool level-headedness, freedom from prejudice, and capacity for exact observation, whereas the English have completely lost their heads and given way to nervous fits, the Belgians are the victims of mass-suggestion, and the French

are drunk with their own talk and war news. The English possess energy of a kind, but it is more animal than mental, so that they are incapable of mastering any novel form of activity, such as the use of a new machine. They are devoid of flexibility, dexterity, and adaptability, qualities acquired by the Germans in a notable degree. Witness the victorious advance of German commerce, the wonderful success of their mercantile marine, the lofty standard of their science. No people have so penetrated the soul of others. Consequently they are able in war to develop at once amazing many-sidedness and surpassing thoroughness. There is nothing they have not mastered, no combination of required qualities and knowledge that they cannot bring to bear. This intellectual superiority is not only available in the higher command and the officers' corps, but it raises the quality of every individual soldier. 'A heaven-storming genius for 'invention' works in the German ranks. The perfect military hygiene bears witness to it. In short, 'the German 'people in arms are permeated by German thoroughness of 'thinking and intensity of feeling.'

In his conclusion he observes that every nation has its day in history, but 'the day of the Germans is the harvest of all 'time.' This thought, he says, dwells in thousands of German hearts—'German weal is the world's heal' (*am Deutschen Wesen solle die Welt genesen*). While the enemy call them barbarians, the order in Germany has been to strip the war of everything unworthy. They have abjured boasting no less than abuse. Yet those who have at their command 'a mental 'disposition so mountain-strong, so conscious of victory and 'worth,' cannot be overthrown. In spite of their superiority, however, they do not wish the war to last long, and in victory they will be magnanimous.

It may, perhaps, be thought that the two writers from whom these gems have been culled are exceptional, and as exponents of German Egoism more extreme than others. But that is not so. They are only more comprehensive and methodical. It would be easy to cite still more extravagant claims. For instance, Herr Willy Helm, who is mentioned above, uses even more violent language in a pamphlet entitled '*Warum wir siegen müssen!*' ('Why we must win.'). A few phrases may be quoted.

'Truth and Right are with us and with us alone.

'The lofty virtues of our German people—the sense of duty and loyalty, courage and trust in God, faith and moral conduct, honour, diligence and perseverance; and not last, respect for women.

'If we succumbed, all belief in Truth and Right, in Good, yea even in a Higher Power which guides the fate of mankind in Justice and Wisdom, would be utterly destroyed throughout the whole world.

'The French soldier has in the past always fought bravely. If he has not done so in this war, but has so often surrendered after the first shots, it is because he is fighting unwillingly; he has no enthusiasm because he knows that it is not his Fatherland but an ambitious and short-sighted Government that has plunged him into the fray, and is conscious that he is not fighting for a great and noble cause, but for a mean and dirty one.

'The Russian does not know in his dull soul why or for what he is fighting; the English mercenary does it for base lucre. It is blasphemy when the former dare to pray for a blessing on their arms, and hypocrisy when the latter profess that they are fighting for Truth and Right.'

The same intense consciousness of superiority colours the treatment of more technical questions such as economics and finance. Dr. Jacob Rieszer, president of the Hansa League, analyses the economic position of Germany and England in a pamphlet of eighty-eight pages called '*England und Wir*' ('England and Ourselves'). He proves the position of Germany to be superior all round financially and industrially, confidently predicts victory and ends up with *Deutschland über alles!* He quotes freely from English economic writings, but some doubts are thrown on the accuracy of his information by the mention of Nottingham and Leicester as the great seats of the cotton industry in this country. He does not, however, confine himself to the economic question, but discusses the origin of the war and the misdeeds of England, who has violated all international laws and particularly those that regulate commercial matters. This is one of the grounds on which he anticipates the triumph of Germany. His deep sense of German righteousness is thus sententiously expressed:

'But there is such a thing as Justice, and competitive envy, arrogance and lies are not yet the moral forces with which one can begin a war and wrest victory from the foe in a struggle which we, alike for the benefit of neutrals and of the world, are maintaining for high ideals and particularly for the final vindication of the

principle of inviolability for private property at sea which is persistently violated by England. . . . We must and shall win because trained military, financial, economic, scientific, technical and organising capacity is combined and welded to a harmonious whole in the German people.'

The perfect self-righteousness, self-love and self-satisfaction of the German people, with the corollary of contempt for the enemy, provide them with an impenetrable triple shield of brass. It is impossible for a people of such supreme merit to suffer any serious reverse at the hands of such miserable foes; their defeat is unthinkable. It is equally impossible for them to do anything wrong; for they are the Highest and Best, the personification of Good. Against the charge of outrages they have a three-fold defence. In the first place they are not true, but calumnies invented by the enemy, who has himself committed all the outrages of which Germans are accused—dum-dum bullets, white flag treachery, firing on the Red Cross, etc., etc. In the second place, where denial of facts is impossible, as in the burning of Louvain and the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the enemy were to blame; their own malpractices forced the Germans reluctantly to commit these acts in self-defence. In the third place, no justification is needed after all; the Germans are their own justification; whatever they do is right because they do it. This seems to be really at the back of their minds all the time, and it has come more and more to light as the war has developed. What is sauce for the German goose is never sauce for the enemy gander. It is a crime against Christianity to allow Mahommedans who are British subjects to fight, at their own request, for the Empire to which they belong against Christian Germany; it is none to drag Mahommedan Turkey, which is the great political embodiment of Islam, into a war waged against other Christian nations. The latter is in fact rather a step in favour of Christianity. This looks a somewhat difficult proposition to handle, but the Rev. Dr. Dryander has the hardihood to attempt it. He points out that though the Sultan proclaimed a holy war against the Allies he nevertheless declared on unfurling his flag that this was not a war against Christianity, and that he recognised a distinction between one Christian and another. Dr. Dryander fails to perceive that the same consideration applies *a fortiori* to the British Mahommedans who fight side by side with fellow British

Christians, not in a holy war, but for political ends. The fact that a man holding his position should dare to offer the once logical and critical Germans such an utterly inconsistent and illogical argument reveals the mental perversion they have undergone.

He is quite safe. No inconsistency is too great for them to swallow. Belgium is charged with two mutually exclusive crimes—with defending her neutrality against Germany, and with not defending it against France. Another instance is the reproach of professionalism against the British Army, which is one of the favourite formulas of abuse. German officers are professional soldiers and the glory of the German Army; but what is a superlative merit in them becomes the vilest of attributes when extended to the whole British Army. It is impossible to reproduce the scorn conveyed by the expression *um schnödes Geld*, which is invariably used, whenever British troops are mentioned, to describe their sole motive for fighting. Germans forget that their own word *Soldat*, from which our 'soldier' is derived, comes from *Sold* (pay) and originally signified a man who served for pay. As a matter of fact our professional soldiers are not 'mercenaries' at all. Mercenaries were troops who sold their services to anyone who would pay them and fought now on this side and now on that. No country furnished so many of them as Germany in the wars of the past, when they were commonly employed. But it is obvious that British troops would be equally abused however they were raised. German volunteers are glorious heroes; British volunteers beneath contempt. If the British Army were raised in the same way as the German and stood on precisely the same footing, it would still present the difference between black and white in German eyes, because the real difference is between German and non-German; it has nothing to do with circumstances, quality or conduct. When Germans drop bombs on undefended watering places and kill civilians it is a glorious feat; when the French retaliate at Karlsruhe it is a monstrous crime.

In short, there is one law for Germans and another for other nations. What suits them is right, and what does not is wrong. There are for them no other rules of conduct than that simple formula, Might is Right—so long as it is German might; 'Need sanctions any deed' (*Not kennt kein Gebot*) so long as it

is German need. Neither maxim holds good for the enemy. German need sanctions any deed in Belgium, but Belgian need does not even excuse resistance. When German artillery is in superior force it is not only right but glorious ; when British artillery had the upper hand it was not war but murder.

The same state of mind, which is daily illustrated in the conduct of the war, governs the general attitude of Germans towards both enemy and neutral countries in other matters, as well as their views of the cause of war and of future conditions that are to follow it. Their estimate of the merits of neutral countries is determined entirely by the degree of service rendered to Germany. The Americans were a great people so long as they helped, or were expected to help, Germany ; they have gradually fallen from that high estate as they have more and more definitely declined to favour her, and are rapidly becoming worthless in German eyes. Italy has completed her fall from grace, and other neutrals are suspect. Nevertheless the Germans are puzzled by their universal unpopularity, and some writers have essayed to explain it. Dr. Ernst Schultze devotes a good deal of attention to it, and to the failure of what he calls ' courting foreigners.' It is generally attributed, quite simply and satisfactorily, to pure envy of German success, to the lies of the cable news service controlled by England, to persistent misrepresentation, and also to incompetent diplomatists. He holds the first of these reasons fallacious, and blames the Germans themselves in part for their offensively smart (*schneidig*) behaviour in foreign countries. He also severely criticizes the diplomatic service. This view seems to be general. Diplomacy is the one thing in which Germans admit national weakness and the need of improvement. Dr. Schultze thinks that the service should be open to business men, who would make much better diplomatists than members of the aristocracy. Professor Max Apt takes the same line in a pamphlet on ' The ' War and Germany's position as a World-power.' But business men have been doing their best to make good the blunders of diplomatists, particularly in the United States, without much success. These and other writers unconsciously reveal the true cause, and at the same time their total incapacity to grasp it. The real explanation of the foreign dislike which Dr. Schultze deplores lies in his own pages, summarised above. People so swollen with vanity and so conscious of their own

superiority are always disliked. They are for ever treading on everyone's toes, and they are so little able to understand the feelings of others that they actually think the way to make themselves popular is to force their own superiority down everybody's throat. They want to make the rest of the world a present of German *Kultur*, peacefully if possible, but if not at the point of the sword. Dr. Schultze thinks the way to win foreign nations is to convince them that Germany has bestowed on them the riches of her *Kultur* of her own accord, without asking for a return and with internal joy. He does not see that they do not want German *Kultur* thrust upon them; they prefer their own. Germany wants to schoolmaster all the world. As Professor Lasson puts it, when the war is over she will be able to perform her function undisturbed, 'enriching all, teaching all, school-masterly, in 'her methodical way.' Professor Karl Lamprecht, who has been more about the world and sees more clearly, speaks satirically of the efforts to court other nations, especially by the professors, and their ludicrous failure. They expected, he sarcastically says, to please the Italians by proving that Dante was really a German, and thought the Belgians would feel honoured by being told about the housing of Belgian art treasures in German museums.

With regard to the origin of the war three views are expressed, but they all agree in putting the responsibility on England and absolving Germany from any blame. By far the most popular view is the now familiar theory that England planned the whole thing out of envy in order to destroy German commerce. This is repeated by one writer after another. Some argue it at length, others refer to it in passing as an established fact which needs no demonstration. According to this theory the war is merely the consummation of the policy of 'encircling' Germany begun by King Edward and completed by his 'testamentary executor,' Sir Edward Grey. It is therefore the work of years and the outcome of a deliberate conspiracy between England, France, and Russia to destroy Germany. One writer even hints that the assassination of the Archduke was plotted in London. The motives attributed to the conspirators are—England, envy and greed; France, revenge and vain-glory; Russia, ambition and conquest. Only these base motives can account for the sudden and unprovoked attack upon peaceful and peace-loving Germany, who threatened

nobody and whose only wish was to develop her own *Kultur* for the benefit of the whole world and to live on good terms with all her neighbours. Strange as it may seem, this theory is undoubtedly held with absolute conviction by most Germans. It is impossible to doubt the sincerity of the writers who set it forth. The ease with which they surmount some obvious difficulties and glaring inconsistencies is not due to insincerity, but to the peculiar state of mind already described, which has destroyed their logical faculty and rendered them impervious to ordinary reason. They say that the Allies had planned the whole thing for years, and at the same time base the certainty of German success on the hopeless inferiority of their forces and equipment; they maintain that Germany was taken unawares and at the same time boast of her perfect preparations. Why the planner of a crime should be unready, and the unsuspecting victim perfectly prepared, is a question that is easily answered by Germany's immeasurable superiority. Neither are they troubled by the fact that up till the 4th of August they were proving that Russia was the criminal, against whose desire for war Germany was working 'shoulder 'to shoulder with England' in order to preserve peace. The change, disclosed in Herr Ballin's correspondence recently published in 'The Times,' is brought out very clearly in a lengthy war pamphlet by Dr. Paul Rohrbach, the well-known advocate of colonial expansion and editor of the weekly review 'Das Grössere Deutschland.' It is a collection of articles which go back as far as August 1912, when he thought, by the way, that the reason why France and England did not strike in the Morocco crisis was the fear of German submarines. The same fear should have been much more potent in 1914, but that is a small inconsistency. The main thing is that up to the 4th of August, 1914, Dr. Rohrbach constantly insisted that Russia was Germany's real enemy, and he repeated it in an article published that very day. Nor did he immediately turn round and accuse England of conspiracy and treachery. On the contrary, he explained that England was faced by a very difficult question on the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia and France, and he anticipated her eventual withdrawal from the struggle. But during the month of August he swung right round to the popular view that England was the real culprit and Germany's chief enemy. She 'willed' the war to suppress German

competition, and victory over England is the only means of securing Germany's future. If it is not achieved she will go on for another forty years 'lying, intriguing, hounding on, 'hiring accomplices and stirring up the world' against Germany.

The second view is that England did not intentionally get up the war, but none the less caused it by setting in motion forces which made it inevitable. Her 'frivolous' diplomacy, though designed to maintain peace, prepared the conflagration and was powerless to arrest it. This view has been put forward by Dr. Oskar Meyer, Professor of History in Rostock University, but does not appear to have gained much acceptance.

The third view is that Germany after all 'willed' the war and chose the time, but only to anticipate attack. This is the theory of a 'preventive' war, which means attacking first in order to forestall the enemy. It has been advanced by Herr Harden, the very independent editor of the 'Zukunft.' Herr Ballin's argument, published in the New York 'World' of the 14th of April, that Sir E. Grey could have prevented war by definitely declaring on one side or the other, may perhaps be regarded as a fourth theory, though it is not incompatible with the first or the third. In any case England is to blame.

The variations between these German readings of the causation of war present an interesting contrast to the general unanimity with which the rest of the world has decided that Germany was the deliberate aggressor. This judgment receives unintentional support from the German views of the future 'after the war.' The forecasts of what is to happen are quite incompatible with the picture of a peaceful, well-meaning nation, wantonly attacked, but they exactly fit one which entered on an aggressive war of conquest and ambition. The subject is very fully and freely discussed by several writers, who deal with different aspects. The great thing on which all Germans agree is that British sea-power—the 'usurped monopoly of the sea'—must be destroyed. Herr Georg Irmer in particular devotes himself to this theme in a pamphlet entitled '*Los vom Englischen Weltjoch!*' ('Off with 'the English world-yoke!')

'We must break them, the English chains which have enslaved the world for centuries and which also bar the German people's free path over the sea to foreign regions. Therefore off with the

English world-yoke! cost what it may. That must be and remain the guiding purpose for this emancipation struggle of our people.'

The same idea is constantly repeated, and it has been dangled before neutral nations, who have received it, however, very coolly for the simple reason that no one but the Germans is conscious of this terrible 'yoke.' They themselves admit that the existence of the British Empire depends on command of the sea. In fact they lay great stress on it when they want to demonstrate our vulnerability; but they fail to see in that any justification for our sea power. *Not kennt kein Gebot* does not apply to us. Destruction of British sea-power involves retention of the Belgian coast; but that is only a beginning, though the most important point. Belgium must be absorbed altogether into the Mid-European economic *bloc* which is to be established. This project is discussed at length by Dr. Hermann Losch, but it was put forward ten years ago by Professor Julius Wolff. Germany and Austria are to form the nucleus, and as many other States as can be induced to join with or without their consent. Another scheme is that of a central European League, to include Holland, Scandinavia, Finland, Switzerland, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey; this is advocated by Dr. Franz von Liszt. Other writers insist on the annexation of Belgium, Lorraine and Poland. Further afield, Germany must command not only the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, but also all the cables, wireless and coaling stations. And to these modest requirements must be added war indemnities which will cover all the losses and costs incurred by Germany.

The last point has a most important bearing on the determination of the Germans to hold out to the utmost. They have cheerfully submitted to sacrifices in the confident hope of full indemnification, and they will not surrender it until they are compelled. They will not even entertain the possibility. Nor will the diseased vanity, which inspires all their acts, thoughts, arguments and hopes, yield to anything less than unequivocal defeat. This war can only end in one of two ways—(1) the absolute exhaustion of one side or both; (2) an inconclusive peace, which would be merely a truce and a preparation for renewed conflict. At present we are drifting towards the second; to avoid it a far greater effort is needed than has yet been made or even generally conceived.

A. SHADWELL.

BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND THE ULTIMATE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

1. **The British Empire.** Six Lectures. By Sir CHARLES P. LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Macmillan. 1915.
2. **Political Ideals.** By C. DELISLE BURNS. Oxford University Press. 1915.
3. **The German Doctrine of Conquest.** A French view. By E. SEILLIÈRE. With an Essay on M. Seillière's 'Philosophy of Imperialism' by J. M. HONE. Maunsel. 1914.

THE mission of the British Empire in the war is now fully realised by its peoples. It is less clear that they have even begun to realise the nature of the problems that will have to be solved when the war is over, and the sacrifices involved in their solution. They know that they are fighting for the honour and safety of the Empire; they believe that they are also fighting for the liberties of the nations and the establishment of a lasting peace; but for the most part they are wholly uninstructed as to the means by which national liberties are to be secured and peace guaranteed. This is the justification for those who, like the present writer, while the issue of the great struggle still hangs in the balance, venture, in however tentative a fashion, to discuss these problems; for if they are not discussed betimes there is a great risk that the efforts of diplomacy may be hampered later on by the clamour of an ill-informed public opinion. The object of the present article, then, is to contribute to this discussion, not by attempting to solve any of the practical problems involved in the ultimate peace settlement, but by considering the question as to how far the British Empire, not only by reason of its power, but by reason of its character, its constitution, and its informing spirit, can contribute towards their solution.

At the outset it is necessary to define what we mean by the words Empire and Imperialism. Words expressing political ideals, as Mr. Delisle Burns points out, will change their meaning so long as they are of use; and of no word is this more true than of Imperialism, the meaning of which has

changed with extraordinary rapidity, and is still changing. But a few years ago it implied no more than personal rule based on military power, and its association with this idea still darkens counsel. M. Seillière, in his 'Philosophie de 'l'Impérialisme,' justifies by the increasing variety and vagueness of its application his use of it as a comprehensive term to cover all the manifestations of 'the need for expansion 'as the primordial condition of life.' For him it is but another word for Nietzsche's 'will to power,' the fundamental tendency of man to 'expand outside himself,' which leads the individual to identify himself with a group or nation, and ends by making him the champion 'of a doctrine which postulates the pre-'eminence in the world of the group to which he belongs.' The impelling force of political Imperialism may be no more than an intelligent utilitarianism; we can, for instance, recognise that Bernhardi's 'Weltmacht oder Untergang' is implicit in Hobbes's axiom that 'a man cannot assure the 'power and means to live well, which he hath present, without 'the acquisition of more.' But, as M. Seillière points out, political Imperialism, as at present understood, must justify itself by an appeal to moral considerations, and so it tends to develop into that race mysticism which is characteristic of modern Imperialists. This race mysticism, in turn, since it is based on beliefs for which there is less than no scientific proof, develops into race fanaticism, and so becomes a militant creed.

It is the degree to which this race mysticism is present that will, in the eyes of the world at large, weigh most heavily in balancing the claims of rival Imperialisms; for Imperialism based on race pretensions is no more than an exaggerated nationalism, the outcome—as Mr. Burns puts it—of 'the 'tendency of every race, as it grows larger, to develop its 'provincial jealousy into what it calls Imperial policy.' Race mysticism has doubtless played its part in the development of British Imperialism—M. Seillière instances Cecil Rhodes as a great type of the race mystic—but it has been a subordinate and not very conscious element. It has played a greater and a far more conscious part in the growth of Russian Imperialism; yet even Pan-Slavism in its extremest form has never aimed at more than making Holy Russia coextensive with the Slav race. It is in Germany that—as M. Seillière

shows—race mysticism, based on the theory of Teutonic pre-eminence, has developed most completely into race fanaticism: that is to say, into the belief, held with religious passion, in the essential superiority of the German race—as most purely Teutonic—and in its mission to impose itself and the civilisation it has evolved on all the world.

British Imperialism is not based upon any theory of race superiority, nor indeed upon any theory at all. The character of the British Empire, as its very imperfections and inconsistencies show, has been determined, like that of the British Constitution, by the sometimes accidental, sometimes deliberately directed processes of its growth. It is not necessary to recapitulate the history of this growth. The point to be emphasised is that there has been in the process of this Imperial expansion no consistent effort at what may be called national assimilation, such as has characterised in various degrees the expansion of Germany and Russia under the influence of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism respectively. German Imperialism has never been content merely to govern subject nationalities, it has thought it necessary to Germanise them and make them an organic part of the national State, and the same has been true in recent years, though less consistently, of Russia. The British Empire is not a State; it is an aggregation of States, and these presenting so great a variety of forms that to classify them would be to give a fairly comprehensive table of the bodies politic of all the world in every stage of their development, from the most primitive tribal organisation to the most fully developed modern democratic community. This aggregation of States, differing thus widely in character and acquired by such a variety of methods, is held together by only one visible bond—the supreme headship of the Crown. But this headship is not Imperial, in the strict sense of the word (that is to say, it is not ostensibly or primarily based upon military force) and this fact is symbolised in the Royal style. The British Empire has no Emperor. It is only as sovereign of India that the King bears this title, and India is an *imperium in imperio*. The style of Emperor of India symbolizes not so much British rule in India as Indian nationality within the British Empire, a symbolism which has been strengthened lately by the removal of the capital to Delhi.

In a sense not negligible, it is true, the growth of the British Empire has been accomplished by the process defined in the title of the late Sir John Seeley's epoch-making book—by 'the expansion of England,' that is to say, of the British State and of British nationality. Legally and constitutionally this is so. Until the time of the late King Edward VII. the supreme head of the Empire bore no other title than that of King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; the Parliament of the United Kingdom still remains the Imperial Parliament. The British dominions beyond the seas which, under the impulse of the new Imperialism, have added a fresh title to the Royal style, are still in greater or lesser degree such as Burke described them: 'subordinate parts' of an Empire of which the supreme sovereignty resides in these islands. 'No lawyer questions,' says Professor Dicey, 'that Parliament 'could legally abolish any colonial Constitution, or that Parliament can at any moment legislate for the Colonies, and repeal 'or override any colonial law whatever.' * It is, however, significant of the change that has come over the spirit of British Imperialism that, whatever may be the strictly legal status of the self-governing colonies in relation to the mother country, we no longer think of them as 'dependencies' or as 'subordinate parts' of the Empire, even though we have not yet become accustomed to give them in common speech their new style of Dominions. We are no longer open to the reproach which Burke, in his great speech on Conciliation with America, levelled at those 'whose whole scheme of freedom is made 'up of pride, perverseness, and insolence,' and who 'feel themselves in a state of thraldom . . . unless they have some 'man, or some body of men, dependent on their mercy.' †

It was the attempt to assert and extend the purely Imperial principle that first enforced this lesson upon us, by causing the revolt of the American colonies and so losing to the British Empire the greater part of the English-speaking world. It was not discontent with their previous position in the Empire that drove the American English colonies into rebellion, for they were reasonably content with the measure of liberty they enjoyed through their representative assemblies, and they were proud of the Empire and of the part they had played in

* The British Constitutions, p. 102. † Work (ed. 1883), ii. p. 416.

its expansion. What they rebelled against was the attempt to depress them from their position of partners in the Empire to that of dependents. Burke reports Benjamin Franklin as saying to him that 'America would never again see such happy 'days as she had passed under the protection of England.'

'He observed that ours is the only instance of a great empire in which the most distant parts and members had been as well governed as the metropolis and its vicinage, but that the Americans were going to lose the means which secured to them this rare and precious advantage. The question with them was not whether they were to remain as they had been before the troubles—for better, he allowed, they could not hope to be—but whether they were to give up so happy a situation without a struggle.' *

The issue of the struggle, though it split the English-speaking world into two rival and often antagonistic Empires, was wholly good in that it preserved in the rest of the British Empire that 'happy situation' which the short-sightedness of George III. and his Ministers had sought to destroy, and enabled it to develop, not into an *imperium* based on what Burke calls 'the dismal, cold, dead uniformity of servitude,' but into a great commonwealth of free States established on the triple principle of self-government, self-support, and self-defence.

An Empire built up by such various means, and composed of such heterogeneous elements, can only in an ideal sense be said to be based upon any consistent principle. So far as the great self-governing dominions are concerned, indeed, the principle as stated above would seem now to be established by a consensus of opinion. 'As regards our relations with 'our self-governing colonies,' said Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, 'we have arrived at a point when we must recognise once for 'all that these relations depend entirely on their free will 'and unreserved agreement.' †

'The temper of the sovereign authority in the United Kingdom in relation to the Dominions,' writes Sir Charles Bruce, 'has been exhibited in a policy based on the mutual desire that they should remain in the Empire, each building up a nationality in its own

* Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs. Works (ed. 1883), iv. p. 100. In the recently published correspondence of Richard Henry Lee, the proposer of the American Declaration of Independence, many of the earlier letters express similar views.

† Quoted in F. von Oppenheimer, 'British Imperialism.'

way, and gradually increasing its autonomy in politics, economics, and defence within the area of their respective territories, the condition of their adhesion to the Empire being complete liberation from the control of the Imperial Parliament.' *

'The English,' says Sir Charles Lucas, 'for sixty or seventy 'years past have set themselves to build up nations within the 'Empire.' † 'The British Empire,' said Sir Wilfrid Laurier on July 8th, 1902, 'is a galaxy of free States.' ‡

This latter statement is obviously true only in a very limited sense. It is true of the self-governing Dominions; it is only partially true of those that are less than self-governing, and with regard to these latter there is more room for debate as to the spirit of British Imperialism. Speaking of the relation of the mother country to her dependencies, Mr. Morris, in his 'History of Colonisation,' says:

'Only one fixed rule of action seems to exist: it is to promote the interests of the colony to the utmost, to develop its scheme of government as rapidly as possible, and eventually to elevate it from the position of inferiority to that of association.' §

Of the conscious aim of those for whom their mission as Empire-builders is a thing very real and sacred, no one has a better right to speak than Lord Cromer, and even he can give it no definition. 'What,' he asks, 'would the Englishman 'reply to the question *Quo vadis*?'

'He would be puzzled to give any definite answer, for he is in truth always striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive—the ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his own supremacy, and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication of his supreme position. Moreover, although after rather a dim, slipshod, but characteristically Anglo-Saxon fashion, he is aware that empire must rest on one of two bases—an extensive military occupation or the principle of nationality. He cannot in all cases quite make up his mind which he prefers.' ||

As the upshot of these debates, then, the only thing that we can safely say is that the tendency is, increasingly as time

---

* The True Temper of Empire, p. 4.
† Greater Rome and Greater Britain, p. 161.
‡ Quoted in Hobson, 'Imperialism,' p. 100.
§ Hist. of Colonisation, ii. p. 80.
|| Ancient and Modern Empires, p. 118.

progresses, to attempt to level up the less advanced portions of the Empire to the plane of the more advanced, so that each may in time take its place in the great co-partnership. The British Empire, in short, is not a structure four-square and completed, established on definite principles, and held together by rigid bonds. It is rather a world in the making: a vast political laboratory in which the British genius is making a series of world-experiments, the ultimate aim of which is to find out how the most heterogeneous national elements can be best combined in an international system, so as to produce the greatest amount of freedom in the parts with the least amount of friction between them, and in such a way as to preserve the cohesion of the whole.

That this is the problem which British Imperialism has set itself to solve is clear from the language of all recent writers and speakers on the subject, the spirit of which is utterly different from that of the champions of Pan-Germanism. 'Our Empire,' said Lord Rosebery, 'is not the realm of conquest which that 'term has been used to imply. It has often used the sword, 'it could not exist without the sword, but it does not live by 'the sword.' * 'Few Englishmen,' writes Mr. Delisle Burns, commenting on the remarks of Lord Cromer quoted above, 'would be willing to contemplate a purely military Empire. We 'should therefore be driven to develop local self-government, 'and that in the end must mean the federation of politically 'equal groups.' † For Mr. Giddings the bonds of union of Imperial Britain are 'a common loyalty to a common judgment 'and will, a common willingness to share a common destiny, 'and a common conviction of the priceless value of individual, 'religious, and local liberty'; the conditions of its success, that 'as it lengthens the reach of government it must curtail the 'functions of government.' ‡ The same idea underlies the utterances even of those who advocate the conversion of the Empire from a loose aggregation of States into a Federal State based on the development of the sense of economic unity. 'The one essential condition to keep in mind,' says Mr. Amery, 'is that the partnership must be real and complete

* Rectorial Address to Glasgow University, 1900.
† Political Ideals, p. 222.
‡ Democracy and Empire, 1910, pp. 10 and 11.

'as far as it goes, and that it must be based on the recognition 'of the full political equality between the citizens of this 'country and the citizens of the younger nations.' *

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the question of Imperial Federation, still less that of Tariff Reform, as a bond of Empire. More germane to our purpose is a passage in which Mr. Bernard Holland suggests the connexion of the federal problem with that of establishing juridical relations between the nations generally:

'When nations or States are not independent, but confederated, the problem of limits of action stands, as it were, half-way between that relating to independent States and that relating to individuals or bodies composing only one State. In an Empire of this kind the nations are the units, but because they are nations the relation between them and the Empire partakes of, though it is not fully of, an international character.' †

Thus there is something of an international character in all federations, even in those which, like the German Empire, have a very strong national unity. This international character is, however, weaker in a Federal State (*Bundesstaat*), which is the form taken by all federations whether inside or outside the British Empire, than in a confederation of States (*Staatenbund*). The latter is the form towards which the British Empire is tending, and any federation of the States composing it which should follow generally accepted principles would differ from any existing federal system in being, not a Nation composed of many States, but a State composed of many Nations. It would, in short, be the first great experiment in the organisation of international government.

It is this super-national quality in British Imperialism which differentiates it fundamentally from Pan-Germanism, and constitutes its chief claim upon the sympathies of the nationalities in its struggle with the Germanic Powers. By the Germans, of course, the claim is repudiated, and with a vigour of language to which the literature of the war has by now accustomed us. Not all German writers, however, have echoed the diatribes of Treitschke, for whom the inspiration of British Imperialism was nothing but a contemptible peddling

* Union and Strength, 1912, p. 9.
† Imperium et Libertas, p. 7.

selfishness (*Krämeregoismus*); but it is precisely by the language of those who do give us credit for our admirable qualities that we can best fathom the depth of the German misunderstanding of the spirit of our Empire. Herr Paul Rohrbach, the object of whose 'Der Deutsche Gedanke' was, like Treitschke's, to spur the German nation on to contest with Great Britain the empire of the world, declares that 'it would be a monstrous folly to suppose that the forces 'which have founded the British Empire are avarice, hypocrisy, 'and brute violence.' The Empire, he says, has been built up by the moral force and character of the English people, which he exhorts his countrymen to emulate.

He goes on to justify his idea of German Imperialism by what he supposes to be the example of the British, and the passage in which he does so is in the highest degree instructive.

'It cannot be admitted that the preservation of certain small and insignificant national groups is as important for the development of humanity as is the growth of the world-nations which are the pioneers of civilisation (*die kulturtragenden Weltnationen*). In the future there will be no choice left to the small nations but to attach themselves willingly to those wider civilisation-groups (*Kulturkreisen*) to which they feel most strongly drawn, or to which their geographical situation points them. . . . If, then, such a nation desire to maintain itself as an independent power alongside of such a gigantic power as is implied by the British Empire and English *Kultur*, and by its own might and right take a share in determining what course the civilisation of the world and the development of humanity are to follow, it must back up its claim by action. The frontiers of England lie not by the Himalayas nor in the Antarctic regions; they lie where another nation is strong enough to set up the banner of its national idea. It is not for us, then, to blame England for her arrogance, but rather to see to it that what we now call English arrogance shall become as much a part of the living expression of the German Idea as it now is of the English.'*

It will be noticed that the British world-power is here represented as not only attracting but assimilating smaller groups, and that it is considered as justified in so doing, since the future of the world thus lies, not with the small nationalities, but with those great national groups which, by the vigour of their organic growth, are able to dominate and absorb them; and the process must continue, in a struggle between these

* Der Deutsche Gedanke, p. 49.

larger groups, until one National Idea emerges triumphant over all. This is the ideal which, according to Herr Rohrbach, the British have kept steadily before their eyes, and if they realise it they will have deserved to do so. It is for the Germans—the only nation which has any claim to aspire to world-dominion beside the Anglo-Saxons—to see that they do not realise it.

We are now in a position to understand the attitude of philosophic Germans towards British Imperialism, which has played so great a part in leading up to the present war. Judging it by the measure of their own ideal of race supremacy, they conceive the British Empire as a stupendous organisation of which the object, consciously pursued from the first, has been to *Anglicise* the world. It is important for our present purpose to examine this accusation, for if it be well founded we can bring as our contribution to the solution of the problem of peace nothing but our power to enforce our will. The German contention has been supported with remarkable eloquence by a Scotchman, the late Professor Cramb.

'If I were asked,' he says, 'to describe in a single sentence the general aim of British Imperialism during the last two centuries and a half, I should answer: To give all men within its bounds an English mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the standpoint of an Englishman; to diffuse within its bounds that high tolerance in religion which has marked this Empire from its foundation; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness of life and death characteristic of our great poets and our great thinkers; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly, we associate with the temper and character of our race wherever it is dominant and secure.' *

If the purpose of giving everyone within the bounds of the Empire an English, or a British, mind be indeed the inspiration of our Imperialism, it is not easy to see how it differs in principle from Germanist Imperialism, which avowedly aims at imposing the German mind upon the world. For the late Mr. Cramb it did not differ; for, himself a pupil and admirer of Treitschke, he accepted the German conception of war as 'the father of all things,' and his book ends with a prophetic vision of the

* Germany and England, p. 125.

English and Germans, the favourite children of Odin the war-god, locked in an heroic death-struggle for the dominion of the world. We are in the midst of the death-struggle. But if the issues involved in this struggle be no more than whether the British or the German mind shall dominate the world, what justification have we for the claim which we so confidently make on the world's sympathies, on the ground that we are fighting, not only to preserve our own material and spiritual heritage, but also that of the nations at large ?

The truth, of course, is that no consistent aim has underlain the growth of the British Empire, and least of all any conscious idea of giving to the world an English mind—a conception wholly foreign to the very practical and somewhat unimaginative British temper. To this extent, indeed, we may admit that Treitschke was right when he said that the British Empire is not the outcome of 'a great policy.' In the long roll of British statesmen the names are but few of those who have had any vision of our Imperial destiny and made its realisation a capital object of their policy ; and in general the Empire has grown in spite of the ignorance, the supineness, and even the timid opposition of those who were supposed to govern its fate. It has grown under the impulse of the adventurous spirit of our Anglo-Celtic race, a spirit in general, as contrasted with the German, impatient of direction and control. Its foundations were laid not so much by the deliberate policy of statesmen as by the enterprise of individual Englishmen. The foundations thus laid have been developed by policy, by the chances of war, by the mere force of circumstances ; but the Empire is ultimately founded, not on an all-embracing national idea, but—as Burke said—upon 'virtue and good 'fortune.'

Whatever the virtue may have been which has gone to build up the Empire, it has gained from the process of the Empire's expansion more than it gave. From the point of view of the relation of the British race and its ideals towards the rest of the world, indeed, the thing that is remarkable is not so much the influence of the English mind upon the Empire as the influence of the Empire upon the English mind, in breaking down the barriers of its insular nationalism, widening its outlook, and broadening its sympathies. It is not suggested that this process is complete, or that the average Briton is not still, in all

his prejudices and tastes, very insular indeed, though he is less so than he used to be. There can, however, be no doubt that, through the double training of democracy and the responsibilities of Empire, the collective mind of the country has been affected in the manner stated. It is this educative influence of the Empire which the Germans, or those of them who are conscious of the narrowness of their own national outlook, envy us above all—and with reason, for it is the completion of this educational process which will justify our claim to act as the most powerful of the trustees of the restored peace of the world, because with the development of our Imperial consciousness it has also awakened in us an Imperial conscience.

This Imperial conscience may be taken to mean the realisation of our duties, as trustees of that part of the world we have occupied or conquered, not only towards the members of our own Imperial system, but towards the world outside.* To the Germans our claim to have developed such a conscience is but further evidence of our national hypocrisy, a stupid attempt to reconcile the world to our continued occupation of conquests which we are no longer able, in view of the rise of a younger and more virile power, to hold by force. To understand this attitude, which seems to us both ungenerous and unjust, we must realise how difficult it is for the Germans, who have passed through no such educational process as we have, to grasp our point of view. The process of their national education has

---

* In the Colonial Office Memorandum on the draft Australian Constitution, dated March 29th, 1900, the following sentences occur: 'In regard to these matters, the Imperial Parliament and Government are in the position of trustees for the whole of His Majesty's dominions.' 'Though the supreme legal power remains vested in the Imperial Parliament, it holds that power as trustee.' See Jebb, 'Colonial Conferences,' p. 308.

In his speech to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, on Nov. 13th, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain said: 'We, in our colonial policy, as fast as we acquire new territory and develop it, develop it as trustees of civilisation for the commerce of the world. We offer in all these markets over which our flag floats the same opportunities, the same open field, to foreigners that we offer to our own subjects, and upon the same terms.' The slight preference given to British goods in certain of the Dominions has not substantially modified this principle.

been, indeed, the very reverse of ours. Instead of widening their sympathies, it has turned them from a nation which, of all the European peoples, was the most susceptible to foreign influences into one which most blatantly proclaims its self-sufficiency and exclusiveness, politically, intellectually, and morally. Moreover, owing to the fact that the union of Germany was attained by the expansion of Prussia, the German nation has in effect become identified with the Prussian State, and the national conscience attuned to the political principles, or want of principles, which Prussia has preserved unimpaired from the days when the 'Reason of State' was universally accepted as a justification for any moral obliquity. It is the Reason of State, reinforced by the new, passionate sense of nationality, that determines the attitude of Germany to the rest of the world, and it is as naturally assumed as underlying the attitude of all other nations to Germany. Hence the violations of international law, the breach of treaties, and the 'cruelty well applied' of German methods; hence, too, the surprise, which we may believe to be genuine, that these methods should excite the reprobation of the world. For us, especially, to blame them for using the same weapons for advancing their Empire which we ourselves used in the past to advance our own is, they maintain, hypocrisy., A nation is to be judged by the grandeur of its ideals, not by the means it uses to realise them; and the ideal of Germany is a grand one—the transformation of the world by means of Teutonic civilisation and culture, while England has aimed at no more than making the whole round earth her trade preserve.*

If this accusation be just, and if we are to be judged by our actions in the more or less remote past, and not by the spirit which animates our Imperial policy now, it would indeed be vain for us to try to persuade the world that we have any special qualifications for helping towards the establishment of an international system based upon the principles of liberty,

* See the remarkable analysis of German war literature, by 'a neutral correspondent,' in The Times of 31st May last, especially Prof. Werner Sombart's description of the war as a world-struggle between 'the shopkeeper and the hero,' the mercenary spirit of England and the heroic spirit of Germany. It may be noted that for Herr Rohrbach it was the Germans, not the English, who were sunk in *Krämeregoismus*.

justice, and the mutual respect of rights. The methods by which our Empire was built up were often not such as our conscience would now approve, and the aims that inspired them were often far from morally exalted. We may confess our faults in the past, and even admit that the spirit that produced them is not dead among us—that our education is not complete ; nevertheless, we may claim that, whatever legitimate part is played in our Imperial policy by the protection and development of our own interests, it is no longer these interests *alone* that determine this policy. The old principle of the Reason of State has, indeed, fallen into so complete an oblivion among us that its assertion by the Germans seems to us a thing new and portentous. For we have developed a sense of the duty of the State, not only to its dependents, but to other States and nations.

It was the revolt of the American colonies that taught us to regard the British communities beyond the seas not as dependents, but as partners with us in the commonwealth of the Empire. The beginnings of the realisation of our duty to those nations and races, on a lower plane of culture, which had come under our sway may be dated from that attack on the system of the East India Company which culminated, in 1788, in the impeachment of Warren Hastings. That the attack was in large measure unjust, and embittered by party hatred and private spite, is true enough, but the principle on which it was based was sound and became the inspiration of a new and nobler conception of British Imperialism. The principle is thus defined by Burke in his speech on Fox's India Bill :

> ' All political power which is set over men, and all privilege claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for such a derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be in some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit.'

' No charter of dominion,' he added later, ' shall stand as ' a bar in my way to their charter of safety and protection.' To show how completely the spirit of these noble words has permeated the service of the Empire, it is only necessary to point to the splendid work being done by British officials in our dependencies and protectorates—India, Egypt, the Soudan, Nigeria, and a hundred others less conspicuous. In these it is

no longer a question of Imperial domination or of exclusive privileges for British trade, but of a great trusteeship exercised primarily for the people governed. It is, moreover, significant of the change that has come over our ideas, since the days of mid-Victorian Liberalism, that this government is not directed to imposing British culture on races little fitted for it, but to so educating these races that they may develop their own cultures, and so guarding them that this development may proceed unchecked, as it was too often in times past, by irresponsible violence or by the barbarous lust for power and wealth. It is above all in the fulfilment of this duty that the spirit of British Imperialism has risen superior to the narrowing influences of a crude nationalism, and it has had its reward. This Empire, which to its enemies seemed to be seething with disaffection and tottering to its fall, has displayed, under a test which would have shattered a structure less firmly based on the community of interests and sentiment between the rulers and the ruled, a unity of purpose which has astonished the world. It has been impossible to witness without pride and deep emotion those spontaneous demon strations of loyalty, those offers not only of wealth but of personal service, which have poured in from all the States and races subject to the Empire, from the proud princes of India down to the humble chiefs of obscure tribes of whose very existence the Empire was scarce aware. The lesson of our Imperial duty towards the people dependent on us has not been learned in vain.

Of more immediate bearing, however, on the question of what part the spirit of British Imperialism can play in the settlement after the war is the development of the British conscience in relation to foreign States and nations. This development may be ascribed largely to the effects of the long discipline of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. It was in the common struggle against a common danger that Great Britain became conscious of the community of interests between the nations, and learned to look beyond the Reason of State to a common public law, embodied in the treaties, by which these interests were secured. In the settlement after the war she recognised her obligations to the commonweal of Europe and, for the sake of peace, at once surrendered many of the conquests she had made and had the power to

keep. It was in this spirit that Castlereagh, in answer to the clamour in England after Waterloo for the dismemberment of France, wrote home to Lord Liverpool memorable words: 'Our business is not to collect trophies, but to bring back the world to peaceful habits.' This was the principle on which Great Britain acted a hundred years ago, under circumstances very similar to those which, as we hope and believe, will arise at the conclusion of the present war; and there is no reason to think that it is a principle that has become weakened in the interval. In the solution of the problems involved in the reconstruction of the world's geography the interests of Great Britain will be largely engaged, notably outside Europe. But we may be certain that, as in 1814, she will set an example of moderation to the Powers and will sacrifice some possible gains if by so doing she can bring back the world to peaceful habits—which is the supreme interest of all. We may be certain, too, that she will bring to the counsels of the Powers those same qualities of honesty and plain-dealing which were universally admitted in her representatives during the peace negotiations that followed the last great general war, qualities which gave to her influence a moral weight that often made it decisive.

In making such a claim it is important to avoid the appearance of talking cant and incurring that very charge of hypocrisy which has been deprecated. To speak of the development of our national conscience in relation to other nations is not to imply that the attitude of Great Britain towards foreign States has been, is, or ought to be altruistic. British statesmen have always regarded themselves, and rightly, as in the first instance the trustees of the interests of their own people. But they have at the same time recognised that these interests are bound up in large measure with those of the whole family of nations, and that, whatever the power of a nation may be, the ruthless use of this power in the pursuit of wholly selfish objects will in the long run defeat its own ends. Hence the insistence on the binding force of international law, as defined in the treaties, which has characterised British statesmanship during the last hundred years. In making treaties they have studied first and foremost the interests of the Empire; but, a treaty once made, they have never pleaded the interests of the Empire—the Reason of State—as an excuse for its

violation, though temptations to do so have been many. They have acted, in short, with the full concurrence of public opinion—which would not have allowed them to act otherwise —as the trustees not only of British interests but of British honour. These qualities then, calculated to inspire confidence, Imperial Britain will bring to the solution of the problems of the ultimate peace :—her steadfast insistence on the obligation of the faith of treaties, and her readiness to recognise the principle that particular national ambitions must, where possible, be subordinated to the supreme general interest—which is peace.

This brings us, finally, to the question of what contribution the spirit of British Imperialism can make towards solving the most difficult of all the problems that will confront the Powers—namely, that of setting up an international system by which the stability of the peace settlement shall be guaranteed, and the world saved, at least for many years to come, from the disaster of a fresh outbreak of war. In the setting up of such a system the fundamental problem to be solved is that of the relation of the principle of nationality to that of human solidarity. Now the principle of nationality, as erected into a *Staatsprinzip*—the basic conception of the State—involves the demarcation of society into sharply defined economical, cultural, and political groups, whose very *raison d'être* is mutual exclusiveness and the passionate pursuit of separate and rival interests. The problem is to reconcile this principle, which is the very antithesis of cosmopolitanism, with a cosmopolitan system, and to discover a process by which these national groups may be re-grouped into a great commonwealth of nations, without destroying or seriously derogating from that national independence which is the very basis of their existence. The experience of the past is not such as to make us sanguine as to this problem finding a solution. But if it is to be solved it will have to be on some such lines as those followed in the development of British Imperialism, of which the acknowledged principle is to allow the greatest possible play for the separate interests of the parts consistent with the supreme obligation of maintaining the interests of the whole. The British Empire, of which the nucleus is a closely knit group of four nationalities, has expanded into a world-group embracing many nations, some

of them very old, some of them very young, some as yet hardly conscious of their nationality. The political ties which united the younger and more vigorous of these nations to the central group have been weakened almost to breaking point—yet they have not broken. Within this world-group which we call our Empire there are federal States, but the Empire itself is not even a confederation. So far at least as the relations of the self-governing Dominions to the Mother Country and to each other are concerned, it is rather of the nature of an *entente cordiale*, based on a sense of common interests and mutual obligations, and on loyalty to that ideal of union which is symbolised by the Crown and the flag. And, whatever it may once have been, this ideal has ceased to be a narrowly national one; for the Empire has welcomed into its co-partnership groups once foreign and hostile to it, such as the French in Canada and the Dutch in South Africa, without requiring them to surrender anything essential to the preservation of their national individuality. The word 'British,' as once the word 'Roman,' is quickly becoming the symbol of an idea wider than the bounds of race.

The motive force of British Imperialism, then, is no longer that of expansion and conquest, but of co-operation in the interests of peace and progress. This is the greater *pax Britannica*, which is not only more widespread but more noble than the *pax Romana*, since it is based, not on the principle of dominion, but on that of liberty. The Germans—so Mr. Cramb has told us—sneer at this Power 'which possesses 'one-fifth of the globe and an army at least as large as that of 'Switzerland.' It has not, apparently, occurred to them—how should it?—how new and wonderful a phenomenon it is that this Empire, composed of so many and such various elements, has needed to keep it together an armed force no larger than that of the smallest of European States.*

To the solution of the problem of preserving the peace of the world, Great Britain can at least bring the light of her

* 'Nothing struck me more,' says Lord Cromer, 'than the manner in which young men, fresh from some British Military College or University, were able to identify themselves with the interests of the wild tribes of the Soudan, and thus to govern them by sheer weight of character and without the use of force.' Ancient and Modern Imperialism, p. 75.

own experience, the lesson of the marvellous results of her Imperial experiment. Whether the lesson will be taken to heart by the nations, who can say? The war may result in the growth of democratic principles and, as their outcome, in a strong movement towards international solidarity. It may, on the other hand, merely lead to a still more complete arming of the nations against one another. None at present can say what will be the outcome. Great Britain herself has been forced by the challenge of the German Empires to become a great military power; it is possible, and even probable, that she will have to remain so. If this prove to be the case, she will remain armed, not in the spirit of Germanic aggressiveness, but in the spirit in which she is now fighting—in defence of the liberties of the nations and of that public law which is at once the guarantee of those liberties and the evidence of the hope of a closer bond between the peoples. She will remain armed, also, in defence of that great commonwealth of nations which has already been established under her ægis, a commonwealth which no force of arms could hold together, but which will remain an object-lesson to the world of how firmly an Empire may stand that is based on those principles of liberty, toleration, and equal justice which are the imperishable heirlooms of our race.

WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS.

ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

Documenti Diplomatici presentati al Parlamento Italiano dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri. Austria-Ungheria. Seduta del 20 Maggio 1915.

ON no nation did the European war burst as a greater surprise than on Italy. The Government, as we know from the subsequent revelations made by Sig. Giolitti in Parliament, had been approached, in August 1913, by Austria, who asked whether Italy would support her if she went to war with Serbia, but until the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum on July 23, 1914, no one in Italy had any inkling of the intentions of the Dual Monarchy and of Germany to plunge the world into a vast conflict. For over thirty years Italy had been a member of the Triple Alliance, so that it would seem at first sight as though her place in the great struggle should be by the side of her Allies. But it was also obvious that under the circumstances she should have been consulted by them before they took so momentous a decision. She had not been consulted, and therefore she elected to remain neutral. It was not till after the war had been raging for ten months, that she entered the lists against her former Allies. The causes and motives which brought about this change of policy merit examination.

The Triple Alliance was never really popular in Italy. It was formed in 1882 when the chief danger to Italy seemed to come from France ; indeed, French policy had for some years been far from friendly. Above all the occupation of Tunisia, which Italians had partially colonised and which the nation had earmarked for its own, rankled deep. Moreover, both the Clericals and the Republicans of France were hostile to the existing order in Italy. Yet the Alliance with Germany and Austria was of the nature of a *mariage de convenance,* in which there was no affection on either side, and the Central Empires, conscious of their superior strength, always treated Italy as a poor relation and showed the completest disregard for her interests. While Germany was contemptuously indifferent,

Austria continued to oppress and persecute her Italian-speaking subjects, just as she had done in Lombardy and Venetia, leaving no stone unturned to wipe out every trace of Italian nationality in the Trentino and on the Adriatic Littoral. At various times, when it seemed as though Austro-Italian relations were about to improve, the Imperial and Royal Government committed some peculiarly foolish and irritating act of persecution against the *irredenti*, which rendered a cordial understanding impossible; and this while Italian statesmen were doing their utmost to discourage Irredentist sentiment in Italy and showing the greatest deference to Austria's wishes. At the time of the Libyan war, while the German and Austrian papers, whose connexion with the Foreign Offices of the two Empires is notorious, were covering Italy with abuse for her supposed cruelties towards the peerless Turk and the gentle Arab, the German and Austrian Governments were placing every obstacle in the way of Italy's action against the Ottoman Empire. The bombardment of Preveza, the attack on the Dardanelles, and the occupation of the Ægean islands gave occasion to severe Austrian remonstrances, backed up by Germany, and once or twice, as, for instance, when Italy was about to occupy Chios and Mytilene, almost resulted in an ultimatum. Indeed the military party in Austria wished to seize the occasion to attack Italy. But the violent outburst of anti-Italian feeling in France, in connexion with the 'Carthage' and 'Massouba' incidents and other events relating to the Libyan war, induced the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to renew the Triple Alliance for seven years in December 1912, two years before the term of expiry.

When after the conclusion of peace with Turkey in the autumn of 1912 the Turco-Balkan war broke out, the general sympathies of Italy were wholly on the side of the Balkan Allies. But Austria strenuously opposed Serbia's aspirations to a port on the Adriatic, and the Italian Government backed up its Ally, partly because the Marquis di San Giuliano still believed that Italy's interests demanded a good understanding with Austria, and partly because he and indeed a good many other Italians were afraid that Serbia would be a mere vassal of Russia, and that a Serbian port on the Adriatic would end by becoming a Russian naval base. Also there were

many people who believed that the Albanians were a real nation and that they must not be ruled by the Serbs.

The one nation with whom Italy had always been on friendly terms was Great Britain. The interests of the two countries had never come into conflict and there has long been a genuine sympathy and community of ideals between Italians and Englishmen. The bonds of the Triple Alliance were firmest, as far as Italy was concerned, when Great Britain was friendly towards it out of hostility to France, but as soon as Anglo-German rivalry arose, Italians felt that they would one day have to choose between their Allies and their friends.

This then was Italy's international position when the great conflict broke out last August: an alliance with Germany to whom Italy had no particular reason to be friendly, and with Austria who had always shown a hostile spirit; friendship with England; dislike of France; and a somewhat vague distrust of Russia. Austria's ultimatum to Serbia placed Italy in a very serious predicament, and the people felt themselves to be in the terrible alternative of joining their Allies in an odious cause or of failing to keep their word. Fortunately, however, the aggressive action of the Central Empires excluded the *casus foederis*, and the Italian Government was free to choose its course. On August 3 it declared the neutrality of Italy. This decision caused a wide-spread feeling of relief throughout the country; indeed no Government would have been strong enough to overcome the repulsion which the enormous majority of the nation felt at the idea of having to assist Austria in crushing the small but heroic Serbian people. Moreover, the Government of Sig. Giolitti had so weakened and neglected the army that Italian intervention, had it taken place, would not have been as effective as the resources and importance of the country demanded. The first measure to be taken was therefore the strengthening and reorganisation of the army, and this the Government proceeded to do with the greatest energy and alacrity. Nevertheless the value of Italy's neutrality was of the greatest importance, for had France been attacked from the south-east even by a comparatively small Italian army at the beginning of the war, the situation of the Republic would have been well-nigh desperate; Italy, at the same time, by refusing to participate in the Austro-German campaign of aggression,

incurred the hatred of the Central Empires, who regarded her as a traitor to the Alliance. The many reasons whereby Italy was free to choose her own course, above all Article 7 of the Treaty, were as nothing in the eyes of Germany and Austria, who considered that it was the bounden duty of their humble vassal to assist them in any undertaking which they might decide upon. There is indeed reason to believe that Austria sent Italy a veiled ultimatum, demanding her participation in the war on pain of being severely punished, and that the threat was only not carried out because the resistance of Belgium and Serbia and the Russian invasion of Galicia upset the plans of Germany and Austria.

But once Italy had proclaimed her neutrality, another grave question arose, viz. whether she was to remain absolutely neutral to the end of the war or intervene at some later period on the side of the Triple Entente, for no one dreamed now of intervention on the other side. There were strong arguments in favour of both proposals. On the one hand it was felt that Italy was a poor country and could not stand the financial strain of a great war for long; indeed, the outbreak of the conflagration, although she had taken no part in it, caused her severe economic loss; hampered her trade; brought back some 350,000 emigrants who usually spent the summer in France, Germany, and Austria earning money which they sent home; suspended the tourist traffic; and caused a run on the banks which was only stopped by a moratorium. If Italy remained neutral she might hope at the end of the conflict, when all the other nations were exhausted, to make her weight felt and perhaps obtain important advantages without fighting, just as Roumania had done after the second Balkan war. In any case she was not for the present directly threatened, and might therefore spare her people the horrors and sacrifices which even a successful war involves. Others, however, saw the grave dangers of such a policy. By remaining neutral when all the rest of the world was engaged in a life and death struggle, she would incur the enmity of both groups and be *a Dio spiacente ed ai nemici sui*. From the great conflict a new Europe must emerge, with frontiers that would not be altered for many a long year, and if Italy failed to play a manly part now, she risked seeing the realisation of her dearest aspirations adjourned indefinitely, perhaps for ever, and her present unfavourable

frontiers fixed eternally; for she could not hope to be so strong at the close of the war as to be able to enforce her will in the face of a united, even if exhausted, Europe, determined to allow no more alterations of frontiers, and she would have no right to demand adjustments in her own favour.

What then are the aspirations of Italy? In an article in the January number of the EDINBURGH REVIEW Mr. Algar Thorold gave an accurate account of Italian Irredentism as regards the Italian-speaking territories now under Austria. Italy's north-eastern frontiers are wholly irrational from every point of view. Strategically they leave the door wide open to invasion from the Tirol and Carinthia; while the deep inlets and the chain of islands along the Istrian, Croatian, and Dalmatian coasts are a standing menace to the safety of the exposed Italian shore. Ethnically they leave a considerable number of Italians outside the borders of the Italian kingdom under the oppressive and hated rule of Austria. The latter, in spite of her alliance with Italy, has, as we have seen, made a point of ill-treating and persecuting her Italian subjects, and encouraging both Germans and Slavs against them, and Germany, whose word at Vienna has always been law, has never moved a finger to obtain better treatment for the *irredenti*. There are, it is true, Italians under other foreign governments beyond the other frontiers of Italy. But the Ticinesi, under Swiss rule, have always enjoyed such a wide measure of local autonomy and such absolute freedom to develop their language and institutions that they do not feel the yoke of foreign bondage, while the people of Nice enjoy such prosperity from the enormous tourist traffic that they seem to have lost all national feeling and are quite content to remain under France. The Italians of Tunisia are more restive and would prefer to exchange the French for the Italian flag, but they are not so rooted to the soil as are the Austrian *irredenti*, and are not so deeply attached to the country they inhabit, in which they have only settled within the last two generations.

Besides the solution of the Irredentist question, Italy has other aspirations which might be satisfied by participation in the war. The great natural increase of the Italian population has led to an exodus of labourers, numbering many hundreds of thousands annually, who seek work and high wages

in foreign countries. Hence the desire for colonies where these emigrants could settle under the ægis of the Italian flag. Unfortunately, while Italy was struggling for freedom and unity, most of the territories in Asia and Africa suitable for settlement by Europeans were occupied by other countries. In the 'eighties she acquired the Red Sea colony known as Eritrea, and somewhat later a settlement on the Somali coast. But although these possessions have a fair commercial future, they do not seem to be suitable for colonisation. The Libyan war was fought to acquire the last available tract of territory in North Africa, parts of which will in time provide land for a number of Italian settlers, but the process will be a slow and costly one. There is only one other land wherein Italy can still hope to found colonies of Italian labourers, and that is Asiatic Turkey. The participation of the Ottoman Empire in the war as the Ally of the Central Empires was consequently a strong incentive for Italian intervention on the other side.

A third more general aspiration was the development of Italian trade in the Levant. In this field, too, Italy found herself in conflict with Austria, who enjoyed the advantage of geographical position and of better means of communication. (Her trade can penetrate into the Balkans by sea via Trieste and Fiume, by rail via Belgrade, Orsova, Predeal, and Itzkany, and by river via the Save and the Danube.) Although Austria by her policy of bullying made herself detested in the Balkan States, she was gradually reducing them to a condition of economic vassalage. Italy's interest, on the other hand, was the free development of those States with the open door for all. Italian trade was making progress in that part of the world, but at every turn it was hampered by the unfair competition of Austria supported by Germany.

During the ten months which elapsed between the declaration of neutrality and the outbreak of war against Austria, public opinion remained divided into two camps, the neutralists and the interventionists, besides a large floating mass of uncertain opinion which tended to remain neutral from force of inertia rather than from any definite conviction. Many of the neutralists were Germanophil and Austrophil, but by no means all. Those who sympathised more or less openly with the Central Empires comprised a considerable part of the aristocracy, who regarded Germany as the palladium of order and

discipline and France as the home of anarchy; they feared that a French victory would result in the triumph of demagogy, even in Italy, and an uprising of the Socialists and the peasantry against the propertied class. The Clericals too were Austrophil and anti-French, for Austria was the only great Catholic Power, and France was in their eyes still the France of Combes and of the war against religion; also they were greatly afraid of Russia as the champion of the Eastern Church against Catholicism. There is reason to believe, however, that neither the Pope nor some of the most eminent members of the Curia shared this view.

In the army there was a strong current of pro-German feeling, for Italian officers had largely been brought up in the school of German methods, and although they do not by any means always follow them slavishly, they cannot help admiring the wonderful discipline and organisation of the German army. In the learned world, too, German methods of study had impressed themselves deeply on the last generation of Italian savants, and many university professors expressed strong pro-German sentiments, which ended with provoking a violent reaction on the part of the students, who were almost all anti-German. Further, there were many persons who, although neither aristocratic nor Clerical, had a strong dislike of France, both because they regarded her as the exaggerated prototype of all the Italian defects, and also because of the many occasions on which she had shown herself jealous and unfriendly towards Italy; consequently, without being pro-German, they did not wish to see France victorious. Nor must we forget the numerous class of persons connected with German banks and industrial concerns, who naturally saw the war through German spectacles.

All these groups were neutralists because they were Germanophil or Francophobe. Realising that intervention on the side of the Central Empires was impossible, they preferred a policy of total abstention. Although not numerous, they comprised a number of influential persons, or at least persons much in the public eye—society leaders, smart young men, Foreign Office officials, well-known professors, and several deputies and senators, including nearly all those who had German or Austrian wives.

The 'official' or revolutionary Socialists, although neither

pro-German nor anti-French, were strongly neutralist on the orthodox socialist principle that all wars are wicked, and merely serve the interest of the capitalist, distracting the attention of the proletariat from the only really holy war, class war. In view of the attitude of the Socialists in all the belligerent States, that of their Italian comrades seemed rather ridiculous, and their appeals to 'internationalism' sounded hollow and meaningless. This party had a certain following among the working classes of the towns and to a lesser extent among the rural population of some parts of the country, especially of the Romagna and Tuscany; but in the course of the last few months its membership has rapidly diminished, and many of its most prominent leaders have abandoned it, including Sig. Mussolini, the fiery editor of its official organ, the 'Avanti,' who resigned his editorship and started a paper of his own, 'Il Popolo d'Italia,' one of the most violent of the interventionist organs.

On the other side was an equally heterogeneous medley of groups and parties. In the front rank were the Nationalists, who maintained that Italy's participation in the struggle was necessary not merely for the sake of annexing the unredeemed territories under Austria, and perhaps acquiring colonies at the expense of Turkey, but also to improve Italy's political and moral position in the council of nations and to give the people a stronger sense of national dignity. For many years Italy had been at peace under the incubus of the defeat at Adowa, and the Socialists and other democratic parties had constantly preached on the iniquities of war and tried to demoralise the nation into a dread of ever being engaged in hostilities. The Libyan war had done something to raise the national spirit, but that war had been so conducted by Sig. Giolitti's Government that it had not drawn the people wholly from the slough of despond into which they had drifted. The Nationalists claimed that if Italy remained out of the great conflict not only would her material interests suffer but her international value would be greatly depreciated. Some of them demanded indeed, with more enthusiasm than prudence, that she should enter the lists at once—at the end of August or in September—when military preparations were by no means complete. But they did much to make the nation realise the issues involved and to prepare the public mind

for the inevitableness of intervention, and for the necessary sacrifices which it entailed. Then there were the various democratic groups—Radicals, Republicans, Reformists, Socialists, etc.—who had a sentimental and doctrinaire sympathy for Republican France and a corresponding dislike for the Central Empires as hotbeds of reaction and feudalism. Many who had been opposed to the Italian monarchy and had professed anti-militarist doctrines, now became ardent and in many cases genuine patriots. Thus we find among the most active interventionists, besides the above-mentioned Professor Mussolini, Alceste De Ambri, the syndicalist deputy for Parma, who had organised the Parma agrarian strikes in 1908 and the disorders of June 1914, Signori Bissolati and Ivanoe Bonomi, the Reformist Socialist leaders (the latter is at present an officer in the army), the Republican deputies Barzilai and Colaianni, Professor Salvemini, an embittered but independent Socialist, etc. Finally, there was a considerable number of persons who were neither Nationalists nor democrats, but who believed intervention necessary both for the settlement of the Irredentist question and for the national dignity of the country. Most of the interventionists, however, did not in August think that the moment for action had yet arrived, and considered that Italy should stay her hand until some time in the spring, when her military preparations would be ready and the appearance of her armies on the field would be all the more effective.

Besides the convinced neutralists and interventionists there was an amorphous mass of people who did not quite realise the importance of the issues involved and wished to avoid war if possible, but were prepared to submit to it if it should be inevitable. On the whole these were more inclined to neutralism than to intervention. Finally, there were those who on principle favoured intervention, but felt a sort of scruple at attacking Italy's old allies unless some compelling *casus belli* could be found. They hoped that Austria or Germany, with the fatuousness which characterised their diplomacy, would supply such a motive, but did not like the idea of going to war until such a *casus belli* arose.

In this uncertain and hesitating state of public opinion the German and Austrian Governments mobilised all their resources to influence Italian opinion in their own favour.

Their attempts to subsidise the press were not very fortunate, for they failed miserably with all the respectable papers and journalists; they only enlisted a certain number of utterly discredited scribes and founded a few rags whose inspiration was too obvious to produce any effect on the public. In society they were more successful, for Prince von Bülow, the new German Ambassador sent to replace the incompetent Herr von Flotow, succeeded by means of his Italian wife and her aristocratic connexions in attracting nearly all the fashionable world to the splendid receptions at the Villa Malta, and in impressing his guests with the magnificence, wealth, and power of Germany. The German-controlled banks and other financial concerns also worked hard to influence their clients or would-be clients in the same sense. Then there were, in addition to the official representatives of the Central Empires, a number of Germans and Austrians, many of them of military age, who continued to remain in Italy on one pretext or another, but whose real mission was either espionage or that of conducting an active propaganda on behalf of their respective countries, and of proclaiming the benefits Italy would derive from neutrality and the horrors which awaited her if she dared go to war. Prince von Bülow's intrigues with Italian politicians will be dealt with later.

The Powers of the Triple Entente made no similar attempt at propaganda. The pamphlets issued by the British Government or by British patriotic associations to influence Italian opinion, although far better written and more sensible than the ridiculous German publications with which Italy was flooded, dwelt too much on the purely ethical aspects of the war, which did not greatly interest the Italian people, now that the conflict had been raging for so many months. What they were much more concerned to know was what would be the probable results of an Entente victory as compared with those of an Austro-German victory. The attempts of certain British journals to drive Italy into the war produced most deplorable results, and provoked great irritation at what was regarded as an unwarrantable interference in Italy's affairs. It must be added, however, that the British press afterwards made *amende honorable* and never reverted to its former impolitic attitude. Nor were the Russian journals particularly happy in their comments on Italian affairs. Just

when it was rumoured that Austria was negotiating a separate peace with the Entente (had the story proved true it would have meant the end of Italian aspirations), the Russian papers gave utterance to sentiments concerning the rights of the southern Slavs to the whole or, at least, to the greater part of the Adriatic Littoral which aroused much anti-Russian feeling and supplied the pro-German press with some strong arguments. Perhaps the Entente cause derived most benefit from the actions of the Germans and Austrians themselves. The violation of Belgian neutrality, the fiendish atrocities committed by the Germans in that country and in North-Eastern France, the wilful destruction of artistic monuments, the horrors of the Austrian invasion of Serbia, and the submarine warfare against merchant shipping did more to influence Italian opinion in favour of the Entente than any amount of direct propaganda could have done.

The policy of the Italian Government during the first months of the war is not yet wholly clear. It certainly devoted itself with great energy to military preparations, in which it enjoyed the advantage of being able to profit by contemporary experience. As to its ultimate intentions, the Marquis di San Giuliano, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Salandra Cabinet, was popularly regarded as an uncompromising triplicist, and even the declaration of neutrality was believed to have been forced unwillingly on him by the Premier. But as the latter declared in his speech of June 2 on the Capitol in answer to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's diatribes, even the late Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent a strongly worded protest to Austria as early as July 25 in consequence of the ultimatum to Serbia, and added a few days later that unless Italy received compensation in the unredeemed provinces the Triple Alliance would end. But it is doubtful whether he would ever have agreed to a policy of war against Austria. In October 1914 he died, and was succeeded by Sig. Salandra himself, who a few weeks later ceded the portfolio to Baron Sonnino, perhaps the wisest and most far-seeing statesman Italy has had since Cavour. The public was naturally very curious to know what were his views on the country's policy and also those of Sig. Salandra, but both Ministers preserved the most absolute reticence. The Premier hinted vaguely in his speeches at 'Italy's aspirations,' without specifying what they were,

while Baron Sonnino made neither speeches nor even a single indiscretion. But from the pages of the Italian 'Green Book' we can follow the course of the Government's policy from the beginning of December to the dissolution of the Triple Alliance on May 4, and we can now appreciate how clear-sighted and straightforward Baron Sonnino's action had been throughout those terribly critical months. His object was that Italy should emerge from the great conflagration stronger, with securer frontiers and with her national aspirations at least in part satisfied. He took his stand, with regard to Austria, on the fact that the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans was one of the objects of the Triple Alliance. The Austrian attack on Serbia tended to destroy that balance of power to the detriment of Italian interests, especially as the Dual Monarchy evidently aimed at establishing direct hegemony over Serbia even if it did not actually wrest any territory from her. Under such circumstances, Baron Sonnino claimed, Italy had a right to compensation in virtue of Article 7 of the Triple Alliance Treaty, whereby the two Powers concerned agreed that, if a change in the Balkan *status quo* were to take place in consequence of a permanent or temporary occupation by Austria or Italy, such occupation could only be made after a mutual agreement between Austria and Italy on the basis of mutual compensation for all the advantages, territorial or otherwise, which one of the two might obtain. Austria at first refused to accept this point of view, and when eventually she was induced to consider it she proposed that Italy be compensated by territories belonging to other Powers which she was generously prepared to cede! Baron Sonnino pertinently remarked that if Italy were to accept compensation at the expense of some of the other belligerents she would thereby violate her neutrality, and added that she would negotiate on no basis save that of the cession of territories already belonging to Austria. The latter, after a series of evasive replies and absurd quibbles (among other objections Baron Burian stated that any cession in the Trentino was very difficult because one of the Emperor-King's titles was that of Count of Tirol), finally gave way on that point, but refused to consider any cessions of territory unless they were to be made after the war was over. This of course was preposterous, and Baron Sonnino affirmed that immediate cession was a

condition *sine qua non* of any possible agreement. Had Austria's proposal been accepted it would have meant that if the Central Empires were victorious they would have repudiated the agreement, while if they were defeated Italy had no guarantee that the Entente would respect it. Eventually Baron Burian gave a partial adhesion to the Italian demand, and proposed, as the extreme limit to which Austria was prepared to go, the cession of a part of the Trentino. Italy of course could not be satisfied with such an arrangement, which would have left a large number of Italians under Austrian rule and given her no satisfactory eastern frontier. On April 8 Baron Sonnino presented Italy's minimum demands, which were as follows: the cession by Austria of the Trentino as far as the frontiers of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy, an extension of Italian territory eastward so as to comprise the Italian towns of Gorizia, Gradisca and Monfalcone, the cession of the Curzola group of the Dalmatian islands, and a free hand in Albania; Trieste, together with north-western Istria, was to be erected into an independent state. In return for these concessions Italy would agree to remain neutral to the end of the war. Considering the circumstances, Italy's demands appear extremely moderate, so much so that one is simply astounded that Austria did not accept them at once; the advantage for her of feeling safe on her south-western frontier would have been so enormous as to make even greater sacrifices worth while. Indeed, one might at first sight be inclined to doubt Italy's wisdom in agreeing to bind herself to remain neutral and renounce all the advantages which might accrue to her from intervention on the side of the Entente, and to risk the hostility or at least the resentment of the latter, for the sake of such slight territorial gains and of so incomplete a settlement of the burning Irredentist question. But both Sig. Salandra and Baron Sonnino wished to prove to Italy and the world that they had done everything to avoid hostilities, and that if war did break out no one could accuse them of uncompromising chauvinism. Also, they probably realised the mental attitude of Austrian statesmen, and felt sure that the Imperial and Royal Government was too blind to make even the most moderate concessions.

Baron Burian continued to make evasive replies and to raise futile objections so as to gain time, in spite of the pressure of

the German Government, which, always generous in the cession of other nations' territories, urged Austria to be more conciliatory towards Italy. Prince von Bülow left no stone unturned to prevent war between Austria and Italy, and indeed made no secret of his annoyance at the former's obstinacy. The councillor of the German Embassy in Rome openly declared that the Austrians were idiots and utterly blind to the gravity of their situation. But while the Italian Ambassador in Vienna was pressing Italy's claims and his German colleague was supporting him at least to the extent of assuring the Imperial and Royal Government that Italy's military preparations were serious, and that the country was ready to go to war if its demands were not satisfied, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Rome was telegraphing that Italy was merely bluffing and that the nation was thoroughly neutralist. This explains Baron Burian's obstinacy, and the Italian Government finally saw that all further negotiations would be fruitless. Consequently on May 3 Baron Sonnino instructed the Duke of Avarna to notify Baron Burian that Italy regarded the Alliance with Austria-Hungary as having ceased to exist.

Such in brief is the history of the Austro-Italian negotiations as revealed by the Green Book. But it is not the whole history, for after May 3 events matured rapidly, and the international situation was also affected by the play of internal politics. The course followed by the Salandra Cabinet was clear, and after the denunciation of the Alliance its only logical conclusion was war. But at this moment Sig. Giovanni Giolitti appears on the scene. For thirteen years master of Italy—even when temporarily out of office he had allowed other Ministers to rule only at his good pleasure, so long as it suited him to remain the power behind the Cabinet—he had supported the present Government because he wished it to solve certain awkward internal questions that had loomed menacingly on the horizon in the spring of 1914. The outbreak of the European conflict confirmed him in his desire to remain out of office for a little while longer. The majority of the Deputies, elected under his auspices and created after his own image, would vote as he told them, so that he thought he could return to power whenever he liked. There was therefore almost as much curiosity to know his views on the policy

of Italy with regard to the war as to know those of the Cabinet, but at first he was no less reserved than the latter. From a hint or two which he had let drop when he returned to Rome in the autumn he appeared to favour intervention, and his faithful henchmen were consequently interventionists.

But in December Sig. Giolitti had a conversation with Prince von Bülow, who realised the importance of winning over a highly astute politician, still the master of the Parliamentary majority. From what Sig. Giolitti subsequently said to all who discussed the matter with him, von Bülow spoke more or less in this wise: 'Why should Italy trouble 'to make war against Austria for the sake of Trent and 'Trieste? We Germans intend to recoup ourselves for the 'losses of the war at Austria's expense and shall annex the 'German provinces; after that we shall leave Italy a free 'hand to occupy the Italian territories.' This proposal seemed to Sig. Giolitti, whose knowledge of foreign politics is as limited as his mastery of Parliamentary intrigue is unrivalled, the ideal solution. Consequently he wrote a letter for publication addressed to his friend Sig. Peano, in which he stated his belief that Italy might obtain 'a great deal' (*parecchio*) without going to war. Such a statement coming from him caused a considerable sensation, and was generally regarded as highly unpatriotic. It tended to damp public opinion, which was gradually being brought to the conviction of the necessity of intervention; and it had no serious foundation in fact. At the opening of Parliament in February, Sig. Giolitti tried to bring about the fall of Sig. Salandra, with the intention of returning to office himself with a neutralist Ministry, one of whose most prominent members was to be Sig. Bissolati, the Reformist Socialist deputy. Once again installed at Palazzo Braschi, even Sig. Giolitti might have gone to war if he had believed he could derive popularity thereby. But Sig. Bissolati refused to enter into the scheme, which consequently fell through.

When early in May the political atmosphere was so highly charged with electricity that war seemed inevitable (the public did not yet know for certain that the Austro-Italian Alliance had been denounced, but it felt instinctively that the situation was approaching a crisis), Sig. Giolitti saw that he would lose his hold over the country unless he made a

bid for power once more, and he again attempted, with the help of Prince von Bülow, to upset Sig. Salandra. On the eve of the reopening of Parliament he returned to Rome from Piedmont and announced by means of the various newspapers devoted to his interests that he still believed that Italy could realise her aspirations without going to war. This utterance he made after he had spoken with the Premier, who had put him *au courant* of the situation, informing him that the Alliance had been dissolved and that Italy had contracted undertakings with the Triple Entente. Nevertheless the faithful majority proclaimed its whole-hearted devotion to Sig. Giolitti, and it appeared as though the Cabinet were bound to receive a hostile vote.

It is difficult to describe the emotions of those fateful days. The interventionists were in the depths of gloom, while the neutralists and the pro-Germans exulted and acclaimed Giolitti as their saviour. Prince von Bülow felt he had won a great diplomatic victory—Germany's first since the war began. On May 13 the Salandra Cabinet resigned on the ground of disagreement between the various constitutional parties on Italy's foreign policy. This decision, which seemed to mark the triumph of Sig. Giolitti, actually resulted in his collapse. For the nation rose as one man against the attempt of the former dictator, hypnotised by the representative of a foreign Government, to juggle away the country's highest interests and jeopardise its good name merely to satisfy his personal ambition. Hitherto, as long as there was talk of intervention for the sake of acquiring territories, strategic frontiers and commercial advantages, the Italian people regarded war as a fatality, but not as an enterprise that could arouse their enthusiasm. Now, however, that the national honour was involved they realised the absolute necessity for war. In every Italian town huge demonstrations were held acclaiming Sig. Salandra and his Cabinet and cursing Sig. Giolitti. The latter's house in Rome had to be guarded by 2000 soldiers, and neither he nor his more prominent lieutenants, such as Signori Bertolini, Facta, Falcioni, Schanzer, etc., dared show their faces in the streets. In an instant the carefully built-up edifice of *Giolittismo*, which had weighed upon the country for so many years like Dante's *cappa di piombo*, was swept away in an outburst of popular fury. The

silent, reserved Baron Sonnino, who, although admired and respected by all the best men in Italy, had never enjoyed popularity, was now the hero of the day. The King summoned the various leading statesmen to the Quirinal, as is the custom whenever a Cabinet resigns, but these calls were mere formalities, for the nation pointed to the Salandra Cabinet as the only possible administration. His Majesty in consequence refused to accept its resignation, and it remained in office. Sig. Giolitti fled to Piedmont before Parliament met, and on May 20 the Chamber, in spite of the 300 Giolittian deputies, granted the Government full powers by an overwhelming majority, only the 'official' Socialists and some thirty or forty others voting against the bill, while the neutralist Senate approved it unanimously. Austria and Germany made a last desperate effort to secure Italian neutrality by publishing a fresh offer of concessions, which Prince von Bülow had communicated to Sig. Giolitti before mentioning them to the Italian Government. These consisted, in addition to the Trentino, of a strip of territory on the eastern frontier as far as the Isonzo (retaining the easily defended left bank for herself with the Italian town of Gorizia) and of local autonomy for Trieste; this, of course, Austria could revoke whenever it suited her. But, apart from the fact that these concessions fell far short even of Italy's moderate demands, they came too late. The compelling motive for war which the interventionists had for so long been seeking was now supplied, and supplied by the intrigues of von Bülow and Giolitti. On May 22 the general mobilisation order was issued, and on the 24th war was declared against Austria.

It is naturally too early to make any forecast as to the probable course of events, but the campaign as far as it has gone has proved two things, viz. firstly, that the Italian army and navy and the railways are far better organised than even the most optimistic believed possible, and secondly that the nation is supporting the Government whole-heartedly and unanimously. Of course the mobilisation had been partly carried out before the war began, but nevertheless the result is an achievement to be proud of. Now even the most impenitent neutralists are converted and are contributing to the national enterprise either as soldiers or by working on some one of the innumerable committees for the relief of the families

of the reservists, or for what is called 'civilian preparation,' the object of which is to enable the life of the country to continue as normally as possible. One circumstance which produced a most favourable impression was that, when the mobilisation was ordered, it was announced that the passenger and goods service on the railways would continue as usual, and the promise has been fully carried out.

Undoubtedly this war appeals to the imagination and traditions of the Italian people as no other enterprise could do. For it is felt by all to be a war of liberation; not merely to free the Italians of Trent and Trieste from their hated task-masters, nor to give Italy safer frontiers and wider commercial openings, but to shake off from the whole country the burden of German ideas, German finance, German industry, German intrigue and German espionage which has been slowly penetrating into the very heart of Italy and poisoning her life-blood. The great war has been a revelation to the world of German methods of penetration, a penetration whereby nations were either slowly strangled and reduced to vassalage or else so undermined and weakened that if it came to war they would be crushed almost before they could begin to resist. That was the fate of Belgium, and that, Germany hoped, would be the fate of Italy. One may observe that Italy is not yet at war with Germany. Technically that is true, for there has as yet been no official declaration of war; but the whole spirit of the war is against Germany and Germanism. Austria, or at least all that makes Austria detested, is essentially German, and the very causes of Austro-Italian rivalry had their fountain-head in Germany, whose interest it was to keep her two allies asunder. Even the refusal of Austria to make any concessions regarding Trieste was inspired as much by Berlin as by Vienna, for Germany hopes to make Trieste the German port on the Adriatic. The acquisition of the Italian provinces of Austria is now but one of the objects of Italy's war, and not the most important. It is her future as a great nation for which she is fighting, her right to make her voice heard and attended to in the councils of Europe.

AN ITALIAN.

WAR POETRY IN FRANCE

1. **Chants du Soldat.** Par PAUL DÉROULÈDE. 163me édition. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 1915.
2. **Paul Déroulède.** Par JÉRÔME et JEAN THARAUD. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 1914.
3. **Les Chants du Bivouac.** Par THÉODORE BOTREL. Avec une préface de M. MAURICE BARRÈS. Paris: Payot. 1915.
4. **Les Poètes de la Guerre.** Préface en vers de HUGUES DELORME. Nancy: Berger-Lévrault. 1915.
5. **Poèmes de France.** Bulletin lyrique de la Guerre. Par PAUL FORT. Paris: R. Helleu. 1915.
6. **Trèfles à Quatre Feuilles.** Campagne 1914–1915. Par LOUIS DE GONZAGUE FRICK. Paris: La Phalange. 1915.

THERE is a quality in war, as there is in religion, which does not lend itself kindly to the art of verse. At first sight we might expect to see these two forms of energy pre-eminent in encouraging lofty poetical expression. They are prodigiously romantic in their outline and their detail, they occupy man's thoughts and passions to the exclusion of all other interests, for, when either of them takes hold of humanity, all lesser occupations have to stand aside and wait. Yet, as a matter of critical experience, the lyrical triumphs of martial and religious poetry are few, and they are narrowly limited in scope. While he was delivering one of his famous Oxford lectures, Matthew Arnold held up in one hand 'The Golden 'Treasury' and in the other 'The Book of Praise,' and said 'How are we to explain that there is hardly anything that is 'not poetry in the one and hardly anything that is poetry in 'the other?' The latter may be affirmed, and with still more confidence, about any collection of exclusively military verse, since war has produced no Christina Rossetti. But the reason of it is difficult to seize, and evaded the acuteness of Arnold himself. Perhaps the very scope and tremendous importance of the two themes, which in their rigid outlines transcend the imagination and make its exercise unnecessary, are elements in the species of paralysis which attacks the poet-artist in his attempt. At all events, it is certain that the poetry which has

definitely succeeded in moving the hearts of armies has, at least in modern times, achieved that success by a sacrifice of the highest qualities of poetry.

It need not, therefore, be a matter of surprise to discover that the poet who has done more than any other single man to prepare the temper of Frenchmen for the present war was not a writer of high intrinsic merit. The sale of 'Chants du 'Soldat' has been continuous for more than forty years, and the little book has run through more than one hundred and sixty large editions. It has been more widely read and more durably popular than any other book of modern French verse. No consideration of the temper of the French nation to-day has any completeness if we ignore it. Nor does it contain a single offence against good taste, or any vulgarity of language. But although the poetry of Paul Déroulède has enjoyed and has deserved so universal an appreciation by the public, and although there is not merely no flagging in that interest, but, as a consequence of current events, a great recrudescence of it, yet it has scarcely received any acceptance from the leaders of literary opinion. In France, where criticism is so abundant and so generally intelligent, very little notice has ever been awarded to the poems of Déroulède. While he has taken his civic place as one of the principal architects of the new national French spirit, the purely literary judgment on his work has never ceased to be what Leconte de Lisle indicated when some one mentioned the name of Déroulède in his presence—'Ce n'est 'pas assez de ne parler de ce jeune homme ; il faut encore en 'mal parler.' When Déroulède has been observed among the poets, there has usually been a proposal to hunt him out of the temple of Apollo.

Let us acknowledge that his rhymes are poor and often are mere assonance ; let it be granted that his hurried emotional writing is amateurish at its best, feeble and mediocre at its worst. Let us also note that we are dealing with a French objective, and therefore with an audience naturally critical. In matters of art, the large English public has a positive fondness for the man who does not know his business, and who triumphs over his want of trained skill. But this is not the temper of France, where ignorance of the *métier* is still held to be a disadvantage. When refined Academicians shuddered to hear the poems of Déroulède howled at café-concerts by

raucous women wrapped in the tricolour, their emotion was not ridiculous. To a conscientious artist these performances could not but be distressing. But what such people as Leconte de Lisle, shut up in their ivory towers, did not perceive was that this painfully 'inartistic' verse was the product of a sincere and lofty inspiration. It is that which makes Déroulède so extremely interesting to-day. His sorrowful, angry verses, smelling of gunpowder and sounding of drum-taps, are so much a part of the temper of the new France to-day that they demand an attention from serious criticism which has never yet been given them. In one of the few serious analyses of his work which French criticism has contributed, Pontmartin called him 'l'intrépide sentinelle des lendemains de la défaite.' For more than forty years France has waited for that to-morrow to dawn; it has come at last, but Déroulède, who gazed all night into the eastern darkness with a great desire, died just too soon to enter into its radiance.

The peculiarity of Déroulède's attitude was that he continued strenuously militant when the rest of the French nation was tired of war. One of his biographers has said of him that 'he not merely preaches revenge, he *is* the Revenge.' His life was enclosed, in a very remarkable way, by the frontiers of war. He appeared first as a public character at the very darkest hour of despair after the defeat. He noted the exact date of his resolution; on the 8th of February, 1871, he wrote: 'A partir d'aujourd'hui, je me voue à la Revanche.' He began immediately to send forth his little poems, which were like so many arrows at the heart of despair. He was always denouncing weakness and fear, and his verses had the awakening sound of the tramp of armed men. He persisted, in spite of constant political mistakes, with exasperating failures of tact, through long periods during which nobody listened to his voice, in calling upon France not to rest under her humiliation, but to face the inevitable struggle with a fiery optimism. When, late in his life, admirers proposed to Déroulède a literary honour of some kind, he waved it aside: 'Je ne suis rien qu'un 'sonneur de clairon,' he replied, and he continued to blow his lonely horn, like Roland in the valley of Roncesvalles. What seems almost a miracle is that he lived on until just before the new war of Revenge broke out, dying on the 30th of January, 1914, worn out by long disease, but heroic to the last. It was

said of him that if he could only have lived six months longer he would have been able to die of joy.

Paul Déroulède was born in 1846, the son of a lawyer, who died early and left him and his brother André to the care of an admirable mother. They were brought up in an atmosphere of literature, for Émile Augier was their mother's brother and Pigault-Lebrun their grandfather. Paul showed the more definite talent, and early began to write verses, to which the death of his uncle Colonel Déroulède, who was killed fighting in Cochin-China, gave a certain martial colour. This was superficial, however, and oddly enough, when the war of 1870 broke out, the future author of 'Chants du Soldat' was very hostile to it. He nourished pacific dreams of a universal fraternity, and he hated Napoleon III. much more than he feared Wilhelm of Prussia. In the very pleasing record of his life which MM. Tharaud have presented to us, the story of his conversion is told, and it is as striking as any crisis in a religious experience. Full of his anti-military dreams, he retired to his mother's country-place, and was walking out, when an old peasant met him and spoke to him. 'Can you tell me,' said the man with an obvious anxiety, 'on what day the troops are 'to start?' Déroulède scornfully answered 'How should I 'know?' and the peasant fixed on him a look of reproach which he never forgot. It brought about what the Evangelicals call an instant conviction of sin, and in that moment the divine grace of patriotism was revealed to him. His pacifist indifference died within him, and the heart of a soldier took its place. He joined the army as a sub-lieutenant, and it was on the 7th of August, the date of the battle of Weissenbourg, that his conversion was complete. From that day on, until his death more than forty years later, he lived for no other purpose than to pursue the apostolate of revenge.

He had his full experience of the distresses of war. He led his troops to the recapture of Montbéliard, and his heroic mother, one day in August when the regiment was at Neuville-en-Tournefuy, drove up to the commander and presented to him a tall lad of seventeen, saying 'You have my elder son 'already; I bring you my younger one. If I had a third, I would 'bring him too, to defend our country.' The splendid courage of the old lady gave the brothers a certain prestige in the regiment, where they were known as 'les fils à la mère';

they fought in successive disastrous battles, and finally at Sedan, where in the gigantic chaos they were believed to have both been killed. So it was reported crudely to their wonderful mother, who, notwithstanding her Spartan courage, was stricken on the spot with a paralysis from which she never completely recovered. But André, though seriously wounded, was not killed, while Paul was carried safe and sound into Germany as a prisoner, and was interned at Breslau. Of his romantic escape and of his adventures during the Commune we can say nothing here, although they have a direct bearing upon his poems. But one phrase which MM. Tharaud quote is too characteristic to be omitted. On his return to his own country, Déroulède solemnly wrote down, for his own behoof, these words: 'Je ne dois seulement être prêt à me faire tuer 'pour la France. Je dois ne plus vivre que pour elle. Mon 'but est de lui préparer des libérateurs et des soldats.' And that is what he never ceased to do until he died last year.

Two months after his return from his German prison, the Commune broke out in Paris. This was one of many occasions in the life of Déroulède when he was mixed up in matters which seemed to have nothing to do with the central thread of his inspiration. His successive dealings with Ferry, Gambetta, Boulanger, and Clémenceau gave a wild appearance of incoherence to his strange and violent career. Curiously enough, now that he is dead, the glaring pieces of glass seem to have taken shape in the turn of the kaleidoscope, and we see what they all meant and why they were inevitable. Looking back over the forty years, the life of Paul Déroulède becomes, not very intelligible perhaps, but yet beautiful and decorous in its penetrating view of the future, in the unity of its proud and fiery aspirations. On the 6th of July, 1872, on the occasion of the anniversary of Corneille, Coquelin recited verses by Déroulède:

> 'Et toi, Corneille, toi, père du grand courage,
> Redis-nous ces leçons dont tu formais les cœurs,
> Le calme dans l'effort, la haine après l'outrage,
> Redis-nous la patrie et refais-nous vainqueurs.'

The poet was charged with inconsistency because he had entered Paris with the army of Versailles, and had led an assault upon the barricades. Some years later, in a violent article in

L'Intransigeant, Rochefort reproached Paul Déroulède with having picked up his cross of the Legion of Honour out of a pool of the blood of Parisians. The answer was direct: 'I 'received my cross two months before the Commune, for service 'on the battlefield. I never have shot a Parisian; and I found 'behind the barricades only the wretches whom you had sent 'there without accompanying them.' He explains, in another place, that he considered that Frenchmen should restore order in their own house, and not let Germans be their policemen.

His arm was broken on the barricades, and he withdrew from the violence of strife to the melancholy woodlands of his ancestral home, a little château at Langély in the Périgord. There the Déroulèdes had worked out their destiny since the sixteenth century, neighbours of Montaigne. There, during his slow convalescence, the latest of their sons, meditating on the fortunes of France, wrote his first little volume of verses, 'Chants du Soldat.' It came quietly into existence in 1872, and, as MM. Tharaud excellently point out, it was the first voice that France raised after the war. The temper of it exactly suited the grave and poignant situation; 'nous 'savions mourir, sinon combattre; nous avons été braves, 'mais la fortune nous a trahis.' The critics hardly observed the appearance of the book, but it presently ran like wildfire through the country. It re-lighted the extinguished torch of hope in tens of thousands of hearts, and it unites 1872 and 1914 with an unbroken thread of blood-red colour. When we speak of the war poetry of the present war, we are bound to consider the verses with which Déroulède, practically alone, and with an astounding persistency, kept alive certain definite sentiments in the fluctuating and shifting conscience of France.

German diplomacy rarely fails to play into the hands of its enemies. A remarkable stimulus was given to the sale of 'Chants du Soldat,' which thereupon became the vade-mecum of every intelligent French fighting man, by the action of Count Arnim in Paris. He protested to General de Cissey, then Minister of War, against the publication by a French officer of 'insolent verses directed against Prussia 'and the Prussians.' The direct answer came from the French Academy, which had not hitherto observed the 'Chants du Soldat,' but now 'crowned' the volume with every

circumstance of distinction. Déroulède, having become a national hero, was drawn back into the army, and was promoted in a battalion of Chasseurs. But the fate which always dogged him lay in wait for him now. Scarcely had he begun his new military duties than his horse threw him, and he smashed his foot so seriously that he was obliged to resign. So it happened throughout the career of this extraordinary man. Thirsting to distinguish himself in action, his efforts in public life invariably failed, while the one frail gift of his lyrical inspiration continued to perfume French sentiment like an inexhaustible grain of musk.

His poems were published in three slender instalments, 'Chants du Soldat' in 1872, 'Nouveaux Chants du Soldat' in 1875, 'Marches et Sonneries' in 1881. Although these little verses have been before the world so long, it is well that we should examine them from a new point of view, for it almost seems as though they spoke to us now for the first time, or at least with a new clear note. It is interesting to analyse their character, and to compare their attitude with the present condition of France.

'Ils ont cette espérance,—
La France n'est pas morte encor—Vive la France!'

This was the spirit which it was given to Déroulède, above all other men, to awaken and to sustain till the hour of new experience should strike. His poems do not deal directly with battle; they are not painted in the Maclise or even in the De Neuville and Détaille manner. They are anecdotes, chosen because they illustrate the temper of the French soldier, or bring home to him the necessities of France. With an unconscious felicity which has all the effect of subtilty, the poet, in lines of brief and sometimes even halting inspiration, insists on giving blunt, plain statements of incidents that awaken the sensation of patriotism. In 'Le Turco,' a boy scarcely seventeen is brought by his mother to the regiment—'Courage, mon fils!' 'Courage, maman!'—and marches to the war; when the winter comes, he coughs and the doctor orders him to go home, but he will not go 'while there are 'Prussians in France.' He is shot in battle, and an old Turco carries him on his back out of the line of fire. The French are forced to retreat, but the Turco will not confess it to the

dying boy, but says over and over again ' Oui, petit Français, ' tu les as vaincus.' This is directly sentimental ; more penetrating is ' La Belle Fille,' where, while the French are marching through the village of Raucourt to battle, a girl rushes up and kisses a soldier ; later, after the defeat, as they march back in disorder, the girl stops the same soldier, and bites his cheek. Déroulède is rarely so savage as this. He prefers such a theme as he illustrates in the extremely gay, delicate, and affecting little piece, ' Le Bon Gîte.' His longest effort in verse, ' Le Sergent,' which appeared in the volume of 1875, is sentimental to excess, and perhaps the point at which his remarkable talent has suffered most from the passage of time is precisely this ' Middle Victorian '—as we might venture to call it—tendency to wallow in the primitive emotions.

Déroulède broke out in a spasm of angry lyricism in 1882, and the cause of this may safely be conjectured. He found that France was sinking into a tame oblivion of her losses and her hatreds. The spirit of Jules Ferry, of whom Déroulède frankly said ' Ce Ferry a l'athéisme de la patrie,' was gaining ground. To the poet of ' Chants du Soldat ' nothing mattered except love for the fatherland, determination to endure sacrifice, a steadfast eye fixed on the captive territories. He dreaded the opiate of peace, the distraction of material advantages, and it is characteristic of him that he steadily opposed the scheme for Colonial expansion, insisting that all that energy should be concentrated on rifle practice and military gymnastics. He saw the nation slipping away from the central idea of revenge. As a poet he is not dejected, he is not timorous, but above all he does not brag ; he admits crushing defeat. Yet all these things are nothing to him, and all commercial and political happiness but dross, so long as the ancient injury is not wiped out :

' France, veux-tu mon sang ? Il est à toi, ma France !
S'il te faut ma souffrance,
Souffrir sera ma loi ;
S'il te faut ma mort, mort à moi,
Et vive toi,
Ma France ! '

During his life-time Déroulède did great injustice to himself, and gave the Philistines frequent cause to blaspheme, by the violence of his language in the tribune and by his quarrels with

successive governments. As early as 1878, when Madame de MacMahon asked him to write a cantata entitled 'Vive la France,' which Gounod set to music, the poet could not help introducing a reference to the white flag which set all the world by the ears. In March 1888, during the inauguration of a monument to the soldiers killed in Tonkin, Déroulède must needs protest, and there followed a riot. After the fall of the Goblet Ministry, indeed, he was like a dog with a tin kettle tied to his tail, rushing hither and thither, till he was patted by the deceptive hand of General Boulanger. All this must now be forgotten, and what must be remembered is that at a time when half the world despaired of the future of France, when Renan could tremulously murmur 'France is dying,' and could recommend a craven policy of pacificism, the poet of 'Chants du Soldat' never swerved from his position for an hour. He wrote in 'À Mes Amis'—and the noble words might be graven on his monument :

'J'en sais qui croient que la haine s'apaise :
Mais non ! l'oubli n'entre pas dans nos cœurs !
Trop de sol manque à la terre française,
Les conquérants ont été trop vainqueurs !
L'honneur, le rang, on a tout à reprendre . . .
Par quels moyens ? D'autres vous le diront.
Moi, c'est l'ardeur que je voudrais nous rendre,
Je ne suis, moi, qu'un sonneur de clairon.

Je vis les yeux fixés sur la frontière
Et front baissé, comme un bœuf au labour ;
Je vais, rêvant à notre France entière,
Des murs de Metz au clocher de Strasbourg.
Depuis dix ans j'ai commencé ce rêve,
Tout le traverse et rien ne l'interrompt.
Dieu veuille un jour qu'un grand Français l'achève !
Je ne suis, moi, qu'un sonneur de clairon.'

Déroulède was supported in his enthusiasm by his old friend Madame Henri Thénard, in whose *salon* in the Rue de Sèvres he was accustomed to recite his 'Chants du Soldat' directly he had composed them. The death (June 1915) of this noble and venerable lady, who was a prime mover in the foundation of the Ligue des Patriotes in 1882, breaks another interesting link with the Empire.

There is something very singular in the coincidence that Déroulède, like Moses, wandered about in the wilderness for forty years, and died at length almost in sight of the Promised

Land of La Revanche. The volume in which Jérôme and Jean Tharaud recount his adventures has been published since his death, but was completed just before it. Those who have read 'La Tragédie de Ravaillac,' which is in its own way a masterpiece, are aware how remarkable is the aptitude shown by MM. Tharaud in reducing a mass of biographical material to its entirely salient and vital proportions. This gift is displayed in their latest work, but not so adequately as to forbid our regret that they did not delay the completion of their monograph a little longer. When once Déroulède was dead, his immortality began and there can be no doubt that his biographers would have been able to produce a more rounded portrait of him if they had not been hampered by the respect due, during his lifetime, to an elderly man in failing health. In particular, they would have dwelt on the significance of the very curious scene which took place in the winter of 1913, when Déroulède, warned by his doctor that the exertion of addressing a large company would almost certainly be fatal to him, insisted on dying in this way. He summoned the Ligue des Patriotes to meet him at Champigny-la-Bataille to commemorate the soldiers fallen in the war of 1870, and determined to be addressing them when the cardiac seizure should destroy him. He duly addressed his leaguers in an impassioned oration, closing his speech with the words 'Vive, vive à jamais 'notre bien-aimée patrie, la France!' prepared to die *coram populo* and amid the thunders of applause. But nothing Déroulède planned ever succeeded, and the motor-car had to carry him home again, to live for several weeks longer.

But the Moses of French battle-poetry had scarcely passed away before its Joshua made his appearance. The name of Théodore Botrel was entirely unknown last summer, and during the first weeks of the war it became famous throughout France. It was signed below a copy of verses, distributed on the 1st of August 1914, beginning:

'Quoi? Le tocsin tonne à l'église?
C'est donc vraiment le branle-bas?
Eh bien! puisque l'on mobilise,
Hardi, les gâs!

Le Kaiser, d'un ton de rogomme,
Vient nous provoquer aux combats?
Rallions tous comme un seul homme:
Hardi, les gâs!'

Here, it was plain, was a disciple or spiritual son of the author of 'Chants du Soldat,' and indeed Botrel presently confessed himself 'petit sergent de Déroulède.' In a poem, 'Mes 'Claironnées,' which he wrote on the 4th of August, he defined his own position :

'—jusqu'à ce que l'on m'égorge,
Tant bien que mal—même râlant,—
Je veux sonner à pleine gorge
Comme Déroulède et Roland ;

Et ma chanson, alerte et pure,
Rythmant votre sublime essor,
Ne s'arrêtera—je le jure—
Que vous triomphants . . . ou moi mort ! '

Sergeant Botrel, however, is very far indeed from being a slavish copy of his predecessor, and the inspiration of his verse is anything but identical. Déroulède did not begin to write verses until France had entered her darkest hour of discouragement and defeat. It is particularly noticeable in his poems that he invariably acknowledges present failure, although he looks beyond it to a coming triumph, of which, moreover, it is impossible for him—in his great sincerity—to pretend to be perfectly certain. Such poetry as is contained in 'Chants du Soldat' was appropriate and salutary up to the moment of renewed hostilities, but then must lose its significance. It is not to be supposed that Paul Déroulède, at the age of seventy, having long abandoned the practice of verse (since 1882 he had done little more than re-issue his poems), would have been able adequately to come forward as the Tyrtæus of a new world at war. For this kind of work the freshness of youth is imperatively needed, and that freshness is the characteristic of Botrel. In him something of the jauntiness of Aristide Bruant and still more a certain childish, almost innocent, *bravura* seems to have taken the place of Déroulède's academic gravity. If we did not fear to seem dazzled by the appearance at the proper moment of so sparkling a talent, we should claim the praise of being the most spirited war-poet of the world, not for Körner or Béranger or even Déroulède, but for the wandering Breton minstrel who is now officially gazetted Poet to the Armies of France.

The romance of Botrel's brief career is remarkable. He

shot up into fame, as we have said, at the moment of mobilisation. Within a few days, as by a kind of magic, all the roads and railways of France were ringing with a new song, 'C'est 'ta Gloire,' which Botrel had composed to a tune of his own. Never were the tap of the drum and the tramping of feet so vividly put into metre :

'Quand, par delà la frontière,
On insulta le drapeau,
Dans un élan de colère
Nous chantâmes aussitôt :
"C'est la guerr', la guerr', la guerre,
C'est la guerre qu'il nous faut !"'

The poet, singing and fighting, found himself by the middle of the month of August in Belgium, where he was nearly lost to French enthusiasm by his determination to serve in the Belgian army. He made a proposal to this effect to the Belgian Minister of War, General de Broqueville, who declined it in terms of the highest generosity, urging Botrel to devote himself to the interests of his own fatherland. Events now moved with extraordinary rapidity, for only eight days later (30th of August 1914) the French Government, by a decree of M. Millerand, appointed Théodore Botrel poet-laureate to the armies of France. An official notice of that date authorised him to 'se rendre dans tous les Dépôts, Camps et Hôpitaux pour y dire et chanter ses poèmes patriotiques.' This is an appointment probably unprecedented in the history of politics.

Since that date, no one has worked with a more fiery assiduity than the Breton 'chansonnier des Armées.' M. Maurice Barrès is an eloquent witness to Botrel's zeal, his activity, his resource and his charm. He circulates among the French troops, from army to army, from troop to troop, reciting and singing to music of his own composition the magical repertory of his constantly increasing store of 'Chants du Bivouac.' Everywhere he is welcomed by enthusiastic soldiers, in crowds often so large that Botrel's rich voice cannot reach the outermost circle, crowds that wait for his refrain, take it up, and disperse it round the whole eastern edge of France. The actual medical effect of Botrel's singing in the hospitals is declared to be miraculous. Mechanically, he introduces to the pain-stricken and the depressed brighter spirits, a quicker pulse, a more

immediate hope. When he has been singing to the wounded, they develop a new determination to get well swiftly and to hasten back to fight. Some of his later songs, born of his perfect confidence, which is now almost a religion, are of a resonant quality. The poem called ' Rosalie ' has excited the coldest critics of Paris, and has been accepted by the Army with a sort of half-idolatrous exultation. It is a song to the glory of the terrible little French bayonet, a weapon which is popularly called, nobody seems to know why, ' Rosalie ' :

' Nous avons soif de vengeance :
Rosalie, verse à la France,
Verse à boire !
De la Gloire à pleins bidons !
Buvons donc ! '

' Rosalie ' promises to take rank immediately by the side of the ' Marseillaise,' as a second immortal war-song of the French.

Another name which was, we believe, quite unknown before the declaration of war is that of M. Miguel Zamacoïs, whose poems, published in various periodicals, have not yet been collected in a volume. His influence is not to be compared with that of M. Botrel, for his appeal is narrowly intellectual, not broadly instinctive. The ' Chants du Bivouac ' are redolent of good-nature, courage, humour, and high spirits ; they are borne up by a kind of divine puerility. Botrel is much more occupied with the bright side of fighting than with its shadows. When the English troops mustered at La Ferté-Milon, he greeted them with the lark-song beginning—

' Dès l'premier jour de guerre
La loyale Angleterre
Envoyait aux combats
Ses plus vaillants soldats,
Conduits par French-le-brave,
Toujours correct et grave.
Ah ! qu'ils ont donc bon air,
Les guerriers d'Kitchener !
Voilà les " Kakis,"
Qui nous ont conquis,
Tant ils sont exquis
(*Aoh ! Yès ! Very well !*)
Lorsque, bravement,
Flegmatiquement,
Ils cogn'nt sur l'All'mand :
Aoh ! Yès ! Very well ! '

This is not the manner of M. Zamacoïs, who is incapable of these Skeltonian or Scarronesque numbers, but who dedicates a muse of rhetorical severity to a study of German character. His addresses to the Kaiser, to the generals, to the enslaved professors of the Vaterland, have a concentration of scorn and a dignity of reproof which remind the English reader of the invectives of Sir Owen Seaman. He sees the brilliant Prussian officer, peacocking it in the *salons* of Berlin, and like an avenging conscience he reminds him of what a brute he really is at heart :

' Car c'est toi, survenant dans la petite ville
Que rien ne pouvait plus à présent protéger,
Qui t'offrais chaque fois le plaisir bien facile
De l'épouvanter sans danger !

C'est toi qui maltraitais le prêtre et le notable
Et faisais devant eux le malin et le fier,
Parce que tu sentais près de toi, sur la table,
Ton grand sabre et ton revolver.

C'est toi qui menaçais les villageois sans armes
Guettés par l'œil mauvais des pétroleurs casqués ;
C'est toi qui faisais peur à des femmes en larmes,
Entouré de canons braqués !

Toi qui terrorisais dans d'humbles maisonnettes
Des vieillards sans vigueur et des gamins tremblants,
Parce qu'autour de toi brillaient les baïonnettes
Au bout des fusils vigilants ! '

The psychology of the modern German is the object of the analysis of M. Zamacoïs, who builds up, like a poetical public prosecutor, his stringent case against the accused. It is sometimes questioned whether any good purpose is served by these exposures. The answer is that crimes deserve punishment, and that it is well that the poet's disgust should be graven in acid on the brow of the criminal. In the case of the Germans there is more than crime : there is inexplicable infatuation. If we may give an instance, which has not been made public, and has reached us from its source in France, we will relate a story which might well inspire M. Zamacoïs. In the varying fortunes of the line in Lorraine, the Germans captured a village which had resisted them. The officer in command had all the houses set a-flame, and then collected

his men in the church. Making them stand near the door, he commanded them to fire up the nave at the ciborium, which they smashed, scattering the Reserved Host over the altar; he then bid them aim at the chalice, with a like result. In the wavering fortunes of the war, this officer was captured by the French, and proved to be an amiable and even pious Bavarian. When some time had passed, the French general reminded his prisoner of his act of sacrilege, and said 'How 'could you, a devout Catholic, commit an impiety which 'must endanger the salvation of your soul?' The Bavarian covered his face with his hands, and murmured '*Oh! es war* '*schrecklich, schrecklich!* but I was ordered to do it!' Even spiritual suicide is demanded of the slaves of Prussian military discipline.

There has surely never been a war which has called forth such a quantity of fugitive verse as the present one. We recollect no parallel to it in modern history. During the war of 1870, the silence of the singing-birds of France was in the highest degree noticeable; there was a complete cessation of sound, as in a hedgerow when the hawk is there. Nor have our own lesser contests been the cause of much verse; no poetical effusion accompanied the South African War. The present abundance of poems is perhaps a consequence, and certainly a proof, of the extraordinary revival of a taste for poetry which has marked the new century, and of the discovery by hundreds, we had almost said thousands, of men and women in France and England that metrical expression of a very decent excellence is easily within their reach. Accordingly, as in this country we have seen offered to the public of the newspapers an enormous mass of verse, very little of which was not marked by some delicate and sincere observation or emotion, so in the French press there has been a remarkable outpouring of ingenious and ardent lyrics illustrating one facet or another of the situation created by the war. It is noticeable, however, that the effect of these pieces is considerably weakened by their being brought together. We have seen this in England, where the too-hastily-edited collections of miscellaneous poems have produced rather a deplorable effect.

Apparently only one such collection has yet been made in France, but in turning over the pages of 'Les Poètes de la 'Guerre' we are conscious of the same disadvantage. The

poets are forty-one in number, and their zeal, patriotism, and high spirit unite them in a fervent chorus. Several of their pieces, when they happened to catch our eye in the newspapers where they originally appeared, affected us keenly. Why then is it that, bound together side by side, they seem to have lost their freshness, and to have become, in a certain measure, importunate and perfunctory? It can be accounted for only on the supposition above indicated, that the poet of war, like the poet of religion, has to sacrifice the fineness of his art to the directness of his task. He cannot throw into the 'Olney Hymns' the beauty of the 'Sonnets from the Portuguese,' and his task being one of edification, the more he tries to adorn the plain tale he has to tell, the more its spiritual significance evades him. He must be Déroulède or Botrel—in other words, he must resign all ambition to write as an artist—if he is to produce his direct and durable impression.

The forty-one poets belong rather to the older than the present generation. Among them are none of the names which have attracted notice for the first time recently, while those who have been conspicuous for experiment or revolt are entirely absent. The young poets are fighting for their country, and several, alas! like Charles Péguy, and the tender Émile Despax, author of 'La Maison des Glycines,' and Robert d'Humières, the translator of Rudyard Kipling, have already fallen on the field of honour. The Poètes de la Guerre have a slightly old-fashioned air, and are none the worse for that; they are non-combatants, but their hearts are in the battle. Here is a spiritual and, we trust, prophetic sonnet, beginning 'Wilhelm, l'Enfer t'attend,' signed by the oldest of the French poets, the octogenarian M. Stéphane Liégeard, who was the last French deputy for Thionville, and knows the tricks of the bandits of the Rhine. Many belated Parnassians find their place among the Forty-One, names once familiar, and now re-awakened by the national crisis; such are M. Auguste Dorchain, and M. Émile Hinzelin and M. Jacques Normand and M. Jean Rameau, the last of whom sends some stinging quatrains on the Iron Cross:

'Ce joujou de fer gris est drôle
Et ne fait pas mal au côté,
Mais, rouge et gravé sur l'épaule,
Ce serait beaucoup mieux porté.'

M. Raoul Ponchon, author of so many *gazettes rimées* in the newspapers, is another old friend, and so is François Fabié, a peasant-poet from the Rouergue, who for thirty years past has been a sort of John Clare of France, and represents with simplicity and sweetness 'la petite patrie.' And here, among the Forty-One, we find more illustrious figures, Madame de Noailles and M. Edmond Rostand and M. Paul Fort.

We mention this name last, for it is that on which we desire to insist the longest. It will be remembered that some five years ago, after the death of Léon Diercx, who had borne the princely title in succession to Stéphane Mallarmé, M. Paul Fort was elected 'Prince' of the French poets by a large majority. This little ceremony of choosing a leader combines in a rather droll way the ancient traditions of Toulouse or Narbonne with the enterprise of a newspaper-office. It would not be wise to claim too much divine right for a monarch so capriciously elected, for a laureate who, like a king of Poland, is made rather than created. But the voters have each time shown themselves men of taste, and a dynasty containing the successive names of Mallarmé, Diercx, Paul Fort, is a royal house that has a history. M. Fort is in several respects a representative writer, and it gave evidence of the moderate and sympathetic nature of his mind that the suffrages of so many schools of poetry could be united in his regard. He has, from the first, been remarkable for the extreme, perhaps the dangerous, fluidity of his language. He is like Victor Hugo in this, if in nothing else, that no subject or mood presents any difficulty of expression to him. He flows, like a tide, over the sandbanks and the reefs of language, flooding his subject with an even, ardent, and melodious mastery, beneath which are concealed problems of style which would daunt any other living writer—except perhaps, and in a totally different way, Mr. Thomas Hardy.

Whether from this amazing facility in bending language to his will, or whether from the concentrated violence of his emotion, or rather perhaps from these two causes acting on each other, M. Paul Fort has succeeded more completely than any other poet in producing a monument of art, as distinguished from improvisation, entirely devoted to the results and preoccupations of the War. With a full sense of the virile beauty of Rupert Brooke's '1914' sonnets, we may place at their side,

because of its plenitude and variety, the exquisite collection of M. Paul Fort's 'Poèmes de France.' If we take Botrel's 'Chants du Bivouac' as the most vivid lyrical utterance of the soldier fighting at the front, we must place beside it, as the work of French poetic art which most marvellously interprets the subtle and poignant reveries of the non-combatant patriot, this 'bulletin de la guerre' by M. Paul Fort.

We have all observed the peculiar effect on landscape produced by an impending change from hot dry weather to rain. The colour of every natural object is intensified; the grey hills turn more than blue, they become purple, with intermittent gauze of violet. The sky grows more luminous, the sea more azure, trees greener and flowers more brilliant than is quite normal, and the agitation of storm and change is felt in the breathless thrill of nature. In reading the 'Poèmes de 'France' we are conscious of a like effect. Everything is drawn up to a pitch, not of exaggeration, but of high clairvoyance and sensitiveness; everything bends to M. Fort's plastic mastery of language; nothing is too slight, too solemn, too tender, too gorgeous to receive its meed of attention. Rossetti, in a phrase often quoted and sometimes misinterpreted, announced that poetry, to make its effect, must be 'amusing.' Amusing is this body of lyrics in the true sense, exciting, various, all alive with its anecdotes, its footnotes, its asides, its sudden daring flights into the empyrean, its swoopings into domesticity.

M. Fort begins with an ode on the destruction of the Cathedral of Reims, dedicated to 'monstrous General 'Baron von Plattenberg,' its infamous destroyer. The poet was born opposite the glorious church in an old house close to the 'Lion d'Or,' that hospitable inn dear to many wandering Englishmen. He mourns, again and again, over the wanton ruin of Senlis, an act which has roused a peculiar ferment of indignation in French bosoms. He gives an extraordinarily vivid account of how the fact of war was announced to himself, early on that August morning, in his peaceful country home, by the rattling of the drums in the village street, an impression which Mme. Marcelle Tinayre has just expounded in her admirable novel 'La Veillée des Armes' (Calmann-Lévy). These are the themes round which M. Fort weaves his skein of brilliant silken threads,—the tranquillity and beauty of France,

the violence of the shock of invasion, the horrible gluttony of destruction on the part of the invaders. He is full of irony, of anger, of tenderness ; he exhibits, waving it like a banner, an immense feeling of pride in the landscape of France.

In ' Ce que nous défendons ' he celebrates, with lingering detail, the beauties of all the provinces of his country :

' Oui ! le Béarn au loin souffre dans ses cérises ; la Provence, où la rose est plus que l'aube exquise, émeut d'un froid mistral ses oranges sanguines, elles tombent ; et ce vent, roses, vous assassine ; la Guyenne aérée empoussière ses vignes.'

(The reader probably does not need to be reminded that since the beginning of his career M. Paul Fort has persisted, nobody knows why, in printing his verses—and very good verses they are—as if they were prose. We respect his foible, though we are tempted to break his periods into metre.) He pays us a charming compliment : ' Il n'est que les Anglais et ' nous pour aimer finement la France.' His stanzas, with their rich praise of all these varied and wonderful provinces, form a great bouquet of odour and colour. His references to the English are invariably of a nature to draw the hearts of the two nations nearer to one another. ' Le Chant des ' Anglais,' which is a sort of dream-fugue on the air of ' It's ' a long, long way to Tipperary,' is extremely touching ; none the less, and perhaps all the more, because a pardonable want of familiarity with the exact meaning of some of our colloquial phrases gives a perilously comic effect to what is entirely serious and tender in intention.

It is difficult, perhaps in consequence of his remarkable fluidity of style, to give a brief and yet adequate impression of M. Fort's manner. But from the splendid ' Veillée des ' Saints Patrons de France ' we may extract one stanza. The saints have met, with oriflammes and ribanded wings, around the Archangel Michael on his great Abbey of Mont St. Michel, there to proclaim their unalterable fidelity to France in her hour of torment ; and they proclaim joy and hope, for victory is announced in heaven. The arrival of the various saints is described with marvellous vivacity, and among the brilliant throng sailing through the calm and silent azure towards the great abbey church on its island there are some legendary forms familiar to ourselves :

'Le preux, le beau, le vrai saint Georges d'Angleterre, éblouissant d'éclairs du casque aux genouillères, haussant brumeusement une Rose géante à la pointe du glaive, illuminant, derrière, la subite venue de saint Patrick d'Irlande (oh! quels grands Trèfles d'or enguirlandent sa crosse!) et l'aspect sauvageon de saint André d'Écosse qui porte en lampes tristes, en veilleuses lumières, d'immenses Chardons bleus sur sa croix de travers. Que nous vient-il du nord où des Anges circulent? O Vierge du Brabant! pure et sainte Gudule! ô bergère des Anges, approchez-vous de l'âtre. Mais ce bûcher n'est rien au prix de votre ardeur, vous qui tenez modestement sur votre cœur l'huile d'Asie brûlant dans la coupe d'albâtre!'

With this we might compare the glowing study of Russia contained in 'Les Cosaques,' and the Italian pictures in the longest and most ambitious poem of the collection, the great ode in honour of the Garibaldis.

The greatest of wars is not over, and we know not what surprises its development may have in store for us. But throughout France, so far as her temper is revealed in the verse which the tremendous crisis has awakened in her literature, there is an extraordinary unanimity of sentiment. Whether in the songs her soldiers sing around their camp fires, or in the elaborate lyrics of her poet-artists, the key-note is everywhere the same, *Sursum corda!* Throughout the French people there is a superb and delicate confidence of victory, which does not express itself in frantic shouts or extravagant prophecies, but is gravely founded on the determination of a united people to defend the fatherland which they never loved with so devoted a passion as they do at this hour of anxiety and sorrow.

EDMUND GOSSE.

NATIONALITY IN GARDENING

1. **Des Divers Styles de Jardins.** By M. Fouquier and A. Duchêne. Paris : Émile Paul. 1914.
2. **Gardens in the Making.** By Walter H. Godfrey. B. T. Batsford. 1914.
3. **Garden Craft in Europe.** By H. Inigo Triggs. B. T. Batsford. 1913.
4. **Houses and Gardens by E. L. Lutyens.** By Lawrence Weaver. Published by 'Country Life.' 1913.

I.

A GLANCE at the mass of modern literature on the subject of gardening will show how rapidly our pleasure-grounds are being transformed. Each season swells the flood of books. There are the stately tomes with their exquisite reproductions and quaint old prints, with their historical, critical, and withal somewhat leisurely letterpress. Fresh details are given of well-known Italian villa gardens, half hidden in the gloom of their cypress trees and pines; stories are told of old-time herbalists and garden lovers, tales that have gathered round the yews and cedars sheltering famous English lawns. Then there is the book of the practical architect, with his splendid photographs and clearly shown plans, with views of marvellous gardens made for multi-millionaires, and pictures of flower-embowered 'cottages,' where worn-out statesmen spend their week-end rest; — no dwelling here on the past, except to turn it into present use and advantage. Books appear on the gardens of the smaller country house, on rock gardens, water gardens, woodland gardens, down to rose gardens, herb gardens, and to all the smallest details of the craft. Gardening magazines flourish and increase. The daily papers, with their quick *flair* and response to the feeling of the hour, find space to tell us, once a week at least, how best to grow the new potato or sweet pea. Even the Board of Agriculture has lately recognised the subject.

As M. Corpechot points out, in his delightful preface to 'Des Divers Styles de Jardins,' 'few can be painters, sculptors, 'composers, architects, or poets, but we are all gardeners'; we can each, if we have the mind, make a little garden. The history of gardening, he goes on to say, illustrates more clearly than any other art the nationality of a people; their collective tastes, faculties, gifts; their manner of life, their conception of the beautiful.

It may be said that architecture began for us with Greece and Rome. But our gardens, if a 'later and greater per-'fection,' represent an older art, and came from further East. Almost all modern garden books are curiously silent on this point, or are content with a few notes here and there, as if determined not to stray outside European spheres. Yet, though the debt is usually ignored, the four most characteristic European styles—styles so definitely national that they have given their names to the 'Italian garden,' the 'Dutch garden,' 'le jardin Anglais,' and the less-known 'Spanish water garden'—owe much of their individual inspiration to their contact with Asia. Italy had the East at her doors. In Spain the Moslem conquerors crossed the threshold, bringing spices and flowery treasures, in search of which, long afterwards, the Dutch and the English sailed the unknown seas.

The great gardens of the old world were the gardens of the arid lands. Egypt was famous for its roses as well as for its lotus flowers. The plan of a temple garden—which is still preserved—shows a great colonnaded portico carried out in a series of pergolas covered by vines. This structure occupies the whole centre of the square enclosure, and is surrounded with ornamental tanks of water and avenues of palms—shade and water were the first requirements of the Egyptian garden; and 'the lure of green things growing' proved ever strongest among those whose work and wars led them over the desert salt-hills, and far across the treeless miles of barren, sunbaked plains.

The Assyrians and Persians, even more than the Egyptians, set great store by their gardens. Xenophon mentions his astonishment at the splendour of the Persian parks and pleasure-grounds, and the care which was taken to have them filled with 'every kind of plant and flower that could by any means 'be collected.' But the earliest mention of a Greek garden is

Homer's palace of Alcinous, the garden of 'the four plough-'gates,' 'where evermore the west wind blowing brings fruits to 'birth and ripens others.' It recalls the Buddhist Garden of the Pure Land, with its self-renewing fruits and flowers, its waters, and its four guardian doors. In Greece, too, as in India, deities and lawgivers had their groves. Lycurgus taught under the shade of his own plantations, and Aphrodite rose among her sweet pink oleander blooms, as well as from her wine-dark purple waves.

The gardens of the Eastern world, the extent and beauty of which so surprised the Greeks, were not only hunting parks and enclosures for producing fruit and flowers; they were, above all, open-air palaces and houses: homes made lovely and delightful by every known device. The old country houses or garden palaces of Rajputana and Northern India show how this ancient form of civilisation, so well adapted to the climate and surroundings among which it was evolved, persists almost unchanged to this day. Outside, the drab land sparkles painfully in the growing morning glare. Bare red rocks reflect a hotter sunshine, or protect a jungle growth of gnarled and stunted trees. Far off, the rising foothills lie quivering in the lavender and mauve of the lost horizon line, until, from the mud-built village sheltering under the palace walls, the children drive the great brown buffaloes, obscuring all in a cloud of golden dust. But through the shadow of the garden portal a fresh world lies revealed: a perfumed fairy paradise, made musical with rippling water-ways, gay with the open blaze of beds full of marigolds and poppies, cool with the green gloom of close-set cypress trees, mangoes and neems, and curiously ornate with a mist of spraying fountains and intricate stone parterres set with rose bushes, gardenias, jasmine, and other smaller flowers.

The garden may be large or small. It may enclose an Emperor's summer palace, the tomb of a saint or a poetess-princess, or the exquisite mausoleum of a famous, well-loved queen. Or it may be only a little garden, a series of small pavilions, a refuge from the breathless heat of June in an Oriental town. But, large or small, in nearly every case the main design will prove the same; the entrance waterway will form one arm of a great cross. High embattled walls, pierced by four arched gateways and guarded by octagonal

corner towers, enclose the whole irrigated square, in the centre of which stands a building or a masonry fountain tank. Here, in the midst of the garden, grew the Tree of Knowledge and of Life. Here it is still planted in India. For no art penetrates deeper into Eastern life and feeling, no form of civilisation is more ancient or unchanged, no craft traditions reveal more intimately the well-kept secrets of the older Gods, the Lords of light and darkness, thirst and hunger, sun and moon, than the art of the Indian 'bágh.'

The Romans, like the Greeks, owed their taste for gardening, and its subsequent magnificent development, to Asiatic influence. What little can be gathered as to early Roman gardens shows them to have been comparatively simple and small, used for purely horticultural purposes, for growing necessary vegetables and fruit. Cato, it is true, pointed out that a city garden, 'especially of one who has no other, ought 'to be ornamented, and planted with every possible care, with 'bulbs from Megara, Delphic and Cyprian laurel, and myrtle on 'palisades both white and black.' But it is not until about a hundred years later that the great general Lucullus, fresh from his victories over Mithridates and Tigranes, commenced his vast garden works described by Plutarch. His villa at Cape Misenum, near Baiae, was the first European pleasure-ground to rival those of Persia.

The Roman villa was divided into two different classes, the 'villa urbana,' in or near a town, and the 'villa rustica,' which was more in the nature of a country house or pleasure farm. In both cases, the warm climate of Italy and the consequent open-air life gave an interwoven character to house and grounds. What charming effects were produced within the smallest compass, town gardens such as those at Pompeii disclose. Each little court had its character and use. The smallest atrium was laid out with plants and flowers. In the centre was the 'impluvium,' a shallow pool or stone-lined tank, receiving the water from the surrounding cloister roof or filled by the merry splash and sparkle of a little fountain jet. Not only flower-beds, but clipped shrubs, statues, mosaic-work alcoves and grottoes, marble seats and water-basins adorned the larger 'peristyles.' Wall paintings both at Pompeii and Herculaneum show what the more ephemeral structures must have been. Shrines, temples, trellised

enclosures, and arbours of variously painted wood brightened the garden. Pergolas were made of marble columns, with carved and painted beams. Aviaries, too, were a conspicuous feature. For in these Roman gardens, as in the East, no paradise was complete without the gaiety of birds.

Maecenas had his famous ' villa urbana ' on the Esquiline. The Pincian Hill was covered by the magnificent pleasance of Acilius Glabrio. Domitian laid out his pleasure-grounds on the Palatine in imitation of the Gardens of Adonis, and on the terraced slopes of the Janiculum were the public gardens bequeathed by Julius Caesar to his people. The whole country outside the city at one time was covered by a series of garden dwellings. Of these, perhaps the most splendid ever built was the Emperor Hadrian's villa at Tivoli, overlooking the beautiful Vale of Tempe, and, far across the wide Campagna, the white temple-covered hills of Rome.

Pliny the younger loved to spend his leisure at his favourite country house, where, under the clear Tuscan sky, ' all is calm ' and quiet, no one wants you in the neighbourhood, and there ' is no need to put on your toga.' Like its Eastern prototypes Pliny's villa was laid out in a series of terraces stepping down the mountain side. The principal rooms and pavilions were specially designed with regard to the time of year at which they were to be occupied, the charm of the garden foreground, and the delight of a distant view. Chief of the garden staff of slaves was the ' topiarius,' the craftsman who directed the extensive planting and clipping of the trees ; next in importance was the ' aquarius,' in charge of the fountains and waterworks. For topiary designs the shrubs most generally used were rosemary, box, cypress, and bay. Their green walls divided plot from plot, formed cool, dim, covered alleys, and sheltered the exotic plants and flowers. This shaping of clipped trees seems to have been a taste dear to the ordered Roman mind ; statuary, whether in stone or marble, or cut out of living green, was the characteristic feature of a Roman garden. The Eastern touch is plainly to be seen in Pliny's garden symbolism, illustrating the artist's and the owner's names, and in his alternating avenues of apple-trees and box ; while his violet garden, scenting the portico overhanging the waves of Laurentium, finds an echo in the Persian lilac terrace above the placid waters of the Dal.

II.

Gardening is, above all, the art of settled peace. Architecture survived amid the most disastrous of the old wars, forts and walled villages replacing country villas and farms. A form of warfare that devastates whole countries with the force of an earthquake and the relentless sweep of some great tidal wave has been the grim reward of scientific research, and reserved for our present age. But with the downfall of the 'Pax Romana,' under the raiding Vandals and Goths, the splendid country palaces, with their open courts and their undefended gardens, which the taste and security of Imperial Rome had scattered over Italy, completely disappeared. With the coming of chaos the gentle art of gardening fled.

When, in the year 330 A.D., the Emperor Constantine transferred the seat of Empire to Byzantium, all the arts underwent a great change. The new Christian influence being antagonistic to the old gods and their sculptured representations, the nude was not studied as in classic times. Figure sculpture became entirely dependent on architecture, which in its turn responded to the direct touch and influence of the East.

It was reserved for the Arabs, and more particularly to the Shiah Moslems of Persia, to develop the love of plants and flowers until, owing partly to the conditions of the country and partly to the religious restrictions of the Koran—which forbade the delineation of human beings—dwelling, as they did, on the delights of the eight-fold Paradise, the garden became the paramount influence throughout Moslem art. The intense appreciation of this special craft was no doubt fostered in Arabia by the difficulties of its practice. Elaborate and costly irrigation works were the only means of producing the result desired. Little wonder then that, after long days of journeying over the shadeless burning sands, the first glimpse of the green, fountain-sprinkled garden seemed heaven itself.

The Yemenite Arabs who invaded Spain in the eighth century had, unlike other nomad Arab tribes, developed a remarkable civilisation and art at their capital of Sana. The naïve traditional birds and beasts painted on the pottery of Triana, and the curious Indo-Persian character of the designs which still persist in the lace-work of Seville, show how

deep-rooted the effect of this influence has been. But the Spanish Moslem water-gardens, although few in number and small in comparison with their originals at Sana, Baghdad, and Damascus, are even more interesting survivals.

The first Omeyyad Emir, 'Abd-er-Raham I., was noted for his love of flowers. After his conquest of Cordova, one of his first concerns was the building of a garden which should recall the palace of his grandfather, Kalif Hisham, at Damascus, where he had been brought up as a child. All kinds of rare and exotic trees and flowers were introduced from foreign lands. The Emir's agents were despatched to Syria, even as far as Turkestan and India, to bring him strange new plants and seeds. Among these, the date palm and the pomegranate, now the emblem of Andalusia, both became naturalised in Spain at this time The two succeeding Emirs, Hisham and Hakam, kept up this taste. Under the rule of 'Abd-er-Raham II., the son and successor of Hakam, the Court of Cordova became renowned for its brilliant luxury. The new Sultan surrounded himself with a numerous and talented retinue; he adorned his capital with costly works, constructing bridges, palaces and mosques, and showed his skill in devising and laying out spacious and beautiful gardens, through which canals conducted water from the mountain streams.

The other cities of the Western Kalifate were no less remarkable than Cordova for their surrounding gardens. Toledo, the old capital of the Visigoths, had a notable Moorish palace. In the centre of the garden lake rose a water pavilion of stained glass, adorned with gold. Here the Sultan could recline in comfort on the hottest summer day, encircled by the glistening shower falling from the dome. At night tapers were lighted to glow through the transparent walls. This pavilion recalls an Indian example in the Maharaja's garden at Alwar, where a veil of spray from beneath the cornice completely encloses the white marble loggia. There is a curiously Indian suggestion too, of a much earlier date, in the Visigothic tradition which taught that no flowers should be plucked that had not been bedewed with the water of baptism. To this day, in Hindu India, no sweet-scented flowers are gathered from the garden to string in wreaths or to decorate the rooms without a previous offering of some blossoms to the gods of the household shrine.

From the intricate story of Western Islam, confused by the fierce inter-tribal feuds transferred from the deserts of Arabia to the valleys of Southern Spain, the figure of Mu'tamid of Seville stands out as the last of the Poet-Princes, the last Spanish-born king who worthily represented Arab culture and nationality. Born in 1040, Mu'tamid, like his predecessors at Cordova, was passionately fond of flowers and gardens. Once when his wife, Rumaykiyya, who was also noted for her wit and skill in verse, was watching from the palace archways the rare spectacle of falling snow, she burst into tears. Mu'tamid, she declared, must provide this lovely sight each winter, or else take her to a land where the snowflakes ever fall. The Kalif promised to grant her wish : 'Thou shalt 'have snow each winter even here ; such is my word.' He promptly ordered the Sierra of Cordova to be planted with almond trees ; so that after the frosts of winter passed away the bare brown hills were once more clothed, for Rumaykiyya's delight, in delicate pink snow.

The neighbourhood of Madrid is not a promising one for gardens. In winter icy winds blow over its plateau ; in summer only persistent watering can keep plants and flowers alive. But at three royal country palaces within reach of the capital there are good examples of what Renaissance gardening in Spain became. The Court of the Evangelists, at the Escurial, has an interesting parterre, laid out with clipped box hedges, narrow pathways, and four large pools, one on each side of a stone garden-house. The Palace of Aranjuez, at the junction of the Tagus with the Xarama, has a wooded island garden, with avenues of fine old English oaks and elms, trees of a kind then new to Spain, which were brought over and planted by Philip II. But the lingering influence of the Moorish water-garden can best be seen at the Château of La Granja, enlarged by Philip II., in imitation of Versailles. For although on a much smaller scale than the French original, its fountains are among the most marvellous in Europe, and far surpass those of Le Nôtre.

But these palace pleasances are isolated examples ; country gardens nowadays are curiously rare in Spain. Even in Moorish times the Christians of Seville, descendants of the old Roman families who had made that city their capital, chose to live in the town itself, while the garden-loving Arabs preferred

to settle in the open country round. But if large modern gardens are few and far between, in the town the 'patio' or internal courtyard is still the most distinctive feature of Spanish domestic architecture, and plays a great part in the life of the household. Like the hall of an English country house, it is the general meeting-place of the family. It forms a delightful open-air living-room, kept cool in the intense heat of summer by the shade of its high, enclosing arcades. Although the Spanish 'patio' corresponds in some ways to the Italian 'cortile,' it is much more directly descended from the atrium of Roman days, and these modern courtyard gardens show how suited to the climate and how charming the 'villa urbana' of the Romans must have been.

III.

It was Charlemagne, after his successful wars against the Saracens, Lombards, and Saxons, who first made a northern garden. At his palace of Nieder-Ingelheim on the Rhine, which he decorated with a hundred columns of Italian marble, he took the greatest interest in agriculture and horticulture. There he wrote his capitulary, 'De villis et curtis,' one of the most valuable and detailed documents relating to the art of gardening in these early centuries. He recommended that his subjects should grow fruit-trees and medicinal herbs, as well as various ornamental plants. His own palace gardens, like the cloistered paradises of the East, of which he had no doubt heard, contained, among other treasures, a remarkable collection of beasts and birds. It was about this time—while 'Abd-er-Raham was laying out his splendid pleasure grounds at Cordova—that a more famous contemporary, the Kalif Haroun-al-Raschid, sent the Christian Emperor a present of an elephant to add to his menagerie. Considering the size of the gift, and the difficulty of the journey from Baghdad to the Rhine, one would like to know how it got there.

The tenth century, a period of such civilisation in Moorish Spain, was one of marked depression over the rest of Europe. The religious communities, almost alone, had the necessary protection or the time to turn their energies towards gardening. During these darkest years of Christendom it was the monastery walls that sheltered such learning as was left, and its fields

and gardens made an oasis in the wild. In every country, horticulturists owe more to the monasteries than is generally supposed.* The medieval monks not only did much to protect gardening and other peaceful arts, but to their ardent preaching was due the great adventure of the Crusades, which brought the West as a whole once more into touch with Asia. The Christian knights and pilgrims who lived to reach the Holy Land were amazed at the civilisation and culture of Islam. All the European arts benefited by this contact and its stimulus, and a special impulse was given to gardening.

The travellers brought back strange new trees and plants. Many hitherto unknown fruits and flowers reached Europe for the first time in this way, such as the Persian rose, and our old-fashioned damask rose, or rose of Damascus. The spring glories of the Eastern parterres, the tulip, hyacinth, fritillary, ranunculus, and lilac were not left behind, and the jasmine, next to the rose in Oriental favour, reached Europe from Arabia by way of Spain.

With the new importations came something of their former symbolism ; for even in its details gardening, like every other Eastern art, had its symbolic as well as its practical meaning and arrangement, and these memories clung to the transplanted flowers. Moslem attributes and Persian floral fancies became emblems of the Christian virtues, and were included in the heraldry of the Saints. Glowing roses typified the fire of missionary zeal ; the azure fleur-de-lis suggested the calm of celestial contemplation, ' which aspires above the sky up to ' th' immortal choir.' The Rosa Mariae, the Rose of Jericho, was believed by the pilgrims to the Holy Sepulchre to have sprung up at each resting-place on the flight into Egypt. It was said to have blossomed for the first Christmas, to have closed at the Crucifixion, and re-opened on Easter Day. The white iris, sacred to the Madonna, was the flower of hope, light, and power. Its threefold petals represented the Trinity and

* In China many species would have completely disappeared but for monastic care. The most striking example is the survival of the maidenhair tree—*Ginkgo biloba*—which, although no longer to be found wild, is so closely associated with temple courts and shrines. This beautiful tree is a relic of a very early flora. It flourished during the secondary period, and it has been said that its fossil remains can be traced back to the primary rocks.

the virtues of faith, wisdom, and valour. In Spain the lily had been adopted by the Knightly Order of Our Lady of Old Time as their crusading device. Henceforward the Lilies of our Lady became the special mark of Andalusian design, and the jar or vase with the two-branched lily springing from it was known as the ' Heraldic Arms of the Virgin.' The sacred lotus, worshipped as the flame of life from the earliest time, found in this guise a way into Christian art and legend ; while the vase holding the lilies took the place of the lota, or Waterpot of the World, from which the Indian flower sprang. Some Spanish artists even went so far as to paint the Virgin sitting on a water-lily, like Buddha, wrapped in meditation, floating on his Lotus of the Good Law.

In Provence, whence the first crusade set out, the songs of the troubadours kept alive and carried on the old traditions of the Valley of the Rhone. Life in a feudal castle, if occasionally dangerous, was for the most part monotonous enough, especially for the chatelaine left behind. She and her ladies must have welcomed the resources of poetry, embroidery, and the delights of their herb-garden. What the castle ' verger ' was like may be gathered from passing references in chronicles of the time, or, better still, seen in illuminated breviaries, missals, and Books of Hours. The enclosure, being carefully hidden away within the fortifications, was necessarily small. Its chief object and architectural ornament was a high stone fountain, a slender, elegant structure, closely resembling an old English village cross. Encircling its steps and basin were rows of small raised beds, filled with flowers, and sometimes edged with tiny wooden rails. Wattle hedges covered with climbing roses divided the garden into separate parts, and a low narrow terrace, planted with herbs or turfed to sit and rest on, ran round the outer walls.

For a time Italian craftsmen were content to follow those of France, but the influence did not last. The imaginative flowers of Gothic art soon flagged in Italy ; they failed to take root in the old Roman soil. The rival churches of the Dominican and Franciscan friars are often the only Gothic buildings to be seen in an Italian town. All through the troubled dream of the centuries, the craftsmen's ears caught faint recurring echoes of a glorious Pagan past. It was owing to the recovery of classic learning that the country's supremacy in the other

arts was gained. With the Renaissance in Italy the gay, careless gods returned. Pan woke from his long sleep in the ilex woods, and peeped over the medieval castle walls. Cupid and Ceres, Flora and the tree nymphs, followed him as he leapt into the garden and laughed as they chased the wan saints, and drove the wyvern and other monstrous beasts of heraldry from their home. The fall of Constantinople quickened the awakening interest in ancient life and thought. The influence from the East was, this time, Greek rather than Oriental. The treasures of the newly recovered classics, brought into Italy by the Greek scholars who fled before the conquering Turks, were eagerly searched for references to the architecture of old times. More settled conditions aided the revived taste for country life. Villas sprang up and dotted the hillsides within reach of every principal town. The merchant nobles of the powerful northern cities vied with each other and with the cardinals and princes of Rome in the splendour of their pleasure-grounds. Then, as now, gardening became the fashion of the day. So well and daringly designed, so solid in their sound construction, so vast their plan, the gardens of the Italian Renaissance are many of them practically unchanged. It was the spell of the distance, that love of looking down from a height—a feeling Italian builders shared with those of Persia—as much as an inherited sense of form, that saved the gardens.

Seen for the first time, the old gardens of Italy are disappointingly devoid of flowers. Amid the cool greens and greys of a northern landscape, the English pleasance strikes a welcome, warm, bright note. Beneath the intense blue skies of Italy life runs in different grooves, and the law of contrast demands and deepens other charms.

Only under a cloudless sky can house and garden be so intimately combined that to step through shady portico and pillared loggia into the open air is but to pass from one set of rooms to another; to exchange the fading glories of the dim salon, with its mirrored frescoes and carvings, for parlours whose chandeliers are crystal fountains, and whose walls are hung with fine green tapestries of box. Each pleasant month from spring, until autumn brings the vintage, has a corner of its own, on the terraces that plunge into the valley or climb the steep mountain flank, till ordered formality vanishes

in the wild chestnut woods. And everywhere through the garden the water throbs and flows; not with the tranquil, purposeful beauty of the East, but with a restless Western magic of its own; dripping ceaselessly over dark, fern-lined grottoes; pouring through great jars which struggling Cupids try to hold aloft, or rushing down carved cascades. Empty urns and broken statues, crumbling steps and sweeping balustrade, cut out of the rough fawn tufa stone, alone relieve the blue of sky and water and the dark prevailing forest green. Fine as the Italian gardens are, it is not so much in actual grandeur of form or glow of colour as in the subtle force of contrast and unexpectedness, in imagination, and in poetry that they reign supreme.

Among the romantic valleys of Italy, with their rapid streams and pine-clothed rocky slopes, a scheme worked out in a splendid series of terraces had become the garden-builder's aim. But in France, when the native designer was partly freed from this influence and began to choose for himself, he chose—as his works and his books tell us,—for preference, 'le niveau parfait.' In a land of great trees and tranquil rivers, of dense wooded areas and far-extending plains, the French gardener was right. Drive up one of the long triple avenues which form the *pâte d'oie* and meet in a circle before the forecourt of the château; enter the main building and, passing through the tall, narrow windows of the salon, step out on the *perron* of the garden front, and you will see how right he was. From the top of the shallow flight of steps the great parterre bursts into view; at first just a maze of colour, backed and enriched by its dark, shadowy boundary of trees, through which delightful woodland alleys give a breath of open distance, or a glimpse of springing fountain, or of placid passing stream. Nearer at hand, the forest, tamed and clipped, throws up in luminous distinctness the white statues filling its green niches, and the rows of flower-decked vases on the low stone balustrade. Serene and calm, a pool of magic colours lost in an enchanted wood, the garden lies, until slowly the form of the parterre begins to take shape, when, with its free-swinging curves and interlacing ovals, its intricate delicacies of colour, spacing, and line, it seems the glowing image of some great flamboyant window traced by the sunshine on the grey cathedral floor.

In the *grand parterre* the French craftsman's innate feeling for *mouvement*, his old love for decorative line, found a fresh and congenial means of expression.

As time went on, the level gardens where this skill was best displayed grew larger and larger. At Vaux-le-Vicomte, and among the woods at Chantilly, where Le Nôtre made his celebrated water parterre, French gardening in its grand yet complicated simplicity, in its *prestige du dessin*, reached its height. The size of Versailles marked its decline. The immense scale of the plan destroyed its splendour no less than its charm. The garden, not content with its former boundaries, completely swept over and submerged the park. Its lines stretched out indefinitely, and the whole force of the general effect was lost—a mistake which no magnificence of detail or beauty of ornament could retrieve.

IV.

The level French garden depended largely for effect on its woodland background. In the Low Countries, on the other hand, where the boggy nature of the soil prevented the growth of large trees, the Dutch designers did well to restrict the size of their gardens, and to rely almost entirely on the beauty and gaiety of their flowers. In France, too, as in Italy, fountains had become a special feature of the national style, and water was often employed for a purely decorative purpose. In Holland this was unusual, for the Dutch gardens, like those of Spain, were in themselves water-gardens. Where the old gardens of Moslem Spain depended on their *cañerias*, the Dutch gardens made use of their canals. Each type of design grew out of its structural requirements; in one, the water coursed merrily along through ornamented pools and channels raised above the level of the ground; in the other, shrubs and flowers stood high on islands and solid earth embankments, intersected by slow-moving waterways and dykes;—if the Spanish garden had to be irrigated, the Dutch garden had to be drained.

From early times the people of the Netherlands were noted for their love of flowers. The Flemings, under the Dukes of Burgundy, rivalled the Provençal knights in the number of strange plants they brought home from Syria and the Holy

Land. It is said that the tulip was first introduced into the *vermakhoven*—pleasure-yards—of the Flemish burghers as early as the twelfth century. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the châteaux of the nobles were surrounded by beautiful gardens forming, as a rule, a series of island courts, divided from each other and protected by a chain of moats and fishponds. We can still see, in Jan Vredeman de Vries' designs, published at Antwerp in 1583, how, in these Flemish water-gardens, trellised cloister walks took the place of walls, and quaint high-arched bridges spanned the dykes, where gaily painted barges plied. The curious storks' nests, constructed in a tree about twenty or thirty feet from the ground, shown in the old prints, are customary at country houses in the Netherlands to this day. Even more interesting are the old tree-pavilions, the round banqueting-rooms made of interwoven boughs, and approached by winding stairs, which often occupied the centre of the garden.

The Dutch of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were ardent horticulturists. Some of the earliest botanical gardens in Europe are to be found in Holland. That of Leyden was started in the year 1577. The soil of the Low Countries, though unsuitable for large trees, grew bulbs and herbaceous plants to perfection, and wealthy citizens and learned men did everything that lay in their power to stimulate and encourage the progress of botany. A ship never left a Dutch port without its captain receiving instructions to bring back all the new seeds and unknown plants he could obtain.

The Dutch settlements in India largely contributed to the supply of new flowers for horticulturists at home. The foundation of the Factory at Surat in 1616 coincided exactly with the commencement of the famous tulip craze in Holland. Enormous sums of money changed hands when the mania was at its height ; many of the most precious bulbs coming, as new specimens come to-day, from Kashmir and Afghanistan, and even from further afield in Eastern Persia and Chinese Turkestan.

The cultivation in such quantities of tulips, hyacinths, and narcissus is thought to have started the more general use of cut flowers for the decoration of the interior of the house. Fine specimens of Delft vases, designed specially for their display, are still preserved at the Palace of Hampton Court.

But the idea probably originated in the Dutch East. It was no doubt taken from the vases of flowers set round the carpet of state on all festive and ceremonial occasions: a charming Moslem custom which would be familiar to the Dutch settled at Surat, as would be also the Persian and Mughal paintings of flowers.

V.

When William III. and Queen Mary introduced the Dutch style of gardening at their palaces of Hampton Court and Kensington, it was but the last of a long series of changes due to Continental influence. Under the Tudors, English gardeners had learnt from Italy the decorative value of terraces and fountains; the Stuarts encouraged the French multiplication of avenues and parterres. During the short, prosaic rule of the Commonwealth, attention was confined to horticulture, for, beauty being but a snare, gardening as an art was at a discount—useful vegetables were much preferred to vain and ornamental flowers. But with the return of the gay world from exile in France and Flanders, the French taste renewed its sway; until, under the Prince of the House of Orange, Dutch water-gardens became the rage.

But each of these changes was, in itself, a thing of slow growth. English craftsmen then, as now, were never prone to welcome unproved ideas. Throughout each phase some means was always found of making foreign fashions fit the national taste and aims. It was only when this English individuality and adaptability were suppressed and crushed, when the more humble artist-craftsmen were entirely overruled by architects trained to admire the worst excesses of the 'grand manner' as seen on the Continent, and to show the skill of their plans by their size, that the well-ordered harmony of the English house and garden broke down. National taste, ever on the side of moderation and reserve, of sweetness rather than display, of beauty on Menager's 'neatly ordered' scale, revolted at the dull miles of avenues and statues, and parterres so involved that coloured sand ousted their flowers. For all its stately delicacy and precision, French and Dutch design had flagged: it had grown tired. Its method, its system, became intolerable; in gardening, as in other arts, the classical inspiration was dying out. And soon the 'grand manner' of Versailles, copied

at every big and little European Court, seemed to the rising school of Romanticists to be a dull pomposity, and all its dignity of well-drilled flowers and bouquets a mere stage scenery of royalty, a stupid, heartless, tiresome sham.

But the garden having grown so big that it swallowed up the park, the park in revenge now swept over the garden. Soon the chase, with its fine groups of trees, and views of wood and rush-fringed lake-side, was the only sylvan beauty it was proper to admire. From the square, many-windowed block of the late Georgian house, no flowers were to be seen; even the kitchen garden was carefully hidden in a neighbouring wood on account of its necessary but offending walls. 'Le Jardin 'Anglais,' in whose name so many of the finest Continental gardens were destroyed, was a park and nothing more.

The Gothic revival in England, which transformed the Georgian house, for some reason or other left the park as it was. The flower orchards and quaint enclosed 'vergers' of the Middle Ages seem to have been overlooked and forgotten by the Romantic enthusiasts. But gradually, as the growth of scientific research joined hands with the love of horticulture inherited from the Dutch, the study of botany came again to the fore, and the colour of flowers crept into the green park-like grounds. Round the tight clumps of laurel and rhododendron bushes that closed in the winding drives, or made squat, unhappy islands on the undulating lawns, narrow borders of colour began to make their appearance. Then, growing bolder, the geraniums and yellow calceolarias, with their edging of blue lobelia and variegated leaves, stepped out unsupported on to the grass. These odd flower-beds dotted promiscuously about were soon seen to be unsatisfactory; besides, they could not contain half the new sub-tropical plants and fashionable flowers; so, to some extent, the terraced parterre or 'Italian garden' was revived. But these Victorian 'Italian gardens' had little in common with their name. Pergolas were unknown in them; stone-bordered pools and fountains were few and far between. The grand simplicity of planting, so noticeable in their originals—where as a rule the most splendid effects were obtained with only four kinds of contrasting trees: stone-pine, cypress, ilex, and plane—was rendered impossible by the taste for specimen trees, 'trees of 'curiosity,' as they were once called.

Throughout the course of the eighteenth century many new shrubs and trees had reached England from the Farther East, and more especially from China. And the English landscape park is thought to have borrowed something of its irregular character from the accounts of Chinese gardening sent home by missionaries and early travellers. But in the nineteenth century, English gardening undoubtedly owed more to Japan. Apart from the many horticultural novelties introduced from time to time, the flowering shrubs and creepers, the chrysanthemums and Japanese iris, we owe the æsthetic movement of the eighteen-eighties very largely to the re-discovery of the art of Japan by European artists. It was the æsthetes with their sunflower and their lily who, if at times rather absurd, first drew attention to the crude taste then prevailing in our houses and our gardens. It was the beautiful Japanese art of flower-arrangement that shook loose the stiff little bunches of prized hot-house flowers, with their frills of maidenhair fern, and brought great branches of blossom into our rooms. To the same cause may be attributed the success of the 'wild garden,' and the charming custom, first advocated, I believe, in about 1881 by Mr. William Robinson, of planting bulbs in the grass, and opening out the shrubberies into flowery woodland glades. Best of all, Japan brought back to view the banished orchard beauties: pink almond blossom with its crimson eyes, snow-white plum and dancing cherry, rose-flushed peach and sturdy moss-grown apple-trees and pears.

It was about this time that 'rock-gardening' came into being, and it is tempting to imagine some connexion between this new phase and the stones of the Japanese style. But in reality they have little in common. The symbolic details of the Buddhist gardener are far removed from the modern Alpine garden, which, like the greenhouse, started life quite prosaically as the best means of growing certain kinds of plants. It is natural that, during a period noted for its marvellous advance in science, what may be called the scientific side of gardening should have received most attention. The recent history of the English garden is entirely horticultural; but, curiously enough, the very progress in horticulture is, in turn through the increasing interest taken in the garden and its house, leading to a renewed study of design. The new rambler roses, in their beautiful varieties, bring in again the treillage

and the pergola over which they climb. Alpine plants need a moraine or a rock-garden, with stepping-stones for paths. From this to the walk or court of broken pavement set with aromatic herbs is but a short way to go, and leads almost inevitably to the building of dry stone banks and terraced walls. At the same time, coloured water-lilies, monster forget-me-nots, sweet-scented rushes, and many strange aquatic plants re-introduce the stone-edged water-garden, with its little rills and pools.

But, despite the increasing interest shown in town planning and garden city projects, the English public garden—a matter of growing importance to us all in these democratic days—has progressed but slightly. The climax of the old pleasance centred round its principal pavilion or house, and so far the public-garden designers have found no worthy substitute. In direct contrast with gardens such as those of the Luxembourg, our open spaces are dull and characterless. Yet what remain of the old college gardens of Oxford and Cambridge, even the unexpected graveyard gardens of the ancient City churches, from their background and surroundings are not without a certain architectural fitness and restful calm; the modern club garden and park at Ranelagh is an instance of how a simple scheme gains in interest and dignity from a definite purpose and a mellow country house.

But to see how delightful an English public pleasure-ground can be we must leave the big cities for a small market town in the Fens. Set between the canal bank and the level corn-land, which stretches away to the horizon in one unbroken green or yellow sea, and shut in on two sides by the red-brick houses of the little town, the site of Asycoughfee Manor offers few opportunities. The whole effect of the garden depends on the grave, haunting beauty of its yews. Great double yew hedges sweep in a semicircle round the lawn facing the windows of the manor-house, and meet in the centre to form a long, tunnelled walk. Yew arches of immense size and age lead from one subdivision of the garden to another. The ancient grass-banked stew-pond is enclosed by dark arcades of yew, beyond which its placid waters reflect the stately gate piers of the base-court, and the grey, crocketed spire of the splendid Fenland church. Here and there, through the gardens, the old deities remain; Diana hunts her hounds, and the

leaden slave kneels over the water, bending under the weight and burden of his vase The flowers themselves are disappointing ; the new skill in norticulture has not penetrated here ; even the garden as it stands is none too well kept up. The space is small for its purpose ; picnic parties and their débris do not help matters ; some more artistic means of lighting surely might be found than that supplied by odd street lamps. But the town of Spalding is neither large nor rich, and hardly realises yet the treasure in its grasp ; for if old English manor gardens in their original state are rare, as a public garden Asycoughfee is unique.

Climate and nationality being the very soul of gardencraft, the genius of the place must always be the gardenplanner's chief concern and guide. Instead of such mistakes as so-called ' Japanese ' gardens, with stone lamps, bronze cranes, stepping-stones, and all the paraphernalia of Buddhist custom and symbolism totally misunderstood, let us in the West make use of Eastern shrubs and flowers in our own individual way, learning at the same time from the country of their origin the value of harmony and restraint, the use of tradition in design. Then, at last, we shall hear no more in England of ' Dutch gardens,' ' French gardens,' ' old-fashioned ' gardens,' ' landscape gardens,' ' formal gardens,' ' Italian ' gardens,' and so on and so forth, and a real English garden will be recognised again, one to equal and perhaps surpass the greatest gardens of old time.

Constance M. Villiers-Stuart.

CHIVALRY AND CIVILISATION

1. **Life and Genius of Ariosto.** By J. Shield Nicholson. Macmillan. 1914.
2. **Don Quijote de la Mancha.** Translated by Robinson Smith. Routledge. 1914.
3. **Alfred in the Chronicles.** By Edward Conybeare. W. Heffer. 1914.
4. **The Philistines, their History and Civilisation.** By R. A. Stewart Macalister. Humphrey Milford. 1913.
5. **Chivalry in English Literature : Chaucer, Malory, Spenser, and Shakespeare.** By William Henry Schofield. Harvard University Press. 1912.

WHEN, on the 30th of April, 1524, in the retreat from Rebec, death overtook Pierre du Terrail, known to immortality as ' le gentil Seigneur de Bayard,' ' le bon Chevalier ' sans paour et sans reproche,' a cry of lamentation went up from the conflicting armies of France and Spain. An event had happened that transcended earthly warfare. The chance bolt of a harquebusier had set a great spirit free, and the noblest exponent of human righteousness in that age had passed beyond the gates of time. It was as if the spirit of chivalry, neglected and spurned in a new epoch of pleasure-loving materialism, had gathered itself together for one last effort in the person of this descendant of many heroes, and had now left swiftly and for ever a world where no more was there any spiritual order. In some such fashion that age felt the departure of the knight with the pearl-pure heart (*le cueur nest comme la perle*). For years after his death, in the churches of Grenoble, a faithful priesthood prayed that his spirit might forestall the general resurrection of the dead and return for the betterment of an unhappy world : ' Te prions, par Ta ' saincte résurrection que veuilles ressusciter du sépulchre de ' ce misérable monde, le noble esprit de notre gouverneur, le ' noble Chevalier Bayard.' His spirit, they felt, was the spirit of civilisation.

Chivalry, indeed, is an essential element of civilisation. Without it the achievements of the brain and hand are dead things, the perishing product of gilded barbarism, creations which have no significance in the evolution of man. Intangible as the spirit that cometh and goeth, imponderable, powerless, scarce observed, chivalry is nevertheless the measure of the difference between immortal longings and the desires that perish.

It is no mean, no impertinent inquiry at this present time to consider the significance of chivalry in the evolution of the society to which we belong. It is not an inquiry in the air ; it is practical in the last degree. For at this moment a professedly Christian nation openly asserts that the ultimate sanction of human society—not the means of administration merely, but the ultimate basis—is naked, shameless, brutal force, involving without hesitation and without regret the desecration and abnegation of truth, the massacre of the innocent, the ruin of the garnered hope of many centuries.

When we gaze into ' the backward and abysm of time ' we see in ceaselessly tragic conflict two wonderful forces controlling the evolution of the human race, and variously framing the outlook of the human mind : utilitarianism and idealism. The necessity and possibility of mastering outward nature—the beast, the forest, the mine, the fruitful field—stamped certain races with the belief that force skilfully applied was the only thing that mattered, and led them to the once attractive error that the inner nature or human nature was equally malleable, equally the subject of purely material organisation, equally fit for slavery.

There were other races who regarded this utilitarianism as mere machinery for larger ends, races who knew, instinctively as it were, that human nature is ultimately not respondent to force. That these respective races were sharply divided is not altogether true. The materialistic races had their percentage of idealists, the idealistic races their percentage of materialists. But on the whole, in the successive waves of history, we see these respective forces at work on a vast scale and from age to age, as in our age, meeting in thunderous and calamitous warfare. Asia was, broadly speaking, the home of idealism, Europe and Northern Africa the home of utilitarianism. And so we see in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean the

successive struggles between fundamental ideas for the control of the future of man.

This was the place of struggle so far as the history of modern, that is to say chronicled, races is concerned. But this struggle of ideas goes back far behind our brief recorded day. Professor Stewart Macalister, in his brilliant and profoundly learned lectures on 'The Philistines, their History and Civilisation,' tells us that:

'The sack of Knossos and the breaking of the Cretan power was an episode—it may be, was the crucial and causative episode—in a general disturbance which the fourteenth to the twelfth centuries B.C. witnessed over the whole Eastern Mediterranean basin. The mutual relations of the different communities were as delicately poised as in modern Europe: any abnormal motion in one part of the system tended to upset the balance of the whole . . .

'The settlement of the Philistines in Palestine falls in that period of fog, as we may call it, when the iron culture succeeds the bronze in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recent excavations have given us a clear-cut picture of the development of civilisation during the bronze age . . . . Then a cloud seems to settle down on the world, through which we can dimly perceive scenes of turmoil, and the shifting of nations. When the mist rolls away it is as though a new world is before us. We see new powers on earth, new gods in heaven: new styles of architecture, new methods of warfare: the alphabet has been invented, and above all, iron has become the metal of which the chief implements are made. Crete and the great days of Egypt belong to the past: the glorious days of classical Greece are the goal before us. The chief interest of the Philistines lies in this, that their history falls almost entirely within this period of obscurity, when the iron age of Europe was in its birth-throes. They and their kin, the Zakkala in the east and Turisha in the west, bridge the gap between the old world and the new. It is owing to them that the reminiscences of the days of Crete were handed across a couple of troubled centuries, to form the basis of new civilisations in Greece, in Italy, and in the East.'

The Neolithic and Bronze ages that passed with the passing of Knossos were, if we may judge by the history of their art, progressively materialistic, aiming from first to last at realism, at the mere presentation of this present world. Would the Iron age be nothing more, a new turn of the materialistic wheel? In those six or eight centuries that separate the destruction of Knossos from that period some six centuries before our era, when we find that the Homeric poems are

thrilling Attica and the Grecian isles, a new force had entered the world, a force that we may compendiously describe as chivalry, a spiritual something that the new iron had struck from the flint of the old world. It was something other than a cult of the gods; it was something supremely human while essentially divine, the sense of self-sacrifice coupled with the desire for action. It was the product of the mingling of Asiatic mysticism as presented by the Semitic peoples with the stern practicality of the Western races. When David the Hebrew shepherd met Goliath the Philistine, the old world and the new met, but the victory was not wholly with the weak, and the scattered Cretan peoples mingled with Asiatic stocks to give a new civilisation to the world. Yet the East made chivalry possible, and it is chivalry that gleams with meteoric splendour through the Homeric poems. The clash of two ages is mirrored in the Iliad and Odyssey. In them we find both the ruthlessness of fundamental war and the glorious sunrise of chivalry out of the night of destruction. Not vainly does the abhorred Helen moan over the dead Hector 'Never yet heard I evil or despiteful word from thee.' Homer echoes, as Mr. Mackail says, 'centuries of feudalism, chivalry, 'romance.' In the unique Homeric record we feel that chivalry has come upon the earth. But the East has not yet achieved her full influence. The hardness of materialism has not yet played its full part in the making of the New Earth. Mr. Mackail points out that Homer (we prefer the term, the single poetic personality that gathered to a head the golden legends of the Cretan and post-Cretan ages) never allows himself to do full justice, except in the case of Helen and possibly Andromache, to womanhood. Even in Homer 'there is the beginning of that harshness or chilliness 'which is a characteristic in developed Greek literature.'

'The pure Greek mind,' we are told, 'was the least romantic 'of all in history.' Not even the lyric poets such as Sappho, though not removed by very many generations from the days of Homer, could save the world from this harsh spirit. It must indeed be admitted that, despite the glory and passion of the Sapphic music, she sang an earthly song that is divided by a vast gulf from the humanism of Euripides, and by a still vaster gulf from the spiritualisation of human love that shines in the conceptions of Dante and in the ideals of medieval

chivalry. The touch of the East had been withdrawn, but whenever we find it merging with Western logic and utilitarianism we find instantly, as in the Alexandrian age opening with Theocritus and ending with Meleager, romanticism bursting the bonds of earthliness and pure mentality.

Theocritus tells us something of heavenly love, Meleager of the eternity of beauty. But the exquisite grace of Greek materialism is sad through and through. Death is the end of all our love and gladness, if gladness and love there really be. In such a world chivalry could not and did not flourish, save in so far as the aspirations of that age came under the influence of the East. It was that influence in the second half of the third century before Christ—an age not unlike ours in so far as it was comfortable and materialistic, but unlike ours in that it had no broad religious and social ideas—it was that influence which brought to bear on the rising Roman Republic forces which made towards light. In Italy, East and West met on new and more familiar terms. Not only had the school of Alexandria played its immortal part, but the inrush of commerce and of strangers which followed the downfall of Carthage brought the Eastern mind and the Jew, both for good and ill, into permanent contact with Europe. Matthew Arnold told only half a truth when he wrote with respect to the age of Christ in Rome :

> 'On that hard Pagan world disgust
> And secret loathing fell.
> Deep weariness and sated lust
> Made human life a hell.'

A new idealism was already permeating a community which outwardly was even more materialistic and more hard than that of classical Athens had been. It was not, in fact, the diamond-like materialism of Athens that distinguished Rome. The existence of Virgil proves this, of Virgil who was destined to inspire, in the not altogether strange company of the Apostles, Martyrs, and Captains of Christ, the ages of chivalry.

The descendants of Gibbon have dwelt too deeply on the materialism of the Roman Empire. The extraordinary phenomenon of that empire, with its unique range of power, has dazzled the materialist. He has confused the gift of

government with the hateful error that might is right. The spiritual element that lay deep-rooted in the conglomerate which formed the Roman people, an element which drew from and imposed upon West and East alike new capacities and new sociological conceptions, is too often forgotten. Fundamentally Rome was not materialistic, though the despitefulness of imperial riches and power tainted some of her conceptions of duty as the centuries passed by. She was no slave of hopelessness and superstition. Behind all things there lay not only self-reliance but a belief in the spiritual basis of things. To those who desire to understand the Roman Empire aright we commend the study, not of the late Western, but of the late Eastern Empire, a society which gave to the world codes of laws that still survive, which sent wave after wave of learning, art, and chivalry into the barbarous North and West, which remained amid the chaos of Asia and Europe a highly organised community, and for a thousand years after the fall of Rome withstood the knocking at the gates of Byzantium. But the best proof that the Roman Empire was not a merely materialistic organisation is the fact that it became the host and carrier of a new world-religion which in itself was and is the subtlest and most spiritual combination of Eastern and Western experience and thought. Christianity, given to the world in Syria, was the means by which the deep spirituality of the East was rendered tangible for daily human use, and became as it were incarnate. The body which this spiritual fact, with its burning recognition of a divine and ever-present God, took to itself was fashioned from and clothed by material drawn from the strict Greek thinkers. The logic and orderliness of Greek thought provided the mysticism of the East with a form that the practical Roman mind could carry to the ends of the known earth. That this form should in its various manifestations become too earthy, in this place or in that, was the inevitable defect of its necessities, and perhaps nowhere did it become more clogged with formalism than in Byzantium itself. Yet these things were but accretions, the defects of the qualities of form, and the essentials of Christianity as disseminated by Imperial Rome remained untarnished by custom and undimmed by time. The deep allegory with which 'The Ring and the Book' opens, the allegory of the making of a ring with necessary but ultimately

dispensable alloy, is always to be borne in mind when we criticise the organisation of Christianity. The artificer

> 'Mingles gold
> With gold's alloy, and, duly tempering both,
> Effects a manageable mass, then works:
> But his work ended, once the thing a ring,
> Oh, there's repristination! Just a spirt
> O' the proper fiery acid o'er its face,
> And forth the alloy unfastened flies in fume;
> While, self-sufficient now, the shape remains,
> The rondure brave, the lilied loveliness,
> Gold as it was, is, shall be evermore.'

No doubt the 'spirt of acid,' the 'repristination' or restoration to the original ideal, has to come yet, is perhaps coming now in this great world-war; but all the while the fundamental principles of Christianity have been at play on individual souls, a new force in civilisation which found its not least manifestation when it accommodated itself to human warfare and shone resplendent under the name of chivalry

It would, of course, be a profound error to identify chivalry with Christianity. As we have said, chivalry is the idealistic as opposed to the materialistic in the human soul. It is not dependent for its existence on any particular form of faith or any particular stage of culture. Its natural home is the East and South, though it has attained its noblest growth when the Eastern and Western ideals have fairly mingled. The chivalry that shines among races reputed to be savages has found many examples in Africa, while the chivalrous loyalty of many subject races to the British Empire in the hour of her need is one of the features of these tremendous days. When Germanic culture to-day speaks in venomed scorn of Japan, as well as of the almost nomadic peoples that dwell in the czardoms of Russia, this culture forgets that Japan looks back with unquenchable pride on a record of chivalry that adorns the ageless annals of the East, while the peoples of the Great White Czar have directly inherited the chivalric ideal of New Rome. Moreover, it is significant of the influence of the East, in whatever form her creeds are cast, that the chivalry of medieval Europe should have received an immense impulse from the clash and conflict in the Pyrenean area between the Spanish Saracens and the Normans. The Saracenic chivalry, with its profound respect for womanhood, stamped the impress

of the South and East on the ruder manners of the West and North. It is a notable fact in the history of chivalry that the descendants of the Norsemen, whether in France or England or Sicily or the East, adopted with enthusiasm the idealism that raised war into the realms of faith. When Saladin and Richard met, the chivalry of East and West closed in splendid emulation, and it is not without significance that the chivalry which ennobled their struggle met with scant recognition from the rude and envious knighthood of Germanic Europe.

But though we have to recognise that the underlying spring of chivalry is idealism rather than formal religion, yet it is profoundly true that this idealism found in Christianity new wells of light. Nominal Christianity divorced from idealism is capable, as we see to-day, of great disaster. Real Christianity wedded to idealism connotes the highest ranges of human spiritual and moral achievement. And this achievement in the world of action, the active side of the progress of civilisation, was exhibited from the Middle Ages onward in the form of Christian chivalry. As we have seen, there was chivalry in earlier days, but its records show that it apparently acquiesced in the degradation of womanhood and in the abject slavery of a large portion of the human race. Greece did not recognise the freedom of womanhood and was built upon a slave basis. A vast stage in the progress of civilisation was achieved when we find that Imperial Rome held an entirely different attitude towards womanhood. There is, indeed, no more important chapter in the history of civilisation than the story of the Roman attitude towards women. Nominally in fetters, subject to her father's *potestas* or to her husband's *manus*, in reality she had achieved for herself freedom by the time that 'strangers 'at Rome' brought in the glad tidings from Syria. This is a fundamental fact in the history of civilisation, and it is one that our generation of historians has been slow to recognise. Christianity, idealism, chivalry seized upon it and made it the deep basis of a new age. Nevertheless it received a check among the peoples of West and Central Europe that has almost lasted into our own time. The legislation of Justinian never reached these areas. The Germanic peoples had their own doctrine of *manus* and the subjection of women, and when they received Roman law they received it in the earlier form contained in the Theodosian Code, and with barbaric skill

adapted to their own materialistic conceptions the early Roman law assigning an inferior position to woman. So we see in the West, even in England down to the middle of the nineteenth century, that woman is in a position of astounding inferiority, and that the husband has even the legal power physically to chastise her. This remnant of barbarism was at last, in the famous Clitheroe Case in 1890, disclaimed by the English Common Law, but it is notorious that to-day in Germany a woman is treated both in private and in the public streets as notably inferior to man. This symbol of gross materialism was attacked throughout the Middle Ages both by Christianity and by chivalry. Chivalry was the standing protest of knighthood, of manhood, of womanhood against the degradation of woman.

But Imperial Rome, though it placed womanhood on a new footing, was unable to displace the Greek tradition of slavery, which was handed on to the Middle Ages in various forms of slavery, villeinage, and serfdom. Medieval chivalry was not in itself strong enough to crush, though it modified, this evil. Slavery was adopted by the Germanic tribes with the Roman codes, and though Christianity, by its system of education, opened up avenues of escape for the slave, the institution of slavery so appeals to the materialistic side of human nature that it still haunts the Asiatic shores of the Mediterranean, and was only stamped out in the New World by a war that but half a century ago exhibited in all its nakedness the essential clash between idealism and materialism. The chivalry of Greece felt that chivalry was consistent both with a degraded womanhood and a slave basis of society. Two thousand years later the chivalry of South Carolina still felt that chivalry was consistent with a slave basis of society : so slowly move the feet of civilisation. The third stage is at hand, when chivalry will declare that it can exist in all its beauty only when the liberty of every section of the human race is assured, when the shackles shall have been struck off the economic as well as the religious and the social being of man. Slowly move the forces of regeneration, but we are able to see with clear vision that these forces are moving, and that through the centuries there is, century by century, with occasional retrogression, a perceptible gain in the ceaseless conflict between materialism and idealism.

The fact most noticeable of all is that the progress of

idealism is due to individual effort, while the strength of materialism is due to uninspired conjoint *vis inertiae*. Materialism in struggling industrious races, that for hundreds of generations have fought sternly against the harshness of nature and of man, is an inherited tradition, gross, brutal, and general, a tradition that can only be checked in the first instance by salient examples of heroism and self-sacrifice. It is for this reason that the history of chivalry is so vitally important. It overwhelms the materialist with a new range of ideas : it makes him see, even with a sense of shock, that man cannot live by bread alone, or even by bread and butter ; that there is a spiritual vision of endless life for those who have eyes to see. To the fact that Germany has violently driven this heavenly visitant from her gates, and has bandaged the eyes of her school children for half a century, must be attributed the horrible incidents and revolting policy for which Germany is responsible in the present war. She has remembered everything except chivalry, and all that chivalry means in initiative and conduct ; forgetting these things, she has passed out of the main current of human progress.

With this view in mind we may inquire what chivalry has meant in the past and what it means to-day. The bright exemplars of faith and chivalry are apt sometimes to overwhelm us men and women of commoner clay. The Church felt this when she added to the holidays of her saints a special feast-day for All Saints : ' a great multitude, which no man could ' number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and ' tongues,' possessing ' hope full of immortality.' In the same fashion we may celebrate a festival for All Heroes. The spirit of heroism and chivalry is not limited to a small body of the elect. It is not even limited to humanity. Observant naturalists tell us stories of dogs, horses and elephants, and even of the wilder beasts, which touch the deeps of admiration. Nor among men are these gifts limited to those who have reached maturity. There are records of deeds of heroism and chivalry performed by little children that cannot be read without tears of pride. Courage and love are indeed the most common attributes of humanity. They may be called conditions of racial survivorship. One might almost venture to say there are no exceptions. Carve but deep enough and there is a hero to be found hidden in all human clay. We sojourners in time possess, even as Cleopatra possessed, ' immortal longings.' But the

rub is that we have so few sculptors ; Pheidias and Angelo are rare indeed. Our human nature is overlaid with clay ; materialism to some extent makes cowards of us all. It is in the school that the sculpturing must be done before environment has made us doubt whether, if and when a great occasion arises, *we* shall rise to its magnificence. Many of us are asking ourselves to-day what *we* should do in the firing line, how *we* should act when shells were falling over our homes. It is right, therefore, to see how great minds have felt about these things, how great hearts have throbbed in the presence of imminent death. Hateful though war is, it nevertheless does provide a test on a scale not otherwise to be found ; it does justify us in adding to the calendar a Feast of All Heroes.

Britons, from the first 'a nation of shopkeepers,' that is to say a practical people with an eye to the main chance on sea and land, blest with the gift of self-government, haters of war but lovers of fighting, rough, insular, desperately patriotic, with a deep hidden idealism—these people, built up of successive accretions of fighting idealistic races from the Romans to the Normans, have been singularly blest with chivalrous figures and the traditions of chivalry. To them belong Arthur, Alfred, Richard, Harry and all that those names signify in the fables, cult, and traditions of chivalry. In the age when the materialistic culture of the late Renaissance smote Europe they were saved by a wave of mysticism that interpenetrated the English Reformation. That Reformation was followed by a literary outburst unequalled in the annals of any nation, and teeming—as the golden pages of Malory and the serene splendour of Shakespeare bear witness—with the purest conceptions of chivalry. Nor was the Elizabethan age confined to the triumphs of the pen and the imagination. When Sidney laid himself down in Flanders he carried on the tradition of Bayard ; when Drake and his companions blazed through the unknown West they revealed to the spent nations of Southern Europe the wonders of a new Odyssey, the deeds of super-Homeric days. Men had wept at the death of Bayard, wept that chivalry was dead ; and lo ! it was alive again.

The tradition, indeed, had never died. The darkest ages had treasured up the memory of heroes. The evil that the ages brought died, or seemed to die, with them ; but the memory of heroism and love and humility survived, sung in

every hall and hallowed by the steady growth of chivalry as the only schoolmaster of gentle youth. This is not the place in which to trace the growth of the practice of chivalric education, reaching its prime, perhaps, in the days of Philippe le Bel, but we may say this of it: that it aimed at the cultivation of hand and mind and heart in one and the same process, and was transfigured during a stern educational period of ten years with the profoundest spiritual views of life and death. The theory of the Knightly Life is perhaps the most beautiful thing that humanity has seen, and though few in any age could rise to its mystic combination of the practical and the ideal, yet it in fact set a standard that made many Bayards and lit three centuries of European history with a light that has rarely shone upon the earth. The White Rose of Paradise that Beatrice disclosed to Dante Alighieri was entirely composed, rank upon rank, of the sacred soldiery of Christ. To an age that thus looked upon the world the legends of Arthur were realities and the deeds of heroes were manna from heaven. The hero illuminated his age, and the great poets mourned and glorified his death. When Bertrand du Guesclin died Eustache Deschamps bade the whole West mourn:

'Estoc d'oneur et arbres de vaillance,
Cuer de Lyon esprins de hardement,
La flour des preux et la gloire de France,
Victorieux et hardi combatant,
Saige en vos fais et bien entreprenant,
Soverain homme de guerre,
Vainqueur de gens et conquereur de terre,
Le plus vaillant qui onques fust en vie,
Chascun pour vous doit noir vestir et querre:
Plourez, plourez flour de chevalerie.'

And yet a little later Geoffrey Chaucer carries on the tradition, describing for us a warrior who had borne his lance from Prussia to the Mediterranean:

'A knight there was, and that a worthy man
That fro the tyme that he firste bigan
To ryden out, he loved chivalrye,
Trouthe and honour, fredom and curteisye.
. . . . . .
And evermore he hadde a sovereyn prys,
And though that he were worthy he was wys,
And of his port as meke as is a mayde.

He never yet no vileinye ne sayde
In al his lyf, unto no maner wight.
He was a verray parfit gentil knight.'

Mr. Schofield, in the very delightful lectures on Chivalry in English Literature delivered at the Sorbonne and elsewhere in 1911, ventures the view that 'chivalry is less an institution 'than an ideal,' and quotes Mr. J. A. Symonds to the same effect:

'Chivalry was an ideal binding men together by participation in potent spiritual enthusiasms. Feudalism was the bare reality of mediaeval life. Chivalry was the golden dream of possibilities which hovered above the eyes of mediaeval men and women, ennobling their aspirations, but finding its truest expression less in actual existence than in legend and literature.'

On this point we do not agree at all, either with Mr. Schofield or Mr. Symonds, and for that reason we have quoted Chaucer, himself a fighting man, familiar at first hand with medieval warfare, and the most exact and realistic portrait-painter in literature. For the same reason we have broadly referred to the curriculum of chivalric education. If that curriculum is examined in detail in the work of Egidio Colonna it will be seen that chivalry was a practical institution as well as an ideal, and the lives of hundreds of individual warriors such as Bertrand du Guesclin bore out this fact.

It is true enough that the fifteenth century saw the decay of chivalry, and it is in this connexion that Mr. Schofield's essays on Chaucer, Malory, Spenser, and Shakespeare are so well worth study. But far more significant than the decay with which these essays deal is the resurrection of chivalry foreseen and indeed hastened by Cervantes and Shakespeare. Nor must mention be omitted of the romantic mausoleum for chivalry erected by Boiardo and Ariosto, of whose genius and splendid power Dr. Shield Nicholson has given us recently such an excellent revelation. Ariosto shows us how the echoes of chivalry thrilled through the sixteenth century; Malory does even more than this. He shows us the English heart responding to its inheritance. 'The reading of Malory shows 'that if nowadays English-speaking people, high and low 'alike, respond instantly to the call of fair play, this is merely 'a part of their chivalric inheritance.' In the music of Spenser we find rather the music of past chivalry than its present operation: in that he is akin to Ariosto. But in Cervantes

and Shakespeare, whose lives were passed in a period of world-reshaping wars, we find the aspirations of the new chivalry blazing forth.

Let us see what Cervantes had to say on this matter in that tremendous work, 'Don Quijote,' the most misunderstood of all immortal creations. There are many who have dared to regard 'Don Quijote' as the jesting sword that gave the final stroke to the dying conception of chivalry. It was, in reality, the sword that re-knighted an awakened world. The warrior of Lepanto, who had faced the new engines of destruction, had to set up touch with a new world, in the hope of persuading it to adopt a new chivalry as its ideal. So he chose a form of literary art that must needs bring the world to his feet. Don Quijote was deliberately presented as one scarcely sane, the fool of this materialistic earth: 'a new knight in 'the world and the first to revive the long-since-forgotten 'exercise of chivalry. . . . For myself I may say that since 'I am become knight-errant, I find myself valiant, courteous, 'noble-minded; liberal, gracious, bold, gentle, patient.' In the second part of the work the old soldier rises to even greater heights. The thirst for fame that impelled Horatius, Caesar, and Cortez is, he says, a forceful motive, but there are nobler things. 'In slaying giants we are to slay pride'; generosity must lay envy low, quietness of mind must appease wrath, faithfulness must destroy lust. 'Some pass over 'the broad field of a proud ambition, others of a base and 'servile adulation, still others of a fraudulent hypocrisy, and 'some of a true religion. *But I, minded of my star, tread the 'narrow path of errantry, in whose practice I scorn wealth, but 'not honour.*'

Unhappily, the new chivalry that Cervantes preached left Central Europe untouched during those Germanic horrors of the Thirty Years' War that have been so aptly repeated to-day. But the point that concerns us chiefly here is the fact that Cervantes deliberately adjusts chivalry to the new conditions of fire-arms:

'Happy and blest were those ages that knew not the dread fury of those devilish instruments of siege . . . that have made it possible for infamous and cowardly arms to worst a puissant knight. . . . When I reflect upon such a possibility, I am tempted to regret that I undertook this calling in an age so despicable as

this wherein we live: not that I fear hazards, of whatsoever kind, but it gravels me to think how powder and shot may remove from me the chance of becoming famous and renowned by arm and sword-edge throughout the known world. But Heaven's will be done, and if I succeed, I shall loom the larger in men's minds even as the perils to which I exposed myself were more hazardous than those faced by errants of old.'

In this passage Cervantes laid down the principle of the new chivalry—a principle that Drake and the naval heroes from his day onward have followed to its extremest verge; a principle that carried the Six Hundred, and has carried myriads of other heroes of all nationalities, into the jaws of death. The increased horrors of war have intensified not only the hazards but the achievements of chivalry. The invention of the submarine and the aeroplane have given to human heroism new and almost inconceivable opportunities of adventure: one may well ask what will men do, what will they not do, to satisfy not only the thirst for fame, which is mortal, but the thirst for honour, patriotism, and love, which are immortal? This present war teems with instances in which Death has been waved aside as though he were a child. The penetration of the Dardanelles will live in history; the bird-like flight on Cuxhaven of the English sea-planers, the lonely flight to the Thames of two German aeroplaners, will not be forgotten; but the things that will be unrecorded in books, the details of day- and night-long watching in bomb-rent trenches without a flinching thought, the self-sacrifice of all ranks one for another, the greed for action, the patience, the total absence of outward fear—these things will be written in the hearts of a people for a hundred generations. We do not limit the range of heroism to any of the belligerents, but we may perhaps—and certainly in no boasting spirit, for we could hope no less—mention an Italian writer's tribute to the British soldiers' spirit in the dreadful circumstance of war. Signor Dugo Angeli, a great student of Shakespeare, and who knows therefore much of the inwardness of our nation, writes of our soldiers: 'They live with dignity, and they die with heroism'; and he tells the now well-known story of a whole regiment shouting to their comrades in distant fire-wrecked trenches—'Are we down-hearted?' After a pause, a dreadful pause, a blood-stained spectre, the sole survivor, raised himself

from a trench and shouted 'No!' with his last breath, and fell back dead. The Italian writer declared that English heroism is summed up in that incident.

But heroism is not necessarily chivalry, and in so far as it is not chivalry it is not the hand-maiden of civilisation. We do claim that in this war, looking largely at the mighty field of operations, the Allied Forces have been more than brave: they have shown that self-control, self-sacrifice, and unselfishness, which is the better part of courage. But there is a test to come that will try them to the core—the hour of advance and victory. If there are reprisals of the same character as those deeds which have deprived Germany of any future claim to be a nation grounded in chivalry, then our claim likewise disappears and our civilisation and superb traditions will alike have passed into mere materialism. The civilisation of Germany is by heredity divorced from chivalry in the broad sense which it has been the purpose of these pages to indicate. Her materialism has never been transformed by the forces that have played upon and interpenetrated Russia, France, and England. Moreover, her materialism for half a century, by its temporary success, has greatly influenced opinion in the countries now at war with her. When reprisals become possible on a vast scale, we shall be able to see how far this corrupting influence has extended. England survived the materialism of the fifteenth century and produced a race of superb heroes. Has she survived the materialism of the second half of the nineteenth century? For our own part we do not doubt it at all, and we look forward to a vast development in world-hope as the goal of this war. 'The peace 'of Christ,' cried Don Quijote, 'is the proper end of war, and, 'therefore, of arms.' This goal is in view. To quote the noble words spoken by Dr. Inge last year in Westminster Abbey:

'For the present we must drink the cup that our Heavenly Father has given us, and if things go badly we must remember that the true greatness of England has always been a moral and spiritual greatness founded, above all, perhaps, on a definite and recognisable type of character—the lay religion of the English gentleman. This, I most earnestly hope, we shall always cherish, with its fine flowers of honourable dealing in war as well as in peace, of justice, kindliness, and respect for the rights of others. It is the best thing that, as a nation, we have to give to the world.'

We are giving it, we shall give it. The description of England in 'Richard II.' at such a time as this comes home to us:

'This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings,
Fear'd by their breed and famous by their birth,
Renownèd for their deeds as far from home,
For Christian service and true chivalry,
As is the sepulchre in stubborn Jewry,
Of the world's ransom, blessed Mary's Son:
This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land,
Dear for her reputation through the world.'

We have long stood for civilisation and for chivalry: in this war we stand again for both, for these inseparable things in a progressive world.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

MEREDITH'S ODES ON FRANCE

Odes in Contribution to the Song of French History. By GEORGE MEREDITH. Constable. 1898.

IN the last weeks of 1870, when France was lying prostrate before the victorious Prussian, with scarcely any hope left of deliverance, George Meredith wrote an ode which was published in the *Fortnightly Review* of January 1871 under the title of 'France—December 1870.' Years after he added to this three other poems entitled the 'Révolution,' 'Napoléon,' and 'Alsace-Lorraine': and the four were published together in 1898 as one series in a volume entitled 'Odes in Contribution 'to the Song of French History.'

This book has always been much less known than it deserves. Its author thought it almost his best work in poetry, and was disappointed that it did not excite greater interest. Probably, like most difficult writers, he had no idea how difficult he was. No English poetry worth reading, with the exception of some passages of Shakespeare, is so obscure as much of Meredith, and especially many things in these odes. But the volume which contains them is perhaps the greatest volume of political poetry which has ever been produced. It is, in the fullest meaning of all the words, what its title claimed for it, a 'Con-'tribution to the Song of French History.' The odes are both poetry and history. Their history is of that highest and truest kind which finds its perfect expression only in poetry. They are an exact illustration of what Aristotle meant by the often-quoted saying about poetry being a more philosophical and higher thing than history. They give not the mere facts, but the essential meaning, the spirit of the facts. They are part of the 'song' of French history: not what it says, but what it sings. We see in them the soul of France.

About such poems two things are obvious. One is their undoubted interest at the present moment. The other and more important is that they differ in kind from most other political poetry. Such poetry is usually written by English-

men about England, by Frenchmen about France, by Italians or Germans about Italy or Germany. But these Odes are written by an Englishman about France. We are all familiar with the poetry of patriotism. Many of us have been renewing our familiarity with it in the last few months. We have been glad to have it in our ears as we watched our soldiers march by us in the street, and perhaps as we tried to do our own safe, dull, ordinary duty in the right spirit. We live in its brave, proud, passionate words :

> 'This England never did nor never shall
> Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror.'
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 'This happy breed of men, this little world,
> This precious stone set in the silver sea.'
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 'O when shall Englishmen
> With such acts fill a pen,
> Or England breed again
> Such a King Harry?'
>
> . . . . . .
>
> 'We must be free or die, who speak the tongue
> That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold
> Which Milton held. In everything we are sprung
> Of Earth's first blood, have titles manifold.'

We know that note, as right and true a thing as a man's faith in his brother, as his love of his wife. But the mutual faith of brothers, the mutual love of wife and husband, rest on a truth which, however high, is not universal but private and particular. What I see in my brother may be the truest part of him, his real essence ; but it is not the whole of him, not what others see and experience. It is partly the result as well as partly the cause of my faith in him ; and others who do not share that faith, cannot see it because in fact for them it does not exist. My brother does not feel or act towards them as he feels or acts towards me. There is the same difference in the case of a country. For an Englishman England is 'this other Eden, demi-Paradise,' the delight of his memory, the pride of his heart, the inspirer of his spirit ; and these feelings are a reality, based on facts. For him England is all these things and more. But for a Frenchman or a German

it cannot be so. To him England is not a Paradise, for it is only love that makes it one. It is difficult for him not to think such language rather ridiculous; just as so much of Victor Hugo's language about France as the Genius of Humanity, in whose presence the other nations are extinguished as stars before the sun, seems rather ridiculous to an Englishman who, not living in France but only thinking about her, is apt to speak, with his own poet, of:

'France, famed in all great arts, in none supreme.'

Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas, said the greatest of French prose writers. And that is as true of patriotism as of religion. But experience shows that to trust it too absolutely is equally dangerous in both. The religion of the heart too easily becomes a luxurious sentimentalism, a morbid self-torture, or a degrading superstition. The patriotism of the heart too easily sinks into a mere irrational emotion, at best a fatuous national vanity, at worst an aggressive arrogance. The heart perceives what it alone can perceive: but it is also blind to many things plain to all besides itself. It needs reason for a guide, without which it is likely sooner or later to mistake the stars in the puddles of sentiment for the stars in the heaven of truth.

The greatness of Meredith lay as much in his clear head as in his eager and passionate heart. In these poems he applies the full strength of both, to a degree almost unique in poetry, to the illumination of a century in the history of a nation. Perhaps he is helped by not being a Frenchman. A Frenchman indeed could scarcely love France better. But while his love gives him the heart's insight, his reason, helped by alien blood and breeding, saves him from the accompanying blindness. Who has praised France better?

'O that is France!
The brilliant eyes to kindle bliss,
The shrewd quick lips to laugh and kiss,
Breasts that a sighing world inspire,
And laughter-dimpled countenance
Where soul and senses caught desire!'

There is the France of Villon and Molière, the France which draws all the world to Paris as a place of delight. But Meredith

is still more sensitive to the France that draws such a large part of the world to Paris as a place of pilgrimage :

> 'O she that made the brave appeal
> For manhood when our time was dark,
> And from our fetters drove the spark
> Which was as lightning to reveal
> New seasons, with the swifter play
> Of pulses, and benigner day ;
> She that divinely shook the dead
> From living man ; that stretched ahead
> Her resolute forefinger straight,
> And marched toward the gloomy gate
> Of earth's Untried, gave note, and in
> The good name of Humanity
> Called forth the daring vision ! '

It would be hard for a Frenchman to put the claim higher than it is put by this countryman of Burke. Few Englishmen, few statesmen of any country, could put it so high without many accompanying qualifications. But poetry cannot always stop to make qualifications ; and the one principally required here—outside the Terror, with which the poet deals later—is one to which poets are almost always indifferent, even when, like Milton, they have had some experience of affairs. Meredith shows no more consciousness than Shelley, or the Jacobins of the Revolution, that continuity is of the essence of politics, and that custom has of right as well as of necessity a seat at the council board of statesmen. To that madness of reason which fancied it could make a future that should spring from no past, Burke gave once for all the answer which closes debate. But the poet's work is different from the statesman's, and even Shelley, with his false history, false political philosophy, and ignorance of all human nature except the saintly and the devilish, has done a great political work, one which no statesman could do, in 'Hellas' and 'Prometheus' and the 'Ode to Liberty.' He has made an idea glow before our eyes, burn in our hearts. That is what Meredith has done for France in these odes, only with the important difference that the historical spirit has arisen in the interval. Meredith's France is no abstraction, independent of time and reality, like Shelley's Hellas or Naples, but the true and actual France, seen in four stages of its life. The material he has used consists of the men, the forces, the events which history records. But his genius has done its

work on them, imposing form on their multitudinous and conflicting chaos; and the result is a portrait of France by a great artist.

The first poem is 'The Revolution.' It begins with a picture of the old order, a whole nation frozen in dumb misery under an icy crust of glittering vanity. Then, 'on the unanticipated 'day,' the new France burst forth, 'a splendid Mænad,' 'dealt 'the awaited blow on gilt decay,' and

> '. . . like a glad releasing of her soul,
> 'Sent the word Liberty up to meet the midway blue
> 'Her bridegroom in descent to her';

Of that bridegroom, the true spirit of Liberty and Right, the spiritual genius of the Revolution, she is the mate 'for 'that one day of the unwritten deed.' But she is only half worthy to be his bride. The deed is yet undone that divorced her from him: but the madness of the Terror before which her 'heavenly lover' was soon to flee was already in her heart.

> 'Athirst to kiss, athirst to slay, she stood,
> A radiance fringed with grim affright;
> For them that hungered, she was nourishing food,
> For those who sparkled, Night.
> Read in her heart, and how before the Just
> Her doings, her misdoings, plead.'

Still, for the moment, her 'young Angelical' can clasp and husband her with joy as she casts off 'dishonour' and 'dalli-'ance,' the old cruelty and the old luxury, and stands 'intense 'for worship' of the highest known to her, and burning to go to the help of a world which seemed to her 'one malarious mire, 'Crying for purification.' But, alas, she falls into the most ancient of delusions, that the way of purification is only by the shedding of blood.

> 'She drank what makes man demon at the draught.
> Her skies lowered black,
> Her lover flew,
> There swept a shudder over men.
> Her heavenly lover fled her, and she laughed,
> For laughter was her spirit's weapon then.
> The Infernal rose uncalled, he with his crew.'

Now she stands face to face with enemies, within as well as without, and she accepts the cup of blood they force to her lips

and believes ever more and more in vengeance as 'the sole sure 'way' to save the 'encompassed children' of Liberty.

'Her heart a flaring torch usurped her wits.'

But it is the other side of the picture which is more attractive now, when Frenchmen are again defending their soil, if not with the amazing lightheartedness of those immortally youthful days, at least with equal courage and equal love of France.

Northward and eastward to the strains of the 'Marseillaise' go the peasants of France to meet the feudal soldiers of Germany:

'War's ragged pupils; many a wavering line,
Torn from the dear fat soil of champaigns hopefully tilled,
Torn from the motherly bowl, the homely spoon,
To jest at famine, ply
The novel scythe, and stand to it on the field;
Lie in the furrows, rain-clouds for their tents;
Fronting the red artillery straighten spine;
Buckle the shiver at sight of comrades strewn;
Over an empty platter affect the merrily filled;
Die, if the multiple hazards around said die;
Downward measure a foeman mightily sized;
Laugh at the legs that would run for a life despised;
Lyrical on into death's red roaring jaw-gape, steeled
Gaily to take of the foe his lesson, and give reply.
Cheerful apprentices, they shall be masters soon!'

It might have been written of the men in Champagne and the Argonne to-day; and of other men, not Frenchmen, who are fighting with and for them, not far off. And we may hope that the glorious tumultuous rush which comes announcing victory in the metre of the next section may soon be as applicable to the men of to-day, and that we shall see the hounds become the hunted, the pursuers the pursued, the 'arrogant 'crying for grace.'

'Lo, where hurricane flocks of the North-wind rattle their thunder
Loud through a night, and at dawn comes change to the great South-west,
Hounds are the hounded in clouds, waves, forests, inverted the race:
Lo, in the day's young beams the colossal invading pursuers
Burst upon rocks and were foam;
Ridged up a torrent crest;
Crumbled to ruin, still gazing a glacial wonder;
Turned shamed feet toe to heel on their track at a panic pace.'

Meredith himself said of these poems that they would need to be read twice. Happy is the reader who can be quite sure that two readings have made him master of all the poet meant to put into his close-packed, violently strained verse. Poetry is articulate music : and a hundred years ago it would generally have been held that this was neither music nor articulate. But, for good and for evil, poetry has since then been continuously growing less and less obvious, more and more subtly daring both in form and in content. And if Meredith is the most difficult of poets, it is partly for the best of reasons, that his brain supplied him so abundantly and rapidly with thoughts and images that it was not easy for him to stay to give them perfect form. His thoughts did not naturally express themselves in musical form, as those of the born poet do. It is not merely that Shelley or Swinburne would have rejected a line so ugly as the last in the passage just quoted. Into neither of their brains could so prosaic, clumsy, and unmusical a line have by any possibility entered. Swinburne could have written as badly in a prose pamphlet, and so could Milton : but Milton and Swinburne knew what Meredith never perfectly knew, the difference between prose and poetry. They knew that the material of thought which is to issue as poetry must be passed through something more than the intellect. All great poetry conveys the impression that the poet is under some overpowering influence and not entirely his own master. The defect of Meredith is that his own intellect and will are everywhere visibly and masterfully present in his verse. The moments of his surrender to that music of the spirit which can never be merely personal, still less merely intellectual, are too rare. But some of them, as we shall see, occur in these odes.

The rest of the first ode deals with France's drunken dram-drinking of victory, going on till the craving becomes insatiable, and till in the attempt to satisfy it she turns her back on her hopes and asks for ' the thing most loathed, the iron lord.'

So we pass to the Napoleon ode, the longest of the four, and in sheer brain power, though not in poetry, the most remarkable. It is doubtful whether any prose writer has given the essence of Napoleon with such amazing insight as it is given here. The whole of him is in it : it is the most complete estimate of a great man ever cast into the form of verse.

> ' Cannon his name,
> Cannon his voice, he came.'

So it begins. But that is only the most obvious thing about him, seen of all. In the next section he is 'the Necessi-'tated' who comes 'to weld the nation in a name of dread,' 'terrible with doubt, with radiance restorative'; jealous of any rival near his throne, a lightning which annihilates, a Sun in whose splendour no other luminant can remain visible. At the blast of the trumpet of his fame all bowed their heads, while 'he, the reader of men, himself unread,' was taken for a god. France, now fallen from her heavenly lover, gazed on him, 'demoniac or divine,' 'Earth's chosen, 'crowned, unchallengeable upstart'; and, 'rescued from 'vivisectionist and knave,' listened to the acclamations of his soldiers and gave to her new lord 'as much of heart as 'abjects can.' 'Who sprang for Liberty once, found slavery 'sweet,' gladly let his cannon blow to deafness the accusing voices that called her 'Liberty's murderous mother,' and cried 'Let them submit' to those who would

'dare withstand an irresistible sword
To thwart his predestined subjection of Europe.'

And as she cried she could not but feel in her steel-cold heart the beating of caged wings, 'Earth's fluttering little 'lyre,' Liberty's lark, no longer singing any song of rapture in her ears, but a cry of pain.

And 'the mark she had missed' was to be seen elsewhere.

'Over the black-blue rollers of that broad Westerly main,
Steady to sky, the light of Liberty glowed
In a flaming pillar, that cast on the troubled waters a road
For Europe to cross, and see the thing lost subsist.
For there 'twas a shepherd led his people, no butcher of sheep;
Firmly there the banner he first upreared,
Stands to rally; and nourishing grain do his children reap
From a father beloved in life, in his death revered.'

Her heart told her that Washington, not Napoleon, was 'the spirit preferred' of her heavenly lover; and she mused and felt herself judged till

'Cannon mastered her soul and all dreams had end.'

But victory, she hoped, would at least give her peace if not liberty; and, as her master

'. . . stood by Frederic's tomb,
With Frederic's country underfoot and spurned,'

she thought the hour had come ; he could go no higher and would drop battle's dice-box. But she hears angry words about the Seaman, the 'inveterate Purse' ; and the same fury at the enemy whom he could not reach, which had led to the vain attempt at the panther spring across the Channel, was also responsible for the final and fatal plunge of his ambition which, in Meredith's view, was essentially a bid at conquering England on the plains of Russia. France writhed while she adored : the Critic in her, not quite dead,

> '. . . dumb in awe reviewed
> This torture, this anointed, this untracked
> To mortal source, this alien of his kind ;
> Creator, slayer, conjurer, Solon-Mars,
> The cataract of the abyss, the star of stars ;
> Whose arts to lay the senses under spell
> Aroused an insurrectionary mind.'

Then follows perhaps the most penetrating analysis of Napoleon ever written. It fills the whole of the ninth and tenth sections of the ode. This is how it opens :

> 'He, did he love her ? France was his weapon, shrewd
> At edge, a wind in onset : he loved well
> His tempered weapon, with the which he hewed
> Clean to the ground impediments, or hacked,
> Sure of the blade that served the great man-miracle.
> . . . . . .
> He loved her more than little, less than much.
> The fair subservient of Imperial Fact
> Next to his consanguineous was placed
> In ranked esteem ; above the diurnal meal,
> Vexatious carnal appetites above,
> Above his hoards, while she Imperial Fact embraced,
> And rose but at command from under heel.'

Of other love he knew none.

> 'Frigid the netting smile on whom he wooed,
> But on his Policy his eye was lewd.'

Men's lives were only pawns in his game : but still his gorge would surge on the battlefield ; and

> 'The common Tyrant's frenzies, rancour, spites,
> He knew as little as men's claim on rights.
> A kindness for old servants, early friends,
> Was constant in him while they served his ends.

. . . His dispense
Of Justice made his active conscience;
His passive was of ceaseless labour formed.
So found this Tyrant sanction and repose;
Humanly just, inhumanly unwarmed.'

His designs were great, and he had no scruples about means.

'The statesman steered the despot to large tasks;
The despot drove the statesman on short roads.
For order's cause he laboured, as inclined
A soldier's training and his Euclid mind.'

He would not endure any opposition from debaters and scribblers who pretended to seek after ideals.

'With a breath he blew them out, to beat their wings
The way of such transfeminated things,
And France had sense of vacancy in Light.'

The darkness closes on her soul as she sees more and more of the truth about the tyrant to whom she has enslaved herself: as she

'Perceives him fast to a harsher Tyrant bound;
Self-ridden, self-hunted, captive of his aim;
Material grandeur's ape, the Infernal's hound;
Enormous, with no infinite around.'

'Enormous, with no infinite around'—is not that the final judgment on Napoleon? 'Hugest of engines, a much limited 'man,' so Meredith goes on to picture the pained discovery of France:

'A heart but to propel Leviathan;
A spirit that breathed but in earth's atmosphere.'

But . . . .

'. . . lost to honour, in his glory clothed,'

she drowns reflection, trying not to worship less

'Than ere she bled on sands or snows, and knew
The slave's alternative, to worship or to rue!'

The rest of the ode is the Russian catastrophe, the final struggle, and the end. France trembles for her national

existence, the tyrant trembles for his throne and life: in 'desire and terror' they embrace each other.

> 'An union in hot fever and fierce need
> Of either's aid, distrust in trust did breed.'

But

> 'Never human fortune throve
> On such alliance';
> . . . . . .
> 'The innumerable whelmed him and he fell.'
> . . . . . .
> 'His name on silence thundered, on the obscure
> Lightened; it haunted morn and even-song:
> Earth of her prodigy's extinction long,
> With shudderings and with thrillings, hung unsure.'

And meanwhile France lay

> '. . . abased and like a shrunken corse;
> Amid the weakest weak, the lowest low,
> From the highest fallen, stagnant off her source;
> Condemned to hear the nations' hostile mirth;
> See curtained heavens, and smell a sulphurous earth;
> Which told how evermore shall tyrant Force
> Beget the greater for its overthrow.'

That is the central doctrine of these odes: the ancient faith of Greece that ὕβρις, that pride and violence go sooner or later to their doom. We see it first in the case of the old insolent monarchy and nobles; then in the Revolution and the Terror; then in Napoleon; and in the remaining odes we are to see it at work in the downfall of the revived tyranny of the Second Empire and to get some prophetic hints of the part that Meredith did not live to see it play in the doom of the braggart militarism of Prussia.

'France, December 1870,' is the earliest written, the shortest and the finest of the three odes. It is less a series of intellectual lightning flashes than they, more an act of fiery faith, emotion, and imagination. The poet was writing at the very crisis of the catastrophe. He feels it as he cannot feel the distant tragedies of the Empire and the Revolution. His eye is even then not blinded to the fact of the sins of France and the law of their retribution: but whatever of justice in it he may acknowledge

his heart bleeds at the torture of the beloved, brilliant, adorable nation struggling in the meshes of inexorable fate.

'We look for her that sunlike stood
Upon the forehead of our day,
An orb of nations, radiating food
For body and for mind alway.
Where is the Shape of glad array;
The nervous hands, the front of steel,
The clarion tongue? Where is the bold proud face?
We see a vacant place;
We hear an iron heel.'

The deeper emotion is felt at once: the hurrying output of the brain is compelled into finer shape: speech is more completely resolved into music, prose into poetry.

'Look not for spreading boughs
On the riven forest tree.
Look down where deep in blood and mire
Black thunder plants his feet and ploughs
The soil for ruin: that is France:
Still thrilling like a lyre,
Amazed to shivering discord from a fall
Sudden as that the lurid hosts recall
Who met in heaven the irreparable mischance.'

The free and apparently irregular metre of such lines as these follows, suggests, emphasises the thought and feeling with almost Miltonic cunning; the ultimate fountain of their art is to be sought in such things as the choruses of 'Samson Agonistes.' The prophetic sternness is akin to Milton too—to Milton and the Old Testament; but even at his simplest and gravest Meredith has a quick glancing activity of intellect, an interest in the detail and variety of human life which are very unlike Milton and the Prophets, and but for Shakespeare and some of the Greeks would be said to begin with the modern world. As with Shakespeare, this seeing of a hundred elements in every character, a hundred aspects of every event, and the desire to get them all expressed, leads to very crowded, tortuous, difficult writing; but the finest passages of Meredith, as of Shakespeare, are commonly, like this, among the easiest.

After the cry of grief for the victim comes the voice of submission to the justice of the law. The dreams of France had

been of victory and luxury and pride: and of such dreams this is the penalty.

'Ever invoking fire from heaven, the fire
Has grasped her, unconsumable, but framed
For all the ecstasies of suffering dire.
Mother of Pride, her sanctuary shamed:
Mother of Delicacy, and made a mark
For outrage: Mother of Luxury, stripped stark:
Mother of Heroes, bondsmen: thro' the rains,
Across her boundaries, lo the league-long chains!
Fond Mother of her martial youth; they pass,
Are spectres in her sight, are mown as grass!
Mother of Honour, and dishonoured: Mother
Of Glory, she condemned to crown with bays
Her victor, and be fountain of his praise.
Is there another curse? There is another:
Compassionate her madness: is she not
Mother of Reason? she that sees them mown
Like grass, her young ones! Yea, in the low groan
And under the fixed thunder of this hour
Which holds the animate world in one foul blot
Tranced circumambient while relentless Power
Beaks at her heart and claws her limbs down-thrown,
She, with the plunging lightnings overshot,
With madness for an armour against pain,
With milkless breasts for little ones athirst,
And round her all her noblest dying in vain,
Mother of Reason is she, trebly cursed,
To feel, to see, to justify the blow;
Chamber to chamber of her sequent brain
Gives answer of the cause of her great woe,
Inexorably echoing through the vaults,
"Tis thus they reap in blood, in blood who sow:
This is the sum of self-absolvëd faults."'

That is the prophet's text. The young heroes of the Revolution became the lawless and merciless soldiery of Napoleon; and, though earth soon covered up their blood-stained deeds with her corn and vines, those deeds are nevertheless not forgotten:

'Forgetful is green earth; the Gods alone
Remember everlastingly: they strike
Remorselessly, and ever like for like.
By their great memories the Gods are known.'

Again and again all through this ode, and never more than in these four lines, Meredith is caught out of himself, lifted above himself, made the voice of something more than a mind,

something more than an individual ; and it seems as if, just in proportion as that is so, he finds this perfect speech, for him so strangely simple and quiet, with such a solemn music. The rhythm and structure of each verse, the pauses which divide the first three, the pauseless unity of the last, make up a theme of varied and expressive beauty which reveals the master-craftsman, and may be his conscious work. But, like so many of the greatest things in poetry, it has a suggestion in it of having come to him as it were from something outside himself, something august and universal.

France 'hears a voice of justice,' and that is at once her keenest torture and a pledge of life and hope. Not for her is the ease of conscienceless apathy.

'Behold, the Gods are with her, and are known.
Whom they abandon misery persecutes
No more: them half-eyed apathy may loan
The happiness of pitiable brutes.
Whom the just Gods abandon have no light,
No ruthless light of introspective eyes
That in the midst of misery scrutinise
The heart and its iniquities outright.
They rest, they smile and rest: have earned perchance
Of ancient service quiet for a term;
Quiet of old men dropping to the worm;
And so goes out the soul. But not of France.
She cries for grief, and to the Gods she cries,
For fearfully their loosened hands chastise,
And icily they watch the rod's caress
Ravage her flesh from scourges merciless.
But she, inveterate of brain, discerns
That Pity has as little place as Joy
Among their roll of gifts; for Strength she yearns,
For Strength, her idol once, too long her toy.
Lo, Strength is of the plain root-Virtues born:
Strength shall ye gain by service, prove in scorn,
Train by endurance, by devotion shape.
Strength is not won by miracle or rape.
It is the offspring of the modest years,
The gift of sire to son, through those firm laws
Which we name Gods.'

The seed of this strength, the 'fires that wax for resurrection,' France has in her: her sons lie dead, but

'Of their death her life is: of their blood,
From many streams now urging to a flood,
No more divided, France shall rise afresh.'

In that faith her poet bids her

> 'Stand fast and hearken while thy victors boast,
> Hearken, and loathe that music evermore.'

It is the very business of the poet to seize and embody the invisible and essential spirit of things. We, the onlookers, did not see, not even the French themselves, the doers and the sufferers, saw the spiritual significance of the tragedy through which France passed in 1870 and 1871. To them and to us it appeared to be a Hell. But to the clear vision of the poet it was seen and known as a Purgatory. The fires were cleansing fires, and the France of to-day is the France foreseen by Meredith, purged and born anew. And now the then boasting Victors are, as we believe, about to go through the same fires, and to learn, as we hope, the same lesson.

Meredith loved France as few foreigners have loved her, but he was not a Frenchman and was not tempted to be blind or angry about the results of the war. If he had known then, what we all afterwards learnt from Bismarck, that in truth France was tricked into declaring war by the falsehood and forgery of her great enemy, he would no doubt have said less of her sin and more of his sympathy with the suffering which was its penalty. But, though France was so much less guilty than he thought, no one doubts that the shoddy militarism of the Second Empire made it as easy for Bismarck to lead her into war by playing upon her vanity as it was afterwards for Moltke to defeat her in the field. And that was what Meredith did not hesitate to say.

> 'Lo, Strength is of the plain root-Virtues born:
> . . . . . .
> Die to thy Vanity, and strain thy Pride,
> Strip off thy Luxury, that thou may'st live,'

so shalt thou again lead Humanity; so shalt thou

> '. . . prove that Reason is a quenchless scroll;
> Make of calamity thine aureole,
> And bleeding head us thro' the troubles of the sea.'

So ends 'France, December 1870.' The words of a foreign poet, read with difficulty by his own countrymen, could of course have no influence in France. But poets are constantly the spokesmen of spiritual forces still in the stage of inarticulate

infancy. They put into words what others are vaguely, half unconsciously, feeling: what even without their inspiration will presently be thought and said by thousands. So all the while it seems to have been with Meredith. The terrible lesson to which he was perhaps the first to give open utterance was slowly learnt. Time and truth, great allies and very ancient, were on the side of those who were learning it. On the whole the temptations of revenge and vanity were more and more steadily resisted. Europe thankfully admits that France has now long been among the most pacific members of her family; and it is plain that the crisis of 1914 found her confronting her destiny in a spirit far more akin to that of these odes than, for instance, to that of the rhetorical fury which drowns the poetry of 'L'Année Terrible.'

Yet there have been several occasions since 1870, especially that of the brief reign of the charlatan Boulanger, when France has seemed in danger of again surrendering to her evil genius. It is with these, and the fear of them, that Meredith's last ode, 'Alsace-Lorraine,' deals. Its general idea is plain. It begins with an introduction in which the poet sets out the gospel preached in so many of his poems, that which bids a man heal his woes and purge himself of his sins by 'commune with Earth' and frank acceptance of her law, which is also Reason's, that whatever a man sows he shall reap. Our destinies are of our own making. The 'sister Hours in circles linked'

> '. . . bear us grain or flower or weed,
> As we have sown; is nought extinct
> For them we fill to be our Fates.
> Life of the breath is but the loan;
> Passing death what we have sown.'

In the third section the poet applies his message directly to France, urging her to look for help, not to her soldiers, not

> '. . . . . to her weaponed children's moan
> Of stifled rage invoking vengeance':

but to her plainer sons, 'Earth's humblest' and also 'Earth's best,' who yet

> '. . . . . welcome day for labour, night for rest,
> Enrich her treasury, built of cheerful thrift,
> Of honest heart, beyond all miracles.'

In the middle part of the ode France looks back upon her past: upon the kings whom the strangers forced upon her after Waterloo, and upon the reaction from them, not to her first lover Liberty, but to the Tyrant whose 'cannon name' she sang' to herself, transferring her soul's allegiance to him and hailing him Saint. That, as the best of her now sees, was the fatal choice: for she had another Saint,

> '. . . . . Earth's gem,
> Earth's chosen, Earth's throb on divine':

that Jeanne who 'had no self but France,' while this 'sainted 'man' had 'no France but self.' Yet all her warriors and clerks chose him, and rejected Jeanne, with the inevitable and just result. Nature allows no rearward steps:

> 'The worship to departed splendour vowed
> Conjured a simulacrum.'

The canonisation of Napoleon I. produced Napoleon III., and Napoleon III. produced Sedan.

Then follows a vision of the great Napoleon hovering over that field of the doom of his dynasty where, with his own scorn of the vanquished, he hurries to the side of the victors, never dreaming they are anything but French. And behold he is 'in midst of the pupils he harried to brain-awake, trod 'into union.'

> 'The France of the fury was there, the thing he had wielded, whose honour was dearer than life;
> The Prussia despised, the harried, the trodden, was here; his pupil, the scholar in strife.'

In disgust he drags his 'penman trumpeter,' Thiers, who had had so much to do with creating his Legend, to 'spy where 'the Legend ends'; and France, too, is forced to see where it ends and where it began, and now to decide for herself of what spirit she is to be. Love calls her both ways: love for her lost children towards a struggle to regain them; love for those who bled for her before, and would again 'in like 'fountains fruitlessly bleed,' holds her back. But the deeper love brings wisdom with it, and the

> 'Passion for one last agony under the skies,
> To make her heavens remorseful, she restrained.'

The struggle is a hard one. Her nature has in it many strings of passion which jar against the note of reason uttered low; but at last she can conquer them, bring herself to wed the stern bridegroom Duty. Of that marriage 'the rational' was the issue. So she became herself again: the whole of herself.

'. . . . . The maimed,
Torn, tortured, winter-visaged, suddenly
Had stature; to the world's wonderment,
Fair features, grace of mien, nor least
The comic dimples round her April mouth,
Sprung of her intimate humanity.
She stood before mankind the very South
Rapt out of frost to flowery drapery;
Unshadowed save when somewhiles she looked East.'

The rest of the poem is a vision of this new France, still suffering from insurgent throbs of the old evil spirit of vanity and revenge, still tempted at times to fall back on the old faith in Fortune, and

'. . . . . pledge to chance
One whom we never could replace';

but more and more conquering these weaknesses, living more and more in the light of reason and the facts, accepting

'. . . . . the proud initiative
Of sacrifice in one self-mastering hour,
Whereby more than her lost one will she reap;
Perchance the very lost regain,
To count it less than her superb reward.'

So she

'Shall stand adjudged our foremost and Earth's Queen.'

But Earth and Reason are one, and none can be their Queen but she who accepts their laws. That is what France is to discover.

'Let but the rational prevail,
Our footing is on ground though all else fail:
Our kiss of Earth is then a plight
To walk within her Laws and have her light.'

And Meredith is confident she will discover this and live by it: and the result will be that

'She above the nations blest
In fruitful and in liveliest,
In all that servant earth to heavenly bidding brings,
The devotee of Glory, she may win
Glory despoiling none, enrich her kind,
Illume her land, and take the royal seat
Unto the strong self-conqueror assigned.'

It was a bold vision of the poet's: a bold appeal for a friend of France to make to her. But to-day we see its wisdom and we hope we are seeing its fulfilment. If France had plunged Europe into war for the sake of her lost provinces it seems certain that she would have lost them anew and for ever, and with them destroyed herself. She was strong enough to bide her time: to leave, as the poet bade her, 'to higher 'Courts' 'the wrongs discerned of higher'; and those Courts are now, as we trust, slowly giving judgment in her favour.

Unhappily the poet has another vision too. While he saw France subduing herself and even admitting and learning from the great qualities of her victor, which no one states more generously than he does—while he saw France purged by adversity, profiting by defeat—he saw also her triumphant conqueror going through an experience out of which it is far harder to get profit. The worst of the school of prosperity is that in it the pupils fancy that they need no teaching, or at least can teach all wisdom to themselves. So while France, blest by the open eyes of adversity, would learn, as the poet thought, and as in fact she has, much of her enemy's stout industry and patient brain, that enemy, drunk with victory, could admire nothing but himself. Rich in the spoils of Force, he was in danger more and more of believing that force was the secret of life. So the poet feared, and uttered his fear and his warning in lines that sound sadly prophetic to-day.

'For the belted Overshadower hard the course,
On whom devolves the spirit's touchstone, Force:
Which is the strenuous arm, to strike inclined,
That too much adamantine makes the mind;
Forgets it coin of Nature's rich Exchange;
Contracts horizons within present sight:
Amalekite to-day, across its range
Indisputable: to-morrow Simeonite.'

So the lesson, which he had drawn from the history of France, is offered for the warning of Germany: that old lesson of

Greek tragedy on which he had insisted all through, that insolence and violence for ever march unawares towards an inevitable doom. It was, as we know, offered in vain; and it seems that before many months are past we may again be watching the accomplishment of that doom as it is pronounced by the thunder of guns on the battlefield and written in the blood with which Fate writes her final and inexorable decrees. Is it too daring a hope that then, after that, not one or two but all of the members of Europe's family will have learnt the great lesson? All of them are now grown up; and dictatorial arrogance, bad enough when some members of a family are still children, is altogether fatal to the possibility of family life when the stage of childhood is past. Whatever may be said of Asia or Africa, there are now no children in Europe. Some are older, and some younger, but not one of the units of national life that make up the European family can any longer be denied some measure at least of the right to choose its own destiny. This war may not be the end of war: though there is hope that it may, in the indisputable fact that at its beginning all nations, but one, looked on the thought of it with horror, and at its end all without exception will look with horror at its memory. But at least it should be the end of the old political doctrine seen at its worst in the Partition of Poland. It should be the end of any theory or practice that conflicts with the true political faith that, so far as human weakness allows, the destiny of every people, small or great, should be decided not by force, not by the desires and interests of its neighbours, but by its own history and traditions, by its own racial and spiritual affinities: in a word, by itself.

JOHN BAILEY.

MARRIAGE AND THE LAW OF BASTARDY

1. **The Marriage Laws of the British Empire.** By W. P. EVERSLEY and W. F. CRAIES. Stevens and Haynes. 1910.
2. **The Laws of England.** Edited by Lord HALSBURY. 1907–1915.
3. **Encyclopædia of Scots Law.** Edited by JOHN CHISHOLM. Edinburgh: W. Green and Son. 1896–1904.
4. **The Law of Scotland relative to Parent and Child.** By the Hon. Lord FRASER. 3rd Edition by JAMES CLARK. Edinburgh: W. Green and Son. 1906.

THE English are a tenacious people, and present a unique combination of the forces of intense individualism and profound reverence for tradition. The national spirit is enshrined in a higher unity which combines these apparently contrary things, and the result outwardly reveals itself in a Common law and a law of the Constitution, that may well be reckoned among the wonders of the world, and in a power of colonisation and self-adaptation which has been exhibited by no other people. The fruitfulness of an indissoluble union of individualism and tradition can indeed not be doubted; the union itself is the miracle, the results are natural and inevitable. But there is another side to the picture, and one that is perhaps too little looked upon. The sun has its spots and the English national spirit its defects. The defects may be due to an imperfect combination of the sense of tradition and the sense of freedom; sometimes the sense of tradition overwhelms that of freedom, sometimes freedom boldly defies habitual authority and becomes licence. The defects exist, and are only curable by a process of national education. Of the excess of freedom we have seen too much of late; the excess of traditional influence is no doubt less apparent at the moment. But the struggle between the extremes has always been reflected in Parliament, is indeed responsible for the particular form of our party system, and some of the bitterest elements of the struggle are seen in the daily details of social life.

English social morality is a not unhappy instance or example of the national spirit to which we refer. Unfriendly critics have often spoken harshly of our English attitude towards questions of morals. They have attacked it as hypocritical or purblind, but have failed to penetrate into the historical reasons which have built up the English home, and have not attempted to analyse the curious combination of tradition and freedom which has made the English home both the freest and, at the same time, the most strait-laced in the world. Under our social system, as it has existed for very many generations, the women have practically perfect freedom to choose their husbands ; parents have a very minimum of legal control over their children in the matter of marriage ; the social meeting of young women and young men in and out of the homes is marvellously unrestricted ; there is no legal liability on parents or husbands to provide, by will or settlement, for their children or their widows. In the most vivid contrast to countries that have inherited the practices of Justinian's law we leave all these things to traditional custom, and, without the safeguards of guardianship and *dos*, generation after generation we build up new homes which follow a traditional law of providence with the unerring instinct of the hive. On the other hand, the evils which might arise are provided against, not by law, but by traditional custom. Breaches not only of sexual morality, but of honesty or even of providence, are unforgivable. An iron custom of honesty and morality holds the vast middle class in a vice as stern as any Indian caste could provide. Those who fail in the test are thrown adrift to find new anchorage in a lower social state or in another land, or to disappear among the waste products of a very wasteful social system. The custom binds women with an even harsher grip than men, though it binds men more sternly than superficial observers think. But the fact remains that the remarkable freedom of English home life is accompanied by a traditional rule which is written in letters of spiritual fire across every aspect of social life.

Now this social phenomenon has a value which it is impossible to overrate. It makes home life organic in a sense that no formal law could produce. The MUST is written in the heart instead of in the statute book, with the result that the English

family is a unit which can multiply under almost any conditions. The United States of America and our Colonial Empire have to thank English home life for growth unique in the history of nations. But the defects are perhaps as obvious as the abounding merits of the system. New social developments due to sudden intercourse on a vast scale with other nations possessing different social ideals may find the English system unable to bear the stress of unfamiliar forces; parental duty, marital duty, may need new sources of strength.

Among the many questions relating to home life that are arising at the present time, not the least important is that of the legitimacy of children. It is no new question. It has occupied the attention of Europe from early Roman days to the present hour. At the moment it is a problem of extraordinary importance in Italy, where an appreciable percentage of the population refuse to submit to civil marriage and are therefore the parents of illegitimate issue. It is proposed here to consider our English problem and to relate it to the general considerations as to English social life set forth above. The legal disabilities of an illegitimate child are manifold. It has no legal relationship to father or mother, and no rights of succession whatever to them or their stock. Few are the child's rights, and innumerable are its wrongs. It bears the sins of its parents in its own body, and to legal disabilities are added the moral disapproval of a community which has found such disapproval the most effective way of preserving the health of the body social. There is no classification of bastards. Accidental bastardy through a defect in the law is as damnatory as the bastardy of wantonness. It is an iron rule administered with the thoroughness of a law of nature. A law of this strictness exists nowhere else in the world, and it is not unimportant to trace the history of the rule in England.

Under the early Roman law there was a variety of unions that attracted legal attention. There were *justae nuptiae*, which gave rise to *manus* and *potestas*; there was *matrimonium*, which gave rise to neither, but which was a true marriage between persons who did not, or one of whom did not, possess the technical *conubium* or right of Roman marriage; there was *concubinatus*, a relationship between free persons or between a patron and freedwoman which was recognised by law and was specially declared by the parties not to be marriage. This

was necessary because after Caracalla, in 212 A.D., had conferred the *conubium* on all free subjects of the empire, *matrimonium* became *justum*, and such marriage, merely based upon consent but clothed with a religious sanction, was adopted throughout the empire. Being formless, it was necessary for it to be distinguished from *concubinatus*, and this was achieved either by registration of marriage or by a formal declaration of concubinage, which excluded legal dowry and gave the children to the mother. Finally we have *contubernium*, cohabitation between or with slaves, who could under no circumstances have the *conubium*. But in fact, in these cases, the attributes of marriage were largely imitated.

When we come to the period in Western Europe when the Western Empire had disappeared, we find that these distinctions continue, but that there is a tendency for concubinage to be regarded rather as an inferior type of marriage than as no marriage ; as a secret marriage which stands out as opposed to a 'just' and public marriage. All the Western codes show us this, and we find the old conflict between *justae nuptiae* and *matrimonium* arising once again. Society is demanding that neither parental consent, registration, nor *dos*, but merely consent between the parties should be necessary. The early Middle Ages, in codes such as the *Lex Romana Visigothorum* or the *Lex Burgundionum* or the *Lex Salica*, had tried to impose formal marriage and failed, for the ample reason that men and women refused to bear the burden. The Canon law took the side of the people, and when, after the time of Gratian, it attained complete control, the mere marriage of consent—often secret—was recognised. It was the Church's method of attacking concubinage. But these Western codes and Roman law in general failed to affect the English legal system. In so far as Roman law came to England at all, it came in the hands of the Church, but this was not till the eleventh century, when the Canon law had evolved, under the hand of Gratian and his predecessors, a universal law of marriage based exclusively on the consent of the parties, and not dependent for its validity on the formalities which the Western codes had endeavoured to maintain. This Canon law of marriage, in order to reduce the evil of concubinage to a minimum, had adopted the well-known expedient introduced about the beginning of the Christian era into the Roman law

of marriage, the doctrine of *legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium*. The general doctrine of legitimation was originally the doctrine by which children born out of the power (*potestas*) of the father could be brought under that power. This doctrine, in the time of Justinian, was applied in three ways to the case of children born out of wedlock. A father could legitimate his child by making him a member of the *Curia*, a thankless and costly office in the age of Theodosius and Valentinian. The result was not, however, to make the child a member of the family for all purposes ; it made him legitimate *sub modo* ; that is to say, it brought him under *potestas* and gave him the right to succeed his father, but no one else. Constantine introduced legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium*, but Justinian subjected it to three conditions : the marriage must have been possible when the child was conceived, there must be a marriage settlement (in other words, marriage registration), and the child (which lost its freedom from control by legitimation) must not object. Justinian added a third method of legitimation by special rescript, a method which applied only where legitimation by subsequent marriage was impossible (as where either parent was dead or already married), and where there were, in fact, no legitimate children.*

Wherever the Roman law was accepted as part of the Common law, this doctrine of legitimation by subsequent marriage was introduced,† though apparently the codes based upon the Theodosian code did not incorporate the doctrine. But the fact that the Canon law had incorporated the doctrine gave it on the Continent general sanction. In England, however, no early code complicated the marriage law, while the Canon law was comparatively powerless before the date when the Common law of England was well established. When the Canon law obtained at last some force in England, we find a very curious position as to the law of marriage. The ecclesiastics and the Courts Christian asserted the now universal Catholic doctrine—that marriage is a mere matter of consent, that it is absolutely indissoluble, and that subsequent marriage, between persons already having issue and being capable of legitimate marriage, legitimises the issue. On the other hand,

---

* See R. W. Leage, ' Roman Private Law,' pp. 69-71.

† Cf. the *Jus Provinciale Alemannicum*, cap. 378.

the King's Court held very different views. The Roman Church had got over its difficulties as to indissolubility by inventing a doctrine of nullity of marriage, whereby almost any pair who found marriage intolerable could sever the bond. But if the marriage was nullified this meant that there never had been a marriage, and that therefore the issue of the nullified marriage were illegitimate. The King's Court repudiated this doctrine, and, boldly inventing the counter doctrine of 'possessory marriage,' asserted the fact of the legitimacy of the issue.* In this way a prolific source of bastardy was cut off, but the King's Courts and Parliament absolutely refused to adopt the converse position. If children were in fact born out of matrimony, their bastardy was incurable. The position was quite consistent: if the children were born in matrimony then they were legitimate, even though the Church, on purely technical grounds, subsequently declared that the marriage did not exist. There was a marriage in fact, a possessory marriage, and the King's Court would not go behind the fact. On the other hand, when there was not a marriage in fact a subsequent marriage could not relate back.

But the power of the Church and of the Canonists and Civilians was very great in England in the thirteenth century, especially in the period following the Oxford lectures on Roman law delivered by Vacarius, and the doctrines in question were not, as some observers have thought, entirely nugatory. Even in the question of succession to land we find that in two cases the doctrine of the Civil and the Canon law secured permanent recognition, and this is remarkable in view of the attitude adopted by the Barons at the famous Parliament of Merton in 1236.

It is important to consider in general terms the English medieval law before the Statute of Merton. The *Mirroir des Justices* declares that 'a bastard is not to be accounted amongst 'sons; for the Common law only taketh him to be a son whom 'the marriage proves to be so.' Glanville, writing in the reign of Henry II. before 1180,† states that 'neither a bastard

* For cases see Appendix I. to the Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, by J. E. G. de Montmorency.

† Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae, Lib. 7, c. 13.

'nor any other person not born in lawful wedlock can be, in 'the legal sense of the term, an heir'; but that inasmuch as it is the business of the Court Christian to inquire concerning bastardy, and not the business of the King's Court, the Court Christian was ordered by writ to determine whether a certain child was or was not born before the marriage of his mother, and to inform the King's Court. The Court Christian was not asked to decide whether the child was legitimate or not, but whether it was born before or during the marriage of its mother. If the Court were asked the first question, it would have decided in favour of legitimacy, for by Roman law and Canon law the subsequent marriage made the *antenatus* legitimate; yet (says Glanville), 'according to the law and 'custom of this realm, he shall in no measure be supported 'as heir in his claim upon the inheritance; nor can he demand 'the inheritance by the law of the realm'; consequently the Court Christian—i.e. the Bishop—merely found the question of fact. The position was intolerable, since the Court Christian was being used by the King's Court in order to secure a decision exactly the reverse of that which the Canon law and the recent Constitution of Pope Alexander III. (6 Hen. II., 1160) laid down as the law of succession, and therefore at the Parliament of Merton the Bishops took the point. They could not answer the writ of special bastardy 'because it was directed against 'the common order of the Church.'

'And all the Bishops instanted the Lords, that they would consent, that all such as were born afore matrimony should be legitimate, as well as they that be born within matrimony, as to the succession of inheritance, forasmuch as the Church accepteth such for legitimate. And all the earls and barons with one voice answered, that they would not change the laws of the realm which hitherto have been used and approved.'

Soon after this date the Ordinary of the Bishop ceased to find the facts in these cases of special bastardy, and only dealt with general bastardy. The King's Court tried the question whether a person was born before marriage, and on finding the fact, found also the bastardy. Bracton makes this clear.

From 1236, then, it was perfectly plain that no person could succeed to English land who was not both legitimate and was also born in matrimony. But the influence of the Church doctrine of *legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium* was by

no means nugatory. In two cases relating to land it still survives, or at any rate survived until the passing of the Inheritance Act, 1833: where a man dies leaving two sons by the same mother, one of whom was born before marriage and one after marriage (called respectively the *bastard eigne* and the *mulier puisne*), and the *bastard eigne* enters on his father's lands and dies seised of those lands, leaving legitimate issue, the *mulier puisne*, though entitled in law, cannot oust the heir of the *bastard eigne*, even though the *bastard eigne* had never acquired a prescriptive title by possession. The rule of law is based on the rule of *legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium*, which, having in fact operated, is not dislodged by the claims of any direct or collateral heir. The same rule applies in a case of coparcenary, that is to say, where a man dies seised of land leaving two daughters by the same mother, one born before and one after marriage. If these enter on the land as heirs in coparcenary, and then the illegitimate daughter dies, the true heir cannot oust the heirs of the dead daughter.

We venture to labour these recondite points of law, as they show that the doctrine of legitimation by subsequent marriage has left its traces even on the English law of real property. But the doctrine in fact went much further than this. While the King's Court took into its own hands questions of heirship to land, and for the most part excluded the doctrine of heirship laid down by the Civil and the Canon law, the question of succession to personal estate remained in the hands of the Court Christian, and there is no manner of doubt that this Court, which strictly applied the rules of the Canon law, applied the doctrine of *legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium* to the distribution of personal estate. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the actual date when this practice ceased. It probably did not extend beyond the date when the Canon law ceased to be operative, so far as the laity are concerned, in England.

Before proceeding to draw conclusions from the early relationship of the law of England to the general Continental doctrine of legitimation by subsequent marriage, it will be convenient to summarise the available information as to the legal position to-day of an illegitimate child. First of all, the doctrine that he is a *filius nullius* has a very limited application. In the case of English realty it is in fact abso-

lutely limited to succession on intestacy when such succession has to be traced through his parents. He is not his father's heir-at-law, he is not his mother's heir-at-law. But if his parents have subsequently married he could, if he in fact entered on the estate, transmit a right of inheritance to his legitimate children. Again, he can take as heir-at-law to his legitimate descendants. He can, of course, if clearly designated, take under a will or generally, as the legal phrasing goes, by purchase. When we turn to personal estate we find exceptions that make the strict law somewhat easier. A bastard is not now one of the next-of-kin to any deceased person other than his legitimate issue unless he has become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of his parents domiciled abroad, or unless 'the law of his father's domicile permits a bastard child to 'succeed.' Personal property has no locality, and therefore, if any person can prove that the law of his domicile recognises him as legitimate, the English Courts will recognise him as legitimate for all purposes other than the local purpose of succession to English lands or hereditaments. But it is clear that, if unlegitimated, the child is regarded by English law as a stranger in blood for many purposes to each of its parents, and succession and other duties are payable on this footing. But nevertheless there is a tendency, even in law and even in matters of property, to blur the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy. We have seen instances of the above, and it is not difficult to indicate further examples. Thus, though a bastard has neither brothers nor sisters, uncles nor aunts, yet this natural relationship springs into sight the moment that the question of marriage arises. A bastard may not marry any person whom, if he were legitimate, he could not marry. Again, by an Act of 1883, 'if he be a member 'of a friendly, industrial, and provident society, a trade union, 'or a savings bank, and die intestate without nominating any 'person to receive the sums accruing in right of his membership, 'such sums may be paid to the person or persons who would 'have been entitled if he had been legitimate.' *

This provision is not without significance at the present time. But it will be convenient to present somewhat more in detail the relations of father and illegitimate child. By

* The Laws of England, vol. ii. p. 439.

an Act of 1874 the father can, if he desires it, be registered, jointly with the mother, as the parent of the child. From his father the child can inherit the capacity to become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of his parents. For this to take effect, the father, at the time of the birth and of the marriage, must be *domiciled* in a country which recognises the rule of legitimation by subsequent marriage, though neither the birth nor the marriage need take place in such a country. If once the child is so legitimised, no change of the father's domicile can undo the fact. The father has no inherent duty to maintain the child unless he marries the mother or in fact places himself in *loco parentis*; but he can enter into a contract with the mother to maintain the child, and if he does so the liability is not discharged by bankruptcy. The paternity can be ascertained by legal proceedings instituted by the mother, who must personally appear, and whose evidence must be corroborated. The justices on these proceedings can declare the defendant to be the putative father, and order him to pay to the mother, or any person appointed to have the custody of the child, a sum covering the expenses incidental to the birth and a weekly sum not exceeding five shillings for maintenance and education, and this order may be operative until the child attains the age of sixteen years. The order is only terminable by the death of the father. If the putative father is a soldier, a copy of the order is sent to the Secretary of State for War, who may order sevenpence a day to be deducted from the daily pay of any non-commissioned officer not below the rank of sergeant, and not more than fourpence a day from the daily pay of any other soldier, and appropriated in liquidation of the sum named in the order. In the case of a warrant-officer not holding an honorary commission the sum appropriated may be, by an act of 1913, one shilling a day. The guardians of the poor can also take proceedings against a putative father to compel him to contribute to the maintenance of the child. But the father has certain rights as well as duties. It is true that he cannot take the child from the mother; but her rights end with her death, and on her death he has a right to the custody of the child and he cannot be dislodged by a guardian appointed by the mother. The Court will uphold his right.

The mother's duties and rights are more extensive than

those of the father. The mother gives the child her domicile, and under the Poor Law Act of 1834, her settlement for poor law purposes attaches to the child to the age of sixteen years or marriage. Until that age, the mother has the legal duty of maintaining her child, and of this duty she cannot divest herself by contract or otherwise. The duty is, however, ended by her death, and her personal representatives are not liable for maintenance. It may be said, also, to be ended by her marriage, for her husband is liable to maintain the child until it attains the age of sixteen years or until the child's mother dies. 'The 'law,' said Lord Halsbury in 1891, in the famous case of *Barnardo* v. *McHugh*, 'has placed upon the mother of an 'illegitimate child obligations which ought to, and, in my 'opinion do, bring with them corresponding rights.' The mother, therefore, has a right of custody with *Habeas corpus* in the background, and the Court will consider her wishes in all cases, and allow her to determine the religion of the child.

What, then, are the rights and duties of the child? It was decided as long ago as 1621, under the Elizabethan Poor Law Act, that he had no duty to support his parents. They had done little for him on which to base such a claim. But 'he 'has a right to receive compensation for the death of either 'parent or grandparent in cases falling under the Workmen's 'Compensation Act, 1906, but not under the Fatal Accidents 'Act, 1846; and the rights of his parents or grandparents to 'receive compensation for his death depend upon similar 'principles.' * Again, he is a 'dependent' within the meaning of the Insurance Act, and it is not unimportant to note that the War Office and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, in dealing with the claims of dependents of those on active service, recognise illicit or informal unions and the offspring of such unions.

The position of an illegitimate child in English law is thus one that has certain mitigations of the extreme degradation involved in the conception of a *filius nullius*. These mitigations belong partly to the Middle Ages when ecclesiastical lawyers were able to secure for the child some of the benefits of the Canon law; partly to the decisions of the King's Court in all ages, decisions that have striven to meet hardships so far as

* The Laws of England, vol. ii. pp. 438–9.

'natural' equity could allow it to be done; partly by the modern application of the doctrines of private international law which enable the Canon law doctrine of legitimation to have operation on grounds of domicile in certain cases; partly by modern statutes and modern administrative efforts. To-day the problem of illicit unions is very considerably in the minds of social thinkers, and thought on the subject has been stimulated by widespread but ill-founded allegations to the effect that the conditions of war-time in England have caused a great increase in the illegitimate birth-rate. It is not possible yet to ascertain whether there has been any, or what, increase, but it certainly seems reasonable to anticipate some increase of this birth-rate in certain areas and some decrease in other areas.* We do not believe for one moment that there has been any noteworthy relaxation of moral restraints during this period of excitement, when great armies have been in training in so many districts; it is indeed certain that discipline and the high purpose of this war has strengthened the moral outlook. On the other hand there has been much mental excitement and much hero-worship among young women in the military areas, and it is probable that many soldiers have gone on foreign service with an expressed intention of marriage, on their return, to the young women with whom they have associated during the period of training. In some of these cases, no doubt, illicit relations have existed and illegitimate children will be or have been born. But there is ample evidence to show that the cases are very few and that nothing in the nature of a general relaxation of morals has arisen.

But the facts of the present time, whatever they are, coupled with the very considerable normal illegitimate birth-rate, amounting to about 4 per cent. of the total birth-rate, give rise to thoughts as to whether it would not be possible to put the whole question of illegitimacy upon a fairer basis, without in any way relaxing the moral pressure to which we

* The present writer has been officially informed that in a certain town within fifty miles of London, where over 15,000 troops have been stationed for nearly a year, the illegitimate birth-rate is actually sub-normal. See also the report of the sub-Committee on Illegitimate Births during the War, which absolutely disposes of many wild rumours on the subject.

referred at the beginning of this article. We have here considered the whole question of legal tradition in relation to the question of bastardy; we know the general social views on the subject; we realise that the law and the views of society represent efforts to conserve social purity, and at the same time to support the freedom of the individual. We have seen the Church making efforts, as an international body, to right the injustices that do undoubtedly mar the legal and the social system in regard to illegitimate children; we have seen in modern times Courts responsible for the application of the principles of private international law doing the same thing; we have seen throughout the ages the efforts of judges, statesmen, and ecclesiastics to reconcile the iron law of social purity with some measure of justice to the victims of human weakness or of human disregard of customary conventions. Has not the time come when these various efforts can be thrown into statutory form so as to give the illegitimate child, in all circumstances, the opportunity of becoming an effective member of society and in certain circumstances of becoming legitimate for all or most of the contingencies of English social life? Acts—such as the Employment of Children Act, 1903, the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904, the Children Act, 1908—supplementing the educational and employment legislation of the last sixty years, have done much to provide physical safeguards for the illegitimate child. Thus in the Act of 1904 it is provided that the sections of the Act relating to the parent of the child shall apply to the step-parent of the child and to any person cohabiting with the parent of the child, and the expression 'parent' shall include every person who is in law liable to maintain the child; and the Children Act, 1908, is even more elastic in allotting responsibility. These acts, where adequately administered, save the illegitimate child from those evils and brutalities that have made the death-rate among illegitimate children much higher than it is among legitimate children.

But the position of such children might be further ameliorated without endangering public morals. Indeed, such amelioration might be made a deterrent to illicit unions. Thus the illegitimate child should be made, without any doubt, one of the next-of-kin to its mother, and the legal right should persist whether the mother subsequently marries or not. Again, the mother

should have the right, as the result of affiliation proceedings, to have the name of the father entered on the birth-register, and the child thereupon should become one of the next-of-kin of the father. Again, neither father nor mother should have the right to exclude such next-of-kin by will from a certain share in his or her personal estate. There was a period in English law when a husband could not on death alienate his whole property from his wife and children. It is time that this very general rule was reintroduced into English law, and was extended to registered illegitimate children. These changes would certainly not tend to increase the illegitimate birth-rate, while they would give some certainty of subsistence in many cases to illegitimate children. Moreover, the right of succession would induce parents to give reasonable opportunities of education to the child—education of the type usual in the class of the mother. But the protection of the child can in many cases go farther than this. In too many instances the fall of the mother has been due to the gross negligence of the girl's parents. This has been patent, it is credibly stated, in some few cases where troops in training are billeted in private houses. We know that the terrible evils which existed under the old Poor Law were encouraged by parents. Now it might well become the law, that in cases where a magistrate finds, as a fact, that the girl's downfall has been due to inadequate home protection, the illegitimate child should, for all purposes of succession to property, rank as a legitimate grandchild of the mother's parents, and should have all the other rights of a grandchild, and should, moreover, have a right of maintenance as against these grandparents. There is a precedent for this in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and the provision would undoubtedly prove a great deterrent against promiscuous immorality. Parents would take pains so to train their children as to protect themselves against such contingencies.

The cases to which we refer are, of course, cases where the father of the child is either unknown, or is unwilling to recognise his moral responsibilities. A different question arises where the father is known and is anxious to legitimate his issue by marriage with the mother or otherwise. There is nothing except an ancient tradition, which, as we have seen, has been repeatedly evaded, to prevent the adoption in our law of the doctrine of *legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium.* To

argue that it would increase the number of illicit unions is really to miss the point of the reform. It is possible that it would increase, by a very minute percentage, the number of illicit unions; but it must be remembered that most of these would become lawful unions, and we have also to remember what was taught us by the case of the Quakers in the eighteenth century, and of the deceased wife's sister cases in the nineteenth century, that these illicit unions are deliberate acts and are not either stimulated or repressed by legislation. We see the same in Italy to-day, where an iron law of civil marriage has been quietly defied and the consequences risked. Moreover, it must be remembered further that subsequent marriage to the mother already imposes upon the father the legal duty of maintenance. It is a mere act of justice to father and child alike that a duty of maintenance springing out of marriage should have a correlative privilege of legitimacy.

The present law as to bastardy, its compromises and injustices, is a result of that social process of growth to which we referred at the beginning of this paper. Tradition demands that bastardy should be penalised in every possible way; tradition records that Parliament itself, seven centuries ago, refused to allow the Church to interfere with what was even then an ancient custom. On the other hand, the English sense of freedom demands that the parent shall not, in matters of marriage, coerce his children, and that free opportunities of marriage shall be available. The results of this double process have, in many ways, been advantageous, but the enlargement of social life and of social ideas that has marked the last half century, and the still greater enlargement that will follow this war, may well make English people doubt whether these conventions of social life can stand unaltered. In fact, as we have seen, the tradition as to bastardy has by no means been an unvarying rule, while the absence of parental control and responsibility threatens to become a monstrous evil. The amended law should endeavour to throw the burden of bastardy on the shoulders that deserve it, not the weak shoulders of the unhappy child, not even in its present proportion on the shoulders of the erring mother, but rather on the man and on the parents of the woman. It should create deterrents that would have the effect of largely reducing the illegitimate birth-rate and of purifying society, while at the same time it would so far as possible minimise the physical

and financial disabilities that fall upon the bastard. Boldly to incorporate into our law the doctrine of *legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium* would do much in the latter direction, while the penalising of unnatural fathers and negligent grandparents would cleanse society. The Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, in its Reports, struck hard at the cruel and immoral convention which draws a distinction in favour of the man in cases of immorality. This blow at that weakness in our national social outlook should be reinforced by legislation, bringing home responsibility in full measure to the father of illegitimate children and giving him also the opportunity of righting those children's wrongs.

It will be useful to consider the current practice in Scotland in order to see this very law at work in our own island. It is not clear as to the date or indeed the manner in which the Roman doctrine of legitimation entered Scots law. It is certain that it was incorporated in that law before the Reformation, and inasmuch as legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium* was adopted in its Canon law form and not in the old Roman form, it is probable that a portion of the Scottish doctrine of legitimation was brought in by the Canonists. The Civilians limited legitimation to the offspring of concubinate unions, the Canonists extended it to all bastards whose parents subsequently marry if they were capable of marriage at the date of the child's conception, and it was found as a fact that the child was the actual child of the married pair. The Scots law followed the Canon law. It permits the legitimation of all bastards by the subsequent marriage of their parents, if they are not the offspring of an adulterous or incestuous union. The important case of *Kerr* v. *Martin* in 1840 proclaimed that it is the purpose of the law of legitimation to restrain concubinage, encourage marriage; and strengthen the tie between parents and children. Lord Gillies, in 1826, in the case of *Rose* v. *Ross*, declared that 'the law, as originally promulgated, stood on its own 'proper principle of justice and expediency.' It is not a legal fiction at all, not a presumption of a marriage that relates back to the birth, says Lord Fraser* ; the legitimation is the result solely of law, and does not in the least depend on the

* 'Parent and Child,' 3rd edit. by James Clark, p. 40 (1906).

intention of the parents. The marriage and the marriage alone brings the children within the fold of legitimacy. Here the Scots law differs from the French variation of the Canon law, by which apparently recognition before marriage is necessary for legitimation, a variation which has been imitated in certain of our colonial laws. But if the Scottish doctrine of legitimation by subsequent marriage is derived from the Canon law, *legitimatio per rescriptum principis* seems to have been derived at some early date direct from Roman law. In Scottish law a child can be legitimated, as he could be legitimated under the Roman Empire, by royal letters of legitimation, which give formal legitimacy, without any rights of succession, to the child, and give to the bastard heirs who shut out the rights of the Crown. In the Middle Ages the Pope also used to issue these letters. But the child was not, in this way, fully legitimised; he was not made an *agnatus* of the family. But legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium* is a very different matter. The effect is to confer the status and rights of a lawful child, including the right of *legitim*, and to bring the child into the rank of the legitimate children with the benefit of seniority. In one case this latter benefit is absent. It is the case when, after the child's birth, one of the parents marries a third party, and after the termination of this marriage marries the other parent of the child. In this case the child ranks as the eldest lawful child of the *second* marriage, and so loses the benefit of seniority. The rule as to legitimacy is very thorough. Thus, if the child dies before the marriage, leaving lawful issue, that issue apparently have for most purposes the rights of descendants of a child lawfully born. The rule of law is, in fact, consistent. The marriage need not be a formal marriage, and here again the Canon law varies from the Civil law. It need not be a public or regular marriage. A mere acknowledgment of the marriage in the presence of servants was, in 1807, held to be sufficient. On the other hand there is the check that the child's legitimacy only dates from the moment of the marriage.

This law has obtained side by side with the strict and very narrow English law for centuries, and has been found to work well. Nor has it stood alone. In the Channel Islands the same law, with certain local variations, obtained and obtains, and is directly derived from the far-off Custom of Normandy.

Again in the Isle of Man, the same law is in force. It was the ancient customary law of the island and was declared to be the law of the land by the Tynwald as long ago as 1594. The convenience of the rule, its ' principle of justice and expediency,' has caused it to extend in British Dominions far beyond the lands which own the sway of the Roman Dutch law. It, of course, exists in South Africa, British Guiana, and Ceylon, for in these dominions the Roman Dutch law runs. But we find it also in Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, Quebec, in St. Lucia and the Seychelles Islands. These instances are all explicable on historical grounds. But the law has been deliberately introduced into the most extensive Dominions of the Crown. It was introduced into South Australia in 1898, into Queensland in 1899, into New South Wales in 1902, Victoria in 1903, into Tasmania in 1905, into New Zealand in 1908. In Ontario alone has it been deliberately rejected in reliance on the moral efficacy of the time-honoured Statute of Merton. Laws of this type do not spread unreasonably. They are only adopted in the presence of an urgent demand for a ' principle of justice ' and expediency.' The law has not been imposed on these new lands by the Church which advocates it ; it has been grafted into their laws out of a startled sense of injustice. The opinion of the Southern Hemisphere may well reinforce the arguments already set forth in favour of the adoption of the doctrine in England. It cannot be that so many races in so many different ages and climes would have adopted the law unless some very profound moral truth underlies it. That truth is the sanctity of the relationship of parent and child. The brutal doctrine of the *filius nullius* degrades humanity and loosens the bonds of parental love. The doctrine of legitimation offers a *locus penitentiae* to imperfect human nature. The doctrine of the *filius nullius* has never raised the morality of the race, while it has degraded the innocent and made despair the lot of the unhappy.

A GERMAN NAVAL HISTORIAN

Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888–1913. By GRAF ERNST ZU REVENTLOW. Königliche Hofbuchhandlung, Berlin. 1914.

AS a fiery commentator on German triumphs and exponent of German designs, Graf Ernst zu Reventlow has become rather well-known in England of late, and one of his utterances has earned him immortality in the pages of *Punch*. Even in earlier years his writings on politics had attracted some attention; but his principal work, 'Germany's Foreign Policy, '1888–1913,' appeared too immediately before the war to receive the notice it deserves. It is a solid quarto of 400 pages, and may fairly claim to rank as a complete history of Germany's relations with the outer world during the whole reign of William II. If anybody still believes that this war could have been avoided, he has but to read fifty pages of this book to be convinced of his error.

Count Reventlow is no fire-eater, or blusterer, or rabid Pan-German. He treats us to no philosophic eulogies of war, no hymns to the supremacy of German culture. He writes and reasons calmly; he never strays into rhetoric. All the more impressive, then, is his repeated demonstration that England and Germany cannot live peaceably in the same planet unless England is prepared to sacrifice to German maritime ambitions her own security and that of the English-speaking peoples beyond the seas. In his eyes, the history of Germany's foreign policy is practically the history of her relations with England. No other country engages so much of his attention; when she is not in the foreground of his thoughts, she always looms large and sinister in the background. And Germany's relations with England are in his judgment entirely conditioned by the relative growth of naval power. The tracing of that growth and of its consequences may fairly be called the real theme of the whole book.

One fact stands out in the forefront of Count Reventlow's record—namely, that it was no unjust or oppressive use of British sea-power that provoked the German challenge.

He tells us (p. 26) that in all colonial difficulties with Germany during the 'eighties England sooner or later gave way. He speaks of an 'apology' made to the German Government by Lord Granville in 1885. Many Germans were of opinion that the pliability of the British Government was due to 'respect 'for Bismarck and his well-known resoluteness in action,' but Count Reventlow holds that Bismarck's power lay in the great adroitness with which he had grouped the nations so as to threaten England's sensitive points, India, Central Asia, and Egypt. It does not occur to him that the desire to live on good terms with a neighbour could have had any influence on British statesmen. Be this as it may, he tells us (p. 58) that in the Heligoland Treaty of 1890 England had been allowed specially liberal terms in Africa because, as Prince Hohenlohe wrote, Germany had in the previous years 'trodden 'too much on the corns' of British colonial policy. Here, then, we have a reiterated assertion that down to 1890 England had not given Germany the slightest cause of complaint; yet we are assured (p. 57) that 'the Emperor William II. mounted 'the throne with the firm resolve to give the German Empire 'a great fleet.'

Count Reventlow adds that this resolve was not unknown in England, and that 'already at the accession of the Kaiser 'the English press discussed it at length,' but without alarm. It is hard to reconcile this with his remark (p. 51) that at the time of the cession of Heligoland 'a strong German navy 'was an idea that existed only in the mind of the German 'Emperor and a few naval officers,' and that had to be kept secret, else England would never have parted with the island.

The opening of the new reign was marked by the most cordial expressions of mutual friendship. In August 1889 the Kaiser attended a great naval review, and was appointed Admiral of the Fleet. The (then) Prince of Wales, at a banquet, expressed the hope that the greatest navy and the greatest army in Europe would work together for peace; and this hope was echoed by the Kaiser at a banquet in Berlin a year later. When Caprivi succeeded Bismarck in the spring of 1890, Great Britain was exerting her influence in the Mediterranean in entire accord with the Triple Alliance, and Caprivi hoped for a continuance of this good relationship. In short, Count Reventlow's pages abound with testimonies to the fact

that, down to about 1892, Great Britain had maintained the friendliest attitude towards Germany, and given her no cause for irritation or uneasiness.

Towards the end of Caprivi's chancellorship, 'certain 'discords began to make themselves felt in Anglo-German 'relations'; but no instance is cited of any unfriendly or vexatious act on England's part. True, we hear of a proposal that England should acquire by lease part of the Belgian Congo, and this the Count interprets as 'an unscrupulous 'attempt to override treaty obligations' (p. 58). Germany and France both protested, and the British Government made no difficulty about withdrawing the proposal, stating that if it had known what importance Germany attached to the matter it would not have made any move. Nothing, surely, could be more frank and friendly; but the Count's comment on the incident is that 'the English plan was not 'sufficiently prepared to be carried through.' With this temper of mind, what argument, what understanding, is possible?

On January 3, 1896, came the Kruger telegram—no impulsive outburst of the Kaiser's, but a deliberate act of his Ministry. The exasperation it aroused in England was certainly illogical, seeing that the Government disowned and condemned Jameson's raid; but when the Count tells us (p. 75) that the telegram was received in Germany with a cry of 'At last!' and a sigh of relief, we cannot but feel that this was perhaps a case in which instinct was wiser than logic, inasmuch as it divined the profound hostility lurking under the formally correct action. 'A British South Africa,' says the Count (p. 71), 'could not but run counter to all German 'interests.' When the Government alleged that Dr. Jameson did not aim at a political but at a commercial union of South Africa, Germany replied, in effect, that that was precisely what she objected to.

Before passing to the period of the Boer War, let us pause a moment to take note of Germany's action in the Far East, as Count Reventlow represents it. In 1895, Germany joined with France and Russia to deprive Japan of the fruits of the war with China. Her ostensible motive was a desire to draw nearer to Russia; but her real object was 'to prepare for the acquisi-'tion of a German foothold on the East-Asiatic coast' (p. 85). Had Russia been forced to give up her designs upon Port

Arthur, she would have opposed Germany's designs upon Kiow-Chow, which Berlin had already determined to appropriate. The Count assures us twice over (pp. 85, 109) that there was a secret agreement between the Kaiser and the Tsar for the acquisition of two ports in East-Asiatic waters; and 'one 'must not forget that this step was taken in the same year in 'which Kaiser Wilhelm made his public assertion of the 'necessity of a German world-policy.' * Kiow-Chow had been carefully examined and fixed upon as the place Germany wanted, and she merely awaited a plausible excuse for seizing it. On November 4, 1897, the Chinese obligingly murdered two German missionaries, and ten days later four German cruisers appeared at Kiow-Chow and took possession. This is the Count's own story of the events.

From 1896 onward, says the Count, British jealousy of Germany's commercial competition came more and more into evidence. He is unfortunately able to quote, from the *Saturday Review* of September 11, 1897, a truly poisonous article, declaring that if Germany could be wiped out to-morrow every Englishman would be richer the day after, arguing that a commerce of so-and-so many millions was certainly worth fighting for, and winding up: '*Germania est delenda.*' Incalculable is the harm done by such folly, especially in view of the German belief (real or assumed) that British public opinion is 'well 'disciplined on national questions' (p. 118) and that every second newspaper is a mouthpiece of the Government. The *Saturday Review* article is almost the only definite proof Count Reventlow advances of British ill-will to Germany. For the rest, he constantly tells, in general terms, how the British press 'raved' (*tobte*) over this incident and that. As applied to the tone of some English papers, the expression is no doubt just enough; but we hear nothing of the 'ravings' of German newspapers. It is tacitly assumed that their attitude was always marked by moderation and good sense.

'The epoch beginning in 1897 may be characterised as 'that in which Germany seriously undertook to remedy her 'powerlessness at sea.' Observe that up to this point the Count has not cited a single case in which Germany had suffered

* In a speech on the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire, January 18, 1896.

the slightest detriment or inconvenience from her lack of a strong navy. There is no suggestion that England was arrogantly or maliciously blocking her path in any quarter of the world. The fact was simply this :

'Into the humming maze of world-wide traffic, the German Empire plunged as a new-comer (*trat neu ein*). Wherever it directed its plans, wherever its merchants made themselves a footing in private competition, Germany found the other great Powers in possession of the field (*als Primolocisten*), and not inclined to give up either their possessions or their hopes and claims. If only the German fleet had then been anything like proportionate to the German maritime interests ! ' (p. 99.)

Could there be a clearer confession of the aggressive purpose of the German navy ? It is not alleged that German commerce was unfairly hampered ; on the contrary, its world-wide success is constantly and justly asserted. But if only Germany had possessed a strong fleet the triumph would have been far greater, inasmuch as other Powers would have been compelled to give up either the ' possessions ' or the ' hopes and aims ' to which they so disobligingly clung.

Arriving at the Boer War, we come to the point at which the whole German nation (as distinct from the official classes) began to realise and deplore its lack of maritime power. Count Reventlow attempts no concealment of the bitter hatred for England which then possessed the soul of the German people, and their rage at being forced to stand idly by while Great Britain established herself firmly in regions which Germany had marked down for her own exploitation. He practically confesses, too, that the German Government had led the Boers into a fool's paradise, by suffering them to look for support which, when the pinch came, could not possibly be given. This was an instance of that worst of blunders in Count Reventlow's eyes : ' ohne entsprechende Machtmittel Macht-' politik zu treiben '—' to engage in a policy of force without ' corresponding instruments of force behind it.' The Kaiser, when reproached for his inaction, was reported to have said that to ask Germany to intervene was like asking a man to stop a runaway horse by waving a handkerchief.

The seizure of three German steamers suspected of carrying contraband of war heightened the German fury ; and it was not in the least assuaged when the British Government owned

itself mistaken and apologised. On October 25, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain made a speech at Edinburgh in which he said that even if stronger measures than any we had taken in South Africa should be required, 'we may find precedents for anything we 'may do in the action of those nations which now criticise 'our "barbarity" and "cruelty," but whose example in 'Poland, in the Caucasus, in Algeria, in Tonkin, in Bosnia, in 'the Franco-German war, we have never even approached.'

'This comparison [says Count Reventlow], with the presumptuous, depreciatory, and unjust judgment implied in it, aroused enormous irritation throughout Germany. Everywhere indignation meetings were held, the papers were full of protests; in short the wrath of the German people was deep, bitter, and universal, as never before or after. It was directed first and foremost against Minister Chamberlain, as the insulter of the German army, the oppressor of the Boers, and—*this was unexpressed, but all the more deeply felt*—as the leader of a policy which had put an end to the hopes and dreams of a great part of the German people.'

This can obviously mean nothing but that a great part of the German people had hoped, in one way or another, to absorb the Boer Republics into their Empire—rather, perhaps, by 'peaceful penetration' than by conquest. The Count proceeds:

'But that unexampled outburst had deeper grounds than the mere irritation against one man. In it overflowed once for all the long-accumulated national sense of injury of the past decade—the feeling of being overreached, the memory of real or imaginary political defeats. The generally superior tone of the English press towards Germans—now patronising, now criticising—and the placidity with which public opinion in England assumed the inferiority of the German nation to the English* had been always felt and never forgotten. On the top of all this came the feeling of impotence. The voluminous literature of these years shows, one might almost say on every hand, the thought and the hope of one day "reckoning with England."' (p. 171.)

What chance was there of any friendly understanding with a people in this frame of mind? Had the German feeling been one of disinterested sympathy with the Boers in their fight against overwhelming odds, it would have been comprehensible

* Had the Count looked more closely into the matter, he could certainly have found numberless utterances of exactly the opposite tendency—articles, letters, and speeches asserting the hopeless inferiority of everything British to everything German.

enough. We could even have made allowance for the too ready credence given to stories of British 'barbarity,' which Count Reventlow himself admits to have 'far overshot the 'mark.' But here we have a close student of the German mind asserting, without the least hesitation, that the Boer War merely afforded an opportunity for the outrush of a bitter 'sense of injury' which had been fermenting for ten years—though in his detailed history of these ten years he has cited no single case in which Great Britain opposed the wishes or prejudiced the interests of Germany.

At the launch of a battleship on October 18, 1899, the Kaiser said 'We stand in bitter need of a strong German navy.' His visit to Queen Victoria in the following month was much resented in Germany; but the Count admits that it was wise

'not to arouse suspicions in England just at a time when we were laying the foundations of a great German sea-power whose chief end (*Hauptzweck*) was gradually to oppose to British preponderance at sea a force which it would be obliged to recognise and respect.' (p. 152.)

The Naval Law of 1900 doubled the programme of 1898, which had been intended as a sort of feeler. On the situation thus created, the Count comments as follows:

'Among the German people bitter wrath against England had for years been piling itself up, and had been brought to explosion by the Boer War. . . . Now came the Naval Laws: we threatened (*man drohte*) England with the creation of a strong German fleet, and forged far-reaching plans for the future.' (p. 157.)

That there may be no doubt as to the idea inspiring the Naval Laws, the Count quotes (p. 158) two utterances on the subject by Prince Hohenlohe and Prince Bülow, both of which, he says, were plainly directed against England.

Meanwhile he admits that the British Government were slow to take alarm. After, as before, the Naval Law of 1900, they did their best, he says, to make friends with Germany (p. 157). At many other points (in nine separate passages) he bears witness to endeavours on England's part to bring about improved relations—and these endeavours do not include the repeated proposals for an armaments-agreement or a 'naval holiday.' Mr. Chamberlain even suggested on one occasion a German-American-British alliance. The

'Yangtse Treaty' (October 16, 1900) might have been the beginning of better things, had not Great Britain, as Count Reventlow boasts, found herself outwitted in it. Both parties bound themselves to maintain the 'open door' in China, to make no territorial acquisitions, and to oppose such acquisitions by other Powers; but when it came to interpreting the last clause, it appeared that Germany did not understand 'China' to include Manchuria, and therefore would not act with England in opposing the retention of that region by Russia. One might take this to be a case of a stupid misunderstanding, without any bad faith; but the Count boastingly admits the bad faith. 'The wording of the treaty,' he says, 'left Germany an open door on either side, and was in itself 'extremely adroit' (p. 169). In another place he repeats his admiration of the way in which Germany reserved to herself the power to play fast and loose. Yet the Count and his countrymen are constantly accusing England of hypocrisy.

Up to about 1902, says Count Reventlow, British statesmen had not despaired of winning the friendship of Germany; but they now began to abandon the effort, deterred partly by the Yangtse incident, partly by the frigidity with which all overtures were received. And then there was the 'spectre' of the German fleet! One of the oddest features of the Count's mentality is the way in which he proclaims in one breath that the 'main object' of the fleet was to threaten the security of England, and in the next breath ridicules England for feeling her security threatened. About 1901, Marshal von der Goltz published in a German magazine a quite 'academic' demonstration that an invasion of England was by no means impossible, while an Oberleutnant attached to the Great General Staff chose the same attractive theme for an entirely theoretic essay. Both these innocent fantasies, the Count tells us, were actually taken seriously in England, and cited for years by professional Germanophobes. He professes himself quite astonished at our lack of appreciation for such 'academic' exercises. The change of front of the British fleet, its massing in home waters, and the establishment of the Rosyth base followed the failure of efforts at conciliation. British alarm was interpreted in Germany as 'hypocrisy,' masking aggressive designs; but the Count confesses (p. 199) that events have negatived this interpretation.

The main interest of Count Reventlow's book is his unintentional but all the more conclusive testimony to the fact that, up to the time when Germany chose deliberately to challenge the naval preponderance on which our security depends, the British fleet, and British policy as a whole, had done her no tangible damage, and inflicted no humiliation of any sort. If we have at any time pursued a 'dog in the manger' policy, it did not begin till Germany had ostentatiously threatened us, and was taking active steps to carry out her threats. Up to the accession of King Edward, the one substantial ground of complaint adduced by Count Reventlow is an article in a weekly paper of no importance, which no British statesman would defend. That there was a great deal of deplorably foolish writing in the press of both countries is probable enough; but no one who knows England can for a moment believe that British hostility to Germany was one-tenth part as fierce or as wide-spread as the German hatred which Count Reventlow again and again emphasises.

When, repelled by Germany, we smoothed out our differences with France, matters unquestionably entered upon a new phase; but even in that phase it is surprising how little positive ground of complaint the Count can discover. He makes great play with M. Delcassé's failure to give Germany official notification of the Morocco Convention, and indeed it is difficult to understand the motives for that discourtesy; but England was not directly concerned in it. He also expresses lofty moral indignation at the existence of secret clauses in the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements with reference to Morocco; as though secret treaties and understandings were wholly unknown in the history of German diplomacy! That there was anything dishonourable, or necessarily prejudicial to German interests, in the secret clauses, may surely be denied. It is a mistake to say that the treaties, on the face of them, 'guaranteed' the independence and integrity of Morocco. The parties expressed their intention to support the Sultan's government, and they manifestly could not add in plain terms 'so long as it is reasonably possible.' But neither could they help having doubts whether any tolerable native government could maintain itself in the long run; and there was nothing to forbid their agreeing on the course to be

pursued in the event of Moroccan independence and integrity proving synonymous with intolerable misrule. There is always apt to be an element of 'hypocrisy' in the relations between civilised and barbarous governments, because mere civility demands it. Nor was Germany's attitude one of sincere moral protest. As the events of 1911 proved, she cared not a jot for the integrity and independence of Morocco. All she wanted was to secure her own commercial interests and to extort from France some 'compensation' for allowing her a free hand in a country where she (Germany) had repeatedly declared that she had no political interests.

Count Reventlow has naturally a good deal to say about Mr. Lloyd George's speech of July 21, 1911. The secret history of that incident has yet to be written. Founding on the emphatic and repeated assertion that Germany neither attempted nor desired to secure any territory in Morocco, the Count argues with some plausibility that Mr. Lloyd George's very serious words of warning were entirely uncalled for. In the absence of fuller knowledge, it is impossible to discuss the point. Mr. Lloyd George and the other ministers concerned may conceivably have acted hastily, on imperfect information. It is worth noting, however, that the Count admits (p. 361) that after this incident the Franco-German negotiations proceeded more smoothly.

Let us now gather up, in conclusion, some of Count Reventlow's reiterated declarations that the one indispensable condition of any drawing-together of Germany and England was that England should be content to see her security gravely imperilled by a powerful fleet in the possession of a people which longed for nothing so much as to settle accounts with her.

After the first Dreadnought came on the scene, Germany stood at the parting of the ways. Count Reventlow recites a long list of advantages she would have gained by giving up the naval competition: untold millions of marks would have been saved, British friendship would easily have been secured, &c., &c. 'The ways of our foreign policy would have been 'smoothed, but—this was the decisive point—*under British* '*tutelage* in all maritime affairs' (p. 250). Germany took the great step, and faced the enormous expense involved, not only in naval construction, but in widening the Kiel Canal, enlarging

docks and harbours &c., in full consciousness that she was 'building for her foreign politics and diplomacy a Calvary which 'would have *nolens volens* to be climbed.' (p. 251.)

'The German Empire, with its politics thrown on the defensive on every hand, went on arming. The thought that we were determined to get through, that pliability could only do harm, and that persistence, on the contrary, must at last have its reward, became year by year more victoriously dominant.' (p. 254.)

Under the heading of 'Utopias and Intrigues at the Hague,' the Count discusses Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's overtures towards the restriction of armaments. He 'may' (the Count admits) have meant them honestly; but they were nevertheless only an attempt to subject Germany to majority pressure, such as she had suffered at Algeciras, and to block her justifiable naval ambitions. At the Hague Conference which met in July 1907, Germany refused to take part in the discussion of the restriction of armaments, and thus 'managed 'to rule the subject out.' The Conference, was, in fact, quite a triumph for her, inasmuch as she 'succeeded in averting or 'foiling everything that could have been injurious to the 'German Empire, and especially that could have impaired her 'full freedom of arming and of developing her power in war.' (p. 288.)

Could Germany, the Count asks, have prevented the Russo-Franco-British combination? His answer is that she could have done so only by adopting Mr. Chamberlain's idea of a German-British-American-Japanese understanding. Bülow had rightly decided against this—and why? Because Germany would have had to give up the thought of a strong fleet:

'a fleet such as the Kaiser thought necessary and the Government had by law determined on: such a fleet as the German people had come to demand, not only with the heart, but with the head. This fleet the German Empire, as the ally of Great Britain, could not have created, the very fact of friendship forbidding it. Matters would have stood as in the period of German-English cordiality in the beginning of the 'nineties, when British midshipmen said to German cadets "We have the fleet, you have the army." It has already been sufficiently demonstrated that such a position was a sheer impossibility for the German Empire of the twentieth century.' (p. 296.)

This is the constant burden of the Count's reflections—Germany's world-ambitions can never be satisfied so long as

the British command of the sea remains unchallenged. And he flatters himself that Germany has already gained her end of intimidating Great Britain. The Bosnian crisis, in which Germany stood 'in shining armour' at the side of her ally, indicated, he thinks, that the Triple Entente was impotent in the face of a serious possibility of war. Ten years earlier it might have been different, for then England would have thought it easy to annihilate the German fleet. But in the meantime she had come to realise that this would be no light matter.

Of course we hear a good deal of wicked Anglo-French attempts to sow suspicions of Germany among her neighbours. In Belgium, for instance:

'English and French efforts had succeeded in awakening profound mistrust. It was constantly repeated in the French press that German troops would, on the outbreak of hostilities, cross the Belgian frontier and trample on Belgian neutrality, in order to take France in the flank. It seems as if the leaders of German policy were at that time [about 1907] inclined to take measures to allay, so far as possible, these groundless suspicions of the smaller States.' (p. 300.)

The phrase 'groundless suspicions' reads well to-day. In April 1908 was signed the North Sea Convention, between Germany, France, England, Holland, and Sweden, guaranteeing the *status quo* of the North Sea coasts and islands. The initiative came from Germany, and was an act of voluntary benevolence to Denmark and Holland, to convince them of the 'Loyalität' of the German Empire. And then, in the very next sentence, this amazing writer proceeds:

'In a great European war, when the to-be-or-not-to-be of the Great Powers is at stake, this treaty will avail no more than any other to protect neutrality and possessions. That can only be done by a country's own power of defence.' (p. 303.)

Such is Germany's 'Loyalität'! Such her kindly encouragement to the small nations!

To sum up:—the one fact which emerges sun-clear from Count Reventlow's careful and detailed narrative is that Germany's foreign policy for the past twenty years has been entirely shaped by her passionate jealousy of Great Britain's sea-power, and her fierce resolve to break it. Every motive, every desire, that conflicted with that resolve has been un-

hesitatingly sacrificed to it. She could not bear to think that her mailed fist was less terrible, less omnipotent, at sea than on land. British naval supremacy, as Count Reventlow amply shows, had inflicted on Germany no humiliation ; but its very existence was humiliation enough. The German patriot could not sleep o' nights for the thought that there were actually portions of the planet where his imperial will might conceivably be thwarted, or (what was almost as bad) realised only by England's sufferance. It was nothing to him that, while Germany coveted the command of the sea for her ambitions, England needed it for her very life. That was England's affair —let her look to it. England was perfectly willing—she showed it again and again—to recognise Germany's claim to rank as a strong maritime Power, so long as she herself retained the margin of superiority necessary to secure her from invasion and from famine, and to enable her to carry out her duties to her daughter nations beyond the seas. There was nothing either in her past actions or in the probabilities of the case to indicate that she would offer any hindrance to any reasonable ambition of a friendly Germany. In so far as she has run counter to Germany's will at all, it has only been since Germany proclaimed her hostility, and made obtrusive preparations for that ' reckoning ' for which Count Reventlow tells us that his countrymen were hungering even in the later 'nineties. That there have been faults of temper and of utterance on the British as well as on the German side no one would deny ; but one feels in reading this book that they mattered comparatively little, since, had we spoken nothing but reason, Germany was in no mood to listen. Nothing would have satisfied her save the power to reduce these islands, at any moment, to the condition of Belgium ; and for one thing only must we thank her—namely, that she has forced us to recognise the full extent of her malignity before it was too late.

WILLIAM ARCHER.

CANADA IN WAR-TIME

1. **Agricultural War Book.** Published by direction of Hon. MARTIN BURRELL, Minister of Agriculture. Ottawa. January 1915.
2. **The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1913.** By J. CASTELL HOPKINS. Toronto. 1914.
3. **Immigration Facts and Figures.** Issued by the direction of Hon. W. J. ROCHE, Minister of the Interior. Ottawa. 1914.

MUCH that is of empire-wide significance has happened since August last in the wide expanse of country that stretches from Sydney, Nova Scotia, to Victoria, British Columbia; but it has had no adequate record in England. The purpose of this article is to survey the political, military, and economic developments in the Dominion arising directly out of the war in the period from the invasion of Belgium to the appalling crime off Kinsale Head on May 8th.

Parliament at Ottawa was not in session when war was declared; and thirteen days elapsed between the receipt of the Foreign Office announcement that 'a state of war 'exists between Great Britain and Germany from eleven P.M. 'on August 4th,' and the reassembling of Parliament on August 18th. But as early as August 3rd, it had been realised all over the Dominion that war was imminent. The day before war was declared four thousand militiamen were under arms at Halifax, Sydney, St. John, Quebec, and Esquimalt; and on the afternoon of the 5th orders were issued from Ottawa for the enlistment and mobilisation at Valcartier, near the city of Quebec, of an army division which at that time it was contemplated would number 20,000 men. There was a prompt and splendid response to this appeal of August 5th, especially from Englishmen and Scotchmen who had come to Canada as immigrants in the preceding ten years. Mobilisation proceeded rapidly. Transport facilities afforded by the Intercolonial, the Grand Trunk, the Canadian Pacific, and the Canadian Northern railway companies were excellent;

and before the short war session of Parliament was at an end —a session that lasted only from August 18th to 23rd—ten thousand men were already in camp at Valcartier, and as many more were journeying thither from every province in the Dominion.

Before Parliament met, two submarines under construction for the Chilean Government at Seattle, in the State of Washington, had also been quietly acquired for the British navy by the Dominion Government at a cost of $1,150,000; and the Dominion cruisers 'Niobe' and 'Rainbow'—the only vessels that had materialised under the naval programme of the Laurier Government of 1910—had been turned over to the Imperial Government, and manned by reservists of the Imperial navy, who were in Canada at the time war was declared. Within a few hours after the official intimation from the Foreign Office that England and Germany were at war, organisation had been effected for dealing with reservists of the German and Austrian armies, and other alien enemies, who were domiciled in Canada. The first reservist to be interned was an Austrian resident in Halifax. He was in the custody of the provost-marshal before nightfall on August 5th; and by August 10th—eight days before Parliament assembled—several thousand Germans and Austrians of military age were held in custody at Montreal, Toronto, and other large cities, and a beginning had been made with preparations for large detention camps for alien enemies at Petawawa, in the province of Ontario, and at Spirit Lake, in the Bitibi region of the province of Quebec. Not more than two thousand alien enemies were detained in these camps at any time during the first nine months of the war. All aliens were compelled to register. Most of them were then liberated on parole; and nearly thirty thousand Germans and Austrians—mostly Germans—were at large on parole at the time of the sinking of the 'Lusitania.'

In these early days of the war—in the thirteen days that preceded the meeting of Parliament—while the first contingent was being raised and mobilised at Valcartier, and alien enemies were being registered and paroled or held in custody prior to internment, other steps were being taken for the safety of the Dominion. Troops—mostly militiamen—were detailed to guard the Atlantic and Pacific coast ports, and in particular

to guard the grain elevators at St. John, Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal; and also at Port Arthur, Fort William, Port McNicoll, Tiffin, Port Colborne, and other lake ports on the national grain route from the prairie provinces to tidewater on the Atlantic. The canals on the grain route—the St. Lawrence, the Welland, and the Sault Ste. Marie canals—were all similarly guarded within twenty-four hours after the declaration of war. So were the dry-docks on the coast, on the St. Lawrence, and on the Great Lakes; the cable stations on the coast; the coaling station at Sydney, Cape Breton; the railway bridges across the St. Lawrence in the neighbourhood of Montreal, and the international bridges in New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario; and within a week after war was declared the railway companies had organised armed patrols for their lines in all the provinces east of the Great Lakes. One hundred and fifty boundary inspectors were promptly stationed along the international line; and while at no time between August 5th and the end of May was it thought necessary to compel Americans crossing into Canada to provide themselves with passports, extra vigilance was exercised at Vanceborough, at St. John in the province of Quebec, Niagara Falls, and at every point at which an American railway makes connexion with any of the railways of the Dominion.

A board of censors was in existence some time before war was declared. Except as regards perfecting its organisation, it had no duties in times of peace; but this skeleton organisation was all filled in by August 6th, and seventy-three censors were then at their stations in the large news-receiving and distributing centres of the Dominion. The newspaper press immediately and loyally responded to the appeal of Major-General Hughes, the Minister of Militia, to 'abstain from 'publishing unauthorised statements as to military happenings 'in Canada'; and although in times of peace there is quite a large inflow of news over the telegraph wires from the United States, and a comparatively large outgo from Canada, newspaper readers in the United States, during the first nine months of the war, learned no more about the military and naval preparations and the movement of troops in Canada than they did of similar activities in Great Britain.

The establishment of a political truce had not to wait until

Parliament met on August 18th. It was arranged even before the extra session of Parliament was called—brought about by a declaration from Sir Wilfrid Laurier twenty-four hours before Canadians generally knew that war had begun. Speaking at Ottawa early in the morning of August 4th, the leader of the Liberal Opposition said :

'It is probable, and almost certain, that England will have to take her share in the conflict, not only for the protection of her own interests, but for the protection of France and the higher civilisation of which these two nations are to-day the noblest expression. The policy of the Liberal party under such painful circumstances is well known. I have often declared that if the Mother Country were ever in danger, or if danger ever threatened, Canada would render assistance to the full extent of her power. In view of the critical nature of the situation, I have cancelled all my meetings. Pending such great questions there should be a truce to party strife.'

Finally, in this survey of the measures that were taken in the days that intervened between the crisis of August 3rd and the meeting of Parliament on August 18th, the Government arranged with the Colonial Office in London for an indefinite extension of the term of office of the Duke of Connaught as Governor-General.

The debate on the address in answer to the speech from the Throne occupied only part of the second sitting of the House of Commons. There were only four speakers to the motion—the mover and seconder, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Robert Borden. The leader of the Opposition repeated his statement of August 4th as to the political truce, and added a message which was addressed to Great Britain, to the Empire, and to the world at large :

'It will go down on a noble page of history that England could have averted this war if she had been willing to forgo the position which she has maintained for many centuries as the head of European civilisation ; if she had been willing to desert her allies, to sacrifice her obligations, to allow the German Emperor to trample upon heroic Belgium, to infringe upon the rights of isolated France, and to put down his booted heel upon continental Europe. At that price England would have secured peace ; but her answer to the German Emperor was : "Your proposals are infamous." And, rather than accept them, England has entered into this war ; and there is not to-day all over the universe a British subject, there is not outside the British Empire a single man, whose

admiration for England is not greater by reason of this firm and noble attitude.'*

The speech of the Premier occupied little more than five minutes :

' It is not fitting that I should prolong this debate. As to our duty all are agreed ; we stand shoulder to shoulder with Britain and the other British dominions in this quarrel. And that duty we shall not fail to fulfil as the honour of Canada demands, not for love of battle, not for lust of conquest, not for greed of possessions, but for the cause of honour, to maintain solemn pledges, to uphold principles of liberty, to withstand forces that would convert the world into an armed camp ; yea, in the very name of the peace that we sought at any cost save that of dishonour we have entered into this war ; and while gravely conscious of the tremendous issues involved, and of all the sacrifices they may entail, we do not shrink from them, but with firm hearts we abide the event.' †

The fiscal year in the Dominion ends on March 31st, and at the session of Parliament held in August the Government asked for a vote of $50,000,000 to meet the extra charges of the war. No general additions to taxation were made at the time this vote was passed. The war budget was not introduced until February 11th, in the ordinary session of 1915. At the August session of 1914 a deficit for the then current financial year of $43,500,000 confronted the Minister of Finance ; and his proposals—proposals that were immediately and unanimously adopted by the House of Commons—were that $36,000,000 should be raised by the issue of $15,000,000 of Dominion notes—'fifteen million dollars free money borrowed ' from our own people upon the Dominion's credit '—and the remainder by borrowing from the Imperial Government ; and $6,600,000 raised by increased duties on sugar, tobacco, and liquor.

From August 3rd to August 20th there had been large withdrawals from the bonded warehouses at Montreal and at all the other ports of entry in anticipation of increased duties. Neither liquor dealers nor tobacco manufacturers nor tobacco dealers gained anything by these attempts to make money out of the fiscal exigencies of the war, for the Minister of Finance

* *Debates*, August 19, 1914. † *Debates*, August 19, 1914.

proposed and Parliament agreed that 'the legislation relating 'to duties of customs and excise be deemed to come into effect 'on August 7th, 1914.' *

It will be recalled that for some months before the war industry and commerce were on the decline all over the Dominion. Evidences of the depression were obvious in all the large cities, where there were many unemployed; and particularly obvious in Montreal, where in the month of June 1914 there were more vacant stores and offices than in any year since 1906. Part of the depression was due to the fact that in 1913–1914 the era of railway construction in the provinces beyond the Great Lakes—the era that began in 1905, when work was commenced on the Grand Trunk Pacific and on the transcontinental line of the Canadian Northern—was coming to an end. In the earlier months of 1914, however, the depression was chiefly due to the collapse of the boom in city real estate, which had been continuous and almost Dominion-wide in extent from 1907 to the autumn of 1912.† From August to December 1914 the revenues of the Government decreased each month. The largest decreases were in September and November, when the falling off in customs and inland revenue was $5,296,000 and $4,041,000 respectively, as compared with the receipts of the corresponding months of 1913. At the end of the calendar year the total receipts were $135,238,000, as compared with $171,684,000 and $161,202,000 in the calendar years 1913 and 1912.

The decreases continued through January 1915; and on February 11, when the war budget was submitted to the House of Commons, it was introduced with a statement from the Minister of Finance that the revenue of the Dominion from all sources for the complete fiscal year 1914–1915 would not exceed $130,000,000. Of the $50,000,000 voted for the war at the August session of Parliament, $38,000,000 had been expended up to the date of the introduction of the budget; and Mr. White told the House that it was likely that the whole of the $50,000,000 would be expended by the end of the fiscal year 1914–1915; and that in this fiscal year—the first year of the

---

* *Debates*, August 20, 1914.

† Cf. *Canadian Annual Review*, 1913, pp. 35–43.

war—there would be an increase of $110,000,000 in the national debt of the Dominion.*

In informing the House as to how the Dominion had raised money since August 1914—partly by the issue of Dominion notes as provided for at the August session, partly by loans from the Bank of Montreal, partly by Treasury bills, and partly by loans aggregating $60,000,000 from the Imperial Government—the Minister of Finance explained the terms on which these Imperial loans were advanced.

'Our arrangements with the Imperial Government,' he said, 'are that we pay interest at the same rate as is paid by the Imperial Treasury upon its war loans, from the proceeds of which advances are to be made to us. At such time or times in the future as may be agreed upon between the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Canadian Minister of Finance, a Canadian war loan or loans will be issued and the borrowings from the Imperial Government repaid. It seems to me that no fairer terms could be named than those so generously accorded us by the Imperial authorities.'†

The total normal expenditure of the Dominion in 1915–1916 was estimated by Mr. White to reach $200,000,000. War expenditure was estimated at $100,000,000. Revenue for the year, based on the customs and excise duties as they stood in 1914–1915, was estimated at $120,000,000. The Minister of Finance, in proposing to meet the special war expenditure entirely out of loans, said:

'Canadian governments have always justified public borrowing for capital account on the principle that expenditure upon enterprises, permanent in their nature, enures to the benefit and advantage of future generations, who may therefore fairly be asked to pay interest upon the debt contracted in respect of them. If this theory is correct, and so far as I know it has never been seriously challenged, then we need have no reluctance in borrowing to meet the expenses of this war, because such borrowing is for the purpose of accomplishing for future generations that which is infinitely more precious than material undertakings, viz. the preservation of our national and individual liberty and the constitutional freedom won by our forefathers during centuries of struggle, enjoyed by us to-day, and destined, we believe, to be ours for all time. It is therefore the intention of the Government to negotiate for a continuance of the arrangement which I have mentioned with the Imperial

* The debt on March 31st, 1914, was $335,996,850.
† *Debates*, February 11th, 1915.

Government, for the purpose of procuring the funds necessary to meet our special war expenditure.' *

To meet the deficit other than that due to war expenditure the House authorised a series of new stamp duties, war stamps on letters and postcards, and an increase in the tariff schedules. In the general and intermediate tariffs, the increase, with a few exceptions, was seven and a half per cent. *ad valorem*; in the preferential tariff it was five per cent. *ad valorem*. There was much opposition to the increases in the tariff duties, and the discussion of them in the House and in the constituencies made quite an inroad on the political truce that was proclaimed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier on the eve of the declaration of war. Later on in the session there was another inroad on the truce when the Government carried through the House and the Senate a bill for enabling Canadians of the oversea contingents, in the event of a Canadian general election, to cast their ballots.

Comparatively little news concerning the expeditionary forces was permitted to find its way into the newspapers between the beginning of the war and April 10th, when Sir Robert Borden took Parliament and the Dominion into his confidence, and made a detailed statement concerning the mobilisation of the men who had volunteered since war was declared. The numbers as given by the Premier were as follows:

'Overseas: the first contingent of the Canadian expeditionary force and the reinforcements which have been sent forward, 35,420. In Bermuda, the Royal Canadian regiment, 982. In St. Lucia, detachment for garrison, 100. In Canada, the second contingent of the Canadian expeditionary force, 22,272. Reserve infantry battalions and Canadian mounted rifles, 27,079. Recruited and organised for oversea service, but not mobilised, 3,500. Total overseas forces, either abroad or organised at home, 89,353 men. In addition to this there are in Canada units of the active militia on active service, garrison and outpost duty, 9,777 officers and men, and the permanent force, 2,430 men, making a grand total of 101,560 men now under arms, either in Canada or abroad. . . . Of course, it is not a great army, compared with the enormous armies that have been marshalled on the plains of Europe. But, considering the fact that this country has never intended or desired to possess a great military organisation, I venture to say that the results achieved during this comparatively brief period—

* *Debates*, February 11th, 1915.

August 5th to April 10th—may be regarded as thoroughly satisfactory, in view of the conditions of urgency under which the undertaking was carried out. No one of us doubted that when the need came the people of Canada would be ready to respond to the call; but we rejoice that in every province, and indeed in every community in Canada, the response has been so warm, so loyal, so splendidly patriotic that every one of us feels to-day more proud than ever he did before of this great Dominion.'*

The forces described by Sir Robert Borden have been recruited out of a total population—according to the census of 1911—of 7,206,000, of whom 3,821,000 were males. All the men of the first contingent were entered on the rolls as enlisted at Valcartier, and as yet details as to the quotas contributed by the nine provinces to the division that was mobilised in August 1914 have not been published. At the end of March, however, the quotas of the several provinces to the second and third contingents were published by the Department of Militia and Defence. Apart from the men on guard duty in Canada, who at that time numbered 10,000, there were then 51,554 men of the second and third contingents. The contributions of the provinces to these contingents were :

Province.	Enlisted men.	Population.
Ontario	17,558	2,523,000
Manitoba and Saskatchewan	11,019	948,000
Quebec	6,841	2,002,000
Maritime Provinces (3) .	4,829	937,000
Alberta	6,520	374,000
British Columbia . .	4,787	392,000

In the early days of the war, when the British reservists were hastening to rejoin their regiments and Canadian volunteers were assembling at Valcartier, there was a meeting in Ottawa of the committee of the Patriotic Fund that was raised in Canada in 1901 during the war in South Africa. A sum of $79,000, which was then in hand, was transferred to the new Canadian Patriotic Fund; and one of the few measures passed at the August session of Parliament was an Act incorporating this Fund. The Act authorised the

* *Debates*, April 10th, 1915.

incorporators to collect, administer and distribute funds for the assistance of the wives, children, and dependents of officers and men serving with the naval and military forces of the British Empire and Great Britain's allies. The Act was subsequently amended so as to enable the Patriotic Fund Corporation to render similar assistance to the dependents of Newfoundland men ; to assist men of the Canadian forces who become incapacitated and are returned to Canada; and also to assist the widows and dependents of Canadians killed in the war.

The Dominion Government pays separation allowances to the families of Canadian soldiers. The monthly allowances are :

Rank and file	$20
Sergeants and staff sergeants . . .	$25
Warrant officers	$30
Lieutenants	$30
Captains	$40
Majors	$50
Colonels or Lieutenant-colonels . . .	$60

These allowances are payable to the wives of the soldiers of the oversea contingents, also to widowed mothers whose sons were their sole support.

The provincial governments also make some provision for men of their civil service, and teachers in the schools and universities who are of the enlisted forces. In Saskatchewan, for instance, the government at Regina pays the full teachers' grant in the case of men who have wives and families, and sixty per cent. of the grant in the case of men who have wives only and no children. Provision is also made by many municipalities and by railway companies for the families of men who are on oversea service ; and much of the work of the Patriotic Fund Corporation consists in supplementing, when necessary, the allowances from the Dominion Government and other public and semi-public sources. By February last ninety per cent. of the Dominion had been covered either by branches of the Patriotic Fund or by auxiliary organisations. Subscriptions to it had aggregated $2,700,000 ; about $800,000 had been paid out ; and there was then a balance in hand of $1,900,000. Families of reservists—British, French, and

Belgian—it should be added, all come within the scope of the Patriotic Fund and its associated local committees.

Before the war began the new transcontinental railway from Moncton, in New Brunswick, to Winnipeg, and thence through Yellow Head Pass to Prince Rupert in British Columbia, was completed. Another transcontinental line—namely the Canadian Northern, from Port Mann in British Columbia to Montreal—was also practically complete, and almost ready for service over its entire length. But the Dominion Government had in hand when war broke out a number of large undertakings—most of them additions to or improvements of the national grain route from the prairie provinces to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The most important of these was the new line from Le Pas in Manitoba to Port Nelson on Hudson Bay. It is 424 miles long, and is to afford a new outlet for grain, and so relieve the pressure that invariably comes in September, October, and November on the three trunk lines—the Canadian Pacific, the Grand Trunk Pacific, and the Canadian Northern—that now connect the grain-growing country west of Winnipeg with the Lake Superior ports of Fort William and Port Arthur. This undertaking was begun by the Laurier Government in 1910. It includes a harbour and wharfs and a grain elevator at Port Nelson, and will cost the Dominion Government $26,000,000. Over 200 miles of the railway had been laid with steel, and $3,400,000 had been spent on harbour works at Port Nelson, when war was declared.

The work next in importance in hand at this time was the deepening and shortening of the Welland Canal, which gives access from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario, and through which, from May to the end of November, passes all the grain from Port Arthur and Fort William that is *en route* to Montreal and Quebec. This improvement is to cost $22,000,000. When it is completed the largest grain carriers now in service on the upper lakes will be able to pass fully laden into Lake Ontario and deliver their cargoes at Ontario ports much nearer to Montreal than Port Colborne, where to-day the larger lake carriers unload their cargoes for transference to smaller steamers which carry the grain to Montreal by way of the St. Lawrence canals.

The war also found the Dominion Government committed

to large expenditure for the building of grain elevators at Port Nelson, Moose Jaw, Calgary, and Vancouver; to the completion of the great railway bridge across the St. Lawrence a few miles above the city of Quebec; and to the completion of extensive improvements to the harbour and port facilities of Toronto, Halifax, and St. John. At Montreal also additions to the wharfs, to the railway system that serves the wharfs, and to the storage capacity of the grain elevators were in progress; and although these improvements are undertaken by the Harbour Commissioners, the loans out of which the expenditure is made are raised through the Dominion Government, which nominates the Commissioners, and exercises some supervision over all improvement schemes and capital outlays.

Owing to disagreement as to terms, the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company declined to take over the length of the new transcontinental railway from Moncton to Winnipeg, and a bill had to be passed in the 1915 session of Parliament authorising the Government to operate the railway. The Government was also empowered to acquire several short feeder lines of the Intercolonial Railway, which since the early years of confederation has been owned and operated by the Government at Ottawa. But no new railway undertakings involving subsidies from the Dominion Government were sanctioned by Parliament, and the Government submitted no new improvement schemes. It decided, however, that there should be no halt in any of the works under progress; and irrespective of the $2,000,000 to be expended by the Harbour Commissioners of Montreal during the navigation season of 1915, the expenditure on railways, canals, elevators, and harbour improvements, and other capital and special expenditure in the fiscal year ending March 31, 1916, will fall little short of $40,000,000.

Immigration had been on the decline for eighteen months before the outbreak of war. It had become widely known in Great Britain and in continental Europe, between the end of 1912 and August 1914, that industry in Canada was much less prosperous than in the years from 1907 to 1912. In the fiscal year 1913–1914 the number of immigrants was 384,000, as compared with 402,000 in 1912–1913; and in the first seven months of the calendar year 1914 the number was only 141,000 as compared with 319,000 in the January-July period

of 1913. The figures dropped to a little over 10,000 in the month that war was declared—only 32 per cent. of the number in August 1913. The number in September was 6200; in October 5300; in November 4200; and in December only 2900—only 30 per cent. of the number in December a year previously.

In April and May 1914 the number of immigrants from the United Kingdom was a little over 10,000 in each month. In August the number dropped to 3000. In September it was 2500; in October 1600; in November 1400; and in December 648. The total arrivals from the British Isles in 1914 were 49,879 as compared with 156,984 in 1913; and from the United States the total for 1914 was 68,659 as compared with 115,751 in 1913. From all countries in 1914 the total was 168,859 as compared with 418,838 in 1913. In the week ending October 6, 1914, there were only 214 immigrants, all of whom were from the United States. In April 1914 there were 25,000 immigrants from the United Kingdom. In the first two weeks of April 1915 not more than 1500 immigrants—all from the British Isles—passed through Montreal. Nor were these arrivals from Great Britain all newcomers to Canada. 'A great many,' it was remarked, 'were returning on the three-months tickets they had obtained 'to visit the Old Country,' 'and 'many were coming out to 'take the places of the young men who, owning land, went to 'the front—old people and very young girls and boys. There 'were scarcely any young men among the party.' *

In the fiscal year 1914–1915 the Dominion Government expended $1,451,000 on immigration propaganda—the largest amount ever devoted to advertising the resources and opportunities of Canada. Within a month after war was declared the Trades and Labour Congress—a Dominion-wide organisation—in session at St. John, New Brunswick, appealed to the Government to stop all immigration campaign; and on September 23rd the 'Grain-growers' Guide,' the official organ of the grain-growers' movement in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, called attention to the advertisements of the Immigration Department that there was assured employment in Canada for farmers, farm labourers, and

* Montreal Gazette, April 25th, 1915.

domestic servants, and suggested that the Department should discontinue this part of its work until better conditions prevailed.

There was some reduction in the votes for the Department at the 1915 session of Parliament. But a vote for $620,000 was taken for salaries of immigration agents in Canada, the United Kingdom, and foreign countries; and in explaining the vote Mr. W. J. Roche, Minister of the Interior, said:

'If the war continues, I do not expect we shall expend all the money we are appropriating this year. But I think we ought to take the precaution of having the money in hand. Supposing the war should cease in July or August, we might have a large influx of people into this country, and we desire to have the money to cope with the situation. The fact that we have the money does not mean that we are going to spend it all. We are economising—cutting down our advertising and other expenses. We are not expending as much on literature as we did. The High Commissioner in London is supervising our expenses in the Old Country in conjunction with the assistant superintendent, Mr. Obed Smith, and has recommended that certain items of expenditure be omitted during the present year.' *

In the winters of 1912–1913 and 1913–1914 there was much unemployment in all the large cities from Montreal to Vancouver. It was due to the slackening of railway construction work, and to the industrial and commercial depression that followed the collapse of the six or seven years of wild speculation in real estate. In spite of the number of British, French, and Belgian reservists who had rejoined their regiments, the number of alien enemies in the internment camps at Petawawa and Spirit Lake, and the men embodied in Canadian militia regiments and in the oversea forces, unemployment was more general and distress more acute in the winter of 1914–1915 than in the two preceding years. As late in the winter as February, 18,570 men, women, and children were receiving relief in Montreal from the St. Vincent de Paul Society alone. In December 850 men and women were on the unemployed register at Saskatoon, about the same number at Regina and 700 at Moose Jaw; and the provincial government of Saskatchewan had found it necessary to make grants aggregating $54,000 to these cities for the relief of distress.

* *Debates*, March 26th, 1915.

As late as April 20th there were 4500 or 5000 unemployed men in Winnipeg.

The opening of navigation on the Great Lakes in a normal year stimulates the demand for labour in every city from Sydney in Nova Scotia to Calgary in Alberta. Thousands of men are then needed for transport services ; and about the time navigation opens railway and building construction work is resumed after the suspension of the winter months. But as late in the navigation and building season as May 26th the Mayor of Winnipeg, Mr. R. D. Waugh, speaking as the representative of the Canadian Union of Municipalities, informed Sir Robert Borden, in an interview at Ottawa, that there were then 33,000 unemployed men in the provinces west of the Great Lakes. Scores of factories in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario—the manufacturing provinces of the Dominion—were making munitions of war in the winter and spring and summer of 1915. But, large as these orders were, the factories that were busy on them could not absorb all the unemployed ; and at the time of this deputation there were 4000 unemployed in the city of Hamilton, Ontario.

Much of this trouble, especially in the cities beyond the Great Lakes, is due to the fact, long obvious, that of the 3,000,000 immigrants who arrived in the Dominion in the fourteen years between 1900 and the beginning of the war a large proportion did not go on the farms in the provinces east of the Great Lakes, or to homesteads in the three prairie provinces, but settled in the cities all across the Dominion from Halifax to Vancouver. 'Sixty-five per cent. of the 'immigrants who have come into the country during the last 'three years,' Mr. Waugh told the Premier at the interview of May 26th, 'have not gone on the land, as it had been expected 'that they would.' 'Eighty-five per cent. of the unemployed 'in the west,' he added, 'are agriculturists, who have remained 'in the cities instead of going on the farms.'

Some reorganisation of the immigration propaganda, on which since 1897 the Dominion has expended fifteen and a quarter millions of dollars, will be inevitable at the end of the war. One of the most pressing problems of this reorganisation will be the prevention of slums and congestion in the cities, and the extension of the area on which grain and other crops

are produced. In the meantime the unemployed problem, as it has developed since the winter of 1912–1913, has become too large and too complex for the municipal and provincial governments; and in the closing days of May the municipal governments, through the Canadian Union of Municipalities, and the provincial governments, were demanding some immediate help from Ottawa in its solution.

Food prices, according to statistics compiled by the Department of Labour at Ottawa, increased in consequence of the war a little over seven per cent. between August 5th and April 21st. The largest increase was in the cost of flour. In July 1914 the wholesale price of a barrel of good-grade flour was $5.15; by August 21st the price had risen to $6.50. In the House of Commons the attention of the Government was called to this large increase—an increase, it was insisted, that was much in excess of the rise in the price of wheat—and an appeal was made to the Government to do what it could to assure reasonable prices.* Some days earlier—on August 15th—the Dominion Association of Bread and Cake Manufacturers, in convention at Winnipeg, urged the Government to regulate and control the price of wheat, and declared that there was absolutely no justification for the inflated prices of wheat and flour. The Trades and Labour Council of Moose Jaw, and other Labour organisations, also urged Government control of foodstuffs. But as soon after the declaration of war as August 6th the Government had apparently decided on non-interference with the ordinary course of trade; for on that day there was issued from the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of Labour at Ottawa a statement that there was no cause for popular alarm as to either a shortage or enhanced prices, as there were ample supplies of food and fuel available for use in Canada.†

There was no departure from this policy of non-interference up to as late as the end of May; and the only action that the Government took in regard to foodstuffs in the first ten months

* *Debates*, August 21st, 1914.

† A day later, August 7th, at the office of the High Commissioner in London, a reassuring announcement was made to the people of the United Kingdom. 'Canada,' it read, 'has reserved for the Motherland seven months' supply of breadstuffs.'

of the war was to appeal to grain-growers and farmers to put a larger area of their farms under crop. All the wheat that is exported and that is milled for the domestic and export trade is grown in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta ; and it was to grain-growers in these provinces that the strongest appeal was made, when in January 1915 the Government issued the 'Agricultural War Book,' which it circulated by tens of thousands all over the Dominion. The foreword, written by the Premier, indicates the character of the appeal :

'In the British Isles military preparation has been imperfect because development has proceeded along the paths of peace. The instinct of the British people is against militarism, and great standing armies are not viewed with favour. But in the British Isles and the self-governing Dominions alone there are at least sixty millions of people, a population nearly equal to that of Germany. If our preparation for the struggle was insignificant compared with that of Germany, let us not forget that her resources are insignificant compared with those of this Empire. There are many things that count besides armed forces in the field. In the organisation of modern war all the nation's resources must be reckoned with. Consider those of Canada, which even during the coming war can supply food products to an almost unlimited extent.'

The Minister of Agriculture—Mr. Martin Burrell—added more explicitly :

'The Government is strongly impressed with the desirability of increasing the crop acreage in Canada. The Canadian farmer, earnestly bending all his energies to increase the food supply for the Britisher at home and the British soldiers at the front, is doing his share in this gigantic struggle of the Empire. Apart from the practical certainty that wheat and other foods this year will yield large financial returns to the producers, there is the great fact that the Canadian farmers who, by extra effort, enlarge their wheat and other field crops, and increase their live-stock products, will be doing the best thing possible to strengthen the Empire in its day of trial.'

Taken as a whole, the crop of 1914 in the grain-growing provinces west of the Great Lakes—the granary of the Empire —was not a good one. Owing to drought, it was almost a failure in large parts of Saskatchewan and Alberta : so much a failure that the Dominion Government was compelled in the spring of 1915 to go to the relief of the impoverished grain-growers. Altogether, 46,630 drought-stricken grain-growers were provided, by means of a parliamentary grant, with seed grain sufficient to seed 3,473,000 acres. The total yield of

wheat in the Dominion in 1914 was only 158,223,000 bushels, as compared with 231,000,000 bushels in 1913; and at the opening of navigation on April 18th, 1915, the quantity of wheat, oats, and barley in the elevators at Fort William and Port Arthur, awaiting shipment down the lakes to Buffalo, Montreal, and Quebec, was only 16,673,000 bushels, as compared with 23,871,000 bushels at the corresponding epoch in 1914.

The quantity of wheat in the grain-growers' hands on March 31st, 1915, was also relatively smaller than in any previous year in the history of the western grain trade, a condition that was due to the light crop and the high prices that prevailed from the beginning of the war. Had there been no war, grain-growers would have attempted to recover some of their losses of 1914, and have seeded a larger acreage in 1915. The war and the Government appeals stimulated autumn ploughing in 1914. To quicken production, the Legislature of Alberta imposed a special tax of ten dollars a quarter section on land within the province that had been patented by homesteaders but that was unoccupied. Members of the grain-growers' associations of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta —who number 42,000—at their winter conventions pledged themselves each to plant an extra acre for the Empire, and to devote the proceeds to the Canadian Patriotic Fund. The press, the pulpit, the municipalities, and the railway companies all contributed their influence to the movement initiated by the Dominion Government, with the result that soon after seeding was completed it was ascertained that there had been an increase in the prairie provinces of twenty-five per cent. on the 10,293,900 acres under grain in 1914.

From the beginning of March to the end of May there was much speculation in Canada as to the probable increase in the yield of wheat in 1915. Canadian railway officials, whose optimism as regards crops is as old and as well-established as the grain trade of the country west of the Great Lakes, put the figures for wheat as high as 250,000,000 bushels. This, however, was mere speculation; and at the end of May the only facts known concerning this year's harvest were that the increase in acreage was fully twenty-five per cent., and that never in the history of the western provinces was there a better bed for a crop than that to which the seed of 1915 was entrusted.

EDWARD PORRITT.

ECONOMIC ENDURANCE

1. **British War Finance. 1914–1915.** By W. R. Lawson. Constable. 1915.
2. **The System of National Finance.** By E. Hilton Young, M.P. Smith, Elder. 1915.
3. **Poverty and Waste.** By Hartley Withers. Smith, Elder. 1914.
4. **British Budgets.** By Bernard Mallet, C.B. Macmillan. 1913.

At the beginning of the present war most Englishmen were excusably congratulating themselves that their powers of economic endurance were essentially greater than those of Germany. To-day some doubts are beginning to be felt. We observe that, in spite of numberless rumours of the approaching exhaustion of her stock of this or that essential material, Germany is apparently still unweakened by the strain of eleven months of war. She is maintaining in the field more troops than ever, supplying them with ammunition in boundless quantities, and at the same time—so far as outsiders can see—continuing all the industries that are necessary for the life of her people. It almost seems as if she could endure the strain of the war indefinitely, and pessimists are beginning to ask whether our economic position is really stronger than hers. The answer is Yes and No: Yes, so far as material facts are concerned; No, so far as economic results depend upon mental forces. Materially our position is still pre-eminent. Our ships of war control the seas so that trade with all the world is open to us, while trade with the greater part of the world is almost closed to Germany. That means that we are able to supplement the resources of our country with the resources of other lands, while Germany must depend almost entirely on her own resources. Merely from the point of view of foodstuffs and of raw materials this is an important advantage, as the Germans in effect acknowledge by their bitter protests against our blockade, and by the strenuous efforts they make to evade that blockade by importing oversea goods through neutral countries. But it is not only a question of materials; it is also a question of men and machinery. At this moment

American men and American machines are working to supply us with munitions of war which the Germans would gladly buy if they possessed sea-power necessary to ensure safe delivery. These tremendous advantages are further enhanced by the fact that nearly all the world stands in our debt either on account of capital invested, or on account of services rendered in the shape of sea-carriage or mercantile insurance. Consequently there is an annual tribute due to us from over the seas, and that tribute we are able, owing to our command of the sea, to collect in the shape of such goods or services as we call for. Germany has far fewer external assets, and a good deal of what is owed to her she cannot collect because the British navy bars the way to her commercial operations.

These facts give us an extra weight in the economic scales, and yet, so far as can be seen, the scales still remain fairly even. The only possible explanation is that Germany has made good by mental resolve what she has lacked in material advantages. Part of her gain in this direction is undoubtedly due to the care with which she planned the war. That advantage is hers exclusively. Germany undoubtedly intended this war, or something like it, and has for years steadily prepared the means for waging it. She therefore started with an accumulation of the necessary weapons of warfare and of the necessary materials of industry. She also started with a carefully planned organisation for utilising all the strength of the nation for military purposes, direct or indirect, and for securing the economic consumption of national resources. No Englishman need be ashamed that in these respects we were taken unawares. As long as the assassin's blow cannot be vital, it is better to risk the chance of feeling his dagger point than to incur the suspicion of having entered his profession. The preparations we made were sufficient to guard our national life, and though subsequent experience has revealed some mistakes, on the whole we have little to regret so far as events before the war are concerned. It is what has happened since that should make us search our hearts.

During many long months a large part of the British public looked upon the war as a more or less interesting side-show. People who ought to have known better preached the doctrine of 'business as usual,' and specifically urged the

continuance of normal expenditure by private individuals in order not to throw out of work the people employed by that expenditure. At last it is beginning to dawn upon the whole community that it is a national service to throw out of work many persons now employed in ministering to private requirements, so that they may be free to minister to the requirements of the nation. The great difficulty at the present moment is to find sufficient workers to do the nation's work, and that difficulty is clearly enhanced by the fact that vast numbers of people who might be doing useful war work of one kind or another are still employed upon tasks which could perfectly well be pretermitted in war time. In this respect the Germans have already gained a great advantage over ourselves. Even in peace time the average German is more thrifty than the Englishman. But since the war began the German government has made a point of organising economy, and the German people have eagerly co-operated. In the early days of the war we hopefully construed this German effort to husband national resources as a proof that Germany was on the point of reaching economic exhaustion. We now know that it was a precautionary measure taken in good time so that the date of economic exhaustion might be postponed indefinitely.

No similar steps of any kind were taken in this country until the war had been in progress for nine or ten months. Then politicians and newspapers at last began to talk about the virtue of thrift. The mass of the people have some right to complain that those who set out to be leaders of men should take so long to discover what is the right doctrine to preach. For there is nothing recondite about the very elementary economic doctrine which is now being preached as if it were a new-found gospel. One man cannot simultaneously do two jobs, and therefore the men employed upon private work are of necessity abstracted from the labour supply available for war work. The question still in suspense is whether the new popularity of the gospel of thrift as a theme for political speeches and newspaper articles will lead to an appreciable alteration in the spending habits of the people. If it does, we need not trouble ourselves about the calculations of the pessimists. The available resources of the British Empire are immensely in excess of those of the German Empire; all that is needed

is that we should economise our resources as the Germans have long been doing, and direct the results of our economy to the one purpose of waging successful war.

The probability is that mere persuasion will not suffice to secure the great change in the habits of all classes that is necessary for an effective economy of national resources. For one thing the persuasion comes too late, and comes moreover from the very people who a few months ago were preaching exactly the opposite doctrine. Even more important are the social considerations which influence expenditure. Neither among the rich nor among the poor do people find it easy by mere effort of will to drop below the scale of expenditure to which they and their friends and acquaintances are accustomed. Economy in some of its phases undeniably springs from meanness, and the average man does not care to run the risk of having that motive imputed to him. There are also vast masses of people whose earnings are so narrow that they do not even cover the cost of what may be called modest comfort. In such homes there is a constant pulling and straining to make the pennies go further in order to satisfy one or other of a multitude of equally pressing wants. Many of these people, as the result of war wages, separation allowances and of billeting payments, are now in possession of increased incomes, and are rejoicing in the new pleasure of being able to satisfy, perhaps for the first time in their lives, most of the wants which they regard as urgent. It is asking too much of human nature to expect that they will voluntarily forego this new freedom from grinding care, when they see that a scale of comfort far beyond their wildest dreams of luxury is maintained by men and women who preach, and even to some extent practise, thrift. The truth is that there is no real equality of sacrifice between the man who saves 1*s.* a week out of a wage of £1 and a man who saves 10*s.* out of £10. Nor can we reasonably expect any class voluntarily to drop back from comfort to discomfort while other classes, even though economising, are still enjoying an extremely comfortable scale of existence.

If we were in a state of siege the problem would be solved by placing the whole community on war rations, and in Germany this has already been done so far at any rate as bread is concerned. But such a step would only be tolerated by English

people in a case of extreme necessity and that extremity of need has not yet arisen, nor in all human probability is it likely to arise. The necessity which has arisen is for a sufficient reduction in the personal expenditure of the whole population to create a vast new fund of savings to be used for war purposes. To secure that reduction more than one method can be employed. Various forms, both of persuasion and of compulsion, are available, and it is well that all that are suitable should be used.

In the category of persuasion, the first method employed has been the appeal to the pecuniary instincts of individuals. Mr. McKenna—whose succession to the Treasury at a time of financial stringency is an unqualified gain to the nation—very wisely planned his new war loan so as to tempt as many people as possible to bring out their money for the sake of making a good bargain. That this temptation alone will influence some persons to save seriously may safely be assumed. In the early middle of the last century, when the railway boom was in progress, numbers of families stinted themselves even of the necessaries of life in order to be able to take up railway shares. We are probably rather less commercial and a good deal more self-indulgent than our grandfathers were, but there are still a good many people who will not like to miss the chance of buying a $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. stock with the credit of the United Kingdom behind it, and who will cut down their expenditure in order to meet the instalments as they fall due or to buy £5 bonds or 5*s*. vouchers.

On this score alone we may expect a not-inconsiderable reduction in private expenditure. But the appeal to commercial motives has very wisely been supplemented by an appeal to patriotic motives. The stern moralist may argue that the two motives are on an entirely different plane and should not be confused, but in practice human motives generally are confused, because human nature is complex. In practice there is not the slightest harm done by combining good investments with good work. The 'five-per-cent. philanthropy' of a past generation provided London with a supply of artisans' dwellings before the London County Council came along with its more expensive methods, and in the same way four-and-a-half-per-cent. patriotism may now serve to supply the Exchequer at moderate cost with a good many of the hundreds of millions it needs.

But when all the millions that the purely commercial motive and the purely patriotic motive, or a combination of the two, may provide have been gathered in, we shall probably still need more, and we shall certainly need to make some definite provision for meeting the interest and sinking fund upon our enormous borrowings. These two considerations move on parallel lines. The same force, the force of taxation, which can be used to compel economy, can also be used to raise revenue. In normal times the business of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is to aim at securing the maximum of revenue with the minimum of interference with the habits of the people. If his taxes are so heavy as greatly to diminish expenditure they may defeat their primary object of raising revenue. But in the present emergency this possibility need create no alarm. The country stands to gain either way. For example, a tax on petrol so heavy as to destroy the private use of motor-cars would, at the present time, be at least as beneficial to the country as a more moderate tax yielding a substantial revenue. In practice taxes upon consumption can generally be so designed as to act simultaneously in both ways, namely to reduce consumption and to increase revenue. This is the double goal at which the Chancellor of the Exchequer now has to aim.

Before dealing in detail with the possibilities of taxation it is worth while to say a few words about the kindred question of public expenditure. The worst feature in the record of the late Liberal Government is the recklessness with which it threw to the winds all the best financial traditions of the Liberal Party. Until Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Mr. Asquith at the Treasury the Liberal Party was the party of economy; during the past five years it has become the party of extravagance. The mischief that has been done cannot easily be undone. Enormous new claims upon public money have been created, and at the same time the government departments themselves have been permeated with the spirit of extravagance. One of the most sinister changes effected during the past five years is the conversion of the Treasury into a spending department. The traditional function of the Treasury is to supervise the expenditure of the other departments and to act as a watch-dog for the Exchequer. So far as the Treasury becomes itself a spending department its

former power of compelling economy is seriously impaired. It is to be hoped that Mr. McKenna will without delay restore to this controlling department its true character by transferring to other departments the administrative work placed upon the Treasury by recent legislation. More generally, it is imperative that there should be rigid economy throughout the whole government service. Probably the best method of dealing with the matter is for the Cabinet to circulate an order to all heads of departments calling upon them to enforce economy in their respective offices, either by reducing staff or by suspending work which is of little importance in war time.

There is much work of this character now being done which ought to be suspended at once. For example, in the budget for the current year there is an item of £1,431,000 for the Road Improvement Fund. This is, in effect, expenditure for the purpose of fitting the roads of the kingdom for higher speed motor traffic. Not only ought this work to wait till the war is over, but if the suspension of the work led to a reduction in the use of private motor-cars there would be an additional gain to the country. It is more than absurd that ministers should perambulate the country preaching the necessity for private economy when such public extravagance as this is allowed to continue.

The same reflection applies with equal force to what may without exaggeration be called the scandal of the Land Valuation Department. In the current year the cost of this department was estimated by Mr. Lloyd George at £676,000; the revenue which the department will collect is estimated at £50,000. There is a net loss to the Exchequer of £626,000 in a year when every penny that can be saved is required for war purposes. The case is even worse than that of the road grants. For the Road Improvement Fund does at least provide road improvements; the Land Valuation Department provides nothing. An attempt was made in the House of Commons on the 29th of June to secure the complete suspension of the operations of the department during the war, but ministers allowed themselves to be dominated by a noisy, though minute, group of Radical land taxers, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was put up to invent excuses for the continued waste of over £600,000 a year. As this is a typical

illustration of the way in which the interests of the country are sacrificed to the interests, real or imaginary, of politicians, it is worth while briefly to recapitulate the main facts.

In the first place it must be pointed out that the land value duties were imposed for the express purpose of raising revenue. An examination of the speeches made by ministers in the House of Commons, when the budget of 1909 was under discussion, proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that these taxes were defended on the ground that they would in the immediate future, 'next year and the year after,' yield a substantial revenue towards paying for Dreadnoughts and Old Age Pensions. Two ministers, the Prime Minister and the present Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, said explicitly that except upon this hypothesis the taxes were indefensible.* Although the budget was not passed until April of the following year the taxes were made retrospective, consequently they have been in legal operation for six financial years ending the 31st of March last. During that period they have yielded £689,000. Meanwhile the department which was created for the sole purpose of assessing and levying these duties, and which has no other statutory authority of any kind, has cost £2,938,000, leaving a net loss of £2,249,000.

Faced with these damning figures the defenders of these taxes shift their ground and argue that the land valuation has helped to increase the yield of the death duties. The first answer is that even if this were true the increased yield of the death duties does not, when added to the yield of the land value duties, cover the cost of the department. There is still a deficiency of over a million pounds on the six years.† But, as a matter of fact, the increased yield of the death duties is due—as Mr. Lloyd George himself explained ‡—to the establishment of a small expert branch of the Estate Duty Office early in the year 1909 before the famous budget was even introduced.§ The authors of these land taxes next try to

* See Edinburgh Review, July 1913, p. 238.

† In The Times of the 11th of May 1914 Mr. Montagu, Secretary to the Treasury, estimated the increased yield of the death duties down to the 31st of March 1915 at £1,225,000. Adding the realised yield of the land value duties, £689,000, we get a total revenue of £1,914,000 compared with a cost of £2,938,000.

‡ See Edinburgh Review, July 1913, p. 244.

§ See also 47th Inland Revenue Report, p. 146, note.

defend their position by urging that the valuation is in itself useful for some other purpose than that for which it was authorised by Act of Parliament. What that other purpose is nobody ever attempts to explain. In the nature of things a valuation of all the land of the kingdom as it was on the 30th of April 1909 can only be of service for some such tax as the Increment Value Duty. No system of contemporary taxation for local purposes could possibly be based upon an assessment already out of date. Nor could the valuation as on the 30th of April 1909 ever be used for any new Increment Value Duty that might be devised in the future. For the war has brought land values down with a rush, and future values will be far below those of 1909. Therefore if any new scheme of increment value taxation is to be established, a new datum year will have to be taken.

These considerations ought to be conclusive even if the work of the land valuation department were being smoothly carried on in accordance with the law. But in effect the work of the department is at a standstill in consequence of various judicial decisions. In substance and in fact this huge department, created to collect a revenue which has never been realised, is doing nothing. At a period of grave economic stress two thousand able-bodied men are kept by the State at a cost of over £600,000 a year merely to mark time.

Another matter on which it is necessary to lay stress is the continued payment of £400 a year to members of parliament. The practice of payment was started for the declared purpose of assisting labour members of parliament out of a difficulty created by the Osborne judgment, which forbade trade unions to spend money for political purposes. But scarcely had the House voted £400 a year to every member of parliament, because some twenty or thirty members were in a temporary difficulty, than an Act was passed removing the temporary difficulty. Thus the case for payment disappeared, but the payment continued. To add to the abuse Mr. Lloyd George subsequently, without any legal authority, permitted every member to make a deduction of £100 for expenses before returning his £400 for income tax. Incidentally this concession proves that the £400 itself is in the eyes of the government a salary and not an allowance for parliamentary expenses. Throughout the rest of the community wages are more or less proportioned to

work done. In the case of the House of Commons there is absolutely no compulsion on any member to do any work of any kind. Many members habitually stay away from the House, wisely deciding that no good purpose is served by going there. Since the war the average attendance has fallen to well under one-fifth of the total number of members. Yet the salaries still go on. An illuminating debate took place on the 11th of March of the present year. It then transpired that though civil servants who join the army have their civil pay docked by the amount of their army pay, members of parliament are allowed to draw their army pay in addition to their full House of Commons pay. The Treasury, with the approval of the Prime Minister, made an attempt to put members of parliament in this matter on the same footing as civil servants, but the House growled, and the Government gave way.

Somewhat different considerations arise in connexion with ministerial salaries. It is open to question whether, even in time of peace, a salary of £5000 a year is not excessive in view of the keen competition for the honour of any post in the ministry, and in view of the fact that several Cabinet ministers only receive £2000 a year. But, be that as it may, in time of war it would have been a gracious act for the King's ministers to set an example to the country by accepting lower salaries. As a matter of fact, the larger salaries have been reduced by a process of pooling, which is highly creditable to the ministers who have agreed to the reduction. But the pooling only benefits those ministers who would otherwise have received £2000 a year; there is no gain to the country. Indeed, the reconstruction of the Cabinet has involved a considerable increase of public expenditure, which certainly ought to have been avoided. A new ministerial post has been created at £5000 a year, with under-secretaries and a whole new staff of clerks. A Cabinet which believed in the economy it preaches, instead of creating a new office, would have reconstructed the existing office of the Master-General of Ordnance. Even now it is not clear what are to be the relations between the new Ministry of Munitions and the old Board of Ordnance, but it is certain that very heavy additional expenditure will be incurred. The reconstruction of the Government has further entailed an extra charge on the taxpayers for ministerial pensions, and there

is even a threat to create a new judgeship at a cost of £6000 a year in order to make a berth for a prominent politician. Yet Mr. Asquith declares that 'waste is a national danger,' and Mr. McKenna proclaims that 'extravagance is a crime.'

As regards the Civil Service estimates, not only is economy in detail possible, if the Cabinet would insist that it must be carried out, but economy running into millions ought to be effected in the cost of education and social reform. Both sources of expenditure have got out of control because it is unpopular to criticise either the one or the other. The result is that money is wasted wholesale upon silly fads, upon overlapping administration, upon the collection of useless statistics, and upon excessive generosity. For example, the local committees which grant old-age pensions have no sufficient motive for economy because no part of the pension expenditure falls upon local rates. It is characteristic of the Lloyd-Georgian system of finance that one set of people should be allowed to disburse the money provided by another set. The Labour Exchanges are a further source of extravagant expenditure for a very moderate gain. Some good work is certainly done by the exchanges, but they only appeal to a limited class of labour. They would probably have been far more valuable to the country, and at the same time less costly to the taxpayer, if they had been organised on the common-sense principle of charging a fee to the individuals who profit by their services.

There is also great room for economy in expenditure by local authorities, and the best way of enforcing this economy is by reducing the contributions from the imperial exchequer. The local taxation account in the current year amounts to £9,406,000. This sum ought to be substantially reduced by re-assigning to the national government some of the taxes now paid into this local account.

The whole question of local expenditure was inexcusably mishandled by the late Government. At the beginning of the war, ministers urged that the local authorities should put in hand as much new work as possible in order to create employment. Later on they discovered that this advice had been based upon a false estimate of the prospects of the labour market, and they urged instead that new work should be postponed. When, however, the London County Council proposed

to act on this advice and to suspend the building of new schools, it was peremptorily told that no educational work must be interrupted. Subsequently this order was cancelled, and the County Council was permitted to postpone expenditure upon work which had not already been contracted for.

Doubtless some of the local authorities will act upon the appeal for economy now made by the Government and try to reduce expenditure, but many will let the question slide—especially when they note that the national government is itself doing nothing to give effect to the principles it advocates. Even those authorities who try to economise will find themselves handicapped either by obstruction from their own officials or by considerations of local politics. It may be suggested that the best way to deal with the matter is for the President of the Local Government Board to set up a strong committee to overhaul the main items of local expenditure with a view to recommending economies. In practice it is easier for a local authority to give effect to specific recommendations for economy coming from above than to formulate of its own motion schemes of retrenchment.

But when all the economies that can be made in our national and local expenditure have been made, the sum saved, though it ought to amount to many millions a year, will still be inadequate for the present needs of the nation. The problem of economic endurance that has to be solved is threefold in character. We have first to increase the savings of the nation, so that more money may be available for subscription to War loans; secondly, to reduce our purchases from abroad, so as to keep foreign exchanges as far as possible in our favour; and, thirdly, to increase the revenue of the State, so as more than to cover the prospective cost of war borrowings and other war liabilities, including the risk of a heavy decline in the yield of the revenue when war expenditure comes to an end. For all these purposes taxation, and heavy taxation, is immediately necessary.

Taking the third point first, it is worth while to see what are the probable charges that the exchequer will have to bear when the war is over. The borrowings already in sight amount to £1,200,000,000. Part of our borrowings, it is true, are on account of our Allies and the self-governing Dominions—up till recently about £200,000,000—and doubtless this will be

repaid. But, unless the war ends sooner than at the moment seems probable, present borrowings will certainly not suffice for the expenditure that must be met. At a moderate estimate the increase of our national debt by the time the war ends will not be short of £2,000,000,000. If we are able to continue borrowing at 4½ per cent. this will involve an annual charge of £90,000,000. To this must be added the cost of a sinking fund, which cannot well be less than 1 per cent. or £20,000,000.* There must also be added the charge for pensions and compassionate allowances to our disabled soldiers, and to the widows and dependents of those who have fallen. No estimate has yet been formed of what this charge will be, but in view of the enormous casualty lists it is hardly safe to put the initial charge which will fall upon the nation on this account at less than £20,000,000 a year. This brings the total up to £130,000,000.

What further charges will have to be met it is impossible to foresee, but this is certain: that after the war thousands of men will be returning from the front seeking employment and finding none. It will be an elementary obligation of justice to make some temporary provision for such men out of public funds; but no estimate can be made of the cost that may be involved.

Finally, account must be taken of the probability—one might safely say the certainty—that after the war the present magnificent yield of the revenue will be grievously reduced.

Our economic position to-day is wholly artificial. The future resources of the country are being mortgaged to provide for the immediate payment of vast sums of money for purposes which yield no direct economic return, though the national return is incalculable. When the owner of an estate mortgages his property to money-lenders in order to be able to indulge in riotous living, it is certain that in later years he or his successors will have to go on short commons. The case of a nation is not quite so simple as this, except to the extent that the nation borrows from outsiders. To that extent a spendthrift nation is exactly in the position of a spendthrift individual,

* There will also be an annual charge which may reach £1,500,000 for the conversion of Consols into War Loan.

and this is a most powerful reason why we should strain every effort to avoid as far as possible external borrowings. So far as our borrowings are internal, it might be argued that from the point of view of the nation as a whole the present lavish expenditure out of borrowed money matters little. It matters at any rate to this extent, that the process of borrowing increases the *rentier* class, which, so far as it does no work—and it is under no economic obligation to work—is a burden upon the nation. Undoubtedly the popular character which Mr. McKenna has so skilfully given to his loan tends to weaken the force of this consideration by making all classes part-owners of the national stock. But in practice the great bulk of the loan will be subscribed by the classes possessing property; the wage-earning classes will take but a small share. Consequently the borrowing of such huge sums will tend to emphasise further after the war the contrast between capitalists and workers. That, however, is not the most important part of the matter. The vitally important fact is that the present methods of expenditure create an artificially enhanced demand for labour, quite apart from the source out of which the payment for that labour comes. The dominating consideration in all government expenditure at the present time is the question of urgency, and when a buyer of labour, or of anything else, is in urgent need he offers high prices. The State is buying both labour and capital at prices which, in comparison with pre-war figures, are exorbitant. But the price paid for labour is paid in full at once, leaving no claim behind; whereas the payment for capital is slowly distributed over many years. This means that the improvement in the position of the wage-earner is temporary, while the improvement secured by the capitalist will be of long duration.

For after the war there will be no urgent call for labour. Doubtless a good deal of work will be put in hand to make good the damage of war, but this will be a leisurely process in comparison with the feverish pace at which war work must be done now. Private employers will not be bidding against one another in the way in which munitions factories and recruiting sergeants are now competing in the labour market. There will be a slump in wages, and that slump will entail a depreciation of profits among the trading classes that cater for

the wants of the wage-earner. The general reduction in prosperity will certainly not be made good by the increased spending power of the holders of war stock.

For these reasons we must look forward to a considerable reduction in the yield of the present sources of revenue when the war expenditure ceases. Not less than £15,000,000 to £20,000,000 ought to be allowed on this score. Adding up all the items enumerated, we may put at the round figure of £150,000,000 the additional annual charge that ought to be provided to meet the possibility that the war may last more than twelve months from now. Towards this total the revenue, as increased by the budget of November 1914 will contribute—comparing the estimates of May 5th, 1915, with those of June 23rd, 1914—£63,000,000. There remains to be made good, either by reducing unnecessary expenditure or by increasing taxation, £87,000,000 a year.

But a prudent Chancellor of the Exchequer ought not to be content even with this sum. He ought also to aim at providing in addition a substantial contribution to the capital cost of the war, so that he may have revenue in hand to give away to the tax-payer when the war is over. This is an extremely important consideration. For after the war it is certain that the country will have much greater difficulty in meeting the demands of the tax-collector than it has now, and therefore we ought to make sacrifices now in order to ease the situation for post-war tax-payers. It is true that if new revenue is raised at once some of that revenue will in the current year be available for capital expenditure, for the whole of the prospective increase in annual expenditure will not mature till later. But if it should happen that the war is prolonged for more than twelve months, and at a necessarily greater daily cost than at present, then, when the full charge matures, there will be no margin available for reducing war taxation. On this account we ought to raise now a revenue more than sufficient to cover the highest estimate of our prospective annual expenditure. By so doing we shall not only keep down to a small extent our capital liabilities, but we shall more equitably distribute the burden between the present tax-payers, who are prosperous, and future tax-payers, who are likely to be the reverse.

For these reasons the Chancellor of the Exchequer, after

making all the reductions that he can in current expenditure, should aim at raising not less than £100,000,000 a year by new taxation. Apart from the importance of raising this revenue, the imposition of the necessary new taxation is in itself desirable, because it will compel private economy, and thus prolong the economic endurance of the nation.

In considering what new taxes should be imposed, great importance must be attached to the question of foreign exchanges. At a meeting at the Guildhall on the 29th of June 1915 the Prime Minister urged that all unnecessary expenditure on imported goods should be reduced, and he specially mentioned tea, tobacco, wine, sugar, and petrol. The way to reduce expenditure on these articles is to tax them heavily. In the Crimean War the tax on tea was 1*s.* 3*d.* a lb.; it is now only 8*d.* In view of the very moderate prime cost of tea at the present time as compared with the period of the Crimean War, no real hardship would be done by doubling the present tax. Allowing for an appreciable reduction of consumption this would yield an additional revenue of at least £5,000,000 a year. The tobacco tax cannot be increased in the same proportion, for it is already about 800 per cent. of the untaxed cost of the article, but some additional revenue could be obtained by raising the duty. Sugar is a more hopeful subject for taxation. The present tax is less than ¼*d.* a lb., and the present retail price of sugar is about 4*d.* a lb. as compared with 6*d.* to 8*d.* a generation ago. The tax might therefore be quadrupled and an additional revenue of at least £10,000,000 obtained. Out of wine there is not much to be made in the way of revenue; but the present scale of wine duties might be modified so as to check the importation of the stronger wines coming from neutral countries without injuring the wine trade of our Allies. Only a small change is required—the starting of the higher wine duty at twenty-seven degrees of alcoholic strength instead of at thirty degrees.

With regard to petrol, the case for increased taxation is overwhelmingly strong. At a time when the army is requiring vast quantities of motor spirit it is desirable that the private consumption of petrol should, if possible, be shut down entirely. Omnibuses must continue to run, but no harm will be done if the omnibus companies are compelled by increased taxation to raise their fares, and to curtail their services. The time has

gone by for tolerating the idea that everything can go on just as usual in spite of the war.

Among imported commodities not mentioned by Mr. Asquith are coffee and cocoa. Both commodities are capable of yielding a slight increase of revenue. In the same way some additional revenue could be obtained from a new duty on imported fruits, such as oranges and bananas. Although the sums at stake in all these cases are not great they are worth considering. The task of raising an extra hundred millions is not an easy one, and wherever even small sums can be obtained, without setting up new machinery for collection, they ought not to be disregarded merely because they are small. This consideration applies of course with special force to increases in existing duties, for the cost of collecting an increased tax is nil. The machinery of the customs department can also be employed with very little extra expense to collect new import duties. The difficulty is to find imported articles which do not enter into some process of subsequent manufacture, for in that case there is a danger that even a moderate tax might injure our industries more than it benefited our revenue. The problem is essentially a practical one which ought to be approached solely from the point of view of the results now desirable and obtainable, without looking back to old political issues.

To pass to a different category of fiscal problems there is a good deal of new revenue to be obtained by a readjustment of postal charges. In the year 1906–7 the net profit on the postal services amounted to nearly £5,000,000 ; in the current fiscal year it is estimated at £3,564,000. The decline is partly due to the increased wages paid to postal servants, and partly to the general spirit of extravagance which has taken possession of all Government departments in the last few years of reckless finance. In our present needs the Post Office must be deliberately utilised as an instrument for raising revenue. The possibilities are considerable. At least £2,000,000 a year could be secured by abolishing half-penny postage both on circulars and on postcards. At the same time the scale for letter postage should be revised. The charge of a penny for four ounces is needlessly liberal, and we might well revert to the old charge of a penny per ounce, with fairly rapid increments for higher weights. These changes would have the incidental advantage of establishing a uniform scale for all postal matter,

printed or unprinted. Incidentally, the absurd concession made a few years ago of permitting letters to be re-directed without fresh postage should be abolished. The parcel post charges might also be increased. All these increases would not only yield revenue but would diminish the volume of matter which the Post Office is called upon to handle, and thus facilitate reductions of staff. The telegraphic branch of the Post Office work furnishes an even stronger case for increased charges. The telegraph service is run at a loss to the State, which, when all items are taken into account, is considerably over a million a year. As a war measure we might well revert to shilling telegrams. At the same time the scale of charges for press telegrams ought to be revised. Nominally, the charge for press telegrams is a shilling for a hundred words, which is more than sufficiently liberal ; but the news agencies are permitted to send duplicate telegrams, which are only charged at the rate of *2d.* per hundred words. Needless to say, such charges are quite unremunerative. The loss on press telegrams is estimated at over £300,000 a year. The continuance of this subsidy to a few private firms at the expense of the general body of tax-payers is inexcusable. Doubtless a reduction in the use of the telegraph would mean an increased use of the telephone, but the latter service involves far less labour per message. Nor is there any reason why the telephone also should not be made to contribute to the necessities of the war. At present the telephone service, which used to yield a six per cent. dividend, barely pays its way owing to the incapacity of Government officials to manage a commercial business. Probably next year the service will show an actual loss. Telephone users may fairly be asked to submit to an increased charge as a war measure.

The excise duties, again, offer considerable opportunities both of obtaining revenue and checking consumption. The Railway Passenger Duty may first be mentioned. This duty was imposed at a time when first and second class travelling was proportionately much more important than at present, and when even third-class fares were higher. With a view to encouraging lower fares the duty was only made applicable to fares exceeding a penny a mile. These are now a small fraction of the total, and it is more than justifiable at the present time to extend the passenger duty to all fares, and to make

it a substantial impost. A tax of 2*d.* in the shilling, working down to a tax of ½*d.* on all fares under 3*d.*, would not be an excessive burden. It would yield a considerable revenue; it would provide a counterpoise to the tax on petrol so as to hold the balance fairly between omnibus and railway traffic; it would reduce railway travelling and thus economise the consumption of coal and the employment of railway servants.

A tax very similar in character which might be imposed is a tax on tickets of admission to theatres and cinemas and other entertainments. The principal objection to it is that some new machinery for collection would have to be established, but it is possible that arrangements could be made with the proprietors of these establishments to collect the tax on commission. No argument is needed to justify a tax upon amusements when the nation is engaged in a terrific war upon which the whole future of our country depends.

Of the other excise duties the most important financially are the licences charged on the sale of alcohol, but these have been so recently increased that it would hardly be justifiable to recast them again. Some of the other licences payable by traders are extremely small, with the result that they yield little profit upon the cost of collection. For example, the makers and vendors of patent medicines pay 5*s.* a year; keepers of refreshment houses in premises worth less than £30 pay 10*s.* 6*d.* a year; motor spirit dealers pay 5*s.* All such licences to traders should be raised to a substantial figure, say £2 a year, which is the duty now paid by hawkers. This would at any rate convert these duties into a sound commercial proposition. The so-called 'establishment licences,' which are now collected by the local authorities, include taxes on male servants, on carriages and motor-cars. The tax on male servants stands at only 15*s.* a year; it might well be quadrupled, so as to discourage the employment of male servants. The question arises whether it would not be both possible and desirable to impose a tax on female servants also. A family who can afford to keep a servant can afford to pay a tax of £1 a year for what is perhaps the greatest of all luxuries to people of modest means. If the tax operated to reduce the number of female servants employed that would be a gain to the country at a time when women as well as men are required for war work.

Carriages and motors are fair subjects for increased taxation, and the increase should deliberately be made so great as to

check consumption. The dog licence, which is a fairly lucrative source of revenue, might reasonably be increased from 7*s.* 6*d.* to 10*s.*, and the gun licence might fairly be doubled.

Attention has been called to these details of the public revenue, first, because, even when we are aiming at millions, the thousands ought not to be overlooked, and, secondly, because the wider the net of increased taxation is thrown, the more completely will the whole country be convinced of the grave urgency of our present financial situation. But, when all has been obtained that is possible out of the taxes discussed above—increased duties on tea, sugar, petrol, tobacco, and sundry smaller imports, increased postal charges, increased or new duties on railway passengers, on places of amusement, on carriages, motor-cars, and domestic servants—there will still remain to be raised the larger portion of the £100,000,000 that ought to be provided out of taxation. It can only be obtained by means of that sheet-anchor of the revenue, the income-tax. But if a further appeal is to be made to income-tax payers, the comparatively small body of persons now comprised in that category are entitled to demand that their burden shall be shared by the rest of the community. One of the greatest defects of our political system is the exemption of the weekly wage-earner from the payment of income-tax. It renders him immune from any direct and conscious contribution to the needs of the State, and it deprives the country of a very large possible source of revenue. It is estimated by statisticians that the total income of the nation is £2,400,000,000 a year; of this total about £1,000,000,000 is in the hands of the present income-tax payers, leaving £1,400,000,000 that escapes income-tax. Admittedly the £1,400,000,000 could not possibly be taxed at the same rate as the £1,000,000,000 because it is divided among a very large number of families, some of whom have little indeed to spare after the bare necessaries of life have been provided for. Nevertheless, out of this huge sum a large revenue could be obtained if the politicians would have the courage to call for it. Many weekly wage-earners are now earning incomes of £5 to £10 a week, but in practice very few of them are charged with income-tax. Until recent years it was possible to plead in excuse of the exemption of the weekly wage-earner that no machinery existed for assessing and levying the tax. That excuse is no longer available. The

working of the National Insurance Act has proved that an enormous annual revenue can be collected from weekly wage-earners, and that the collection raises neither administrative nor political difficulties. It is true that the wage-earner in this case pays for what may prove to be a direct personal benefit to himself, but even among the pacifists there will be few who will be bold enough to say that a working-man ought more willingly to contribute to the cost of his own insurance against disease than to the cost of insuring his country against defeat. There is no practical difficulty in requiring each workman to fill in with stamps a weekly "war tax" card as well as an insurance card. The tax would be proportional to the amount of the wages, and thus its imposition would to some extent correct the inevitable hardship of the flat rate for insurance. As regards wage-earners earning over £3 a week and therefore not coming under the Insurance Act, the employer should be under heavy penalty to return the amount of the income to the Inland Revenue authorities. He is already required so to do, but in practice the obligation seems to be seldom enforced. It ought to be possible with a wages tax on these lines to raise a revenue of not less than £14,000,000 a year, or one per cent. on the assumed total.

For the rest we must look as before to the middle and upper classes. They have already contributed much; they must contribute more. It is not a political but a national obligation. If we are to prolong the economic endurance of the nation we must at once cut down private expenditure; if we are to avoid very grave financial embarrassments in the future we must at once provide a sufficient revenue to meet our prospective liabilities. On both accounts patriotic citizens ought to welcome new taxation. After all, the sacrifice asked from us who remain at home is very little indeed in comparison with the sacrifice voluntarily made by those who go to the front; we give a little, they give everything. If the nation will to-day shoulder its financial burdens with but a little of the grim determination with which our soldiers fight in the trenches, there need be no doubt as to the endurance of our economic strength.

EDITOR.

No. 454 will be published in October.

223

The Edinburgh Review

OCTOBER, 1915 No. 454

THE QUINTESSENCE OF AUSTRIA

FOR more than a year we have been fighting the two 'Central Empires' and Turkey. By dint of hard experience we have begun to understand the character of the German people and of the German State. Turkey has always been less incomprehensible to us than are some of our nearest neighbours on the continent of Europe. We know that the Ottoman Empire is an Asiatic polity, and, despite the aberrations of the idealists who mistook the Young Turkish revolution of 1908 for a democratic upheaval, we have never fallen entirely into the error of judging an Oriental people by Western standards. But in the case of Austria-Hungary, currently styled 'Austria,' Englishmen have never known quite what standards to apply. Their general idea has been that 'Austria' is a motley country ruled over by a Sovereign whom age and misfortune have rendered venerable and worthy of sympathetic regard, a Sovereign much harassed by the perpetual strife among his 'mosaic of peoples,' a sort of crowned president of a crazy republic which was destined to collapse at the first severe shock from outside. The truth that Austria is a country, or, rather, an Imperial Estate, more Eastern than Western in character; that Francis Joseph is more nearly a Sultan than a true constitutional monarch; and that his action is less the action of a passive, equilibrating moderator

All rights reserved.

than that of a consciously and positively governing dynast, could hardly be appreciated in this country, where knowledge of Central Africa, Polynesia, and the Far East is less rare than knowledge of Central Europe. The essential facts about Austria are not set down in handbooks nor enshrined in statistical tables. They are only to be learned by observant experience.

Some years ago a promising diplomatist, with a reputation for well-informed shrewdness, was chosen to represent one of the Great Powers as ambassador to the Austro-Hungarian Court. In diplomatic circles it was an open secret that his path to preferment had been smoothed by a series of brilliant and painstaking despatches which, when Minister in a minor European capital, he had addressed to his Government upon some of the larger issues of European politics. One of these despatches, which dealt with the Austrian problem, was incautiously circulated by his Government among its other representatives abroad. Copies of it thus fell into the hands of men less erudite but more experiencd than its writer. Their comments upon it were unfit for publication. It was, in fact, so plausible, so nearly true, so perversely lucid as to be dangerously misleading; and none but those who had dealt with Hapsburg affairs at first hand and had breathed the baffling air of the Austrian capital could divine how far from the truth were the theories set forth by the outside student. Partly by accident, the author of these despatches was presently installed as ambassador in Vienna. His reputation as a keen critic of European and Austrian affairs had preceded him. Great expectations were entertained of his diplomatic activity. Here, at last, there seemed to be a diplomatist thoroughly conversant with the affairs of the country to whose Sovereign he was accredited. He set about his task with vigour and sought for facts to substantiate his previous conclusions. But within three months he exclaimed 'What 'a strange place this is! On the inside it is quite different 'from what it seems to be from the outside. Everything is 'elusive. There is nothing to take hold of, nothing solid to 'stand upon.' And in his search for 'something solid' he placed his faith in a statesman who, though Austrian by birth, had lost, by long residence abroad, the sense of the peculiar realities of Austrian life—and eventually both came to grief.

Attempts to understand Austria from the outside are almost certain to fail. 'Austria' is like Hegelian philosophy. The late Friedrich Engels, co-author with Marx of the German Socialist evangel *Das Kapital*, spent half his life in the study of Hegel, and, shortly before his death, explained to me the difficulties he had encountered. 'I am German,' he said, 'and 'know my own language. But one needs to read Hegel for 'years in order to acquire his particular vocabulary and to 'understand the special meaning he attaches to recognised 'philosophical terms. Only then is it possible to penetrate 'his meaning; and, even then, some doubt always remains 'whether one has truly grasped his concepts.' The hardest thing in the study of Austria is to learn the true, not the apparent, meaning of the Austrian political vocabulary. When this has been learned there remains the difficulty that, in the last resort, everything depends upon the person of the Sovereign. It might be supposed that, in the course of his sixty-seven years of reign, the personality of Francis Joseph would have become a 'known quantity.' This is not the case. Francis Joseph has been, or has seemed to be, everything by turns, and his most intimate counsellors have never felt quite sure of having gauged his mind. One of them, who had worked with him in close and almost affectionate intercourse for a quarter of a century, confessed to me that neither he nor any human being has ever been allowed to catch a glimpse of what goes on behind the veil that shrouds Francis Joseph the monarch, the collaborator of the Deity, from the gaze of those whose work brings them into contact with Francis Joseph the man.

When the Austrian political vocabulary has been approximately learned and the fact appreciated that few of its terms are the exact equivalents of those employed in other European countries, there remains the Austro-Hungarian catalogue to be committed to memory. By 'catalogue' I mean the list of Hapsburg peoples—Germans of Austria, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Italians, Poles, Magyars, Rumanes, Ruthenes or Little Russians, Saxons of Transylvania, Swabians of Southern Hungary, Jews and Gipsies—with their special characteristics, political and 'national' aspirations and historical relationships to the dynasty. A lifetime may be unprofitably spent in mastering the juridical niceties of Hungarian Constitutional Law,

Bohemian State rights, the exact significance of the Pragmatic Sanction, the true meaning of the *Ausgleich* or settlement of 1867, the relations between Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary, and the thousand and one peculiarities of the relations between the Hapsburgs and their ' Kingdoms and Lands.' In Austria-Hungary every question tends to assume an historico-legal aspect which, when thoroughly mastered, is seen to be illusory, inasmuch as matters are invariably settled in the last resort by the power of the Crown to coerce its subjects or the power of the subjects to coerce the Crown.

The racial strife, of which so much has been heard in reports from Austria and Hungary, is not in itself a proof of hopeless incompatibility of temperament among the Hapsburg peoples. It is rather the outcome of a deliberate system of State which aims at setting off one race against the other, favouring those which behave well towards the dynasty, curbing those whose power seems dangerous, and creating an equilibrium of moderate discontent in which no one race is ever entirely satisfied, never without jealousy of its neighbours, but in which each and all are taught to look to the Crown as the sole dispenser of benefits. This system is most carefully worked, with the help of the police, by a powerful bureaucracy whose higher *personnel* has been trained from youth upwards in traditions that end by being instinctively observed. This governing class depends, in its turn, entirely on the Crown, although its rights and privileges are carefully tabulated in a long series of ordinances and laws. It is the executive instrument of the will of the monarch, to whom its relationship resembles, in some respects, that of an old butler who controls and tyrannises over his master in a dozen petty ways, but on whom he depends for his wages and eventual pension.

If to these peculiar Austrian realities there be added the fact that some of the strongest Hapsburg peoples are markedly Oriental in character—notably the Magyars and the Jews—while others lay for centuries under Ottoman control, it will be understood that the reflection of all these elements and influences in the governing circles tends to produce an atmosphere to which enterprising diplomatists and foreign students find some difficulty in accustoming their lungs. In reality, diplomatists rarely breathe the true Austrian atmosphere at all. They live and move in special compartments supplied

with oxygen from 'Europe,' whereas the Austrian atmosphere is 'Asiatic.' Journalists are more favourably placed, because their work enables them, if they be conscientious, to touch life in many directions. It is true that for journalists also, and for foreign journalists in particular, special compartments are prepared. In these they may thrive and be happy so long as no reprehensible spirit of adventure or mania for independence prompts them to break out. Those who revolt are apt to find themselves growing year by year more foreign. To live uncritically in Austria is not to understand it; to struggle against the influence of local circumstances is to run the risk of becoming progressively isolated. I have known Austrians who, after returning home from a prolonged stay abroad, have felt themselves, as time went on, less and less at their ease, and have confessed that they were rapidly becoming strangers in their own land. To be comfortable in Austria one must accept things at their face value, ask few questions, join in the light and not inelegant life of the people, cultivate a taste for sensuous enjoyment, profess amiable scepticism, avoid earnestness, believe that public affairs are the concern of the government, and cherish friendships with the influential, so that, in case of need, their protection may be invoked.

This 'Austrian' atmosphere is by no means confined to Vienna, though there it is to be found in its concentrated impurity. Vienna is the chief seat of government, the head-quarters of the dynasty; and to the dynasty and its head, the reigning monarch, all lines converge. The Magyars may regard him chiefly as King of Hungary, the Bohemians as King of Bohemia, the Austrian-Germans and the Viennese simply as 'the Emperor,' but it is he who typifies and symbolises for them all the power of the Crown. He is not an abstraction, but a living force. He is the custodian of the traditions of which every true Austrian is, in his heart of hearts, intensely proud. Pride is the essence of the Austrian character. Whether it take the form of mock humility and self-depreciation or be expressed in colloquial phrases like the Viennese '*M'r san m'r*' ('We are we'), it is omnipresent and needs only a pretext to blaze forth in all its ancient intensity. Though its immediate object may vary in the different parts of the monarchy, its quality is the same. The system of education, the Army, the Church, the Bureaucracy and the Press all

contribute to maintain it. It is the chief reason for the comparatively tough resistance shown by the Austro-Hungarian troops in the present war. The theorists who imagined that the monarchy would fall to pieces at the first hard knock, and that the centrifugal forces, whose existence is undeniable, would paralyse any successful, co-ordinated effort, have been undeceived by the course of the last fourteen months' fighting. Austria is loose-jointed, but not therefore weak. Doubtless the German control and stiffening have greatly contributed to increase Austrian efficiency, though the Germans would probably have obtained better results had they been more careful not to wound Austrian pride.

When all is said and done, the Austrian regards himself as a better fellow than the North German, a superior and more polished human being. For this he has many grounds. He may admire the efficiency, the 'pushfulness' of the North German, whom he nevertheless despises as an upstart semi-barbarian. The Austrian-German speaks a richer, purer tongue than the Prussian; he has more inherited culture and less *Kultur*; he is conscious of centuries of imperial tradition, and his dynasty is to him the living symbol of a great past which he has hitherto hoped might somehow be merged into a greater future. The pessimism and discouragement which sometimes mark Austrian public utterances have never yet, or, at least, up to the beginning of the war, had never tinged the feelings of the people.

In these feelings the people are at one with the Imperial family. Pride is still the strongest characteristic of the dynasty, most of whose blunders it has inspired. The Hapsburgs cannot stoop to conquer. They cannot place themselves in the position of others or treat them with that imaginative tact which smooths away obstacles and wins hearts. Otherwise Bismarck would not have turned them so easily out of Germany; Lombardy and Venice might not have been so quickly lost; and, above all, the Southern Slav question might never have acquired its fatal significance. The Hapsburgs have rarely yielded a point save under coercion. They have never seemed to understand that concessions tardily made under pressure evoke no gratitude. The Hapsburg theory is that no better fate can befall any people than to come under Hapsburg rule; and that, when under Hapsburg rule, it can

aspire to no higher honour than to loyal service of the dynasty. Disaffection, resistance, or revolt are therefore felt by the dynasty to partake of the nature of blasphemy and to require severe punishment. When, by Imperial clemency, punishment is mitigated, it is the manifest duty of the punished to be grateful. The perversity of the Italians in preferring a national existence to the benefits and glory of belonging to the Hapsburg Empire has never ceased to be a cause of painful astonishment to the Austrian Imperial family. To have imagined, as the German Government seems to have done, that Austria would willingly yield further territory to Italy, was entirely to mistake the Hapsburg point of view.

Similarly with the Serb and Croatian inhabitants of the Monarchy. Their aspirations towards national unity were felt to be not only politically reprehensible but positively wicked, inasmuch as they implied a deliberate intention to eschew that which is good—the rule of the Hapsburgs—and to cleave to that which is evil. Serbia, from whom the perverse unitary propaganda was believed to proceed, therefore deserved chastisement, which nothing but the long-suffering patience of the Hapsburg State saved her long since from receiving. True, this patience was impregnated with contempt for a 'people of swineherds,' who, in Austrian estimation, were scarcely distinguishable from the swine they bred. *Die Serben, das sind Schweine,* is a current Austrian phrase. When in the autumn of 1905 the Serbs and the Croatians of Austria-Hungary sank their differences—always carefully fostered by Hapsburg administrations—and formed a coalition, the anger and alarm of Vienna knew no bounds. This sign of concord, and the manifestations of Southern Slav solidarity that accompanied the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, inspired Austro-Hungarian statesmen with a determination to nip in the bud what was regarded as a dangerous conspiracy. In this determination Hungary was at one with Austria, for the majority of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs inhabit Croatia-Slavonia which are 'Lands' of the Hungarian Crown.

The world is familiar with the nefarious preparations made in 1907–8 for the punishment of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slav leaders, and for the despatch of a 'punitive expedition' of which the effect was intended to be the extinction of Serbia as an independent State and the acquisition by the Hapsburgs

—though, in the mind of Germany, not for the Hapsburgs—of the Gate to the Near East. The employment of Austrian *agents provocateurs*; the preparation, under the auspices of the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade, of hundreds of forged documents designed to prove that the leading Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary had been guilty of corrupt and treasonable commerce with the Serbian Government; the constant vilification of Serbia in the Austrian Press, and in the Press of Western Europe by telegrams from Vienna; the equally active slandering of Serbia by Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors, Ministers, and Consuls abroad—all these preparations have been sufficiently described in the works of Dr. Seton-Watson and other competent writers. One detail that has recently come to my knowledge may nevertheless be mentioned. In September 1908, a month before the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Hungarian Premier, Dr. Wekerle, was informed that a number of Austrian secret service agents had been sent from Vienna to Belgrade for the purpose of working up anti-Austrian demonstrations and of promoting attacks upon Austria in the Serbian Press. Not wishing to be caught unawares by any sudden development of Austrian policy, Dr. Wekerle sent, in his turn, a number of Hungarian secret agents to Belgrade with orders to get into touch with their Austrian colleagues, find out what instructions they were receiving, and report daily to him. The reports received showed that a noisy 'anti-Austrian' movement was being worked up in the Press and the cafés of Belgrade, the worst offenders being journals notoriously subsidised by the Austro-Hungarian Legation. Dr. Wekerle thus received a clearer indication of the tendency of Hapsburg policy than he had been able to extract officially from Vienna, and he made his plans in consequence.

It may seem strange to the unsophisticated British mind that one of the governments in the Dual Monarchy should be reduced to spying, by means of secret service agents, upon the action of the joint Austro-Hungarian Government. The explanation is that Austro-Hungarian policy is dynastic, and that its objects are not necessarily known either to the Government of Austria proper, or to that of Hungary. It is executed by the joint Austro-Hungarian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for War, of whom the former is, above all else, Minister

of the Imperial and Royal House. The Premiers of Austria and of Hungary may only be told what it is thought expedient that they should know. Their advice may be taken on subsidiary points, but when a decision has been reached by the Crown, they are confronted with the choice of obeying orders or of coming into conflict with the Monarch—a formidable prospect which none but the foolhardy will lightheartedly face. As far as Austria is concerned, the likeliho d of resistance to any dynastic purpose is small indeed. The Austrian Constitution is a mere fig leaf to hide the nakedness of the absolute rule exercised by the Emperor through the bureaucracy, from whose higher ranks Austrian Ministers are almost invariably chosen. The case of Hungary is different, but in Hungary also the power of the Crown is far greater than academic students suppose it to be.

Few developments in modern European history are more curious than those which have brought Hungary into a position of practical dependence upon the Hapsburg dynasty and, latterly, upon Germany. After the 'Compromise' or Settlement of 1867, when, in consequence of the Austrian defeat at Sadowa, the Magyar leaders secured for the Hungarian Government far more than its fair share of influence in the Monarchy, Magyar statesmen had two courses open to them. The one was to follow the perspicacious policy, favoured by Deák and Eötvös, of associating the non-Magyar races of Hungary with the Magyars in the government of the State, and of satisfying their reasonable aspirations to such a degree as to render them insensible to attractions from without. The other, which was eventually adopted, was for the Magyar Government to aim at the complete political subjugation and Magyarisation of the non-Magyars—who, together, form more than half the population of Hungary—and to secure a free hand for this purpose by satisfying the requirements of the Emperor and of Austria in military and economic matters. The policy of Magyarisation associated with the name of Koloman Tisza, who held the Hungarian premiership from 1875 to 1890, would not have been possible save with the tacit support of the Crown; nor would the parallel and analogous policy of the political and economic compression of Croatia-Slavonia by Hungary have been feasible without the same support.

Thus, at the risk of estranging the non-Magyars and the

Southern Slavs from the dynasty, the Crown deliberately allowed the Magyars to engage in an oppressive policy, of which the ulterior effect must necessarily be to render the Magyars dependent upon Austrian support if they wished to retain their ruling position in Hungary. In the same way, the policy of Magyarisation was bound to make the Magyars instruments of the foreign policy of the dynasty, or of any influence to which the foreign policy of the dynasty might become subservient. This is the true explanation of the support given by the Hungarian Government to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, although it had scarcely been consulted upon the matter beforehand. This also is the explanation of the strongly pro-Austrian and even more pro-German attitude of Hungary under the premiership of Count Stephen Tisza, son of Kolomon Tisza, during the present war.

The legend that Hungary is a liberal country, 'rightly 'struggling to be free,' dies hard. Notwithstanding all the efforts made to enlighten the public in Western Europe, not a few politicians, diplomatists, and newspaper editors are still foolish enough to believe that Hungary may 'break away' from Austria and conclude a separate peace with the Allies. Solicitude for 'the future of Hungary' has played a part even in the diplomatic calculations of the Allies, and the Italian Government in particular has chased the will o' the wisp of a future Italo-Hungarian agreement. The plain fact is that there is no such thing as 'Hungary' in the sense of the liberal legend. There are some millions of Magyars ruled by an oligarchy of nobles and bureaucrats who have mortgaged their very souls to the Austro-German cause in order to purchase a free hand for the oppression of the non-Magyars; and there are nearly a million Jews who, under the Magyars, have secured a practical monopoly of Hungarian banking, trade, and industry, and have therefore a potent interest to bolster up the oligarchy and the Magyar State. The Hungary of the last forty years has been a main prop of Germanism, and will continue to be a prop of Germanism until the Hungarian Rumanes are incorporated in Rumania, the Croatians and Serbs included with Serbia in an independent Southern Slav Confederation, the Hungarian Ruthenes allotted to Russia, and the Hungarian Slovaks to an autonomous Bohemia-Moravia. Then the Magyars will be reduced to their rightful

place on the central Hungarian plain and left to reflect upon the consequences of betraying the policy of fair play to subject races, that might have made of them the trusted leaders in a tolerant Hungarian State.

Similarly with Austria. The conception underlying the old phrase that 'if Austria had not existed it would have been 'necessary to invent her' seems to have paralysed the imaginations of many statesmen in England, Russia, France, and Italy. Some of them entered upon the war in the fond belief that, whatever might happen to Germany, it would be good policy to harm Austria as little as possible. The truth that the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy is an indispensable preliminary to the creation of a peaceful Europe, seems never to have penetrated their conservative minds. For years one main object of German policy—and, inasmuch as Austria has long been controlled from Berlin, that of Austrian policy—has been to solve the Eastern question in favour of Germany. The Baghdad railway enterprise had no other meaning. The establishment of German diplomatic preponderance at Constantinople, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, possibly even the overthrow of Abdul Hamid, the Potsdam conferences with the then inexperienced M. Sazonof, the mission of General Liman von Sanders to Constantinople, the mission of Hakki Pasha to London, and a dozen other indications, all pointed in the same direction. There is reason to believe that, even before the Turkish revolution of 1908, Germany had begun to withdraw her support from Abdul Hamid, who, despite his crimes, was the most considerable Ottoman statesman of the last generation. Abdul Hamid foresaw the Anglo-German conflict, and had sufficient respect for the resources of the British Empire to believe that Germany might get the worst of the struggle. During the last two years of his reign he began almost imperceptibly to edge away from Germany—and Germany from him.

The existence of an independent Serbia was the chief stumbling-block in the Austro-German path of conquest. Since the battle of Sadowa in 1866, Austria had been potentially and, since the war of 1870, really under German control. The first consequence of Sadowa was the conclusion of the Settlement or 'Compromise' of 1867 between Austria and Hungary. That settlement made the Austrian-Germans predominant

in Austria and the Magyars predominant in Hungary, and left both practically subservient to Germany. The Magyars, under Andrássy, who was then Premier, vetoed in 1869 the idea of an Austro-Franco-Italian Alliance that should undo the work of Sadowa ; and Russia, mindful of Francis Joseph's ingratitude in 1854–5, lent Andrássy and Bismarck her powerful aid. In 1870, after the first victories of Germany over France had shattered the Hapsburg dream of regaining a footing in the German Empire, Andrássy joined hands with Bismarck and with Beust, the Austrian Imperial Chancellor, to defeat Francis Joseph's affrighted efforts to establish an agreement with the Czechs of Bohemia and thus to place his realms on a basis less lop-sided than that of the 1867 Settlement. The failure of his scheme blighted the hopes of future Hapsburg independence in Europe. Before Francis Joseph could tentatively renew his policy in 1879 with the help of Count Taaffe, Andrássy had brought back from the Berlin Congress of 1878 a mandate to 'occupy and administer' Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had concluded in October 1879 the treaty of alliance with Germany against Russia.

The Monarchy was thus committed to a forward Balkan policy. Its ambitions were directed towards the south-east and away from Central Europe. For this reason Germany encouraged those ambitions, and also because she knew that they must bring the Hapsburgs progressively into conflict with Russia and thus increase their dependence upon German support. Germany would therefore be in a position to blow hot or cold upon Austria as the exigencies of securing 'brokerage' from Russia might require. In these circumstances, Bismarck might well declare that, to Germany, the affairs of the Near East were not worth the sound bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. The sound bones of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers buried in Bosnia-Herzegovina had done Germany's work for her.

Francis Joseph may well have looked upon these things with mixed feelings. He was glad that the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—he would fain have annexed the provinces outright—should save him from the reproach of having been, through the loss of Lombardy and Venetia, a 'Verminderer des Reiches' ; but his heart was hardly in the Balkan enterprise. His son, the Crown Prince Rudolph,

on the other hand, aspired to the conquest of the Balkans, and carefully studied the ritual of the crowning of the Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople. 'Here shalt thou be Empress,' he declared to the Crown Princess Stéphanie during their visit to Constantinople in 1881. When, by his death in 1889, his cousin Francis Ferdinand became heir-presumptive, the outlook was modified.

Francis Ferdinand's education had been pitifully inadequate. His tutors had instructions not to overtax his mind. Though in some respects a promising officer, he was, from early manhood, handicapped by a severe and inexorable malady which he, like his handsome brother, the Archduke Otto, contracted at Göding in Moravia. Otto eventually succumbed to it. Francis Ferdinand, after succeeding Rudolph, was sent on a voyage round the world in the hope that his health might be restored. He was, falsely, announced to be suffering from pulmonary disease. For some years after his return he worked hard to make good the deficiencies of his early education. In so far as his political tendencies were revealed, they appeared to be as typical of his Sicilian-Bourbon mother as of his Hapsburg father. He seemed to be a devoted son of the Church, a partisan of the restoration of the Temporal Power, and a thorough-going hater of 'liberalism,' particularly of the liberalism represented by the German-Jewish Liberals of Austria and the 'Magyar Liberal' Jews of Hungary. He was credited with anti-German, anti-Magyar, and pro-Slav tendencies. His chief aim was believed to be the overthrow of the Settlement of 1867 and the reorganisation of his future dominions on a basis that should not leave the dynasty at the mercy of the Magyars, the Austrian-Germans and their Hohenzollern mentors. He was thought to be seeking the alliance of the Roman Catholic Church in order to secure its support in the formidable crisis which any attempt to realise his ideas must inevitably provoke. His personal relations with the German Emperor were not cordial, and German statesmen looked with misgivings upon the contingency of his accession to the throne. In 1900, however, he gave hostages to fortune by his morganatic marriage with the Countess Sophie Chotek, and thus added a dynastic problem to the serious political problems which his temperament and ambitions threatened presently to raise. The Magyars, who are cunning

lawyers, bound him deftly with legal bonds and embodied in Hungarian Constitutional Law the marriage declaration, by which he renounced every conceivable right of succession for his wife and children. The Hungarian crisis of 1903–6 was due in part to the desire of the Magyars to secure military guarantees against his eventual interference with Hungarian privileges.

In October 1908 Austria startled Europe by proclaiming the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand favoured the policy of annexation, although it is credibly reported to have been suggested in the first instance by the German Emperor during his visit of Jubilee congratulation to Francis Joseph in May 1908. The Archduke and Baron von Aehrenthal, the Foreign Minister, had previously been working to revive the Conservative League of the Three Emperors, and had aimed at making Vienna rather than Berlin the pivot of the European situation. This prospect could hardly be agreeable to the Emperor William; and nothing was more certain to preclude its realisation than a thorough breach between Austria and Russia. Aehrenthal resented, or was induced by Germany to resent, the Anglo-Russian Agseement of 1907 as essentially anti-Austrian, and was helped by Berlin to break the ten year-old Austro-Russian understanding in regard to the Balkans by selling the work of European reform in Macedonia for a concession from Turkey in regard to the construction of a useless railway through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. A breach between Austria and Russia having been thus effected in January 1908, Austria was induced to widen it by the annexation policy.

That policy appealed to the instincts of Francis Joseph, whose title to the definite possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina it affirmed; it appealed to the temperaments of Aehrenthal and Francis Ferdinand, who were anxious to assert the right of the Monarchy to what they believed to be an independent initiative in European affairs; and, above all, it awoke the slumbering pride of the Austrian peoples by making them feel, after years of humiliating internal crises, that they counted for something in the world. Indeed, Austrian preparations for action went far beyond the mere annexation of the occupied provinces. The efforts made to inflame Serbian resentment were intended as a prelude to a 'punitive expedition' that

would have brought Serbia under Hapsburg control and would have opened, ostensibly for Austria but in reality for Germany, the road to Salonika and Constantinople. No resistance to Austrian schemes was to be apprehended from Bulgaria, whose ruler had been encouraged by Austria to proclaim the independence of his principality and to assume the title of King.

The German Emperor has always been a skilful manipulator of men, but it may be doubted whether his talent was ever more astutely used than when, in November 1908, he invited himself to shoot for a couple of days, alone with Francis Ferdinand, at Eckartsau, on the Danube. What passed between the two men may never be known. The fact only is certain that, at Eckartsau, the German Emperor took the full measure of his host, captivated him, and left him solidly chained to the Hohenzollern chariot. So infatuated was he that, in the following spring, it needed a pertinent reminder from the more cautious Francis Joseph to prevent the Archduke from playing into the German Emperor's hands by accepting a proposal that German troops should garrison Bohemia and Galicia, so as to hold Russia in check while the Austro-Hungarian army advanced to the conquest of Serbia.

'I see the Germans coming in,' Francis Joseph is credibly reported to have said, 'but I do not see how we are to get 'them out afterwards.' It was therefore decided by Francis Joseph and his nephew, on March 18 or 19, 1909, that there should be no war; but Germany, not to be balked of her triumph, hastened to send, on March 23, to St. Petersburg the scarcely veiled ultimatum which enabled her to secure and present to Aehrenthal the diplomatic capitulation of Russia.

Aehrenthal never forgave Germany for her intervention and could not be brought to acknowledge the 'service' rendered. Germany, for her part, never forgave Aehrenthal for his 'ingratitude,' against which the German Emperor presently protested in the famous speech at the Vienna Rathaus in which he attributed the 'success' of Austria to the support received from her ally 'in shining armour.' He was determined to keep his hold on the Austrian public at all costs.

Thus, through the annexation crisis, Germany tightened her grip on Austria. Discord was sown in 1910 between the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and Aehrenthal; and the Austrian military party was encouraged by the German Ambassador

to make Aehrenthal's life a burden to him. Great though Aehrenthal's faults had been, there was something tragic in the way in which he was hounded into his grave by German intrigues. His successor, Count Berchtold, who became Foreign Minister early in 1912, was no match for Berlin. He was 'subjectively honest,' but vacillating and unready. By this time, moreover, the Archduke had begun to feel the effects of his relentless malady. He became moody and irresolute. His control even of military affairs grew slacker. During the Balkan wars of 1912–1913 his influence appears to have been thrown rather against than in favour of the aggressive policy recommended by the Chief of General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, who, like the rest of the military party, was under German control. For months at a time Francis Ferdinand disappeared from public view and withdrew, for the sake of his health, either to his castle of Konopisht, in Bohemia, or to Miramar, near Trieste. In the spring of 1913 alarming reports began to circulate in well-informed quarters. They represented the Archduke as being within measurable distance of mental derangement and progressive paralysis. Foreign governments, including the British Foreign Office, made confidential inquiries based on knowledge of the nature of his illness. The truth was certainly known to the German Government, and it was not questioned by the Austrian Premier when prominent Austrian politicians sought information from him.

These facts seemed to lend sinister significance to the news of the assassination of the Archduke and of his consort at Serajevo on June 28, 1914. They suggested doubt whether the crime was the outcome of a spontaneous Serbian conspiracy; and when, from the middle of July onwards, the policy of Austria became one of deliberate aggression against Serbia, doubt hardened into suspicion.

There exists strong evidence to prove, that, on or before July 14, 1914, the German Emperor wrote to the Emperor Francis Joseph a letter so encouraging, and containing such explicit promises of German military support in all directions if Austria would take the opportunity to settle her account with Serbia, that the reluctance of the Emperor Francis Joseph was overcome and his assent given to the terms of the ultimatum to Serbia. To this evidence, the nature of which

cannot yet be made public, Signor Barzilai, the Italian Minister without portfolio, has now added the public declaration (Naples, September 26) that, eight days before the presentation of the ultimatum to Serbia (July 23, 1914), i.e. on July 15, 1914, the German Ambassador at Constantinople informed confidentially his Italian colleague, the Marquis Garroni, that the ultimatum would be so drafted as to render war inevitable. What interest had Germany thus to push Austria into war, a war, moreover, in which she was likely to be engaged against two Slav States and consequently to fight at a disadvantage ? The answer lies in the whole character of German policy, of which the most immediate object has long been the settlement of the Eastern Question in German favour: that is to say, the acquisition of complete control, military, political, and economic, in the Near and Middle East. That object could not be attained without the overthrow of Serbia, who held and holds the gateway to the East. For this reason Germany had supported the aggressive designs of the Austro-Hungarian military party which centred round Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, and for a time, though not perhaps in the last phase, found the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

The years that followed the annexation crisis were devoted to strenuous military and naval preparation. The formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912 disquieted both Germany and Austria, who, however, took refuge in the hope that the Serbian army at least would be crushed by the Turks, and that Austria would then be enabled to extend her ' protection ' to Serbia. The Serbian victories at Kumanovo and Monastir dashed this hope. Then Austria set about creating a direct *casus belli* with Serbia. The scandalous Prochaska incident—the case of the Austrian Consul at Prizrend whom the Serbians were falsely accused of having insulted and even mutilated—had no other meaning. When that intrigue failed, recourse was had to the Montenegrin occupation of Scutari as a pretext for war. This danger was also, somewhat ingloriously, averted by the Powers. Then, with the willing help of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, Austria promoted the Bulgarian attack upon Serbia and Greece and precipitated the second Balkan war, in the confident expectation that a Bulgarian victory over Serbia would give Austria the opportunity which she had hitherto awaited in vain. That expectation Serbia defeated,

together with the Bulgarian army, on the Bregalnitza. Reduced to desperation, Austria then invited Italy to engage with her in a 'defensive' war against Serbia. As we know from Signor Giolitti's revelations, Italy declined the invitation; and the German Emperor proceeded to assist in drafting the Treaty of Bukarest in such a way as to preclude future agreement between the Balkan States.

In the meantime England had allowed the Treaty of London, which concluded the first Balkan War, to go by the board; had tolerated the Turkish reoccupation of Adrianople; and had begun sinister negotiations with the Turco-German envoy, Hakki Pasha, about the Baghdad railway. In Constantinople, where I spent several weeks in August and September 1913, I found Austrian and German diplomacy working hand-in-hand with the Committee of Union and Progress; and from indiscreet admissions, made by influential members of the Committee, I acquired the conviction that an Austrian attack upon Serbia, coupled with a Turkish advance upon Salonika, was but a matter of time. The only real question was what the pretext would be.

It is not known what part, if any, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand took in all these intrigues. Ill-health had been assigned as a reason for his remarkable attitude of detachment from the Austrian military preparations during the winter of 1912–13, and it was currently stated that, in the event of war, he would not be well enough to command the army. Possibly, with the tragic lucidity of mind that often accompanies the malady from which he was suffering, he saw and impotently resented the dangerous course into which Austria was being driven, and understood that, in the best event, it could only end in the complete subjection of Austria to Germany. With all his failings, Francis Ferdinand was a passionate Austrian. His aim was ever the attainment of greater power for the dynasty and of greater freedom of movement for the Monarchy. He detested the 1867 Settlement and desired to upset it. Whereas Francis Joseph's feeble attempts to circumvent it had been based upon tentative agreements with the Northern Slavs—that is to say, the Czechs and the Austrian Poles—Francis Ferdinand sought in an agreement with the Serbo-Croatians, or Southern Slavs, a starting-point for internal reconstruction.

Unfortunately, he approached the Southern Slav question only from its Catholic, or Croat, side, and appeared to ignore, or to antagonise, its Serb, or Orthodox, side. Doubtless he worked with the tools that lay readiest to hand, mainly the Jesuit and pro-Jesuit organisations, which were fanatically anti-Serb and dreamed only of solving the Southern Slav question in a Catholic sense, by force of arms if necessary. But the Southern Slav question can no more be solved in a purely Croat than in a purely Serb sense. The only solution worthy of the name lies in the direction of a complete Serbo-Croat-Slovene unity on the basis of equality of political and religious rights. It is in this sense that the Allies must solve it, if they desire lasting peace in Europe.

Much light might be shed on the tragedy of Serajevo and on the preparation of the European War, could it ever be known exactly what passed at Konopisht amid the Archduke's rose gardens during the visit paid to him there by the German Emperor and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz in June 1914. We know only the externals of those fateful days. The Archduke and the Duchess Hohenberg left late in June for Bosnia, where the Archduke was to inspect the 15th Army Corps. It has been asserted, and not convincingly denied, that Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, warned the Archduke not to go. Nevertheless, he went. The civil authorities at Serajevo, who control an extraordinarily efficient police force, were instructed that the arrangements for the protection of the Archduke would be made by the military. When, after inspecting the Army Corps outside Serajevo, he visited the city on June 28, the police took no special measures for his safety.

In the spring of 1910, I was at Serajevo during the visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph and was struck by the completeness of the police arrangements. During the Archduke's visit none were made. Having warned off the police, the military authorities, under the command of General Potiorek, the governor and commander of the Army Corps, omitted even to provide a military escort. On the way to the Town Hall a bomb was thrown at the Archduke's motor-car by a youth named Cabrinovitch, son of an Austrian police-agent who had lately returned from a visit to Belgrade. At Belgrade, the Serbian authorities had proposed to expel him as a suspected Austrian *agent provocateur*, when their hands were

stayed by the Austro-Hungarian Consul, who gave Cabrinovitch a certificate of good conduct! After the bomb had been thrown, the Archduke with his wife drove on to a reception at the Town Hall. There his anger at the outrage found violent expression. On leaving the Town Hall, surprise was expressed to General Potiorek by Count Harrach, a member of the Archduke's suite, that no escort should have been provided in the interval. 'Do you think that Serajevo is 'full of assassins?' returned Potiorek testily. The Archduke and the Duchess then started for the hospital to visit an officer whom the bomb had wounded, General Potiorek guiding the chauffeur, who did not know the way. At a point where Prinzip, the second assassin, was posted, the motor-car slowed down, so that Prinzip was able to fire point-blank at the Archduke and the Duchess and mortally to wound them both. Immediately after the crime, bands of hooligans, carrying banners and led by the police, sacked the houses and shops of the Serb inhabitants. No police official and no military authority was dismissed, nor, as far as is known, even reprimanded for failure to protect the Archduke and his wife. General Potiorek remained Governor, and presently commanded the Bosnian army against Serbia. The latest information concerning him is that he has lost his reason and is confined in a madhouse.

Almost as significant as the apparently deliberate neglect of the Bosnian military authorities to provide protection for the Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg, and the condonation of their remissness by the central authority, were the reception of the tidings in Vienna and the arrangements made for the funeral. In many quarters indecent joy was privately manifested. Some members of the Imperial family, whose enmity the Archduke had incurred, did not hide their satisfaction. In view of the Emperor's age, it seemed a great gain for the dynasty that an Heir-presumptive of uncertain mental stability should have disappeared. Although he had been the executive head of the army, full military honours were only accorded to the Archduke's remains in the capital under pressure from the aristocracy; and the arrangements for their conveyance from Vienna to the vault at Artstetten were little short of scandalous. If it is easy to understand the satisfaction of sundry members of the Imperial family at the

removal of the Archduke and of his morganatic wife, whose presence on and near the throne might have given rise to endless complications, the neglect of the Court officials to pay due honour to the dead can only be explained by their obedience to instructions. Prince Montenuovo, the High Chamberlain, who was violently criticised for the inadequate ceremonial arrangements, received, after the funeral, the public congratulations of the Emperor. An agent of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office subsequently explained to an Ambassador of a Great Power that, after all, the assassination was not such a terrible affair, since the Archduke had been so ill that he would not in any event have lived more than a twelvemonth !

There was undoubtedly a plot to assassinate the Archduke. In part, at least, it was organised at Belgrade—but so were most of the bogus anti-Austrian manifestations of 1908 and the majority of the anti-Serbian forgeries exposed during the Friedjung trial. It is possible that some corrupt or fanatical Serbians may have been implicated in it, but there is not a shred of evidence to implicate the Serbian Government. More enlightening than any circumstantial evidence is, however, the application of the test : *Cui prodest ?* Serbia and the Serbian Government had nothing to gain and everything to lose by a crime which was bound to revive memories of the assassination of Alexander and Draga, and to put Serbia out of court in most European countries. Serbia, moreover, had just emerged exhausted, albeit victorious, from two Balkan wars, and was in no condition to pick a quarrel with the neighbouring Monarchy. The Monarchy, on the other hand, had been repeatedly foiled in its efforts to pick a quarrel with Serbia. Had a pretext been deliberately manufactured to put all the apparent right on the side of Austria, and all the wrong on the side of Serbia, and to reduce to a minimum the Serbian chances of receiving sympathy or help from Russia, England or France, no apter pretext than the Serajevo assassination could have been forged.

But, whether fatality or design came to the help of the Central Powers, whether they profited by an accident or jogged the elbow of Providence, they were not slow to take advantage of the crime. Whereas the Emperor Francis Joseph's first proclamation to his peoples, in which he adjured them not to make the whole Serbian race responsible for the

act of a few fanatics, seemed to betray a disposition not to push matters to extremes, it is certain that, a fortnight later, he had been persuaded by the German Emperor to sanction the ultimatum to Serbia which was designed to render her submission impossible. The German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, then, as always, in closest agreement with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, worked hard and successfully to prevent a pacific solution. It is uncertain whether either Germany or Austria really believed that a European conflagration would ensue. They may have expected to 'pocket' Serbia without undue trouble. They may have thought that Russia and France would 'back down,' and that England would not intervene. The attitude of the British Radical Press and of some Unionist organs which advocated the punishment of Serbia certainly encouraged such a belief. Thus things drifted towards the catastrophe.

The time has not yet come fully to discuss the diplomatic history of the first year of the war. It can only usefully be said that not until after the first six months of the war did the diplomacy of the Allies really reveal comprehension of the main German purpose in precipitating it. That purpose can only be defeated decisively and irrevocably, if the diplomacy of the Allies is guided by the settled determination so to reconstitute Europe that a renewal of the struggle shall become impossible. Europe cannot be so reconstituted without the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy. The overthrow of the Turkish Empire and the settlement of the Balkan problem would necessarily involve the solution, once and for all, of the Austrian problem. The aim of the Central Empires is domination; the aim of the Allies must be, not passively or reluctantly but actively and constructively, liberation in accordance with the principle of nationality. Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania should receive as nearly as possible their ethnographical boundaries. Serbia should be united with all the Southern Slavs hitherto under Hapsburg rule, that is to say with the Serb and Croat inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, part of Istria, and the Slovene country. Bohemia and Moravia with the Slovak country of Hungary should be constituted an independent principality with a port on the Danube at Pressburg and a port on the Elbe at Aussig—of which the

traffic before the war exceeded that of Trieste. An autonomous reunited Poland under the Russian sceptre is indispensable to European stability.

No sentimental solicitude for the maintenance of a semi-Asiatic polity like that of the Hapsburgs ought to stand for a moment in the way of a thorough readjustment of the political configuration of Europe. The Hapsburgs have had their opportunity and have misused it. They might have been an element of European concord, and they suffered themselves to be made instruments of aggression. They represent a past epoch, an obsolete conception of the mission of dynasties. If the Allies prove true to their principles and their professions, the hour of the Hapsburg Monarchy will have struck.

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

THE WORKSHOPS AND THE WAR

1. **Through Terror to Triumph.** By D. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P. Hodder and Stoughton. 1915.
2. **Labour in War Time.** By G. D. H. COLE. G. Bell and Sons, Ltd. 1915.
3. **Proceedings of the 47th Annual Trades Union Congress.** 1915.
4. **Parliamentary Publications.**

THIS autumn has brought us to a threefold crisis or critical turning-point—military, financial, and industrial—involving the three great factors in carrying on war: men, money, and material. The most pressing of all is the supply of material, with which this article deals.

In the striking preface to his volume of speeches, Mr. Lloyd George states in the plainest words that 'the Central Powers 'have still an overwhelming superiority in all the material 'and equipment of war.' So long as that is the case we have no chance of victory or even of substantially improving the military situation. Nor does the recent advance invalidate Mr. Lloyd George's statement; it was only rendered possible by the accumulation of material during many months of inactivity. The task is therefore clear and imperative: it is to reverse the balance of superiority, and that without losing a moment that can be saved. The obstacles to be overcome are partly real and partly artificial; they arise, that is to say, from what people think as well as from concrete facts. Hitherto the artificial difficulties have proved more resistant than the real, and the greatest of these are slowness of comprehension and adherence to old ideas. Both are very strong in this country, stronger perhaps than in any other, and they are paralysing in a time of unprecedented emergency like the present, because everything must be done by consent, and they operate to withhold consent from every new departure. That has been the history of this question of war material from the beginning right up to the present time.

If we throw a glance backward broadly over the field of national action, we can see the workshops at home gradually

forced more and more prominently into the foreground on the stage of war. All the principal events and changes have converged on this. A significant illustration is afforded by the recent Trades Union Congress,* which attracted far more public attention than any previous one, because of its bearing on the war. And it is to be noted that the highest point of interest reached was not upon the question of military service, in spite of the efforts of partisans in an unhappy and mischievous controversy to make it so, but on the question of industrial service at home. This was not intended or expected to be a prominent point of the proceedings, but the logic of events forced it into the forefront. The climax of the meeting was the unprecedented appearance of a Cabinet Minister specially invited to attend, and his indictment of trade unionism in its influence on the war. This dramatic incident put a finishing touch to the slow process of education which has been going on for well-nigh a year, and brought matters to a head. It is now generally, if vaguely, recognised that the workshops at home are the pivot on which the War is turning at the present stage, and that their efficiency is the crucial question of the hour. We have come slowly and haltingly to the perception of this truth, and its full significance is still very imperfectly realised. Only four months ago, when the first isolated attempts to organise our industrial resources were being made, influential newspapers understood the position so little that they tried to bury the subject in oblivion. 'Let the talk about shells be dropped' was their advice to the nation. The motive was political. They feared discredit to the Government, and insisted, in their ignorance, on maintaining that all was well. The inexorable course of events has proved that all was very far indeed from well, and has compelled them to 'talk about shells' themselves ever since. Gradually the ignorance is being dispelled, but there are still forces which resist enlightenment.

---

* The confusion prevailing about the terms 'trade union' and 'trades union' makes it desirable to say that the correct term for the Congress is the latter; and since it is a title, not a matter of verbal usage, it should be so written. The Congress has a continuous history from year to year, going back for half a century, and it has retained its original title, adopted when that term was correct. In all other cases the proper term is 'trade union.'

Two of these cannot be passed over, because they exercise considerable influence. They represent opposite poles of thought, and only agree in ignoring or obscuring the vital problem of the moment. Between them lie all shades of opinion tending to complacency and inaction on one ground or another. One is a school of military 'experts' and quasi-military writers; the other a school of social theorists. The former care intensely about the war and its successful prosecution; it is their one concern. The latter care nothing about the successful prosecution of the war; their only concern is its effect on industry. The two agree in ignoring the active part of industry in the war.

The military writers referred to cling tenaciously to the formulas and categories with which they have bemused the public and themselves so long. They laboriously count heads, with the aid of much guessing, and talk of numbers, strategy, and tactics as determining the issue. Eventually, perhaps, they will. Far be it from us to deny the importance of these things, but they have determined no decisive issue yet, because they have had no chance. Before they can play their part there must be something like equality of armament; and hitherto that has been lacking, save on isolated occasions. The course of the war on land has been determined by weapons; and so far it has gone broadly in favour of the enemy since he was thrown back in France a year ago, because he has been better armed. All the soldiers in the field, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, have harped on the dominating importance of material until it has become a commonplace; but the 'experts' at home are extremely reluctant to admit it, although—or perhaps because—the fact has so consistently falsified their calculations as to make them ridiculous. The effect of their interminable demonstrations that defeats are victories, or very soon will be, according to the logic of numbers and strategy, is to draw attention from the real problem, which has still to be solved, and to encourage a complacency that would hardly be justified if there were no such problem at all. As for the quasi-military writers, whose stock-in-trade is the personal superiority of John Bull to Hans Wurst, and mysterious hints of marvellous military surprises, their importance lies in the fact that they appeal to the men in the workshops, from whom the greatest

effort is demanded, and confirm them in the comfortable belief that there is no need for them to do more than they have done.

The soporific influence exercised by these and other military apostles of complacency is supplemented on the other side by the positive teaching of the social school, who tell the workmen that their business in the war is not to supply material to the utmost of their power but to safeguard their own interests in the invisible future known as 'after-the-war.' This is the most deadly phrase we have. It carries the mind lightly over the stupendous task of bringing the war to any tolerable conclusion, and assumes that it has already been accomplished. The idea implied is a sudden and satisfactory cessation of hostilities in an indefinite but not distant future. No such 'after-the-war' is in sight, nor is there any sign of it on the horizon. There never will be if we yield to the enticing illusion. It is a day-dream, and indulgence in day-dreaming never leads to realisation because it paralyses effort. Some of it is harmless and may serve as a refreshment from the strain of reality; but deliberate neglect of the actual work needed to reach the promised 'after-the-war,' and its subordination to objects which may or may not present themselves hereafter, are fatal. They are not merely negative and soporific, but positively and actively antagonistic to the effective prosecution of the war.

Mr. Cole's book is an example of this mode of regarding the war, and the most thorough exposition of the attitude that has yet appeared. It is entirely concerned with the effect of the war upon labour, or rather upon trade unionism, and it ends with the inevitable after-the-war speculations. To Mr. Cole the war is clearly an episode—a disagreeable and disturbing episode—in the evolution of trade unionism. He assumes its termination without any untoward results or larger changes than those already introduced into the social and economic structure of society; but these he considers of 'fundamental importance' to Labour. They are the relations between the State, the trade unions, and the employers. Otherwise he assumes that things will be just as they were before, and the main questions will be the state of trade and the recovery of old lines of business. In short, the war itself does not trouble Mr. Cole at all. The possibility of an inconclusive peace, for instance, or a still more decided failure of

the Allies, does not enter into his calculations. His interest in the War is confined to its disturbing influence on industrial conditions, and, above all, on the labour movement. It is, he thinks, of supreme importance that the organised workers 'should not allow their minds to be so taken up with other 'things as to neglect the urgent problems of labour organi-'sation.' The 'other things' are the defence of the Realm and similar trifles.

This is typical of the attitude, not of representative trade unionists who devoted their Congress directly to the war, but to those outside advisers whom Mr. Cole represents. He is not a labour man and has nothing to do with trade unions, though he undertakes to tell them how to manage their own affairs. He is, or was, a Fellow of Magdalen College and one of the young Oxford school of social theorists. He is interested in labour questions and has taken trade unionism under his intellectual patronage. He has studied it carefully, so far as it can be studied in print and through intercourse with the still exotic type of working man who seeks knowledge at the academic spring. He is master of all the 'isms' and has compounded one of his own, which he calls the Greater Unionism and takes with much solemnity. It is not Socialism or Guild Socialism or Syndicalism, but a blended essence distilled from all three, and a purely theoretical product. His book is a plea for the pursuit of this ideal during the war. The Congress ignored his advice, but the Welsh miners, who went on strike in September to force the members of another union into their federation, illustrated its practical application. They did not act on his instigation and he would, perhaps, disapprove of these strikes, because he lays it down, though in very cold terms, that if men decide to support the war—as the miners have done but need not, according to him—it is not logical for them to hamper its prosecution. But the leaders who did instigate them hold views very similar to those of Mr. Cole, who has, indeed, drawn inspiration from that source; and in subordinating the war to the business of industrial organisation they are doing just what he recommends. Short of actively hampering the war by wanton attacks on capital, 'the worker' is, he thinks, bound to see that 'the war is not used by his enemies for the purpose of 'exploiting still farther the class of which he is a member.'

This amounts to an exhortation, couched in the stereotyped language of Socialism, to maintain those practices which restrict production. Since these have been and are the greatest obstacle to the effective armament imperatively required for the war it is interesting to know the grounds on which their maintenance is defended. This is how Mr. Cole describes the situation which workmen have to resist :

> ' The enemies of Labour will of course claim that for the period of the war the workers must hand themselves over tied and bound to their lords and masters, that they must submit to every indignity and to every exaction, without protest and without retaliation.'

' This plea,' he continues, ' is obviously the merest nonsense.' He is quite right ; that is just what it is. No more grotesque travesty of the true situation could be put into words. If Mr. Cole, whose book is merely a study of documents revealing total ignorance of actual conditions, knew anything about the real relations between the employers—who are the ' enemies ' of Labour '—and the employed since the war began he could not have written this turgid nonsense, which is only fit for the street corner. The trade-union leaders have never pretended anything of the kind, and the men concerned themselves know very well that the boot has been on the other leg. They have never had the game so completely in their own hands, as they freely admit among themselves. It has come about through the unprecedented demand for labour, which is one of the cardinal facts in the situation.

Of all the surprises provided by the war—which has been a succession of surprises—the greatest is its effect on industry and the labour market. The long tale of calculations upset and predictions falsified contains no such complete reversal of anticipations as this. At the outset, general unemployment and widespread distress were not only expected but regarded as certain. The prospect of distress, deepening with the continuance of the war, preoccupied all minds. Relief funds were started and money was subscribed in millions ; innumerable committees were formed to collect and distribute it ; elaborate schemes were drawn up to prevent distress. Labour organisations formed war committees of their own for pursuing the same objects ; trade disputes and ' national ' programmes ' were dropped ; the Congress for the year was

abandoned; employers were urged to keep employment going and the Government to subsidise trade union funds. The economic problem overshadowed all others, and the apprehensions generally felt were so large and vague that the Government might have taken any steps without demur



at the price of guaranteeing employment or subsistence. Wage-earners and their societies anticipated ruin, and only asked to be saved from it. The course of events has run so diametrically contrary to these anticipations that their very existence has been forgotten. Unemployment has virtually disappeared; prosperity far in excess of the most prosperous peace experi-

ence prevails in most industrial areas, and organised labour is master of the situation.

This astonishing result of war has come about gradually, but progressively, after recovery from the initial shock had set in, which occurred in a very short time. The whole movement can be seen at a glance in the annexed diagram, which shows the curve of unemployment, as given in the trade-union returns, from June 1914 to July 1915.

The chart shows that unemployment, which was already rising before the War, went up suddenly in August, but not to an unprecedented height. The highest point was only 7·1 per cent., which is considerably below the level maintained for months together in 1908 and 1909. Individual trades—and particularly cotton, which was very hard hit—suffered more severely; but we are dealing with industry as a whole for purposes of comparison. After the first sharp rise—due more to financial disturbance and apprehension than to the actual conditions—it declined again, nearly as quickly as it had risen, down to the end of 1914; and after that more slowly, but still progressively. After a year of war it stood below 1 per cent.—a point never before reached since returns have been instituted. And this extraordinary state of things affected all groups of trades in some measure. The amount of unemployment varied, as it always does, but in every group it was below 3 per cent. The highest groups were building and furnishing, with 2·8 per cent., and this was lower than the point reached by the same trades before the War. In some trades unemployment went down to zero, and several others returned only a fraction of 1 per cent., which amounts to the same thing.

These trade-union figures are the best index, though an imperfect one, to the state of the labour market, and they are confirmed by others. The evidence is all to the effect that, after a year of war, the demand for labour was greater than in the most prosperous times of peace. This has been accompanied by a rise in rates of wages and a much greater rise in earnings. During the first eight months of this year increased rates were reported affecting 2,560,000 persons, and aggregating £467,000 a week. This does not include agricultural labourers, seamen, railway servants, police, and Government employees, of whom the Board of Trade says 'it is known 'that considerable bodies of workpeople in each of these

'occupations have received increases or war bonuses since 'the beginning of 1915.' The increase of earnings by overtime, which is paid at a higher rate, has been far greater than the increase of rates in munition works and several other occupations. Occasional cases of very high earnings have come to light in the courts. In an assault case at West Ham a driller admitted he had been getting 3*s.* 6*d.* an hour—say, £9 for a week's work of 52 hours. His ordinary earnings would be from 38*s.* to 42*s.* A man at the Enfield factory was shown to be earning £7 10*s.* a week. A boiler-maker admitted in the Paisley police court having made £12 and £13 a week. There have been many other cases, and they are not exceptional; they only happen to have achieved publicity. Nor is it only the skilled workmen who have been able to command these terms. A lad, who was getting 26*s.* a week in a Yorkshire village, went into Armstrong's at Elswick. He was presently asked to come back. 'Not me,' was his answer. 'What do you suppose I am getting?' 'Perhaps £2 a week.' 'I'm getting £6.'

The signs of abounding prosperity in all the manufacturing towns where war material is produced are visible to the eye and unmistakable. There is bustle and life everywhere, the trams are crowded, the shops intensely busy, and every night the streets are blocked by crowds waiting to get into the places of amusement at every performance. In public houses the practice of treating reached such extravagant dimensions that the law has recently interfered and forbidden it; every man who comes in has money in his pocket and wants to display it. Nor is it the men only; the employment of girls in the new occupations has raised the family income to an unprecedented height in many households. In short, the people have their pockets full of money and do not know what to spend it on but eating and drinking, amusement and finery for the women. According to Mr. G. B. Wilson, the 'drink 'bill' for the kingdom rose £8,000,000 in the first half of this year as compared with the same period in 1914. Mr. Buchanan Taylor, of the Variety Booking-office, estimates that £55,000 a week are being spent in and round London on seeing 'revues' alone. It would be a moderate estimate to put the amount spent on entertainments in Great Britain at £1,000,000 a week. The prosperity of the munition trades has fructified others,

and notably the luxury trades which cater for the poorer classes—such as cheap jewellery. It has spread over the country. The most general index of prosperity is pauperism, which has fallen since the same time last year by 21 per 10,000 over the whole kingdom, and by 30 in the metropolitan area. Another general index is bankruptcy, which has also fallen off to a remarkable extent.

Measured by every test the general condition is one of extraordinary prosperity. And to grasp the full meaning of this it must be remembered that trade and employment were going down in an ominous manner before the war. If it had not intervened a state of serious depression must have been reached by now. The effect of war has been to convert this prospect into its opposite. Of course, the picture has another side. The money circulating in the manner described is war money, raised by liquidating past accumulations and mortgaging the future. The situation is artificial, and it means an immense dislocation of the normal economic order. This upheaval has entailed hardship in some directions as well as benefit in others. There has been a transference of burdens and of gains ; and the complement of the prosperity described is impoverishment in other quarters. The classes which have suffered most are professional men and women of variable and insecure income, trades which cater for certain superfluities, and small tradesmen whose custom has been diverted into other channels. All these have suffered a loss of income which has in some cases extended to complete disappearance, and they have had to bear the general rise in the cost of living.

A great deal has been heard of this economic factor, which has had much to do with labour troubles. The cost of living always rises in prosperous times with rising wages and forms a sort of natural discount. So it is now, and allowance must be made for it in estimating the economic effect of higher wages. But the really surprising thing is that the rise in prices is not much greater. The Board of Trade calculated the average increase in the retail prices of food since the beginning of the war at 35 per cent. in August last, and stated that the increase in other items of working-class expenditure had been considerably less. The level reached, therefore, is lower than in 1873, the high-water mark of peace prosperity.

In the third quarter of this year the price of bread fell by ½*d.* and 1*d.* the quartern loaf. The incidence of the burden is general, but it obviously falls with least severity on those whose income has increased, and with most severity on those in the opposite position, persons of small, fixed income occupying a middle place. So far as wage-earners engaged on war material are concerned, the increase in their earnings is generally much greater than the rise in prices ; and they do not in fact advance the latter as a grievance. It is only put forward as a reason for higher wages on the ground that somebody else is making a profit out of the war by the raised prices. Other wage-earners, such as railwaymen, transport-workers generally, and miners, are in a different position, and some of them have really been hit by the rise in prices. But the loudest outcry is maintained by Socialists, who make of it a lever to compel the Government on principle to take over the food supply, which would, they think, be an instalment of Socialism.

On the whole, the state of prices, which discounts the state of wages, only modifies the general prosperity of wage-earners to a limited extent. It does not affect the demand for labour and the state of employment at all ; and these are the governing conditions. They are, at the same time, the most unexpected result of war. A rise in prices was expected, but an insatiable demand for labour and unemployment at zero were foreseen by nobody and would have been deemed impossible. That is because no one foresaw the character of the war, which is unlike any other waged before. Everybody knows it now, and it would be unnecessary to dwell on the point but for its intimate connection with the problem of the workshops, which can hardly be appreciated without some account of the conditions from which it has arisen.

The main causes are (1) the number of men withdrawn from industry to serve on the military side of the war ; (2) the equipment and supply of the fighting forces. It is chiefly the latter which took the world by surprise and upset all calculations.

The failure to estimate the material required was complete and universal. It is not too much to say that nobody in any belligerent country had, up to this time last year, the faintest conception of what would be wanted in the war. Germany,

probably, had the best idea, because her own armament set the pace; but General von Moltke has admitted what was indeed, obvious enough to close observers, and had already been pointed out in this country, that the German authorities were completely taken aback last autumn by lack of material in spite of their preparations. That the Allies were, we know only too well.

Armament is the principal item; but in regarding the matter from the point of view of industry, which is the purpose of this article, we must not forget that the requirements of fighting forces by land and sea have increased and multiplied in a thousand directions, even within the last few years, and since any Great Power fought a serious war. For instance, in the medical field alone there are new methods, new processes, new drugs, new appliances, and new apparatus, some of which are of a most elaborate character, such as X-ray, electric light, and sterilising outfits. Similarly, with transport and communication. They require materials, engines, and scientific apparatus of endless variety and the most elaborate construction. Some notion of the multiplicity and quantity of requirements may be gained by looking through the list of contracts, which number many thousands every month. But the meaning of it all translated into work can only be realised in the workshop, and this especially applies to the manufacture of munitions in the narrower sense of the word. Shells have been most prominent in the public eye, partly because they were the subject of controversy and partly because the deficiency was extreme; but they are only one item out of very many, and a comparatively simple one. They need a minimum of skill and can be turned out with astonishing rapidity. Most of the others are far more elaborate. There are all the types of naval craft, from submarines to battleships, and every one is a mass of complicated machinery; all sorts of engines, turbines, dynamos; guns of all patterns and sizes, mountings, torpedoes and mines; rifles and cartridges; bombs and grenades, fuses and detonators; gun carriages and limber wagons; armoured cars and many types of motor vehicles for transport; aeroplanes, which are in themselves a marvel of delicate and complicated construction. Without seeing them made it is impossible to grasp the multiplicity and variety of these things, the minute exactness of their parts,

the innumerable processes involved in their manufacture, the brains and work expended on them. Some of them take a very long time and cannot be hurried. And they are all required in a profusion never before imagined and hard to conceive now. The aggregate volume of effort already devoted to them is prodigious. Every part of the country is contributing something—from little workshops with a few men or women to large establishments employing 30,000 or 40,000.

The present point of development has only been reached by slow stages, and it is not enough. We must neither deny the achievement nor disguise the shortcomings. Much has been done, but more remains to do, and it will not be done by ignoring the obstacles. It is no pleasure to go over old mistakes, but the present problem can only be understood in the light of the past.

The primary source of difficulty was the original state of unpreparedness on the military side. We plunged into war with the workshops of war more or less dismantled. The second source, and the most potent, was the failure to grasp the situation and foresee what was needed. The third was the confusion prevailing in Government departments. The fourth was indiscriminate enlistment. All these faults, it should be observed, were at the centre; neither workmen nor manufacturers were responsible for them in the smallest degree. Both behaved extremely well. Manufacturers offered their services and their plant. The Labour Members of Parliament, who must not be confounded with the two or three middle-class Socialists belonging to the Labour Party, joined the Opposition in dropping party interests and supporting the Government in the vigorous prosecution of the war—a course from which they have never swerved. The trade unions dropped disputes in progress and gave up demands which they had in hand. A joint conference of central organisations recommended on August 24th:

'That an immediate effort be made to terminate all existing trade disputes, whether strikes or lock-outs, and whenever new points of difficulty arise during the war period a serious attempt should be made by all concerned to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a strike or lock-out.'

This was an industrial truce following the political truce, and no doubt the chief motive was the same. It was patriotism,

though the fear of unemployment and distress also influenced the conference. As a matter of fact, strikes and disputes did fall off to insignificant proportions for six months after the beginning of the war. After this, however, a change set in, signalised by the serious strike of Clyde engineers in the middle of February. It was not a breach of the truce by the heads of trade unionism, because the men were urged by the officials of their society not to strike. It was a breaking away of the men, signifying a return on their part to the normal state of conflict with the employers and the normal methods of conducting it.

The change of atmosphere indicated by the strike was due to several causes. The first was the improvement in the labour market, which relieved the earlier fears of unemployment and distress during the autumn. Between the end of October and the end of November trade union unemployment fell 1·5 per cent. in the engineering, and 3·5 per cent. in the shipbuilding trades. Simultaneously overtime increased and short time diminished. Under-employment was being converted into over-employment, and that change went on progressively through the winter. The men had therefore nothing to fear on the economic side. The second cause was the removal of all apprehension in regard to the war, which they were assured was going on so well as to be already virtually decided. This view was due to the combined efforts of Ministers, purveyors of official news, the Censor, the military 'experts' and other newspaper writers, who one and all proved daily to their own satisfaction that the enemy had not an earthly chance. The mischievous influence of this campaign of mingled suppression, misinterpretation, and bombast, which completely misled the public, is not yet exhausted; and so long as it continues laziness, selfishness, and cowardice will find cover under it.

The third cause was the rise in the cost of living. An outcry about it was started by a halfpenny paper, which rejoiced in hitting on a good popular subject and treated it after the usual manner, proving that the rise was all due to the 'middle-man,' who was making enormous profits.

With these three ideas in their minds—abundance of work, war going well, prices artificially raised by war profits—a change in the attitude of workmen was inevitable. Why

should not they benefit by the improving state of trade, with the yards full of orders and a rising demand for labour? Why should they suffer? Why should not they have a share of what was going on as a set-off against the cost of living?

So the Clyde engineers pressed the demand for a rise of wages which they had brought forward before the war in view of the approaching termination of their expiring agreement with the employers. They took it up in December, but the employers were slow to meet them. Abortive negotiations took place in January, and eventually the employers offered less than half the advance demanded by the men. The executive of the Amalgamated Society recommended acceptance and arranged for a ballot, but the men refused to wait, and, under the inspiration of an unofficial strike committee, began to come out on February 16. The number of strikers gradually increased to 8000, the ballot showed an overwhelming majority against acceptance, and on February 26 the Government intervened.

Thus the labour truce was broken in a war industry of first-class importance, and a bad example set. Disputes, mostly but not entirely about advances of wages, became frequent. Most of them were settled, chiefly by the Committee on Production; and though some developed into strikes, which were much more numerous after January 1915 than in the previous six months, they were not very serious until the strike of Welsh miners in July, which involved the whole coalfield. Since this dispute has created an even worse impression than the Clyde strike, it is desirable to understand it. The essential circumstances are very similar in both cases. An expiring long-term agreement; refusal of employers to renew; terms offered less than demanded; advice of executive to accept; advice repudiated by men; strike under unofficial leaders; Government intervention; reconsideration of terms; settlement. The main difference is that the Welsh miners struck after the intervention of the Government, and when the owners had put themselves unreservedly in the hands of Mr. Runciman. This made the case very much worse, because the strike was a flat defiance of the Government and of the law, and a successful defiance.

Now, it is obvious that if terms were agreed to after a strike they could have been agreed to without one, since

the actual conditions were the same before as after. That is, of course, true of all strikes which are settled by agreement. The sole reason for fighting is the mutual hostility and pugnacity of the parties. But to maintain this attitude in such a national crisis as the present is criminal. It would be impossible if the parties really felt the national danger ; they would do their utmost to avoid quarrelling. But they do not feel it ; they are preoccupied with before-the-war and after-the-war ; with their old quarrels, which have left bad blood, and with the anticipated ones hereafter. Both are to blame, but the employers in the first instance in both cases. They should have been more prompt to meet the men, who had a right to ask for a fresh agreement on the expiry of the old one. Their refusal to enter into another long-term agreement in such abnormal and uncertain circumstances as the present is reasonable. They may be full of Government orders now, but no one can tell how long that will last or what will follow. They should, however, have been all the more prompt on that account to meet the men, explain the situation, and offer as much as they could fairly afford. On the other hand, the men should not have thrown over their responsible advisers, and they should not have struck while negotiations were still proceeding. Why did they ? Partly because they were exasperated by the evasion and haggling of the other side, partly because they knew, at least in the case of the miners, that they could hold the country to ransom. Of course their feelings were inflamed by all the social quacks who, like Mr. Cole, think the war quite secondary to the furtherance of some 'ism' which will introduce the millennium, and by those who want the enemy to win. These elements happen to be exceptionally strong on the Clyde and in South Wales, and they made the most of the opportunity put into their hands by the folly of the employers.

But the crowning blunder was committed by the Government in the South Wales case in putting down their foot and then taking it up again. No more pitiable exhibition has been seen than the pilgrimage of three Cabinet Ministers to Cardiff to make abject submission to men who had defied the Government and the law. The newspapers which foolishly demanded that Mr. Lloyd George should play the leading part in this act of abdication still more foolishly hailed it as

a great triumph, and showered gushing congratulations on everybody concerned, particularly themselves. It was a triumph which opened the door to endless trouble, because it proved to the miners and the world at large that they were masters of the situation and could do as they pleased. Their big gun, firing a 200,000-lb. projectile, had demolished the compulsory arbitration part of the Munitions Act in one round. They walked through the gap themselves a week or two later when the Board of Trade and the owners, untaught by experience, were still playing the same senseless game of refusing terms which they could afford to concede, and did concede after another sight of the big gun. The railwaymen promptly took the hint and threatened to bring their still bigger gun into action. And there will be no end to it so long as the same elements remain—complacency about the war; the grievance of war profits; pugnacious and grudging employers who give a handle to the preachers of violence and nullify the moderating counsels of responsible officials, making their difficult position impossible; the policy of refusing to negotiation what they are prepared to concede to force; misjudgment, vacillation and weakness in the Government. The way to avoid these large and dangerous strikes is to get rid of all those influences and substitute the opposite. Be as conciliatory as possible; but if that fails, then take drastic action and stick to it.

Such strikes, however, have not been the most serious hindrance to the effective prosecution of the war, though they loom largest in the public eye. The worst trouble has been, and still is, in the workshops. It is partly due to the failure and confusion of Government departments, partly to the action of organised labour. Manufacturers are not to blame. They have displayed great energy, enterprise, and capacity, and have done what they have been permitted to do by mistakes from above and resistance from below. That is to say, they have done so as a body; there have been individual exceptions and the degree of energy displayed has naturally varied; but they are much less responsible for the inadequate production of war material and the slow progress made than either the Government or the workmen.

To make the position clear, we must go back to the earlier period before the definite breach of the labour truce by the

Clyde strike. One of the reasons why the Clyde employers were not more prompt and conciliatory in meeting the demands of the men was the persistent refusal of the latter to assist in carrying out the work they had undertaken by suspending artificial restrictions and doing their best. This trouble had been going on for months.

After the Cabinet Council in October, as we have already seen, a marked change had taken place in the direction of increasing production. The armament firms undertook a great increase of work, and in order to carry it out they not only enlarged their own operations and augmented their staffs, but they put out orders on subcontract wherever they could. Nevertheless, the output fell seriously short of expectations, while the Army and Navy were crying for more. In December, the manufacturers turned to the trade unions to help them and some communications passed. It was supposed that some arrangement had been made for the removal of restrictions and accelerating output, but that was not the case. The unions proposed that skilled men should be transferred from private to Government work, that they should be obtained from Canada and elsewhere, and should be brought back from the Army. All these proposals have since been adopted, and it is a pity they were not put into practice last December. They would have helped, but they did not touch the chief obstacle. The magnitude of the problem was still far from being realised. So matters dragged on through the winter, the demands of Army and Navy growing more insistent and the response more inadequate.

The next phase began with the appointment on February 4th of the Committee on Production, to inquire into production in engineering and ship-building establishments engaged on Government work. The appointment of this committee indicated the previous failure; the promptness with which it issued a series of reports—four between February 16th and March 5th—revealed great urgency; and the subjects dealt with showed where the shoe pinched. They were all different forms of avoidable hindrance to output—namely, lost time, restriction of earnings and output, restriction of female labour, of semi-skilled and unskilled labour, demarcation disputes, stoppages of work. The committee urged the suspension of

all restrictions in return for a signed guarantee from the employers that any departure from the previous practices should only be for the period of the war, and that no change made in the war should prejudice the position of the work-people afterwards in regard to these matters. Meanwhile, the Clyde strike had taken place and had revealed to an astonished public the existence of a large body of workmen quite ready to sacrifice the lives of men in the trenches for 1*d.* an hour at home. On February 28th, Mr. Lloyd George entered the arena with his speech at Bangor, in which he said: 'We 'need arms more than men, and delay in producing them is 'full of peril for this country.' . . . 'Output is everything in this 'war. It is not going to be fought mainly on the battle-fields 'of Belgium and Poland. It is going to be fought in the 'workshops of France and Great Britain.' He appealed for the avoidance of disputes and the suspension of trade-union restrictions and for support in dealing with the evil of drink.

Much has happened since, and he has made many more appeals; but down to the Trades Union Congress more than six months later, no substantial improvement had been effected in the workshops. The industries concerned and the districts vary, but as they were in February so they remained. In the districts most subject to friction there was no improvement whatever. What has been accomplished since is the reorganisation and extension of resources, which has been projected and is being carried out upon a great scale. We will run briefly over the intervening months and the prominent events.

In March, two important events took place. The Government took power under a Defence of the Realm Act to commandeer any factory for war purposes (March 16), and a great conference was held between the most important labour organisations, excepting the miners, and the Government. It took place at the Treasury, and Mr. Lloyd George presided. At this conference, a solemn treaty was drawn up and signed, embodying the suggestions of the Committee on Production (March 19). The Amalgamated Society of Engineers came in a few days later (March 25). The labour trouble was generally supposed to be settled and done with, and so far as the official representatives of organised labour were concerned, it was.

But the assent of the leaders, though absolutely necessary to any agreement, is no guarantee whatever for its acceptance by the men; and the agreement remained inoperative in the yards and shops. At the end of the month, a deputation of ship-builders saw Mr. Lloyd George and laid great stress on drink as a cause of lost time. He was led to overstate the case and a great controversy arose. Eventually a Board of Control was formed, which has taken and is still taking practical steps, of which the chief are a drastic curtailment of hours and the prohibition of treating. They have already effected a marked improvement in some of the most drunken districts.

April was chiefly devoted to reorganisation. Attempts were made to reform the confusion at the centre by the formation of new Ministerial and Departmental committees; but there was no real co-ordination, and the muddle was rather increased than lessened. A more successful move was the establishment in Newcastle of an Armaments Committee for the North-Eastern District. This was the first step towards the local organisation of resources, which has since developed under the strenuous efforts of the Ministry of Munitions and Mr. Lloyd George into a complete system embracing the whole country, and working on the whole with great and steadily increasing success. In that month, too, the deficiency of ammunition at the front was mentioned in the newspapers and the great shell controversy begun. On April 21st the Prime Minister made a speech at Newcastle appealing to the workmen to do their best, but stultifying the appeal by an assurance that there was no deficiency and by a general tone of 'optimism.' The effect was to encourage complacency and nullify the efforts made to increase production.

In May, however, the truth began to come out and to break down resistance inspired by reluctance to face disagreeable facts and by desire to shield the Government. An official report on bad time-keeping in munitions areas was issued by Mr. Lloyd George and raised a great hubbub. Then the Military Correspondent of 'The Times' raised a still greater one by firing a high-explosive shell from the seat of war, attributing the failure of our offensive to lack of that munition. A day or two later, the same paper fired another shell from Glasgow, declaring that the labour position was as bad as ever

and attributing it to complacency about the war. There followed the political crisis, Coalition Government and creation of Ministry of Munitions. The workshops had become the centre of gravity for the nation in war, though few realised it.

In June Mr. Lloyd George began his new campaign as Minister of Munitions by visits to Manchester and Liverpool, where he spoke more plainly than before about the gravity of the position and went so far as to refer to the possibility of defeat. Then he had a second conference and a second agreement with the heads of labour organisations in anticipation of his Munitions Bill, which was introduced on June 23rd, and became law at the beginning of July. The passage of this Act and all the events leading up to it were a proof that the efforts to overcome the labour difficulty by persuasion and consent had failed. Its main objects were to prevent strikes and to remove the obstacles to production caused by trade union rules and customs. The means adopted were—for strikes, compulsory arbitration; for restrictions, to make them illegal and subject to penalties; both for the duration of the war only. The first applies to all munitions work and to any other employment which may be proclaimed by Government as essential to the 'manufacture, transport, or supply 'of munitions'; the second applies only to 'controlled 'establishments.' The Act further provides for limitation of employers' profits in the latter. The last is a very important point and one that ought to have been dealt with long before. The Committee on Production, in their report of March 5th, had laid stress on 'a pronounced and widespread belief among 'workpeople that undue and abnormal profits were being 'made' as an element in the labour unrest, and had urged Government control. This was also a condition of the trade union agreement of March 19th, but no effect was given to it until the Munitions Act, nearly four months later. Unfortunately, the delay gave colour to suspicions of the Government's sincerity, readily entertained by the men and vigorously fanned by Socialists who have their own axe to grind. The effect still remains and the men are still told by those who want to make trouble that the limitation is a sham.

That influence has played its part—and no small one—in keeping up the trade union obstructions, which Mr. Lloyd

George told the Trades Union Congress were still maintained. Doubt has been thrown on the validity of his information, but those who take this line are treading on thin ice over deeper water than they know. Mr. Lloyd George spoke from the card and from an abundance of evidence which would raise a storm of indignation if it were made known. The truth is worse than either he or anyone else has alleged. Some of it is now coming out in the Munitions Courts, but the most deadly testimony is that of men who have tried to do their duty and have been prevented. If they do 'too much work' —and the standard is sometimes one-third of what they can do—they are first 'spoken to,' then they are made aware of hostile attentions, then things begin to happen to them or their machines; the old 'rattening' tricks are played; belts are loosened or cut; nuts are dropped into the gearing; and so on. All this is against the official policy of the unions. It is kept going by an obscure minority among the men, who for various reasons wish to keep down output and use the trade union tradition as a lever.

When the war began the Germans reckoned confidently on certain elements within the British Empire. They expected Canada, Australia and New Zealand to 'throw off the yoke'; they were sure that the Boers would seize South Africa; that the native populations in India and Egypt would rise; that those in Crown Colonies would make trouble; that there would be civil war in Ireland; and finally they reckoned on the co-operation of British workmen at home through disputes and inefficiency. Of all these items the last is the only one which has not wholly disappointed them. What does it mean? Are these men unpatriotic or wholly callous? Well, they are, like other people, of all sorts, from very good to very bad, but mostly betwixt and between. Very few are unpatriotic. If the enemy set foot on British soil they would fight to the last gasp, even those who assume the Keir Hardie pose—'I have 'nothing to defend. It is all one to me whether I am ruled by 'King or Kaiser. The only thing that matters is the capitalistic 'system.' This is pure affectation, a display of lofty aloofness from the common herd by a superior intellect which has plumbed the depths of wisdom; it would vanish at the sight of danger to themselves. But the workmen do not see any

danger, and they are constantly told that there is none. It has never been explained to them that the danger does not lie in the immediate risk of invasion but in such a termination of the war as would leave Germany in a position to pursue her fixed and ultimate purpose—now more firmly held than ever—of wresting from us the command of the sea and destroying our independence.

But if they feel secure at home themselves, what of the men in the trenches? Have they no regard for them? Some, it must be admitted, are absolutely callous and selfish, but others are very sensitive on this point and appeals have not been in vain. A process of penetration and conversion is going slowly on, but it has not yet been able to break the force of tradition. Individually many men long, even passionately, to get rid of hampering restrictions and do their utmost, and the number is growing. But so long as even a few insist on observance of the old creed, the collective tradition gives them power over the rest. And that is still the case, though they are already furtive about it, and officials are careful to disclaim responsibility in public, as in the Coventry case, whatever they may say in private. Mr. Lloyd George's disclosures to the Trade Union Congress have made an impression and the subsequent agreement with the executives of trade unions, concluded just six months after the first, is much firmer and more precise in tone than previous ones. They, at least, are convinced of the need and satisfied about the limitation of profits and guarantees for the future. The taxation of war profits in the Budget will also make some impression. Then the Munitions Act is having some effect. The first part prohibiting strikes has been knocked out, at least for the time being, by the Welsh miners, but that relating to controlled establishments is only now being put into operation and is bringing out the state of things in the workshops. Visits to the front by workmen are another influence tending to a truer conception of the war.

These are to the good, but on the other hand an active propaganda is being carried on to belittle the war and the need of effort, to foment discontent, foster distrust and suspicion about limitation of profits and Government guarantees, encourage strikes and warn trade unionists against relaxing

their rules. More attention might be paid to the agencies that disseminate this teaching and in particular inquiry might be made into the free distribution of literature intended to checkmate the Ministry of Munitions and damage the national cause. Who pays for it ?

In conclusion, production is steadily increasing through improved organisation, extended effort, additional resources, growing experience and greater efficiency ; but it is still far below our needs and our capacity, and time is passing. Efficiency may be increased in several ways quite apart from removal of artificial restrictions. Workshops might be better managed, the well-being of the workpeople better cared for by canteens and food arrangements and by more rest. It is a question whether Sunday labour pays at all. The evidence produced in the recent case of absenteeism (which has nothing to do with trade unionism) at Cammell and Laird's showed that the time lost was equivalent to shutting down for three whole weeks out of twenty. The loss is slightly more than every Sunday off. Why not try the experiment ? The crucial questions, however, are the supply of labour and the attitude of the skilled men, particularly engineers. There is plenty of unskilled labour, male and female ; and partly skilled labour for the huge new factories now in course of erection might be obtained by the systematic use meantime of all engineering schools for training lads, who are the best material. But full success cannot be secured without the ungrudging co-operation of thoroughly skilled men. Some are willing, but others are not. They and other trade unionists will do well to reflect on the following point.

If trade unionism is allowed to interfere with the successful prosecution of the war the result will be to smash it up. There are very large numbers of trade unionists in the Army, as we have often been told. They are not offering their lives to maintain trade union rules ; and if their lives and the cause to which they have dedicated them are sacrificed on that altar there will certainly be an industrial revolution, but not the one predicted by Mr. J. H. Thomas. The revolutionaries who rely on force forget that there is now another force in this country consisting of men who *have* ' allowed their minds ' to be so taken up with other things as to neglect the urgent

'problem of labour organisation' and are not disposed to see their sacrifices go for nothing and their King, their country, and all they hold dear betrayed at the bidding of a minority of anarchists and skulkers, who have given up nothing and are only concerned to get as much and do as little as possible. They are already burning with resentment against the strikers and shirkers and if the latter insist on bringing matters to the issue of force there will be an end to the over-strained tolerance of a movement which has drifted into anarchy and is proving in the day of peril a national curse. The accredited heads of trade unionism are aware of the danger. They have long had to contend against disruptive influences which have undermined their authority. The war has brought this internal struggle to a sharper issue and before long it must come to a decision.

DEMOCRACY, DIPLOMACY, AND WAR

1. **Ordeal by Battle.** By F. S. Oliver. Macmillan. 1915.
2. **The War : Its Causes and its Message.** Speeches delivered by the Prime Minister, August–October 1914. Methuen. 1914.
3. **The Cult of Incompetence.** By Émile Faguet. (Eng. Trans.) Murray. 1911.

'DO not allow yourself to have your judgment of the '*Welthistorische* warped by the accidental, however 'all-absorbing and terrible that accidental may be.' * The warning uttered many years ago by one of the most brilliant of English diplomatists seems to be peculiarly apposite in times like the present. More particularly should it be taken to heart by the historian who attempts to gauge the significance of contemporary happenings. Any appreciation of passing events must necessarily be provisional ; for the contemporary chronicler suffers alike from lack of information and, even more seriously perhaps, from lack of perspective. Yet the chronicler is not without compensating advantages. He is in a far better position than the student, who must rely upon 'Sources' and documents for observing and registering variations of political temperature, and for noting the more subtle changes in popular opinion.

One such change has obviously taken place in England during the last twelve months. It is not a change from optimism to pessimism ; from absurd and irrational over-confidence to equally unreasoning under-confidence. Only in the least informed quarters was there over-confidence a year ago ; only in the same quarters is there anything which can fairly be described as pessimism to-day. Nor can the change of temper be ascribed entirely to disillusionment and disappointment. That there has been some disillusionment it would be idle to deny ; that there is some ground for disappointment is a proposition too obvious to demand demonstration. On the other hand, there are many features of the situation

* Sir Robert Morier : 'Memoirs,' ii. 227.

for which we ought to be profoundly grateful : for the hitherto undisputed supremacy of our sea-power ; for the almost complete immunity from attack enjoyed by our over-sea trade ; for the untiring energy which Lord Kitchener has thrown into the task of raising a voluntary army not ridiculously contemptible even in the eyes of the great military nations ; for the fine response to the call of duty made by a large section of the population at home—whether duty calls to direct military service, or to arduous toil in mine and factory and in the work of transport ; above all for the superb and self-sacrificing loyalty exhibited by the Dominions and the Dependencies. All these things are a source of legitimate satisfaction, if not of pride.

Nevertheless, it were both disingenuous and unwise to refuse to recognise that there is another side to the picture, or to deny that there is solid ground for disappointment, and even, in some respects, for humiliation. The whole nation now knows what had long been suspected by the few, that for three years previous to August 1914 war between Great Britain and Germany had been virtually inevitable and had at one time (August 1911) been imminent. It now realises that between our diplomacy and our military administration there was no sort of correspondence, and that consequently, when the expected actually occurred, we plunged into war without the least attempt—in a strictly military sense—to count the cost. Had Sir John French's gallant little army suffered the fate which, as a fact, it so narrowly escaped, we should have had no one but ourselves, or rather our politicians, to blame. The splendid tenacity with which that army has maintained a position which for a time was all but untenable has compelled the admiration alike of allies and enemies. Had the expeditionary force yielded before the first fierce onset of the enemy we should have grieved, and we should have suffered, but we could not have wondered or complained. Again : had there been delay in the raising and training of the new armies we should have had little reason for astonishment. We have never been, in the continental sense, a military nation, and that Lord Kitchener should, even under the stress of war, have gone so far to make us one, is a wonderful tribute to his organising genius and driving power. What does, however, inspire consternation is the fact that a 'nation of

'shopkeepers' should have shown itself deficient in business capacity; that we should have proved ourselves weak precisely where we thought ourselves strong, and that confronted by distributive organisation problems of industrial production, we should hitherto have failed to solve them.

For this failure many explanations have been offered. Nor can their cumulative cogency be questioned. But whatever the explanation, the fact remains that a nation which has believed itself to possess a peculiar genius for the organisation of industry, has failed to adapt itself with rapidity and ingenuity to industrial demands which, though novel in direction and unprecedented in volume, were well within the economic capacity of the greatest industrial and commercial nation in the world. That the business men ascribe the failure to the ascendancy of a clique of political lawyers and complacent bureaucrats—that the politicians question the efficiency of the captains of industry—that both parties are inclined to lay the chief blame upon the unbending conservatism of political trade-unionism, and to the ca' canny methods of organised labour, is both notorious and true; but charges and countercharges against particular classes do not constitute a sufficient answer to the indictment preferred against the nation as a whole.

That which Burke declared to be impossible is impossible no longer. Under an autocracy, or even under an aristocracy, it may be impossible to prefer an indictment against a nation. Under a democracy the case is different. A democracy may fairly be said to get the government it deserves, and to deserve the government it gets. We have been taught that self-reproach is indulgence in a 'shameful pleasure.' Democracies are so little prone to this particular indulgence that the vice may almost merge into a virtue, and though a class may not frame an indictment against a nation, there is nothing in reason to prevent a nation from framing an indictment against itself.

Something of this sort is, in fact, taking place, as a result of the retrospect encouraged by the completion of a year of war. Thus the change of sentiment to which allusion has been made is not so much a transition from optimism to pessimism; from excessive elation and ungrounded expectation to undue depression, disillusionment, and disappointment.

It is rather a change from excitement to reflection—from denunciation to introspection—from righteous indignation against the atrocious misdeeds of our enemies to a closer and clearer and more critical apprehension of our own shortcomings.

The change is, on the whole, decidedly for the better. Denunciation of the wickedness of opponents may conduce to personal satisfaction, but it will not really help to win the war. A stern and reasoned conviction as to the righteousness of the cause for which we fight is a moral asset of incalculable value; but though we may trust in God to defend the right we must not neglect to keep our powder dry. As the sturdy Bishop of Carlisle bluntly reminded King Richard II.:

> 'The means that heaven yields must be embrac'd,
> And not neglected; else, if heaven would,
> And we will not, heaven's offer we refuse,
> The proffer'd means of succour and redress.'

Shakespeare's Richard—whether the portrait be historical or not is nothing to the immediate point—is the perfect type of the sentimental amateur who wills the end, but neglects the means; who rushes from the extreme of confidence to the depths of unmanly despair; who at one moment maintains:

> 'Not all the water in the rough rude sea
> Can wash the balm from an anointed king';

and at the next is plunged into impotent pessimism:

> 'Of comfort no man speak:
> Let's talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs.'

The contrasted types of character suggested by Richard of Bordeaux and Henry Bolingbroke—the attractive sentimentalist and the repellent but efficient expert—still divide between them the world of affairs. Thus the keen-sighted German critic felicitously imagined by Mr. Frederick Oliver in his 'Ordeal by Battle' is quick to contrast the 'quiet experts' who virtually rule Germany through its civil service with the 'loquacious amateurs' whom he supposes to be dominant in Great Britain. 'Our civil service, which you are pleased to 'describe as a Bureaucracy, is,' he contends, 'distinguished 'among all others existing at the present time, by the calibre 'of its members, by its efficiency and honesty, by its poverty, 'and not less by the honour in which it is held notwithstanding

'its poverty.' He boasts that so far Germany has 'succeeded 'in maintaining public officials of all grades in higher popular 'respect than men who devote their lives to building up 'private fortunes, and also than those others who delight and 'excel in interminable debate.' 'With you,' he adds, caustically but not untruly,

'the fame of the showy amateur fills the mouths of the public. We, on the contrary, exalt the expert, the man who has been trained to the job he undertakes. In so doing we may be reactionaries and you may be progressives; but the progress of Germany since 1870—a progress in which we are everywhere either already in front of you, or else treading closely on your heels—does not seem to furnish you with a conclusive argument.'

With the argument of 'Baron von Hexenküchen'—a thin though becoming disguise for Mr. Oliver himself—we may profitably contrast the views of a friendly neutral—now President of Harvard University. Reviewing English institutions some seven or eight years ago Mr. Laurence Lowell found the secret of English efficiency—the secret of the success of self-government in England—in the felicitous combination of amateur and professional, of layman and expert: the co-operation of the 'great unpaid' and the professional clerk to the Justices; the professional judge and the amateur jury; the Cabinet Minister and the permanent official; the lay Chairman of a Railway Company and the expert General Manager—and so forth. The point is not a novel one. Sir George Cornewall Lewis observed many years ago: 'It is not 'the business of a Cabinet Minister to work his Department. 'His business is to see that it is properly worked.' But though not novel the generalisation comes with peculiar force from an exceptionally competent and 'outside' critic of English Institutions.*

Is President Lowell right, or is Mr. Oliver right? The approbation of the former, it is proper to point out, refers to a period anterior to that which has incurred the special opprobrium of Mr. Oliver. The latter's 'Ordeal by Battle' is primarily an exposure of the shortcomings which characterised the 'squalid episode' in the history of English politics

* 'The Government of England,' by A. Laurence Lowell (1908), vol. i. c. viii.

which filled the period between 1905 and 1914. In effect, however, if not in form, it is a singularly incisive indictment of the methods of 'Democracy,' more particularly in relation to diplomacy and national defence. Democracy must, as he justly contends, be judged like any other form of government by results. Popular government is to-day standing its trial.

'No nation, unless it be utterly mad, will retain a form of government which from some inherent defect is unable to protect itself against external attack. Is democratic government capable of looking ahead, making adequate and timely preparation, calling for and obtaining from its people the sacrifices which are necessary in order to preserve their own existence? Can it recover ground which has been lost, and maintain a long, costly, and arduous struggle, until, by victory, it has placed national security beyond the reach of danger?'

The answer which the author would himself be inclined to give to these searching questions may perhaps be inferred from the following passage.

'When a people becomes so self-complacent that it mistakes its own ignorance for omniscience—so jealous of authority and impatient of contradiction that it refuses to invest with more than a mere shadow of power those whose business it is to govern—when the stock of leadership gives out, or remains hidden and undiscovered under a litter of showy refuse—when those who succeed in pushing themselves to the front are chiefly concerned not to lead, but merely to act the part of leaders "in silver slippers "and amid applause"—when the chiefs of parties are so fearful of unpopularity that they will not assert their own opinions, or utter timely warnings, or proclaim what they know to be the truth—when such things as these come to pass, the nation has reached that state which was dreaded by the framers of the American Constitution and which—intending to warn mankind against it—they branded as "Democracy."'

In the present war there is, of course, much more at stake than a particular form of government. Still as Mr. Oliver insists, it is in effect, if not in intention, a war against democracy. For democracy, as a form of Government, could not survive the defeat of the Allies; it could not even survive their failure to achieve complete and decisive victory. And the English democracy albeit much more tardily than that of France, or of Serbia, more tardily even than that of Italy, would seem to be awakening to the fact. But what

is the condition of success? There is no obscurity about Mr. Oliver's answer to this question. The nation must find a Man, and the Man must tell the nation the truth. 'Demo-'cracy' he says truly, 'is by no means invincible.' Before it can conquer 'it must find a leader who is worthy of its 'trust.'

'Leadership is our greatest present need, and it is there that the Party System has played us false. To manipulate its vast and intricate machinery there arose a great demand for expert mechanicians, and these have been evolved in a rich profusion. But in a crisis like the present, mechanicians will not serve our purpose. The real need is a Man, who by the example of his own courage, vigour, certainty, and stedfastness will draw out the highest qualities of the people; whose resolute sense of duty will brush opportunism aside; whose sympathy and truthfulness will stir the heart and hold fast the conscience of the nation. Leadership of this sort we have lacked.'

Mr. Oliver's interesting and vigorous essay gives rise to many reflections, and challenges an answer to several obstinate questions. Is the form of Government really a matter of supreme moment? Is it of primary importance in the sphere of diplomacy and the conduct of war? If so, is democracy at a proved disadvantage as compared with autocracy or aristocracy? Are the shortcomings which seem to Mr. Oliver to be revealed by the experience of the last ten years the inevitable results of the democratisation of our institutions or may they rather be ascribed to the peculiar circumstances under which, in England, the democratic experiment has been attempted? What is the real test of the success of any particular constitution? Is there any valid reason to apprehend that democracy will fail to respond to the test? Assuming failure, is there any ground for the supposition that any other system would yield better results? Questions such as these naturally arise and might be indefinitely multiplied. With none of them is it possible to deal exhaustively or even adequately within the limits of a review. But discussion though summary may not be wholly unprofitable.

To the question as to the importance of the form of Government political philosophers have given answers unusually diverse even for philosophers. The gamut extends from

Aristotle to Pope. The latter dismissed the whole problem in the familiar couplet :

> 'For forms of government let fools contest;
> Whate'er is best administered is best.'

To Aristotle, on the contrary, the question seemed to be of supreme moment. Nor was his solicitude unintelligible. In the Greek City-State everything depended upon the form of the polity. The Constitution stood to the State as the soul to the body. The identity of the State depended, therefore, not, as with us, upon identity of territory but upon the continuity of the Constitution. Upon the form of the government depended also the character of the educational system, for education 'must be relative to the polity.' Most important of all: the constitution determined the character of the individual citizen. 'The virtue of the citizen is relative to 'the polity.' To the modern publicist these are hard sayings. To the Greek philosophers they were a commonplace. 'Each 'constitution embodied,' as Newman says, 'a scheme of life 'and tended consciously or not to bring the lives of those 'living under it into harmony with its particular scheme.'* This intimate interdependence of ethics and politics was not impossible of practical realisation in the tiny City-State of Greece. Calvin, too, hoped to achieve it, in the City-State of Geneva. In the vast Nation-States of the modern world, the connexion between the ἦθος of the constitution and the life and character of the individual citizen is necessarily less intimate. Nevertheless, there is ground for the belief that even in the modern State there is a close connexion between structure and policy. 'No State,' said Treitschke, 'is entitled 'to renounce that egotism which belongs to its sovereignty.' The 'egotism which belongs to its sovereignty' would seem to be the Teutonic equivalent for the ἦθος of the constitution, to which Aristotle, like his German disciple, attributed such supreme importance.

Modern writers have, as a rule, exhibited some impatience with the time-honoured debate as to the best type of constitution. There is, says the scientific historian of the Positivist School, no 'best type.' There is no single type equally

* 'Politics' of Aristotle, i. 209.

appropriate to all States at all stages in their political development. The excellence of a constitution is a matter not of abstract and universal theory, but of applicability to the environment of the particular State. In this matter the Positivist surely has reason on his side. To assume, for example, as some are apt to do, that the peculiar type of democracy—and English democracy is in many respects *sui generis*—which has in the course of centuries been gradually evolved in this country is applicable to all countries, at all times, at all stages, betrays both ignorance of history and characteristic lack of imagination. Nevertheless, though we may not presume to say that the political institutions of this country are abstractedly superior to other forms of government, there is a presumption that they embody the form of polity best adapted, for the time being, to our own peculiar circumstances.

But this presumption is obviously conditional. The condition is that the constitution is apt to fulfil the first political law—that of self-preservation. In the modern international economy self-preservation depends, in the first instance, upon skilful diplomacy, and ultimately upon the adequacy of national defence.

How has the democratic constitution of modern England fulfilled this condition? How has it responded to the test? To this question Mr. Oliver's answer is unequivocal. Our diplomacy, though transparently well-intentioned, has been as unskilful as our military preparations have been inadequate. Worse still: there has been complete lack of correspondence between policy and armaments. And the blame for this he imputes not to the personality of a Foreign Secretary, to whose high-mindedness and integrity he pays a tribute as ample as it is just, but to the condition of domestic politics and the mischievous ascendancy of the party system.

Can 'democracy' be held responsible for these shortcomings?

Before attempting to answer this question, it is important to remember that even 'democracies' do not all conform to a single type. The Swiss type, for example, differs fundamentally from our own. The Swiss Confederation exists to prove that the party system, as we understand it, is by no means the necessary complement of a democratic constitution, and that the highest type of individual liberty is consistent with

the universal obligation of military service. Into the Swiss executive the idea of party has never, I believe, intruded. Certain it is that party mutations in the legislature in no wise affect the personnel of the executive. Nor has it ever been suggested in Switzerland that personal freedom involves exemption from the liability to take a share in national defence. There are, of course, many other points of contrast between English and Swiss democracy: the most obvious being the fact that the former is unitary and the latter federal. But even more important is the fact that while English democracy is *representative*, Swiss democracy, like that of the Greek City-States, is in no inconsiderable degree *direct*. The latter principle obtains in lesser degree in the United States, and even more conspicuously in the Australian Commonwealth.

Generalisation in politics is proverbially dangerous; yet the mention in close conjunction of the Swiss Confederation and the Australian Commonwealth might seem to suggest that the successful working of democratic institutions is not unrelated to the size of the State or rather of the population. That the Greek philosophers held this view is, of course, notorious. To Aristotle the size of the State was of pre-eminent importance. A State of some fifty thousand citizens was, in his judgment, ideal. Ten thousand were inadequate to that self-sufficiency which he predicated as essential: one hundred thousand tended to degenerate into a mob. In the great Nation-States of the modern world democracy has necessarily assumed a representative character. Has it, under this necessity, lost some element essential to its completeness and success? Swiss publicists would answer this question with an emphatic affirmative. Indeed, in their scientific literature the term 'democracy' is employed as the antithesis of 'representative government.' The point, though it cannot be elaborated, is unmistakably suggestive. It might be regarded, perhaps, as tiresomely academic, were it not that federalism is at hand to suggest a practical if partial reconciliation. It cannot, however, escape observation that the democracies of Switzerland and of Australia, alike small in population, alike federal in type, alike in some measure 'direct,' are alike also in the acceptance of the primary obligation of citizenship. 'A democracy,' says Mr. Oliver, 'which asserts the right of manhood suffrage while denying

'the duty of manhood service is living in a fool's paradise.' Neither the democracy of Switzerland, nor that of Australia (to say nothing of France) is obnoxious to this charge.

In England, on the contrary, the people have been not merely permitted but encouraged to select this particular site for their habitation. That is the real gravamen of the charge preferred by Mr. Oliver against the political leaders of the English democracy. Rather than risk the ingathering of an abundant harvest of domestic and social reforms, or, as a less friendly critic might put it, rather than risk the loss of the possession or the prospect of office, our politicians have deliberately withheld from the people whom they affect to trust, a knowledge of facts which the people, if really sovereign, had a right to know, and which politicians with a single eye to national security would not have hesitated to divulge. A graver indictment could not be preferred against politicians. Full investigation of its justice is, for the moment, out of the question. But history will not fail to take note of the remarkable revelation made by the Prime Minister himself at Cardiff on the 2nd of October 1914, supplemented and documented by Sir Edward Grey's reply to the challenge of the German Chancellor.*

To this indictment there are only two possible answers: (i) that a revelation of the facts would have accentuated the danger and might have precipitated the war, which it was the supreme object of English diplomacy to avoid; and (ii) that the proposal of the only remedy appropriate to the actual situation revealed by the publication of the facts would have provoked a social revolution. In other words the politicians can rebut the grave charge preferred against themselves only by framing an indictment against the nation.

Is there a true bill? Again, detailed investigation must be deferred to a more convenient season, but it must be confessed that the proceedings at the Trades Union Congress at Bristol (September 1915)—despite obvious and praiseworthy restraint—and still more the language employed by one or more leaders of organised labour in the House of Commons, do unfortunately afford some justification for an affirmative answer.

---

* Foreign Office Statement, August 31, 1915.

Let us assume, for the moment, that the Trades Union Congress—occasionally described with some grandiloquence as the 'Parliament of Labour'—does fairly represent the considered opinion of the aristocracy of the manual workers of the country. That Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, expressed its belief that 'all the men necessary can 'and will be obtained through a voluntary system properly 'organised,' while the President of the Miners' Federation went so far as to say, amid approving cheers, that 'it will be the 'duty of organised labour to prevent conscription taking 'place.' That the dislike of 'conscription' is not due to any wish to evade personal responsibility for the defence of the country is proved by the magnificent response made by the working classes to the call for voluntary recruits. On the other hand, it is probably true that the magnitude of the task before us is even now imperfectly realised by the working as by other classes.

Lack of imagination has always been a prominent characteristic of the English people. Relatively remote from the actual scene of the conflict it is not easy for us to apprehend either its magnitude or its ferocity. The power to do so postulates not only a vivid imagination, but full and accurate information. The former is denied to us by nature, the latter is intercepted by authority. But apart from these deficiencies common to all classes, the men represented at the Trades Union Congress are inspired, in their opposition to 'compulsory' service, by a motive which is a natural derivative from the organisation of which they form part. Trade Unionism, which may fairly be regarded as the economic complement of political democracy, has, from the first, proposed to itself two main objects: on the one hand to maintain an organisation for the purpose of collective bargaining with the employers; and, on the other, to improve in every way possible the conditions of labour, more particularly though not exclusively by obtaining for it a larger and larger share in the product of industry.

The opposition of Trade Unionism to 'compulsory' service to-day is prompted by the same reasons that have led Trade Unionists to oppose 'compulsory' arbitration in the past. The leaders of political Trade Unionism are afraid that if 'compulsion' is applied in respect of military service, it will

during war-time be applied also to industrial service, and they are apprehensive lest the whole of the complicated and elaborate machinery of Trade Unionism should, in the process, be seriously dislocated and perhaps permanently damaged. The apprehension is, from the point of view of men whose whole being is saturated with class-consciousness, not merely natural but intelligible. Conscription—the application of the principle of compulsion to the service of the citizen on the field of battle as in the field of industry—would unquestionably revolutionise for the time being the entire relation at present subsisting between the individual and the State. This truth is perceived, somewhat confusedly perhaps, by 'labour,' and its perception is at the back of the demand that if the State claims the right to dictate to the individual labourer the manner in which he shall employ his labour, and the amount of remuneration he shall obtain for it, it shall also dictate to the capitalist the direction in which he shall employ his capital and the amount of remuneration that capital may earn. Nor can it be denied that there is both logic and equity in the contention. Certainly it is not disputed by the possessors of capital; though in applying the principle it must always be remembered that 'labour' possesses an element of fluidity and mobility which does not by any means invariably attach to 'capital.' A sudden demand for the transfer of capital from one employment to another might result simply in its destruction. Nevertheless, in principle, the demands of the State must be conceded in the one case as promptly as in the other.

Those who, like the Swiss peasants or our own fellow countrymen in Australia, believe that the duty of manhood service is the corollary of the right of manhood suffrage, may find it difficult to comprehend, and still more difficult to justify, the attitude of organised labour in this country. It is, in truth, impossible to do either without realising that English Trade Unionism is itself one of the peculiar products of that inflexible individualism which dominated English thought and English politics during the middle years of the nineteenth century—the period in which Trade Unionism was painfully struggling for a recognised place in the industrial economy. That the Trade Unionists of to-day would deny their paternity and would repudiate with derision any affinity to individualism

is likely enough. But it is, nevertheless, abundantly clear that they have not grasped the fundamental principle of State Socialism. With many of the economic applications of the latter principle no one has less sympathy than the present writer; but it is obvious that the State must, in war, temporarily assume responsibilities and perform functions which, in days of peace, are properly left to individuals. Various sections of the people have eagerly acclaimed the partial application of this principle; it is clear that no section has yet grasped its integral significance. Until it is grasped by the nation as a whole there is no chance of bringing a great war to a successful issue, whether the form of the polity be democratic, aristocratic, or autocratic. In this respect, at any rate, the form of government is unimportant. War necessarily involves the unquestioned supremacy of the State, and in war the State itself can survive only by committing the supreme direction of affairs to a very small number of individuals, preferably to one. For the time being these men or this man must be virtually autocratic. The problem is to find the man.

The question under discussion would seem, then, to narrow itself. Under what particular form of government is it most easy to find the man? The apologists of democracy are fond of pointing to the example of the first French Republic, triumphant over the monarchical coalition which was opposed to it. How far does this example go to prove the capacity of democracy for the conduct of a great war? It would be impossible to analyse the many causes which contributed to the remarkable success of French arms during the period between the fall of the monarchy and the advent of Napoleon. But one may be noted. Out of the agony of the Terror there emerged two men of genius: Danton who dared everything to save France, and Carnot the greatest organiser of war that ever lived. If, however, we are to appeal from theory to experience, the appeal may more conveniently be confined to the history of our own country.

Until 1688 England was ruled by a personal monarch; the aristocracy were supreme in affairs until 1832; democracy has been a fact only since 1867, or, it would be safer to say, since 1885. During the period of personal monarchy there was only one great international struggle in which England was seriously

engaged. Until the close of the Middle Ages there were no international wars, for the simple reason that except England there was not in Western Europe any nation. The Hundred Years' War was not a contest between the English and French nations. The French nation had not yet come into existence. It was a feudal struggle between the King of Paris supported by some of his feudatories against other feudatories, led by the most powerful among them who happened also to occupy the English throne and was thus able to bring into the field his English subjects. By the beginning of the sixteenth century France and Spain had been consolidated under powerful monarchs, and the modern States-system was in process of formation. Thus the first great international war was that between France and the Habsburgs. The first in which England took a serious part was the contest with Spain which culminated in the Armada fight. But that contest was fought, except for one or two desultory and unimportant expeditions to the Low Countries, entirely at sea. Not until the Revolution of 1688 and the accession of the Dutch Stadtholder to the English throne did England, as a nation, take a leading part in military operations on the Continent or overseas.

The Second Hundred Years' War with France, begun in 1689, ended only with Wellington's victory on the field of Waterloo. During the whole of that period English politics were dominated by a small knot of great territorial magnates. How did we fare as regards diplomacy and war under the rule of an aristocracy ? It might be inferred from a bare statement of the facts that the aristocratic governments of the eighteenth century were especially prone to military enterprise. But the inference, though natural, would be directly contrary to the truth. The territorial magnates were not as a class naturally inclined either towards a 'spirited foreign 'policy,' or towards participation in continental wars. The Tories among them belonged mostly, if we may accept the testimony of Bolingbroke and Swift, to the 'blue-water 'school.' The Whig magnates, on the other hand, carried on the political traditions of William III., believing with him that the preservation of the domestic liberties of England was inconsistent with the ascendancy of the Bourbons in Europe.

The so-called wars of the League of Augsburg and the

Spanish Succession were due—apart from the masterful personality of William III.—to the conviction of Louis XIV. that in order to dominate the continent of Europe he must secure a controlling influence in the domestic affairs of England. Thus William III. was able to convince the English Whigs, that if they would preserve domestic liberty they must circumscribe Bourbon supremacy upon the Continent. The success of English arms in the first round of the contest (1689–1713) must be ascribed to the fact that in the person of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, we produced a man as skilful in diplomacy as he was brilliant in war.

The second and more important round (1739–1763) was, as regards English intervention, purely commercial and colonial in origin. The commercial classes were by this time becoming an important element in the Whig party. Their appetite for oversea trade had been whetted by the commercial concessions made to us by Spain and embodied in the Treaty of Utrecht. The renewal of the war against the Bourbons was directly due to commercial rivalry, leading to repeated 'incidents' in the southern seas. The first half of the war ended by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) brought little advantage to either side. The critical portion of the struggle was still to come. It opened with a threefold attack on the part of France and a threefold disaster suffered by England.

If any antidote be needed to the feeling of disappointment engendered by the net results of the first twelve months of the present war, it may most surely be derived from a glance at the history of the first twelve months of the most brilliantly successful war ever waged by this country. The opening scene of that war was marked by a terrible reverse to English arms in the Ohio Valley, where General Braddock was defeated and killed. That defeat filled the nation with well-grounded alarm for the safety of all its possessions in North America. Hardly had it recovered from the shock administered by the news of Braddock's defeat, when from the Mediterranean there came the news that one of our two vantage points—the island of Minorca—had, thanks to the ineptitude of Admiral Byng, been captured by the Duc de Richelieu. From India came the news that Calcutta had fallen to Surajah Dowlah, the senseless tyrant who inflicted upon a band of English residents the terrible sufferings of the Black Hole. Nearer home, too, the

situation was equally discouraging, for the Duke of Cumberland had been compelled to sign at Kloster-zeven an engagement to disband his forces and to take no further part in the war.

Still more depressing and alarming was the condition of affairs in England. The 'doge' of the 'Venetian oligarchy' was the Duke of Newcastle who, in 1754, had succeeded to the place vacated by his much abler brother, Henry Pelham, solely by virtue of his influence in the small borough constituencies whose representatives filled the House of Commons. Newcastle, a man 'not fit to be chamberlain in the smallest 'of German Courts,' was utterly dismayed by the outbreak of war and still more by the succession of disasters which fell upon his country. He turned for help to Pitt, but Pitt was not minded either to serve under Newcastle or to cover his retreat. By the autumn of 1756 the cup of Newcastle's unpopularity was full, and the streets of London resounded to the cry 'to 'the block with Newcastle and to the yard-arm with Byng.' In November, Newcastle resigned, and Pitt took office under the nominal leadership of the Duke of Devonshire. But he held it only until April 1757. Pitt was the idol of the populace; but popular support availed little. No ministry could maintain itself in the House of Commons unless it enjoyed the sanction of Newcastle and the favour of the King. The Pitt-Devonshire Ministry enjoyed neither, and in April 1757 it was dismissed.

For eleven weeks—from April until the 29th of June—the country was without a ministry. Well might the stoutest hearts be filled with the presage of disaster. 'Whoever is in, or whoever 'is out,' said Lord Chesterfield, 'I am sure we are undone both 'at home and abroad. . . . We are no longer a nation. I never 'yet saw so dreadful a prospect.' 'It is time,' said Horace Walpole, 'for England to slip her cables and float away into 'some unknown ocean.' 'The Empire is no more' was Pitt's own comment.

From an intolerable situation there was only one possible means of escape, and Pitt perceived and seized it. He 'borrowed 'Newcastle's majority' to carry on the Government. In this way he was able to rule England for four years (1757–1761), virtually as a dictator. In those four years the foundations of English supremacy were firmly laid in India; the destiny of North America was determined; and the danger of a Bourbon

ascendancy was finally dissipated in Europe. Only the greatest of men could, under the conditions, have achieved such results. 'England,' said Frederick the Great, 'has been 'long in labour, but at last she has produced a man.' And the man had complete confidence in himself. 'I know that 'I can save this country and that no one else can.' 'I want 'to call England out of that enervate state in which 20,000 'men from France can shake her.' The response to his call was immediate and effective. In Macaulay's glowing phrase: 'the ardour of his soul set the whole Kingdom on fire. It 'inflamed every soldier who dragged the cannon up the heights 'of Quebec, and every sailor who boarded the French ships 'among the rocks of Brittany.' This was the secret of Pitt's success—the magnetism of his personality. His courage, too, was superb; his disinterestedness unquestioned; his patriotism at once passionate and pure. 'He loved England as an 'Athenian loved the city of the violet crown.'

The Empire saved by Pitt was in large measure lost by George III. The Peace of Paris of 1763 and that of 1783 marked respectively the zenith and the nadir of our imperial fortunes. 'This,' said Lord Granville in 1763, 'has been the 'most glorious war and the most triumphant peace that 'England ever knew.' That of 1783 was the most shameful. But within twelve months the younger Pitt had entered on his long tenure of office. His genius though hardly less great was quite unlike his father's. He had little natural aptitude for the conduct of war, and his military policy during the first years of the struggle with republican and Napoleonic France was full of blunders. None the less it was his serenity, his courage, and his tenacity which made the final victory sure. The same qualities were conspicuous in Castlereagh, upon whom his mantle fell and by whom his work was completed. Marlborough, Chatham, Pitt, Castlereagh, Nelson, Wellington —these were the men thrown up by the oligarchy of the eighteenth century, and by them our most brilliant triumphs alike in war and diplomacy were achieved.

From the above survey, rough and summary though it has been, there would seem to emerge one or two points which are not without significance to-day. The first is, that even in a period marked by great triumphs and conspicuous for great men there were some very black hours. One such was

the crisis of 1756–1757, which it has seemed worth while to examine in some detail; another occurred in 1780–1782 when we lost the thirteen colonies in North America, when we all but lost India and our Mediterranean power, and when Ireland wrested from nerveless and impotent hands her legislative independence; a third was the crisis of 1797. Another point would seem to be that in military, as opposed to naval, operations, it takes us some time to get into our stride. In a word, we are bad starters. It was so in 1756, and again, even more conspicuously, in and after 1793. Nor is this unintelligible. We have never pretended to be a military nation, and though the navy is always ready for action, the army as a rule is not. In this respect the aristocracy of the eighteenth century differs little from democracy of the twentieth. Whether, in the midst of nations which are military, and face to face with an enemy which has challenged, and unless beaten in the present war will continue to challenge, our whole position in the world, we can still afford to remain an unarmed people is too large a question for discussion at the close of this paper.

A third point which emerges clearly enough from a survey of the eighteenth century is that the strength of an oligarchy is its capacity for the production of leaders. Nor was this capacity demonstrated only by the aristocracy of the older England. It was equally apparent in the new. What chance would the Puritan States have had against the mother country in the American Revolt, but for the leadership supplied by the Virginian aristocracy? The military blunders committed by the British commanders in that fratricidal conflict were almost beyond belief, but despite those blunders the confederate armies must again and again have been annihilated but for the tenacity, the resourcefulness, and the skill of George Washington.

Salvation, then, would seem to depend, whatever the precise form of the polity, upon two interdependent conditions: the existence of leaders who are not afraid to lead, and the ability of the mass of the nation to discern true leadership and its readiness to follow.

According to the classical theory, it is the characteristic weakness of democracy to be unable to fulfil these conditions. It is apt to produce tyrants, and it is not infertile in demagogues, as 'The Knights' of Aristophanes will always live

to remind us. Another peculiarity of democracy, according to the same theory, is the prevalence of a false conception of 'freedom' and 'equality'—the notion that 'freedom and 'equality mean the doing what a man likes.' But this, says Aristotle, is wrong: 'men should not think it slavery to 'live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their 'salvation.'* The admonition addressed by Demosthenes to the Athenian Democracy is more stern. 'Take care lest in trying 'to get rid of war you find yourselves slaves.' The antithesis is striking. Military service is the corollary of freedom. 'But 'enough,' it may be said, 'of ancient saws and of classical 'theory. The democracy of modern England is not that 'of Demosthenic or Aristotelian Athens.' The reminder is pertinent, but the implied argument is double-edged.

That the environment and conditions of ancient Athens were fundamentally different from those of modern England is obviously true. A City-State as compared with a world-wide Empire; the limitation of citizenship to freemen; the economic substratum supplied by slavery; the direct form of democracy as compared with representative government:—these and other circumstances should unquestionably induce caution in instituting comparisons, but they do not entirely vitiate them. There is another caution which should equally be borne in mind. It was impressed upon the readers of this Review by no less an authority than John Stuart Mill.

'Democracy is too recent a phenomenon and of too great magnitude for anyone who now lives to comprehend its consequences. A few of its more immediate tendencies may be perceived or surmised; what other tendencies destined to over-rule or to combine with them lie behind there are not grounds even to conjecture. . . . It is not, therefore, without a deep sense of the uncertainty attaching to such predictions that the wise would hazard an opinion as to the fate of mankind under the new democratic dispensation.' †

Precisely three-quarters of a century have elapsed since Mill penned these words. But they are still true and still apposite. The 'democratic dispensation' is even yet relatively new. We cannot yet comprehend its consequences. There are not yet sufficient grounds for conjecture.

Still, the fact is sufficiently obvious that the modern world,

* Politics, V. 9, 14. † Edinburgh Review, October 1840.

and in particular the English race, is engaged in the trial of an experiment without precedent or parallel in the experience of mankind. We English folk, dispersed in distant homes, are attempting to administer not merely a City-State like Athens, not merely a Nation-State of the ordinary modern type, but a World-Empire the several parts of which are at different stages in political, economic, and social development. And we are attempting to administer it under the ultimate sovereignty of a scarcely veiled democracy, and, for the most part, by means of democratic machinery. This experiment is new; and if we were able to take up a point of observation scientifically detached we should watch it with the interest and curiosity which similar experiments in politics have been wont to command. Such detachment is, however, impossible to an Englishman; nor, at a time like the present, will the required point of observation be easily found elsewhere.

This World-Empire is in the pangs of a struggle for existence. In the battle of the nations there is, of course, much more at stake than any particular form of government. But among other issues this, if not the most vital, is not the least interesting. It is a testing time for many things; among them for democracy. A popular dictatorship secured us against the onslaught of Spanish despotism in the sixteenth century. In the eighteenth century a genuine aristocracy brought us triumphant out of the prolonged contest with France—with a France, monarchical, republican, and imperialist in turn. In the twentieth century the English democracy, in close alliance with the peoples of France, Russia, Serbia, Italy, and Japan, finds itself at death grips with a nation which has cheerfully confided its political fortunes to a military autocracy. In the first bout of the contest that autocracy has enjoyed all the advantages which naturally accrue from many years of conscious, careful, and sustained preparation; nor has it failed to make full and profitable use of them. Can the English democracy, in conjunction with its allies, make good the lost time and recover the lost ground? If it can, it will not merely have preserved and vindicated its own existence, it will also have responded triumphantly to the severest test ever imposed upon a particular form of polity.

J. A. R. Marriott.

CHRISTIANITY AND WAR

1. **The German War and Catholicism.** Published under the direction of Mgr. ALFRED BAUDRILLART by the Catholic Committee of French Propaganda. Paris: Bloud et Gay. 1915.
2. **Guerre et Religion.** By ALFRED LOISY. Paris: Émile Nourry. 1915.
3. **Entretiens des Non-combattants durant la Guerre.** Paris: Union pour la Vérité. 1915.
4. **L'Opinion Catholique et la Guerre.** By P. IMBART DE LA TOUR. Paris: Bloud et Gay. 1915.
5. **A un Neutre Catholique.** By Mgr. PIERRE BATIFFOL. Paris: Bloud et Gay. 1915.
6. **Essays on Faith and Immortality.** By GEORGE TYRRELL. Edward Arnold. 1914.

'HE prayeth best who loveth best'; and yet, from all times, fighting and praying have been closely associated. Even in our day, when war is no longer spontaneous and instinctive, when it demands a moral justification, when we perceive a certain incompatibility between its exigencies and the laws of Christianity and civilisation, we still find that it has driven men and women to the foot of the altar, and that we and our enemies are praying and fighting against one another with equal earnestness.

In England we have the testimony of our better-filled churches, besides the accounts, brought us from the front by Anglican bishops and clergymen, of the responsiveness of our soldiers to their religious ministrations.

In France we hear, on all sides, of an outbreak of faith and fervour; of the influence exercised by the priest-soldier; of the return of combatants and non-combatants to forgotten religious practices.

The Catholics of Germany, in the protest addressed to their French co-religionists in the 'Kölnische Volkszeitung' of the 17th of June, testify to 'the moral and religious awakening 'of their people.'

It can, of course, be argued that a religious revival of this

nature is superficial and ephemeral. Thus M. Loisy remarks that it is only amongst believers that this renewal of religious belief has occurred, and he points out that it is the common love of country that is chiefly accountable for the harmony that now reigns between the religious and non-religious parties of France. Yet, even so, the fact remains that, in this time of national tribulation, each country has sought comfort and strength in its religious faith. At the same time a question—which never troubled the mind of man in the days when he fought for fighting's sake and because he looked upon it as his natural and fitting occupation—has now arisen as to how far religion and warfare may be in any way conciliated, and whether the profession of Christianity be compatible with an internecine struggle between Christians.

Our world is one of adult religious thought to a degree that has not obtained till now, and the questions which children may overlook must be faced by grown men and women. One of the greatest contradictions that this war presents is the fact that while, under its political aspect, it is a war between nations, it is at the same time, under its religious aspect, nothing else than a civil war.

One need be no pacificist to admit this fact; one may be as loyal to the interests of one's country as the most ardent militarist and yet see that there is a certain contradiction between one's patriotism and one's Christianity. We hear men speak and write of the 'Christian laws of warfare.' A Catholic reviewer in our English Jesuit organ 'The Month,' for August 1915, has remarked that 'war between Christian 'communities should be Christian.' But are not such expressions essentially fallacious, and can we really find any words of Christ to justify them? Did He allow us any enemies but those of our own spiritual welfare? And did He teach us to esteem any earthly good so highly as to sacrifice love and peace for its attainment?

'Put the Gospel in the cupboard and take it out when the 'war is over!' This remark, which I quote from a French Catholic, does at least recognise the contradiction, though it makes no serious attempt to solve it.

'To preach brotherly love in war-time is like telling a man 'to "feed up" when he is suffering from a violent bilious 'attack.' This moral résumé comes from the mouth of an

English Catholic, and is equally graphic in its presentment of the difficulty.

Yet we know that a Gospel which has ever to be put in the cupboard is not one that will be worth taking out of it again; while the love which is extended to our enemies only so long as we have none is a somewhat academic sentiment.

M. Loisy treats the subject with perfect consistency when he maintains, in accordance with his past utterances, that the other-worldliness of Christianity is the secret of its failure in this one; and that it is as useless to attempt to conciliate the teaching of Christianity with war as it is to adapt it to many other essential demands of human life. He writes:

'The Gospel of Jesus does not inculcate the love of country; it suppresses it. War between true Christians would be an absurd and inconceivable thing if such Christians existed. . . . Are we right to be patriotic at the risk of being less Christian, or not Christian at all? Certainly, since our only hope of life is in our patriotism. The truly Evangelic Christian is he who would let himself be killed without resistance, and who would refuse to take up arms even for the service of his country.'

There follows a passage which shall be quoted later on, when the theme of this article is more fully developed, and then M. Loisy goes on to show that the main reason why literal Christianity is impracticable is that it was directed to another and more perfect form of life.

'To console man for the uncertainties and cruelties of actual life, he was offered a place in the blessed city that God would found on earth. This desperate hope had but one weak point, which was that it overlooked the true state of human existence.'

He goes on to show how this 'mirage of faith' was preserved during those ages in which the task of living absorbed man's energies, while the hope of something better supported him in his misery. The Church took the place of the promised Kingdom of God, and only when the world had settled into a happier and more organised condition did men begin to realise that they had been fed on an illusion. To perceive this illusion was to enter on a process of disenchantment with Christianity as the supreme gospel of human life, the conclusion at which M. Loisy believes the world to be gradually arriving. He questions, as we have seen, the truth of that religious revival of which others speak, and maintains that,

for his countrymen, 'the great interest, the great passion, 'the true religion of the present moment and for always, is 'devotion to "France Immortal."'

If, as Christians, we disagree with M. Loisy's estimate of the value and future of Christianity, can we truthfully disagree with his statement of its teaching? Can we honestly deny that he is right when he says that only the pacificist can be termed a Christian in the full sense of the word?

There is, indeed, another aspect of Christianity, to which reference will be made later on, that qualifies this view, just as there is another interpretation of its other-worldliness which fits it, instead of unfitting it, for the direction of human life. But these are further considerations, inspired by a different outlook on Christianity as a whole from the traditional one with which M. Loisy is dealing. Actually, as regards certain leading precepts of Christian morality, his thesis is surely undeniable. Christ did tell us to turn the other cheek, and did not tell us to try to strike our enemy on both; He did repudiate the doctrine of 'a tooth for a tooth,' and He did not tell us to strike out ten from the mouth of our enemy for one of our own.

Christianity does not adapt itself to war, says M. Loisy, because it was not intended to adapt itself to human life except under conditions we have never known and never shall know. The second part of this proposition is open to a different interpretation from that which M. Loisy gives it—an interpretation, however, which he himself does not wholly preclude; but the first part can surely not be denied without lapsing into a certain amount of sophistry.

From a very different standpoint, and with very different conclusions, did Leo Tolstoi uphold the other-worldliness of the Christian message, for its very incompatibility with the existing state of things is, for him, a pledge of future fulfilment. The Churches have wrought a substitution, and given us a human organisation based on authority and force, in place of the spiritual kingdom that is to be moved and controlled by love. The Russian mystic, like the French critic, recognises that Christianity can only flourish in another soil than that offered by the present political condition of mankind. In 'The Law of Violence and the Law of Love,' we read:

Understand that welfare for men lies only in their unity, and that unity cannot be attained by violence. . . . The Christian teaching of love . . . is the definition of the supreme law of human life. The fulfilment of this law allows of no exceptions . . . and is applied equally to foreigners, to all sectarians, and to enemies who hate and wrong us.'

Once more, we may disagree with Tolstoi as to the conclusions he draws from this interpretation of Christianity; we may believe, as against him, that the Churches, with all their imperfection, have been essential to its life; we may see the utter hopelessness and impracticability of such an application of the Christian Law to human life as he suggests; but can we deny the truth of his interpretation in itself? Is it not a fact that Christianity looks to a life beyond this one, for which the goods of the present can profitably be sacrificed? Does not the Gospel teach a love for all mankind that overpasses the barriers of race and kindred, and unites men in pursuit of an ideal which is common to all?

This is indeed the 'folly of the Cross,' and we cannot expect nations to be guided by it. We know that such literal Christianity as Tolstoi advocated would result in just such an evil as may be urged, though not as a conclusive objection, against the voluntary system of recruitment as contrasted with a law of conscription; in the evil, namely, that the best would perish and the worst be preserved.

But it is one thing to admit of a contradiction between the spiritual demands of Christianity and the practical exigencies of human life, and it is another thing to fit the spiritual ideal to the material necessity. If that religious revival which we now witness is to have an abiding result it will be by solving, and not by overlooking, the contradiction that faces us. A religion that, even in virtue of its purity and greatness, proves itself impracticable and unreal is no religion for men, who must live according to the circumstances in which they find themselves. If it is human to fight, while it is Christian to lie down and let our enemies walk over us; if it is human to love the land of our birth, and Christian to care just as much for the land of our enemy's birth; then humanity and Christianity are somehow themselves at war, and it is humanity that will win.

But the case is not so desperate. The religious crisis, which

is as yet partly hidden by the material crisis, may reveal an inadequacy in our religious conceptions which tends not to death but to fuller life. Pressed by new dangers, religious teachers will have to realise the fact which Modernism sought to establish, that no religion can live that is in opposition with any essential element of human life and truth; while, on the other hand, no religion is worth preserving unless its demands are higher than those of our actual existence. Those intellectual difficulties which sprang from the human mind could be ignored in virtue of the general ignorance; material objections cannot be thus set aside. Theologians would have overruled any critic who dared to question the genuineness of the following texts:

'You have heard that it hath been said "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." But I say to you not to resist evil: but if one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other. And if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him.'

But the concessions which would never have been made to textual criticism are made now to political necessities, and those who defended the historic genuineness of every line of the Gospel are now prepared to attenuate its moral meaning.

Thus a French ecclesiastic, the Chanoine Gaudeau, in his essay on 'The Christian Laws of Warfare,' writes that 'When 'war is let loose by the enemies of the Love of God, it 'is still the Love of God which kindles, in the hearts of those 'for whom war then becomes a duty, warlike virtues.'*

Forced into brutal contact with facts which nobody can overlook, theologians are thus learning, in their own way, that religion is a part of human life, and not a separate province. They are wrong in finding a homily of anti-Germanism in the Sermon on the Mount, but they are right in so far as they are coming to realise that every essential human need, whether it be the need for truth, or the need for liberty, or the need for fuller life, must find its due place in the religion of the future.

By a strange Nemesis, the successor of Pius X. has distressed some of the most loyal of his followers by maintaining,

* The German War and Catholicism.

in the political order, that attitude of detachment from human problems which his predecessor manifested in the intellectual and philosophical order. To many it seemed that Benedict XV., if anyone on earth could do so, should be the one to uphold the cause of justice and rebuke those who had violated it. The case of Belgium was a plain one. Whatever doubts might be entertained as to the justice of the Allied cause, as such, this was a clear moral issue. Here was a country that had been ruined for refusing to lend itself to the designs of Germany. Here was a Christian and a Catholic country, of which but few remain, which had been outraged in her religious feelings, insulted in the persons of her clergy. Even though the Pope could take no side in the contest, he could surely protest, in the name of justice, against the treatment of this land.

Such hopes were disappointed, and Benedict XV. confined himself to expressions of sorrow for the misery of mankind. In words almost too well known to be quoted, the Holy Father declared, in the Consistory of the 22nd of January 1915, the absolute 'impartiality' of the Holy See in this war of nations.

'It is, for every thinking man, abundantly clear that in this frightful conflict the Holy See, whilst unceasingly watching it with the closest attention, must preserve the most absolute neutrality. The Roman Pontiff as, on the one hand, the Vicar of Jesus Christ who died for all and each, and, on the other, as the Common Father of Catholics, must embrace all the combatants in the same sentiment of charity. He has on both the belligerent sides a great number of sons for whose salvation he must have an equal solicitude. He must accordingly consider, not the special interests which divide them, but the common bond of faith that makes them brothers.'

These words have formed the text of a vigorous indictment by M. Loisy, who points out admirably the distinction between *neutrality* and *impartiality*: a distinction which has been generally overlooked, since we find, in the document in question, either term indifferently adopted by translators.

'Impartiality,' writes M. Loisy, 'is to be understood as that perfect justice which is to be observed in the treatment of persons and the judgment of facts. Neutrality is non-moral and has no connexion with justice; it is an attitude of indifference towards the quarrels of others. . . . Impartiality is a duty and a virtue; neutrality is a matter of ordinary prudence and expediency. Impartiality and neutrality are therefore very distinct things; they

are even incompatible in moral questions, for it is wrong to be neutral in morals, and whoever professes himself neutral in a question of justice fails in impartiality. . . . We may therefore ask why the Pope is neutral, and wherefore, while he claims the right to preach justice in the name of the God whose interpreter he is, he dispenses himself from the impartial judgment of the events of the actual war.'

This distinction between neutrality and impartiality is adopted, verbatim, though without reference to the one who originally made it, nor to the object against whom it was directed, by the Chanoine Gaudeau in his article above referred to on 'The Christian Laws of Warfare.' Thus France, Catholic and non-Catholic, expressed her disappointment at this cold treatment of a burning human problem. On the other hand Benedict XV. was reproached by another party, not for his human indifference, but for his lack of spiritual zeal. In the 'Chrétien Libre' of July–August 1915, Dr. Ernesto Ruttili exclaims:

'Think you that Jesus would have waited, as you do, for "a favourable occasion"? On the contrary, He would have cast Himself between the combatants. Perhaps they would not have listened, perhaps they would have slain Him; but would He have compromised His "moral authority" by His failure? The goodness of a cause is not determined by its success.'

The disappointment excited by these negative utterances of the Holy See has of course been fostered by the suspicion that they covered a certain amount of sympathy with the opposite side. This suspicion is justified by the attitude of the Vatican Press, and of a considerable section of the Ultramontane Press in neutral countries. Monsieur P. Imbart de la Tour enumerates certain instances, in the brochure quoted at the head of this article. First and foremost, we have the old enemy of England and of France, the 'Osservatore 'Romano'; then, in Switzerland, the 'Neue Züricher 'Nachrichten'; in Spain the 'Correo Español' and the 'Tribuna.' He also names the Italian 'Unità Cattolica' and others.

But there were some other words in the celebrated Allocution which should, by right, have excited even more surprise, as coming from the mouth which uttered them, than the afore-quoted expressions of neutrality. Those are the words in which the Pope alludes to the direct effect of the war on

religion. Those are the words in which he implores the invading forces of Germany :

> ' not to wound *without real necessity* the inhabitants [of Belgium] in what they hold most dear, their sacred temples, the ministers of God, the rights of religion and of faith.'

Here the Holy Father is dealing with the province that strictly, and by all rights, belongs to him. Even if he could not enter on the international question, who, better than he, could proclaim the right of religion to be respected in its ministers, its temples, its monasteries, and, above all, its convents ? What mean, in this place, those qualifying words —*without real necessity* ? ' All these things,' he might have said, ' *are mine*, mine to rule and guard and protect—mine to avenge. ' My bishops and priests are under my care ; the lives of monks, ' the honour of nuns, are my concern as they are the concern ' of no one else. The religious sentiments of a people are *my* ' special province and care. Here is the one point on which I ' may speak—touch these things and every force I can wield ' shall be exercised against you. Here I admit of no qualifying ' necessity—for these things my office exists—for their sake ' alone am I Pope.'

Perhaps an uncompromising attitude of the Holy See on this one point would have explained its attitude on all the others ; it would then have been manifest that the Pope was as uncompromising as he was courageous when his ground was sure ; that if he hesitated in some places it was either because he was insufficiently enlightened, or because the question, in his eyes, was morally more complicated than we Allies think it to be. But the gentleness and ambiguity of his protest in those matters, which were so strictly his own concern, lend a certain force to the reproaches made him.

This also may explain the coldness with which others of his exhortations to peace have since been received, and the scant welcome granted to the prayer whose recital he urged. For the first time in Catholic experience a prayer composed and enjoined by the Pope has remained almost unknown to a large mass of the faithful—a fact which has been urged against French Catholics by their German co-religionists, as we read in the ' Kölnische Volkszeitung ' of the 17th of June 1915.

Yet there is surely a good deal of unreasonableness in the disappointment of those who expected more definite action on the part of the Holy See. First of all, it is eminently injudicial for either side to prescribe to an independent power its duty in the case of a dispute. However convinced we be of the justice of our cause, we must admit that it may present a different aspect to one who regards it from without, and not from within; we must allow for the force of argument that exists on the opposite side; we must remember that it is not in human nature to be so wholly right as we would gladly think ourselves.

But, secondly, if we still have reasonable cause for dissatisfaction, and ask why, at least on one or two obvious and flagrant points of injustice, some definite pronouncement was not made, we must remember that the Papacy is not a purely spiritual office, nor wholly unpolitical in character; that it has its human and imperfect past, and cannot rise above it in an instant, however imperative may be the need.

To administer justice, the first requirement is entire disinterestedness; only those who have nothing to lose or to gain can compel confidence and attention in times of dispute. If some measure of temporal power be essential to the maintenance of the prestige of the Holy See, it must also be reckoned as a detriment to its moral influence. Benedict XV. may be entirely disinterested; but his difficulty is to prove it. He cannot speak for himself alone, but must also speak as the successor of those who never ceased to claim a greater or lesser measure of earthly sovereignty.

But, lastly and chiefly, this war is a contest of human ideals, and such a contest cannot be appreciated by a power that has for so long a time reckoned the aspirations and ambitions of mankind as negligible or dangerous. Here we touch once more on the great main conflict between the demands of literal Christianity and the claims of human life; that difficulty which the Churches have failed to solve, not, alas! solely because they cared only for the next world, but also because they had no regard for some of the true necessities of this one.

Parents who dread and suspect their growing children have not much influence on their development, much part in their fuller life, much understanding of their trials and successes,

their faults and their excellences. The Papacy has not taken count of the growth of humanity, and now it remains cold and perplexed in the midst of this human crisis. In so far as new ideals of social life and freedom are at stake in the present struggle, the Holy See has not yet fitted itself to understand the issues. Our Popes have not trusted us well enough to be trusted in their turn, and now we are probably suspicious beyond what the actual facts would warrant.

And yet, conceivably, the Papacy might become, in the history of the world, that which it has been the dream of some—not even Catholics—that it should become: a power whose end and aim are spiritual, while its heart is human; a power disinterested and other-worldly in character, but rooted in the very life of mankind. Such a tribunal might achieve more than an International Convention, for, without possessing any dictatorial power, it might be, in itself, representative of all the conflicting interests. The Papacy has not yet attained such moral eminence, and no one can say that it will ever do so; but it represents the one and only authority in this world that has ever been supposed possibly capable of such a position.

Yet we should not flatter ourselves that the quarrels of the world would necessarily be ended even by appeal to a tribunal whose justice was recognised by all sides. The moral question is rather more complicated than we like to think, and though all Christian, or Catholic, defence of war is coupled with the assumption that the war be a just one, this proviso needs a certain amount of qualification. There is, first of all, the obvious difficulty that our enemies may be as convinced of the righteousness of their cause as we of the contrary; but this is an acceptable contradiction. The real weakness of this defence of the Christianity of warfare lies in the fact that, actually, our country has a claim on us irrespective of the moral issue. It would be, from every political as well as patriotic point of view, a monstrous doctrine that should free individuals from allegiance to the cause of their country if they should deem their country to be in the wrong. Would an Englishman or a Frenchman, unconvinced by the diplomatic documents of the entire righteousness of his national cause, convinced on the contrary, however mistakenly, that Germany was in the right and we in the wrong, be entitled to

play the part of an enemy of his own land, to refuse the service demanded of him, or assist the enemies of his country? We know quite well that he would not. We know that our life and that of our country is one; that even should we be, in some respects, wiser than the majority of our countrymen and the government of our land, our wisdom is not to avail us in such a case. There are times when we must be in the wrong with those amongst whom we live; when even an unjust war, that we could not prevent, may claim our aid and co-operation. The justification of war that depends wholly on the justification and exclusive moral rectitude of our own side is not a justification wide and deep enough for the demands of patriotism. It is not only in so far as the German people have been convinced by their rulers of the justice of their cause that they have a right to defend that cause; their duty would be the same were they as convinced as we ourselves that moral right was against them.

As Mr. Clutton Brock has wisely said:

'There is a question which every pacifist should ask himself, if he wishes to know his own heart and his own motives—the question, namely, whether he is quite sure that he would wish us all to be pacifists. . . . At any rate, now, while they preach pacifism, they are preserved from the possible effects of it, they and their wives and children, by the armies of their unregenerate country.'*

There is something of the Pharisaical leaven in the strictly moral attitude of a war party. However convinced we may be that we have justice on our side, we ought to know that this is not the only motive that inspires us, and that even were it withdrawn our conduct would be the same. The party that is disloyal to its country in the midst of a crisis should be rebuked in the name, not of international morality, but of that duty to one's own land which is an inevitable result of our dependence on it. In a great Spanish novel the hero, a confirmed free-thinker, dies in defending a tabernacle in the cathedral of which he has been made custodian. Be our country right or wrong, we must clear out of it or defend it. We are fighting, please God, for a noble end; but we are also fighting with England against Germany because we are English, with France against Germany because we are French;

* 'Times' Lit. Supp. August 19, 1915.

and let us grant our enemies the same right to fight with Germany against France and England because they are Germans. We should all live and labour for a continual raising of our national aims and morality; but we are part of our country for better or for worse.

Thus the contradiction with which we are dealing becomes the more clear-cut and undeniable. While the laws of justice and morality are universal as humanity itself, while the Christian law of love makes mention of no national distinctions, we see that the ethics of patriotism establish a line of cleavage cutting clean through these other two domains.

Somewhere or other there is an inherent contradiction between religion, as we have been taught it, and human life; between the law of love, as it has been set before us in traditional Christianity, and the imperative instincts of the life of man on earth. Either our Christianity has not the universal significance we supposed, or it must be limited and qualified according to exigencies of another order. There was no religious contradiction in the wars between pagan races that swore allegiance to their own national gods; there is a deep and undeniable contradiction in the wars between Christian nations that profess the same faith and worship at the same altar. If war is not wrong—and how can anything that is physically or morally inevitable be wrong?—then somehow religion fails us, and we Christians and Monotheists find ourselves worse off than Pagans, for we have to be untrue to our most sacred professions.

If, then, the present war has excited a religious revival throughout Europe, it has also made manifest a religious contradiction, which is even more patent in the Roman Catholic Church than in any other, because of its universality and its centralisation. Catholics, all over the world, acknowledge a common head and father of all Christendom, the vicegerent of Christ. In him the hierarchy is centred; from him bishops and priests receive their powers, and those powers, though subject to territorial jurisdiction, are, in themselves, universal. A French Catholic who should find himself in Germany would, even now, have to renounce the Sacraments or receive them at the hands of a German priest. On both sides we kneel before the same tabernacle, follow the same ritual, recite the same prayers, receive the same Eucharist. The ministers of the Catholic religion, if asked to what end their lives were devoted,

would have to answer that they were devoted to the advancement of the spiritual interests of mankind, without any regard to nationality. They profess, in fact, to live for something wider and deeper than those goods, of life, or property, or honour that are the matter of international disputes.

A reviewer in 'The Month' of August 1915 denounces as *heresy* the notion that war is wholly immoral. The point of his remark lies in his use of the word *heresy*, which implies the denial of some article of faith, and thus knits the doctrine that war is moral into the infallible teaching of the Church. Such an utterance reveals a desperate need to reconcile the demands of patriotism with those of Christianity; and it is significant that men who could overlook the intellectual problems of religion are forced to face them now that those problems are making themselves felt in the material order. Christianity has incorporated itself in a system, and it was forced to do so; but the system has erred in secluding itself from human influence and making religion a thing apart. We see now that human life has its own claims, and yet we will not sacrifice our religious ideals to fulfil them. Nor can we be satisfied to await their fulfilment in another life. Even though this one must be ever imperfect, yet, in its measure, it must satisfy our religious as well as our earthly aspirations.

How much stronger we should be if we knew where we are weak; how much more enlightened we should be if we knew where we are blind; how much freer we should be if we knew in what respect we are, inevitably, unfree; how much more Christian we should be if we recognised those elements of our life which still resist all Christian influence!

There is no such thing as Christian warfare; there are no Christian laws of war. It is not true, as a Jesuit writer says, that

> 'Our foes are blamed in the present conflict, not because they are fighting, but because they are not fighting as Christians . . . that in so far as they have been treacherous, cruel, unjust, they have degraded the character, not merely of Christian, but even of human warfare.'

And yet it is true that Christians can fight, and can remain Christians while they do so, and that the influence of Christianity will make itself felt, even in the conduct of war, by introducing laws and practices that have nothing to do with

war. War itself cannot and will not be Christianised, but here and there Christianity will get the better of war, and by its partial victories over it will give a hint of the complete victory at which it is aiming.

Christianity is not a finished product; it is a life of tendency and aspiration. That character of other-worldliness in its message, that insistence on an approaching kingdom in which its ideals can be realised, are just the elements that fit it to the discontent and strivings of human life.

Christian laws were shaped in expectation of a more perfect social condition; that condition was not attained, and men were left with broken ideals that only served to make them discontented with their previous condition.

Tolstoi summons them to a fresh beginning, in which the artificialities of Church and State organisation will be cast aside, and man will develop his native powers of goodness and love. M. Loisy has a keener sense of facts, and it is another religious future that he foresees and describes, in pages of touching eloquence which should be read in the original to be fully appreciated:

'Each one will have realised that his country is his mother, in the truest sense of the word. It is his human house. It may be well to discourse of the brotherhood of mankind, but we can only serve the universal republic by first serving our own, honouring it, and devoting ourselves to it. And to love our country we must understand it, and not do it the wrong of adopting a narrow, selfish, and savage nationalism. . . . What gives France a place apart in the midst of other peoples is that she has first stammered the new Gospel of truth, of liberty, of justice, of fraternity. . . . Because our ideal is less abstract, less metaphysical, less transcendent than that of the ancient mystics, it is far from being less efficacious.'

Thus the religion of patriotism is substituted for that of Christianity, and the opposition between this-world and other-world ideals is settled by the sacrifice of the latter to the former. Yet the conflict is not thus evaded, for all nature and all life lie under the burden of the same contradiction. It is in the form of Christianity that the religious message has been expressed to our Western World, the message of struggle and hope, of sorrow and blessedness, of humiliation and glory. But that same message is deeply imprinted in Nature herself, which has her own dim religious revelation, a revelation of something beyond her actual achievement, a law higher than

the more obvious one of brute material necessity. As Father Tyrrell writes:

'We do ill to view the life of Nature as other than an extension of our own life, as part of one whole with ourselves; the duality (not dualism) that we find in ourselves is to be found also in the world all round us. What we call the material and the spiritual are without us, as well as within. Nowhere can we find, or even imagine, the one except in relation to, in conflict with, the other. They are contrary polar aspects of every experience. We call things material or spiritual according as one or other combatant prevails and preponderates. . . . Hence the man in whom the antagonism is most explicit, and the victory most complete, is he who best interprets the spirit of Nature by the spirit in himself, the lower by the higher manifestation, the rude essay by the finished work—a Jesus of Nazareth, a Francis of Assisi.'

In the very incompleteness and failure of Christianity the Modernist found proof of its true character; it was imperfect with the imperfection of that humanity to which it was wedded by its central doctrine of the Incarnation of God in man. Thus, while Christianity appeals to what is highest, and strongest, and most spiritual, it does not withdraw man from his environment. We are to seek the Kingdom of God, but not alone, for meanwhile we are to bear each other's burdens, and be weak with the infirmity of our brethren. If militarism collides with the Christian law of love, unqualified pacificism collides with the Christian law of humility. As Christians we must look higher than the ambitions of this life, but we must also burden ourselves with the sins of the rest of mankind.

Without the Church the Christian message would have perished—yet through the Church it has been too much robbed of its character of tendency and hope. It is the leaven of humanity rather than its law; a promise rather than a fulfilment, a means rather than an end. This is what the Churches also must be to fulfil their true task.

Bravely does a French ecclesiastic embrace the contradiction when, in answer to an Italian theologian, he writes:

'You pray for "the victory of a France renewed in Jesus Christ." Do not pray thus conditionally. Rather let us adopt the words of St. Paul to the Thessalonians: "Brethren, pray for us, that the word of the Lord may pursue its course and be in honour, as it is with you, and that we may be delivered from vexing and perverse men; for faith is not the inheritance of all."'*

* 'To a Catholic Neutral'—Mgr. Pierre Batiffol.

Mgr. Batiffol here recognises the same truth that M. Loisy has proclaimed. It is for France that Frenchmen are fighting; their war is not Christian, but human; yet it is consonant with Christian faith and aspirations, and the promise of Christianity is no more an illusion than the yet unfulfilled ideals of humanity.

Without, then, either renouncing hope in the next world or denouncing this one, can we not cease to talk of 'Christian warfare,' or to declare the solidarity of religion and of war? There are many things in life that we have learned to accept as elements of its probation, and not of its perfection; cannot war be one of these? Can we not admit that Christians are at war because they have not yet attained the full stature of Christianity, just as men are at war because they have not yet attained to the full ideals of humanity?

Yet Christianity, an Italian writer tells us, has its warlike as well as its peaceful characteristics.

'In the Christian conception, love, indeed, is the dominating and essential motive. But love, as Jesus intended it, is not mere contemplation nor wordy aspiration, but at once surrender and vigorous affirmation; the will of both sacrifice and conquest, it implies struggle. . . . The Christian law is a law of struggle, just because its foundation is life, in which alone the ideal of love has a meaning.' *

These words are true in their principle but not in their application; it was the same confusion of two kinds of warfare that armed Christians against infidels, and invested the ambitions and cruelties of Crusaders with a sacred character.

Christianity calls on our fighting instincts, but to other ends. 'I came not to bring peace, but a sword,' said Christ; but added that the enemies of a man are those of his own household. The warfare of Christianity in the world is the warfare of conscience in Nature; it is the struggle of the spirit with the flesh, and not of the flesh with the flesh. Self-sacrifice, such as Christianity has taught us, may glorify the death of the soldier on the battle-field; but he is slain, not because he himself is a Christian, but because the world is not yet Christian. As P. Ghignoni, an Italian priest, writes:

'It is, above all, the fault of us priests. . . . We have

* 'Il Cristianesimo e la Guerra,' Vincenzo Cento, 'Bilychnis,' July 1915.

lost our time, we have wasted centuries in trifles of subtlety, scholasticism, theology, canon law, and all kinds of jargon, instead of attending to our one rude and glorious task of crucifying the world in us and ourselves in the world, instead of living for the moral reformation confided to us. The fault is ours, who have substituted our own interests for those of God, who have sacrificed the Gospel of Christ to our miserable vanity and pride; who, when we should have condemned the paganism in which souls are entangled, have ourselves bowed down to pagan laws and customs, thus robbing of its efficacy the Evangelical word by its strident contrast with our conduct, and the contradiction between our theories and our life. The fault is ours, who, instead of trusting in the Divine virtue of the word of Christ, confided in human means and support, even in human arms and in the subterfuges, tricks, and vicious compromises of politics; who, in order not to condemn ourselves, have adopted easy principles along with the rest, and have woven around the massive rock of the Gospel a dense covering of webs to hide its structure, to blunt its angles, and to render its summit apparently accessible to cowardly souls.' *

This is another kind of crusade than that of the Middle Ages; it is a crusade within the Church, of its spiritual against its earthly elements, and the courage it demands is not that which is needed to kill our enemies, but that which is needed to live for our friends. It is not by conquering but by serving the world that the Church can fulfil her mission towards it.

We have made a severance between religion and life, a severance for which the Churches are largely accountable. That division has to be healed, and the remedy lies in perfect honesty on both sides. With wilful blindness, the Churches have denied the intellectual problems they could not solve, have evaded the moral difficulties to which they had no answer. Thus the Christian conscience has been falsified, and men have forced their faith into accordance with their knowledge, or their knowledge into accordance with their faith. There is but one way of salvation, and that is the way of perfect truth. Step by step we can bring our human aims and needs into accordance with our spiritual ideals, but only in so far as we recognise a contradiction where we find it, and accept those passing discords which go to the making of an eternal harmony.

M. D. PETRE.

* 'Bilychnis,' May 1915.

'THE HUMANITY OF MODERN WARFARE'

1. **The German War Book.** Translated by J. H. MORGAN. Murray. 1915.
2. **Germany's Violation of the Laws of War.** Compiled by the French Foreign Office. Translated by J. O. P. BLAND. Heinemann. 1915.

THE phrase 'the humanity of modern warfare' is used in a letter written by the Duke of Wellington to Canning in 1820. While we are under the lively impression stamped on us by much that has happened since August of last year, the words must needs sound bitterly ironical. And when they are read in their context it is not easy to believe that they were used without irony by the Duke himself. The occasion on which Wellington wrote, and his comment, provide between them an excellent shoeing horn for a modest inquiry into what 'humanity' in war may mean, what view has been taken of its meaning at different times, and how men have practised what they would in general have been prepared to allow was in itself a virtue.

The Mahratta War of 1817–1818, waged by the Marquis of Hastings, is now little more than a vague memory. Yet one incident of the war made a resounding disturbance in its day. In February 1818 the Commander-in-chief of the Deccan army, Sir Thomas Hislop, summoned the Mahratta fort at Talnêr on the Tiptee River. Talnêr had already been given up to the British authorities by Holkar, to whom it belonged. Sir Thomas had with him a written order from the Mahratta ruler to the governor—the Kiladar—of the Fort, Tulasi Rám, directing him to hand it over. The Kiladar was fairly warned by Hislop that he would be treated as a rebel if he offered resistance. It is impossible now to know on what motive Tulasi Rám acted as he did. The Mahratta States were heaving in anarchy and were reeking with falsity. He may have had secret counter orders. The man hesitated and haggled till the outer works of the fort were breached and stormed. He then surrendered, and a part of his followers

with him. But there were in the garrison three hundred Arab mercenaries who refused to give in. Two British officers, Major Gordon and Captain MacGregor, were sent to negotiate with the recalcitrant Arabs, who still held the inner works. Various interpretations of what followed have been given. The proved fact is that the Arabs killed Gordon and MacGregor and several Sepoys they had with them. Sir Thomas then ordered a storm, and the Arabs were put to the sword. Tulasi Rám was hanged next day, without trial, as a rebel, and also because he was suspected of having instigated the Arabs.

A loud outcry was raised in and out of India, and in and out of Parliament. Canning laid some of the papers in the case before Wellington and asked his advice. The Duke, in reply, gave the following weighty exposition of doctrine :

> 'I believe it has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress stormed have no claim to quarter, and the practice which prevailed during the last century of surrendering a fortress when a breach was opened in the body of the place, and the counterscarp had been blown in, was founded on this understanding. Of late years the French have availed themselves of the humanity of modern warfare, and have made a new regulation that a breach should stand one assault at least. The consequence of this regulation was to me the loss of the flower of the army in the assaults of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. I certainly should have thought myself justified in putting both garrisons to the sword; and if I had done so to the first, it is probable that I should have saved 5000 men in the assault of the second. I mention this in order to show you that the practice of refusing quarter to a garrison which stands an assault is not a useless effusion of blood.'

It will be seen that the Duke went far beyond the case of the fort at Talnêr, which was not an ordinary operation of war. If Tulasi Rám was harshly treated, the reason was that he was not allowed, as other Mahratta governors who acted like him were, a chance of proving to a court-martial that he had received secret directions from his master to disregard the public order. If Sir Thomas Hislop was cruel to the Arabs, the cruelty only consisted in denying pity to mercenaries, who believed they were about to be massacred in any case, and therefore thought that it would be a satisfaction to kill as many of their executioners as they could before they received the Moslem 'crown of martyrdom' at the hands of

the unbeliever. Perhaps too, as they spoke no Indian language and the British officers had had no occasion to master Arabic, the parties in that tragic parley could come to no understanding. Yet the mercenaries had put themselves out of the pale by slaying men who were, at any rate, trying to parley with them.

Wellington, without being a 'man of sensibility' as they would have said in the days of his youth, had as good a heart as could be made out of brains. He saw no good in 'killing a poor devil of a sentry.' It was a useless slaughter, and therefore brutal. But we see that he would have thought himself justified in putting the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to the sword. We hear a tone of scornful impatience with 'the humanity of modern warfare,' which was the cause that the quarter given in that storm led to the awful butchery in the great breach at Badajoz, to say nothing of the bestial outbreak of lust and cruelty at the expense of the miserable townsmen which ensued when the soldiers, who did not scruple to act on the old rule of war, had them at their mercy. If he did not act on his own principle at Ciudad Rodrigo, the reasons were no doubt that he too was a man of his time. He could not have followed the example of Marlborough, who desolated Bavaria after the battle of Blenheim in order to punish its ruler for his alliance with the French King. And Marlborough was not a cruel man. He was only a soldier of the seventeenth and not of the nineteenth century. And then the Duke was more far-sighted than Sir Thomas Hislop, a stout but rather commonplace officer, and he looked beyond the immediate gain to the effect likely to be produced in England.

Whether he was right or wrong in his estimate of probabilities is not the question. Philipon, who defended Badajoz, was a resolute man, and as the alternative before him would have been between dying like a soldier in the fortress given him to hold *à outrance* or facing a firing party on the Plain of Grenelle for disobeying the Emperor's orders, I incline to believe that he would have preferred the first, and that his men would have done the same. So nothing would have been gained for humanity by the military execution of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. Our own loss might have been greater, and the townsmen would not have suffered less. We

cannot overlook the townsmen, for their fate was bound up with that of the garrison.

Wellington was plainly thinking of the soldiers only. Yet the very war in the Peninsula from which he drew his examples included one passage of a highly significant character to show how easily the line is passed when men judge that the avoidance of future loss justifies present severity. The facts are stated with military frankness by the best possible authority—the memoirs of the officer who caused the thing to be done, General Suchet, who had not then won his marshal's bâton by the taking of Tarragona. He had excellent military reasons for hurrying on the taking of Lerida. This Catalan town lies at the foot of a steep flat-topped hill on which is a fort, now antiquated, but counted very strong a century ago. And this is how Suchet tells us he took the place :—'Les troupes,' acting, as he avows, by his express orders,

's'attachèrent à pousser la garnison et les habitants à coup de fusil de rue en rue, de maison en maison, vers la partie haute et vers le château afin de les forcer à s'y réfugier. . . . Nos mortiers et obusiers ne cessèrent de tirer toute la nuit, et le lendemain pendant la matinée. Chaque bombe dirigée sur l'espace étroit qui contenait cette multitude tombait sur des groupes entassés de combattants et de non-combattants et portait la destruction et le désordre. On sent que les efforts du gouverneur et des militaires les plus déterminés devaient être enchaînés par la présence de ces femmes, de ces enfants, de ces vieillards et des paysans sans armes, qui de la fureur populaire tombaient tout à coup dans le découragement et la crainte de la mort. Comme le général Suchet s'en était flatté, ces dispositions eurent un effet prompt et décisif.'

The Spanish governor, Garcia Conde, a brave and active man, could not endure the horror of the massacre and surrendered. To make the story complete as an illustration of principles, I will quote the comment of Napier :

'Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced by a proceeding politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilised warfare. For, though a town taken by assault be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed, helpless people into a situation where they must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless the governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it on the ground that he thus spared a great effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers' blood at the expense of women's and children's, and had

Garcia Conde's nature been stern he too might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.'

It will be generally allowed that Napier's 'scarcely' is tell-tale. He was 'a man of sensibility' in the good and bad sense of the word. One is at times tempted to apply to him Porson's amusing phrase about Gibbon, whose humanity, he said, was never at fault except when Christians were persecuted or women were violated. Napier was ardently humane except when his prejudices and passions were aroused. He detested the Spaniards, and he was always on the side of the soldier, and in particular of the French soldier, who shared his own adoration of Napoleon. He condemns the barbarism, but with an obvious effort. And he did not stand alone in regarding Suchet as no monster. When our officers met the Marshal in 1814 they treated him on the footing of an officer and a gentleman, though they laughed at his ostentatious profusion of gold lace on the very seams of his uniform. As for the man himself, the candour of his account of his doings at Lerida is less offensive than the oily hypocrisy of his concealments of what he did at Valencia. And lest we also should be smirched by the touch of hypocrisy I will add that at least one justly famous British soldier was no less convinced of the legitimacy of the practice of striking at the combatant through the non-combatant than was Suchet. At the beginning of the Seven Years' War, Wolfe, who also was a man of sensibility, stated his views of the proper course for dealing with disorders in the Highlands if the Jacobites did stir, as it was feared they would. In a letter to his friend Rickson, then stationed at Fort Augustus, he recommended the seizure of women and children as hostages and the laying waste of the country while the men were absent, and the sending of letters threatening fire and sword to the chiefs.

At times Englishmen have been as unscrupulous as men of any race in using those severities without which the object of war cannot be obtained. Cromwell was not a man who loved cruelty, yet he put the garrison of Drogheda to the sword deliberately, and in the Preston campaign he gave orders that the royalist prisoners were to be slain if there

appeared to be any danger that they would be rescued. Both these forms of 'frightfulness' were common in his day, and had been before. Edmund Verney, the gallant royalist gentleman who himself perished in Drogheda, slain after quarter given, had served long in the Irish wars. Writing to the ladies of his family in 1641 he describes a piece of service thus: 'We had 20 men slaine and 30 hurt, and 3 'officers shot; after, we put some four score men to the sword, 'but, like valiant knights errant, gave quarter and liberty to 'all the women.' It was not till the royalists came to be put to the sword themselves in stormed towns that they saw anything wrong in this ancient practice of the wars. Cromwell did what Wellington held he would have been justified in doing, and what Sir Thomas Hislop did not hesitate to do. Other examples could be given if we were to go on to more modern times and to the Sudan.

It is not necessary to labour to prove that war has been ferocious, but to say that the English have been as bad as the rest would be both untimely and unjust. Apart from the Scotch Border and the Irish wars, or wars with barbarians, in which we went as far as anybody, we have not been as cruel as other peoples have been. I will not say that that is because we have a double dose of original virtue. It is quite enough to note that we have not suffered invasion and have not been brutalised by its insults as most of our neighbours have been at different times. Forty years ago there were still old Spaniards who could remember the 'France-'sada.' To hear them talk and see their fury was an education in what subjection to 'licentious' foreign soldiery will do to barbarise the very soul of a people. We have not suffered that for many centuries, and if we are less ferocious in war than some others, perhaps our most becoming attitude is to say—there, but for the grace of God, who put us on an island and gave our defence to a fleet, goes the Englishman. Napier tells the story of the young Portuguese soldier who was executed for murdering an old Frenchman and his wife in 1814. He was a well-behaved man, not given to plundering or other military sins. Yet he killed those poor old people deliberately. He made no attempt to escape, nor did he expect to be pardoned. He only said that his own father and mother had been murdered by French soldiers, and that

he had sworn to take an equal revenge. Would no Englishman or Scot have done the same thing if he had had the same memory to make a savage of him?

The natural instinct of mankind is to think that war consists in killing your enemies, and that the more you kill the fewer will there be left to retaliate on you. Yet, from very early periods, and among quite barbarous peoples, this primitive view has been modified in action. The modification has not been due to humanity of sentiment. 'L'homme,' said Molière's Orgon, 'est, je vous l'avoue, un méchant animal.' When he has spared in battle he has commonly been restrained from slaughter by the hope of profit. He enslaved his prisoners, or he kept them for ransom. Even kings of Assyria did not kill all. They took many captives and set them to work. The knight of the Middle Ages fought to win a ransom, and gave quarter that he might earn money. The Black Prince spared the French knights at Limoges, when he massacred the townsmen. Class feeling may have had something to do with his restricted mercy. A certain noble cavalier of German birth who followed the honourable profession of arms was once about to attack a caravan of traders. As he was beginning to ride forward he saw a pack of wolves come out of a wood and fall on a flock of sheep. Whereupon he stood up in his stirrups and shouted 'Good luck to us all, gentlemen.' The knight, and the professional soldier who was his successor, were much inclined to acknowledge the brothership of the wolves.

The standing reason why men during many centuries abstained from killing was that they hoped for profit. They took their enemy prisoner to win his ransom, either directly from him or by selling him for money down to some capitalist speculator of the stamp of our own Sir John Fastolf, who then applied pressure to obtain the best return for his investment. That was the true inwardness of the greater mercy which chivalry (the theme of immeasurable ignorant talk) is credited with having introduced into the practice of war. It was a pure and simple question of profit. When the Lord Grey of Queen Elizabeth's time put the Spanish and Italian adventurers to the sword at Smerwick, he spared the officers. They could pay for their lives and the men could not. Ransom was a great business. Froissart has a

good deal to say about 'making finances.' A prisoner who was found to be unable to pay might look to be, at the best, treated as if he had been the captive of Barbary pirates at Algiers. Sometimes he defrauded his captors by concealing his quality, but if he was detected the consequences of his meanness were dire. A distinguished Austrian officer whose pleasing name was the Beloved Devil—Erasmus Teufel—became prisoner to Soliman the Magnificent. He tried to cheat the Turk by concealing his rank, but his dishonesty was discovered. Soliman caused him to be sewn in a sack and thrown into the Bosphorus. And we may be sure that Sir John Fastolf would have behaved not otherwise than the malignant and the turbaned Turk.

The relations of the wolf to the sheep were always bad. How bad they were we can see in the first pages of that most strange book 'Simplicissimus,' or in the drawings of Jacques Callot. The soldier plundered, murdered, violated. The peasant retaliated whenever he got the upper hand by knocking his natural enemy on the head. One of Callot's inimitable and bedevilled etchings shows a body of peasants eagerly engaged in beating a handful of tired out soldiers to death with flails. And there is plenty of sober evidence to prove that these were no mere romances. There was a very slow change for the better down to the Napoleonic Wars.

As between themselves the soldiers were relatively moderate. Until the revolutionary period every army in Europe consisted in part of foreign mercenaries. These men, when they were regularly paid, would do their duty in battle and siege. They would play the game, but there was among them little personal hostility for one another. Even the rule which the Duke approved of, and Napier thought was a remnant of barbarism, that a garrison which stood an assault when the walls were breached had no claim to quarter, was a part of the game. The soldier who put a besieging force to the hazard and loss of a storm showed a contumacious determination to inflict the maximum of injury on his enemy with no reasonable prospect of final success for himself. It was only fair, only a part of the game, that he too should suffer the utmost. But the fight once over, the professional soldier was generally disposed to look upon his brother who fought on the other side as one of the family. Even when he was not

a foreigner serving for pay and careless of the cause, the soldier of the old stamp followed a trade. 'Dynastic wars' did not stir his passions violently. It was his business to fight, and he fought. He nothing did in hate, but all in honour.

The irregular fighter was indeed not entitled to the courtesy which the real soldiers were always ready to extend to one another. 'Partisans,' as they used to be called, were never unknown. Marlborough, when expostulating against some excess committed by a warrior of this stamp who fought on the French side, complained that he had abused the licence of a partisan. But these bodies were akin to the privateers in naval war. They were bands of irregulars who could be useful, but who fought for licence and plunder. They would not punctually observe the rules of 'clubbable behaviour,' and they tempted men to desert from the regular troops. Every privateer, said Nelson, was half a pirate, and the navy detested him. The partisan was half a brigand, and the professional soldier disliked him. He barbarised war, which was barbarous enough without his help. The bands of Mina or Julian Sanchez in Spain and Schill's followers in Germany were, it is true, not mere partisans. They fought for a national cause. But they inherited the discredit of the old partisan bands. It was not altogether without good cause that the French were harsh with them, or that Wellington in 1814 threatened fire and sword if guerrillero bands were formed against him in France. They would not play the game. They had no scruple in killing a poor devil of a sentry, or a straggler, or sick and wounded men. They used the quartered bullet —that is to say, the round musquet bullet with four cuts, one above, another below, and others on each side, which expanded in the wound and mangled horribly. War to them consisted in killing enemies wherever found, and in any way, for if they fought in honour they also fought in hate. The Empecinado, Chapalangarra, the Marquisito, &c., were gallant men and good Spaniards, but they made war more ferocious, and they left behind them a dreadful inheritance. The anarchy of Spain for half a century was largely due to predispositions which the guerrilleros had established. To keep down war of this kind, even by stern measures, is not pure cruelty even to the side for which the guerrillero fought.

The misfortune is that in proportion as peoples and armies

become identical, and as dynastic wars are replaced by national struggles, so does the guerrillero spirit, the individual hate for the man on the other side, tend to extend itself to all armies. It is no longer a question whether King Picrochole shall or shall not enforce his claims to this or the other frontier province of King Gargantua. The strife is not carried on by men working at their trade. A national cause is fought for by those whose personal interests are at stake. One side will try for a 'weltmacht.' The other will make an object of destroying the nationality of the aggressor. Learned men on both sides say as much, and they have the ear of the people. A very large fund of natural optimism (to put the thing in the most polite way) is required to inspire a confidence that wars are likely to become more humane when they are promoted and conducted by the fury of national passion.

We have, in fact, before our eyes evidence to show that the contrary is the case. When the Napoleonic war began again, on the breach of the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon interned all the English who happened to be in France. He justified his action by pointing out that England made a practice of seizing all the French merchant ships it found at sea when war was declared. We replied that this was an ancient practice and a customary right, but that what he had done was a novelty and a barbarism. To-day all nations follow Napoleon's example. If any complaint has been heard it is that the work has not been done thoroughly. And when army and people are one this harshness has become inevitable. All German fencible men whom we allowed to go home would have been called on to serve against us. But though intelligible and inevitable, the measure is none the less harsh and tends to embitter. Humanity has certainly not gained on that side.

Nor has it on another. In the eighteenth century one of the first steps taken in war was to arrange a cartel for the exchange of prisoners. The creation of professional armies, and the general increase in material prosperity which provided the means for supporting captives, had introduced the custom of giving quarter to all ranks, and not only to those who could pay ransom. The belligerents were ready to exchange man for man, or men for rank. Napoleon was as bitterly blamed for refusing to exchange prisoners with the British Government, even when the terms offered him were

very good, as he was for interning the travellers. To-day all Powers follow his example. We hear nothing of cartels of exchange except in the case of prisoners who are too crippled to be able to render military service. Here is another instance in which the modern practice is less humane than the old. The world has gone a step back towards the ancient tendency to kill the enemy, whom it was burdensome to keep as a prisoner. We are still a long way off that barbarism, and we shall not travel so far in our time. But we are on the road which leads to that goal. Already the results are seen in the sufferings of prisoners. If the Power which holds the greater number is also the poorer, the captives of war must share the hardships of those who have taken them. The policy of refusing exchanges, which we adopted in the Boer War, is intelligible and profitable when it weakens the enemy, but it does not tend to humanity. It is for one thing only too likely to lead to short commons for the prisoners.

During the two generations which followed the Napoleonic wars fierce things were done in the suppression of revolts, and still more in the conflicts between civilised and barbarous peoples. In those cases the maxim that the severities which hasten the end of the struggle are in reality humane has been much acted on and large interpreted. None the less, the tendency seemed to be to favour whatever was likely to render war less ferocious. But a great change took place within recent years. Military writers began to insist complacently on the wisdom of making war as injurious as possible. Writers who were military only in sympathy began to keep them company. Talk has been interpreted into act. We have seen the 'horrors of war' displayed before our eyes in Belgium by a nation which boasts of its humanity. The atrocities which were simply acts of ferocity or of lust, committed by individual officers and men, are not the worst. Acts no less revolting have been done by brutal natures in all armies,—by British soldiers as well as by others. The Germans deny that such things have been condoned by them, and the denial is at least a proof that they consider them too shameful to be confessed. The real charge against them is that the Government has not only permitted but directed a policy of terror, and that the nation apparently approves of what its rulers have done.

The spectacle is shocking, and it is not to be accounted for by the easy explanation that the whole German people is brutal and hypocritical. We had best put such rhetorical invective aside, and try to understand how it comes that a race of men whom most of us know by meeting its members, and whom we have found to be quite human, is capable of acting in the manner we see. Analyse as we please, there will always be something which escapes the test. There is a difference between the Burgundy of France and the Burgundy of Australia, which to the analytical chemist appear to be identical. There are deliveries of mankind's self which have no name. But though the causing causes may escape discovery—or at any rate be very open to dispute—the immediate causes are not difficult to name. They are primarily the results of the contemplation of—not to say the gloating over—a certain theory of war. The theory is sufficiently well expounded in the German War Book.

The greater—by far the greater—part of the little treatise is as innocent as such a thing can be. It contains the mere commonplaces of the conduct of war. Even when the book condones, or rather recommends, the use of fraud it can be easily paralleled from our own authorities. Lord Wolseley was a British officer and a gentleman. Yet he jeers at those who think that lying in war ought to be forbidden to the cavaliers who follow the honourable profession of arms, and says that their moral sentiments are mere copy-book headings. He agreed with Mahomet, that the lies which the captain tells in war to deceive the enemy are pardonable, and thought that it was the duty of every general to mislead his opponent if he could, by action, by reticence, and when these devices were not enough, then by downright statement of the thing which was not.

But there is a heavy-footed insistence, a dull persevering dwelling on what is ugly in the German book which gives the impression that the authors like the subject. They almost seem to lick their lips in this passage :

' Bribery of the enemy's subjects with the object of obtaining military advantages, acceptance of offers of treachery, reception of deserters, utilisation of the discontented elements in the population, support of pretenders, and the like, are permissible ; indeed international law is in no way opposed to the exploitation

of the crimes of third parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the like) to the prejudice of the enemy.'

Now, use has been made of the crimes of third parties in many wars. What else was the British Government doing when it aided Georges Cadoudal and his associates to bring about what was decently referred to as 'the event'? It was helping a man who went into France to organise an attempt to kidnap the 'First Consul.' Cadoudal knew, and so did all the world, that General Bonaparte would almost certainly be killed if the attack on him was made. His venture was neither more nor less than a plot to murder.

Reluctance to tell the ugly truth in plain words may be mere hypocrisy. Our constant efforts to hide the real character of what we were doing have been quoted as scandalous examples of 'British cant.' Yet, after all, what men are unwilling to avow they will be the less likely to do. If the Germans find a lively pleasure in giving the utmost prominence to what other people do not parade, the reason presumably is that they are more inclined to make use of these shady resources. This disposition, this leaning to make the most of what may be at times necessities, but ought never to be treated as acceptable, comes out constantly in the German War Book. It is in the tone of the following passages:

'What is permissible includes every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained: what is reprehensible, on the other hand, includes every act of violence and destruction which is not demanded by the object of the war.'

'In the matter of making an end of the enemy's forces by violence it is an incontestable and self-evident rule that the right of killing and annihilation in regard to the hostile combatants is inherent in the war power and its organs, that all means which modern inventions afford, including the fullest, most dangerous and most massive means of destruction may be utilised: these last, just because they attain the object of war as quickly as possible, are on that account to be regarded as indispensable and, when closely considered, the most human' (*sic*, but the word should surely be humane).

There is little in the mere words of the passages quoted above to which any soldier, or even any layman who knows by study what war is, would object. Yet they would cover the acts of Suchet at Lérida. He had a definite military object to attain. He wished to precipitate the fall of a fortress

which was strong in itself, and was still stronger when it was looked upon as a part of the total forces of his enemy in the field, able to give and to receive support. A prolonged resistance would have laid him open to attacks from other quarters, which it would have been difficult for him to resist. Was he justified in what he did? Humanity and honour revolt against the supposition that he was.

It is to be noted that he never repeated his own cruel feat, though he profited by what he did at the time. He was condemned by the silent public opinion of his fellow soldiers and his countrymen. His excuse they saw, as Napier did, to have been true in fact, and yet the deduction he drew from his premise led to the perpetration of one of those offences against humanity and self-respect of which no man of honour would allow himself to be guilty. Their revolt against the results of their own theories was no doubt illogical, or even irrational. But these men were not pedants. They did not believe that they were bound to accept as rules of conduct all the deductions which some player at a mechanical game of dialectics could deduct from a premise and carry to its 'logical conclusion.'

Now it is most unhappily the case that the great faults of the German are pedantry and sentimentality. They can go well together. Sentimentality is perfectly capable of becoming blood-thirsty. When it is strongly excited, indeed, it very commonly does. And pedantry is prepared to supply reasons for cruelty when it is first provided with a premise from which to draw deductions by a process which, when the trick is once learnt, is as easy as working a pump-handle, and far less fatiguing. The premise has been quoted above, the deductions have been drawn by the pedantic theorists on war, whose names are now familiar to us all. The result has been seen at Louvain and at many other places where the Germans of to-day have shown themselves nowise superior in humanity to the brutes of the 'Thirty Years' War.'

All this would be bad enough if we were fighting now with the weapons of 1870. But when we read the copious accounts supplied us of the tremendous efficiency of modern weapons, doubts arise as to how far science will allow modern war to be humane. How is humanity to be reconciled with the use of weapons which grow ever more destructive and

produce their effect at ever growing distances? And where are we to draw the line?

The question is no new one. When the hero who lives in history as John of the Black Bands was mortally wounded by a falconet shot in 1526, there were not a few cavaliers who began to think that war was ceasing to be an occupation for a gentleman. It was degraded when a base mechanical fellow making use of a match and villainous saltpetre could slay the best lance of his time at a distance. And that is what has always been said when one side succeeded in springing a destructive novelty on the other. The innovator was denounced—and imitated. It would be superfluous to quote evidence to prove such a universally known fact. The process by which science, beginning with gunpowder and advancing to high explosives, has rendered war so horrible may be defended. When men fought with the white arm and aimed at capturing for ransom, there was little reason why wars which were, or were expected to be, profitable and not very dangerous to the combatants should ever cease. The peasants and townsmen whom the fighting men oppressed had as good as no say. The fighting men knew that peace would lead to their being turned adrift, and very probably hanged when they took to highway robbery as their only means of support. It is the loss inflicted on the actual combatants which shortens wars. Therefore we ought perhaps to welcome every improvement in the 'massive' powers of destruction of modern weapons. The argument has been often advanced and looks plausible. Yet, rational as it looks, it does not tend to humanity.

There is a barbarism of thought of a very penetrating order in the train of reasoning which concludes by fixing men's minds on the problem how to inflict the maximum of death and pain at the greatest possible distance and the least hazard to themselves. An entire change is made in the whole ideal of the soldier. One has to go back continually to the inexhaustible treasures of Napier for examples and illustrations. He tells how, in the course of the fighting on the Pyrenees, a British officer, who had occasion to intervene at a critical moment, first marshalled his regiment to perfection and advanced in exact order to the sound of the fifes and drums. He had, Napier says, the true spirit of a soldier. Men who

in his circumstances would have done like him would be said, and justly, to act like fools if they imitated him now. They would only send their gallant men to instant destruction. The ideal of to-day is not Napier's. It is to take cover, to hide, to kill from a distance—suddenly, if possible—with a new and more destructive weapon if you can, and the perfection of the thing is to run no risk while you are killing your opponent, if only you can achieve that triumph. It is inevitable, and it is common sense. Science applied to war has imposed the new standard on us by providing weapons which it would be madness to treat like a Brown Bess ; it is useless to complain or to regret.

But does the ingenuity of science work for humanity ? Which is more likely to produce a callous indifference—the practice of marching upright, taking your risks boldly and even gaily, or the other practice of killing what you cannot see ? Which method requires the greater courage is not a question we will consider. Nothing this war has produced goes to show that the ' courage of the common soldier,' which Gibbon in the least pleasant tone of the eighteenth century judged to be the cheapest of all commodities, is less now than it ever was.

Granting that the object is to produce the maximum of harm at the least cost to yourself by using the inventions of science, at what point does the use of scientific ingenuity become shameful ? Allow that you may develop a combination of gun and propulsive exploding gases which will hurl for many miles a shell which is itself charged with other explosive gases, capable not only of scattering a murderous shower of fragments, but of killing by their fumes ; why is it unlawful to pour a poisonous gas directly on your enemy ? It is the novelty of the act more than its intrinsic barbarity which makes it hateful. Moreover, it is at once imitated and another step backwards is taken in the barbarism of war.

There are combinations of weapons which by their very nature are barbarous—the torpedo with the submarine and the bomb with the airship. When Fulton wrote his ' Torpedo War and Submarine Explosions ' he had to argue his case with ' men ' who ' without reflecting, or from attachment to established and familiar tyranny, exclaim that it is

'barbarous to blow up a ship with all her crew.' Yes, he replied, it is barbarous, but so it is to beggar men by capturing their property at sea. So it was in the English to bombard Copenhagen, to burn a church and hundreds of houses. So it would be if they came here to New York (he was writing in America in 1810) to bombard us. We have a good right to blow them up if we can, and I am showing you how to do it. If the English come, knowing that they may be blown up, 'the inhumanity must be charged to them and not to the 'American government or to this invention.'

Fulton was a forerunner, a prophet who had little honour in his own time, but we see the result of the seed he cast abroad. The submarine has come, and of course it is not used only for defence. Just before the war Sir Percy Scott predicted that the submarine, acting in the only way it can, would be used to enforce blockade by sinking ships at sight. He was told that he was wrong because International Law forbade the destruction of merchant ships which had not been summoned, and before their crews had been taken out of them. The Germans have undertaken to show that Sir Percy was right, and that his critics had overrated the influence of International Law. They have pushed the use of the torpedo to its logical conclusion.

But anterior to them were the inventors who provided the weapons which by a process as sure as gravitation were destined to be so used by somebody. The barbarous act has been the natural outcome of the barbarous weapon. To say that we have gained formidable successes against the submarine is a poor consolation. What we see is the early youth of the thing. The pouring out of gas from tubes will probably, as one hopes, lead to little. The poison can be easily guarded against, and is very liable to turn on those who have employed it. But the submarine has a future. The Germans were not leaders in the use of this essentially cruel instrument of war. They were tardy and reluctant imitators. But they have used it with the same brutal determination to go to the logical extreme that they showed when they inflicted their positively Assyrian penalty on Louvain for an alleged abuse of irregular methods in warfare. It is only too probable that their example will be followed as Napoleon's has been.

There is about the airship something even more essentially barbarous than there is in the submarine. The amount of

actual damage they have done has not been great. Mere riotous outbreaks, such as the No Popery Riots in London, or the Bristol Riots of the Reform time, have done more harm than all the bomb throwing from airships in this war so far. What makes them horrible and threatens to make them an instrument of degradation to all alike, is the disposition to kill for killing's sake, which must be shown in the use of them. A swift rush of aircraft dropping bombs will never force a fortified town to surrender, nor subdue a country. There is so great a difficulty in being sure of the bearings of such objects as fortifications, buildings for military purposes, railways etc., in misty weather or by night, that the aircraft can never rely on hitting them. The bombs thrown to fall on them strike the helpless non-combatants of both sexes and all ages in the great majority of cases. We know as much by experience, and the Germans know it as well as we. If then the airship is used, it must be with the knowledge that certain consequences will follow. The legitimate military mark will in all probability be missed, and the blow will fall on the unarmed, on women and on children. We must believe that the injury done to them is looked upon as a useful alternative or secondary object. The more enemies you kill the fewer will be left. Panic may be created—at any rate damage will be done, and that is an argument of barbarism, leading to acts of mere barbarity.

There are some who have convinced themselves that this war will end in the destruction of 'militarism.' Let us hope they are right. But the usual consequence of a great war has been to produce more 'militarism.' That this one will be an exception is a mere prophecy, and therefore cannot be confuted. The distinguished Spanish man of science, Señor Ramon y Cajal, when at last he was worried into giving his opinion as to the consequences of the present war, said that neither side would win so completely as to destroy the other, and that the losing party would set about imitating the winner in the hope of one day taking its revenge. So the world will be the worse for it all. He was accused of a 'deso-' lating pessimism'; but imagining as one would, and believing what you wish to believe, are not the surest ways of reaching truth. When we next fight we shall but too probably start from a lower moral level.

DAVID HANNAY.

THE DESECRATION OF FRENCH MONUMENTS

1. **Les Allemands destructeurs de Cathédrales et de Trésors du Passé.** Paris: Hachette. 1915.
2. **Journal d'un Rémois, du 3 Septembre au 6 Octobre 1914.** Par Henri Jadart. Paris: Collection du 'Tour de France.' 1915.
3. **Les Villes Martyres de France et de Belgique.** Par Marius Vachon. Paris: Payot. 1915.

IT is well said, in the official report of the Sous-Secrétariat d'État des Beaux-Arts on the injuries done by the German invasion to the cities of France, that these cities have suffered 'in their flesh and in their spirit.' In other words, they have had to endure a double tribulation in the death, outrage, or other personal misery of their population, and in the destruction of those ancient buildings which were their heritage and their pride. All who are acquainted with French provincial life must be aware of the jealous enthusiasm with which the inhabitants of the principal country towns regard their local monuments. The municipal council may be as anti-clerical as it pleases; its individual members are no less proud of their cathedral than any abbé or *archiprêtre* could be. The spiritual life of the town revolves around the edifice which links it to a distant and glorious past, which encourages the combative pride of the population, and which even the peasants vaguely recognise as something dignified and of personal value to themselves.

In the present war there has been produced an element of destructive force which is, in its main essence, new to history, and which is excessively sinister. We are accustomed to that vague stupidity of destruction which is inevitably connected with the necessities of strategy. No general can endanger his safety or change his plan of attack because a beautiful building stands in the way. It is obvious that such æsthetic sensitiveness would be absurd and even blameworthy. Works of art must take their risk like human beings, if they have the misfortune to find themselves crushed in the embrace of conflicting armies. But in the campaigns of 1914–15 we find a new force

working in the ingenious brains of the German invaders. We find clear evidence of their determination, lucidly planned in advance, to destroy peaceful and beautiful towns which offered no resistance, simply because they were beautiful and were of the nature of spiritual assets to the opponent. The existence of this diabolical ingenuity of desecration has been very generally perceived in the case of Belgium, where the deliberate assassination of Louvain and Malines excited the horror of the whole civilised world. In France the same outrages have been perpetrated, but, with the exception of Reims, these seem as yet to have attracted less, or less definite, sympathy in England.

Against these acts, whether in France or in Belgium, no protest has been raised either in Germany or Austro-Hungary. On the contrary the servile and pedantic art-critics of the Central Empires have gloried in the humiliation of the artistic wealth of their neighbours. They have displayed the savage insensitiveness of which Heine prophesied. It seems to be no more than just to insist that, while more harrowing and more imminently pathetic details of human suffering pour in upon us, we should yet not forget to execrate the results of the fury of the disciplined Teutonic hordes on the treasures of French art. It is to be remembered that in the case of a country so sensitive, so highly cultivated, so elegantly educated as France, the historical monuments take a leading part in sustaining the national independence. They foster that due pride and resolution which support the national grandeur. It was with the definite intention of humbling their enemy in his tenderest susceptibilities that the Germans, armed by all the ingenuity of their science, coldly executed the destruction of Louvain and of Reims. It is impossible that the world of art can ever forget the crimes committed against it by these professorial vandals, and we think it well to put on record, as plainly as the shifting history of the passing hour will permit, the actual facts with regard to the desecration of French monuments. We have striven to exaggerate nothing, but to disengage from the often vague and always distracted testimony of survivors what is approximately the real state of affairs.

The crime committed against the incomparable Cathedral of Reims has awakened throughout the world an indignation only equalled and scarcely surpassed by the horrors of Louvain. It is noticeable that there was a difference of attitude in the

two cases. At Louvain, amid the appearance of unbridled frenzy, a perfectly cool calculation spared the one central building which might be a future asset to a victorious Germany. At Reims a parallel calculation was concentrated on the humiliation of France by the desecration of that 'Bible in 'stone' which was the peculiar glory and joy of every thoughtful Frenchman. To German *kultur*, Louvain might yet be something, Reims must ever be nothing, and on the German system of complete contempt for all things not Teutonic, to smash and burn the cradle of French patriotic sentiment was an amusing as well as a laudable feat. With the horrible erudition which makes their barbarity the more sickening, the Germans were well acquainted with the value, the beauty, the singularity of the great royal treasure-house at Reims. It was knowing all this, and armed with tiresome disquisitions and monographs, that they quietly resolved on a complete devastation of the Cathedral. The conversation of the Saxon commander with the Mayor of Reims is preserved, and is an appalling record of callous pedantry.

The national sentiment about Reims, as the cradle of French sovereignty, was first recognised, or rather was revived, ninety years ago when the government decided on the coronation there of Charles X. An alternative proposal had been that the ceremony should take place at St. Denis, and if this had prevailed it is probable that Reims would have remained no more sacred than other French cathedrals. We gather that its artistic value had been greatly neglected since the occupation of the city by the Allies in 1814, when much damage, not of a structural kind, was done to several of the noble churches of Reims. As soon as the coronation was decided upon, a work of restoration was begun in feverish haste, with the result that by May 1825 the Cathedral became much what it remained until the Commission of 1875 worked the will of Viollet-le-Duc upon it. The young Victor Hugo attended the ceremony, fired with enthusiasm for the essentially Gothic style of the church. In a letter to his wife (May 28, 1825) he wrote :

'Charles and I spent a quarter of an hour gazing at the arch of a single doorway ; we should need a year to see and to admire the whole. The interior, as they have arranged it, is much less beautiful than it was in its ancient nudity. They have painted the old granite blue, and have loaded the austere sculpture with gold-leaf

and tinsel. However, they have not repeated the mistake they made at St. Denis, the ornaments are gothic like the cathedral, and everything, except the throne, which is of the Corinthian order (how absurd !) is in good taste. The general effect is pleasing to the eye, and the more one reflects on the proportions of the structure, the more one sees that the best possible has been done. As it is, this decoration shows the progress of romantic ideas ; six months ago they would have turned the old church of the Franks into a Greek temple.'

The sentiment of a whole nation for the miraculous building, the Rose of the Kings of France, has been steadily growing during these ninety years, and it is not surprising that the outrages of September 1914 have awakened a greater rage and disgust than almost any other act of the invader. These feelings have found expression in a multitude of forms—in the poetry of M. Paul Fort, from which we quoted in our last number ; in the prose of M. Pierre Loti's ' La Basilique-Fantôme ' ; in the exhibition of innumerable paintings and photographs of the fane as it stood before last year and of its present lamentable and mutilated state. For this reason, we shall dwell less on the actual detail of damage done to the Cathedral than it would otherwise be needful to do, but rather concentrate our attention on matters of less importance which have been more neglected. In particular it is well to record briefly the exact history of the devastation.

It was on the 4th of September that the huge advancing wave of German invasion, making straight for Paris from Charleroi and Mézières, broke on the light hills of the Haute Champagne and paused in the Rémois. From an eminence outside they playfully threw a few bombs at the Cathedral, and smashed a little old glass. Then they occupied Reims, professing great veneration for the antiquities of the city, and they placed their own wounded in the nave of Notre Dame, as a special sign of the immunity of the Church itself. They stayed in Reims eight days, doing no particular harm, but on the 12th, when they evacuated the city, the bewildered inhabitants saw the soldiers heap up great masses of straw within the Cathedral. The Germans pretended that this straw was to form beds for the wounded, but at the same moment all the wounded were removed, and the straw left. Already a sinister suspicion was awakened in the minds of some of the inhabitants. The attitude of the invaders had

changed, and for the present nothing more was said about the Cathedral having been 'annexed to the German Empire.' After the defeat on the Marne, the general in command arrested eighty-one of the principal citizens as hostages, marched them off, and issued a proclamation that if anything was done by the inhabitants unpleasing to the German authorities, the hostages would immediately be executed, and on the return of the Germans 'the city would be entirely or partially burned, and 'the inhabitants hanged.' A facsimile of this atrocious poster, which would otherwise be almost incredible, has been circulated by the French government. Having given Reims this foretaste of their 'frightfulness,' the Germans evacuated the city in the evening.

On the morning of the 15th the bombardment began, at first vaguely, doing little harm. The great church was not hit until the 17th. But on the morning of the 18th shells began to fall with more and more precision and effect, aimed directly and continuously at the Cathedral. By the fall of the light, a serious chipping of the sculpture and of the corners of the masonry was visible. The 19th of September 1914, however, is the red-letter day of Hunnish vandalism. Exactly one hundred years before, the atrocious fanatic of Coblenz, J. J. von Görres, had fiercely urged his countrymen—in the *Rheinische Merkur* which Napoleon called *la cinquième puissance* —to 'reduce to ashes that basilica of Reims, where Klodovig 'was crowned, where was founded the empire of the Franks, 'false brethren of the noble Germans.' 'Burn that Cathedral,' Görres had shrieked; and now at last his prayer was heard. All through that dreadful 19th of September the shells fell in a continuous rain upon the almond-shaped centre of ancient buildings round the Cathedral and the Hôtel de Ville. The celebrated Gothic house, No. 57 rue de Vesle, was one of the first objects to be entirely destroyed, but as the day went on most of the houses of the Place Royale, the Quartier Cérès, the archbishop's palace and above all the interior of the Cathedral suffered the same fate. The bombardment came from the slight eminence to the north-east, not far from Fresnes. It was the fire in the scaffolding which broke out under the shells which did the greatest amount of damage.

It is not necessary to go in detail into the extent of the injury done to the Cathedral, the immense solidity of whose osseous

structure enabled it, in outward appearance, to sustain for a long time less complete destruction than the more fragile buildings around it. But as a wonderful living entity the existence of this glorious church was at an end. What was spared by this principal bombardment was lost when the Germans attacked Reims again on the 14th of October 1914, on the 19th of February 1915, and on subsequent occasions. The shell appears to be left, and opinions still differ among architects as to the degree to which it will be possible to 'restore' the battered basilica; the Germans, with their delicate tact, have suggested that a master-builder of their own might undertake the job. But in practical fact it is best for us to realise that as a work of art the outraged Cathedral is dead.

The peculiar glory of the exterior of Reims was its lace-work of exquisite medieval sculpture. Architectural critics have objected to this profusion of carved design as mitigating the grandeur of the principal lines of the building and as frittering away some part of its imposing majesty. But, as De Quincey reminds us, simplicity is not everything—Belshazzar's Feast was not simple. The great West Front of Notre Dame de Reims was rather to be looked upon as a gallery of intentional magnificence than as the entrance to a typical Christian church. The Gothic world contained no other such bewildering specimen of richness, mounting, unstinted, far up into the heavens and farther than the eye could reach. It is this priceless veil of sculpture that German brutality has destroyed, and this is the answer to those who declare that the general lines of the Cathedral have been preserved, so that its restoration is possible. This might be true of other cathedrals, which depend upon their proportions and their scheme. But Reims depended upon its wealth of exquisite devotional sculpture, carved by the artists of Charles V., and preserved, as by a miracle, through the dreadful fire of 1481, when the five leaden spires were melted, and poured through the streets in so many rivulets of burning lava. Let us consider the tribute of the most eminent of living sculptors. M. Auguste Rodin, just before the war, wrote of Reims:

> The cathedral soars above me like a flame. I pause before the portal. These figures of Saints, well competent to hurl the thunder-

bolt! These humble serving men, who carry the Book! This great figure of a majestic woman, the Law! The admirable St. Denis of the northern door-way carries his head in his hand, and two angels support a crown where the head should be. May I not see in this a symbol?'

On all these statues irremediable ruin, permanent desecration, has been poured by the ignoble barbarity of the Germans. It is said that a certain General Baron von Heeringen was the executor of this particular feat. Let not the name of so detestable a Herostratus be unrecorded on the roll of infamy!

In our anger at what has been done to the House of Kings, we are in danger of neglecting to record the damage of a lesser kind which has been perpetrated elsewhere in the pre-eminently picturesque city of Clovis. The nucleus of which we have spoken, bounded by the boulevards and by the Rue Chanzy, is believed to be entirely reduced to ruins. It was full of winding streets, arcaded pavements, ancient carved houses, and those which clustered round the Place d'Erlon, resting on pillars of stone or timber, were of endless variety and romantic charm. The curious façade of the church of St. Remi, in the square of the same name, far away at the eastern extremity of the city, and peculiarly exposed to the enemy, is said to be unrecognisable, its world-famous glass lying in dust on the desecrated floor. This, however, is far from being the first time that St. Remi has been forced to relinquish its treasures to the violence of an enemy; it suffered incalculable losses at the Revolution. The early seventeenth-century Hôtel de Ville; the brilliant little thirteenth-century chapel of the Archbishop's Palace; the Maison des Ménétriers, with its extraordinary frieze of life-sized statues, under Gothic arches, of minstrels playing on strange musical instruments of the thirteenth century; the sculptured fronts and arcades of the Place des Marchés,—all these are objects to which those who loved Reims in the past will look back with sorrow. We know not yet whether they are all of them entirely destroyed, but we shall be the less disappointed if we make up our minds to see them no more except in the volumes of archæologists.

One consolation, however, we may allow ourselves. Much anxiety was felt among art-lovers as to the fate of the celebrated tapestries which on feast-days gave such an aspect of sumptuousness to the interior of the Cathedral. The oldest

of these were presented by Archbishop Robert de Lenoncourt in 1530; there are fourteen of them, all dealing with subjects taken from the History of the Virgin, and they are particularly splendid in colour. They have not, however, the historical interest which attaches to those given in 1593 by Charles de Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine, called the Tapestries of the Mighty King Clovis, because one at least of these latter deals with the prowess of that peculiarly Remish monarch; however only two of these, and a fragment, out of the six which once existed, have reached our day. Finally, there are the Pepersack Tapestries presented by Archbishop Henry of Lorraine in 1633, which were kept in the Archiepiscopal Palace, but which the present writer had the privilege of seeing on an Easter Sunday many years ago, when the incalculable treasures of the church were simultaneously exposed before a dazzled audience. The earlier tapestries mentioned above were, it was at first reported, destroyed in the fire of the 19th of September, but fortunately, by a happy forethought, not everywhere displayed by the French local authorities, they had long before been packed up and sent to a safe and secret destination. But of the seventeen Pepersack pieces, only two have survived the bombardment and the fire. They were in artistic merit much inferior to the Lenoncourt and the Clovis sets. In the month of August 1915 all that had been preserved of the Reims Tapestries were produced from their hiding-place, and exhibited in Paris, at the Petit Palais. An elaborate quarto volume, produced by Madame M. Sartor in 1912, has fortunately preserved for us the detailed description and reproduction of those pieces which the Germans have now destroyed.

By far the most coherent account of the martyrdom of Reims is given by M. Henri Jadart in the remarkable journal which has been recently published in the collection, 'du Tour 'de France.' M. Jadart is the librarian of the city and the keeper of the Reims Museum. His original diary must be a very curious document; it was kept in pencil, on odd scraps of paper, and often written in the dark. The author refused to leave his post, and withdrew at length to the cellars of his museum, from which, whenever there was a lull in the cannonade, he emerged to note what fresh damage had been done to the sculptures, the documents, and the works of art.

His unaffected record is of extraordinary interest. We regret that we have no space to quote from it the tragical pages in which, on the 19th of September, he observed that the scaffolding on the northern tower of the Cathedral had at last taken fire, and in which he wrote down, hour by hour, the progress of the exterminating flames.

If, in time to come, the historians of Germany prove ingenious in proffering excuses for their violence at Reims, on pretexts of military necessity and what not, it is to be expected that they will do their best to prevent the bull's-eye of history from being flashed on their activities at Arras. The picturesque capital of the Artois offered no resistance to their armies, and its complete destruction was an act of wanton malice unsurpassed in the roll of Teutonic vileness. It is desirable to follow with considerable care the treatment of Arras, which has not received from English writers all the sympathy and interest which it deserves. Let it be admitted at once that Arras has not been, in past years, appreciated at its full value by English or even by French artists. It has never attracted the tourist, although in its completeness and strangeness it was one of the unique treasures of the north of Europe. In our guide-books, our Joannes and our Baedekers, little has ever been said to draw the man 'for 'whom the visible world exists' to any places in which the monuments are not either antique or medieval. Since the days of Viollet-le-Duc, what has occupied French critics is largely the ecclesiastical architecture of the later Middle Ages and early Renaissance, for examples of which, as all the world is aware, Northern France is richly, and even lavishly, conspicuous.

But there is another source of picturesque beauty in France of which the guide-books know little and care less. This is the domestic architecture of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. It gave a peculiar charm to many Flemish towns, most of which have perished in the course of this war. It was to be met with, less abundantly, in several towns of the north-eastern corner of France, although in the majority of cases already reduced in extent by fires and reconstruction. Yet, here and there, little patronised by art-critics, there remained precious relics of it, such as the solemn and stately Place Ducale of Charleville, with its wall of high-roofed seven-

teenth-century houses. Charleville, now in the deepest segment of the enemy's occupation of France, may or may not still exist : it is difficult to obtain any information. But of this Flemish, or Spanish, style of sixteenth-century domestic architecture, Arras was the principal example left in France ; and as our taste became more and more emancipated from a servilely exclusive admiration of Gothic, Arras would more and more have been appreciated as one of the jewels of Europe. It may safely be said that Arras was destroyed before the world had quite waked up to a sense of the treasure it was neglecting.

Before the war of 1870, Arras must have been in its own way one of the most perfect things in Europe, for it was snugly enclosed in the admirable double line of fortifications built by Vauban in 1670. These were destroyed after the peace, and their ruin gave the external view of Arras a slovenly and dingy appearance. But within the crumbled cincture of fortifications the little city was perfect until the summer of last year. Arras is slightly raised above the vast plain of the southern Artois ; it was the Nemetacum of the Atrebates, a stronghold from the very earliest ages of history. There has been an unbroken line of Bishops of Arras for more than fourteen hundred years. Although it had undergone bitter vicissitudes, of which the worst was its capture by storm, and complete depopulation, by Louis XI. in 1479,—when he destroyed the very name, and re-colonised Arras under the title of Franchise,—yet it had retained, or since the fifteenth century regained, its appearance of romantic unity. In the other towns of that district, in Valenciennes, for instance, or Douai, or even Cambrai, a house here and there, or a cluster of buildings, may preserve the Hispano-Flemish character, but the tourist has to ' make believe ' a great deal to conjure up a relative antiquity. But in Arras the illusion was complete, the evidence of ancient state abundant.

The centre of attraction was the Belfry, built in 1554, which soared up, the highest of its kind in France, from the heart of the Upper Town. The way to visit Arras, so as to enjoy the exquisite impression of its ripe and warm beauty, was to make for the Belfry by pushing up to the pleasant Jardin Saint Vaast, where a nucleus was formed by the Bishop's Palace, the Cathedral, and the Library-Museum. Thence winding

lanes, so narrow as to darken midday, led to the Petite Place, the western end of which was almost closed by the huge bulk of the Hôtel de Ville. Behind this magnificent obstacle the square expanded, and revealed a complete series of houses built during the Austrian occupation, before 1654, when Spanish taste ruled in domestic architecture. This was surprising enough, but a narrow lane at right angles from the top of the Petite Place brought the wanderer abruptly out into the Grande Place, which was more amazing still. One had here the illusion of being transplanted to the scene of one of Callot's topographical engravings. The Grande Place was the most untouched example of its kind in Western Europe, a huge open space, without monuments, unpaved to the doorsteps of the houses, surrounded by arcades that rested on rude stone pillars, and diversified along the sky-line by an endless series of graceful and fantastic gables. These, and the ancient houses of the tortuous and exiguous Rue St. Géry, leading out of the right side of the Petite Place, comprised, with the Hôtel de Ville, the city's real artistic wealth, which did not consist in its churches. The beauty and value of Arras were civic.

At the end of August 1914, after the battles of Charleroi and Mons, the German army swept in a south-westerly direction through the north of France. Its right wing passed, almost without meeting any resistance, through the Nord and the Pas de Calais, pausing on the night of the 5th of September in the valley of the Scarfe under the dilapidated walls of Arras, which the Germans entered next morning. The French, in retreating, had removed all men of military age, and the Germans found only a sad multitude of women, children, and aged men. They stayed in Arras three days, disgracing themselves by a good deal of pillage, but not of murder, nor did they destroy or injure any building. They left the city on the 9th of September, and they did not reappear until after the battle of the Marne. The combat went on raging in the neighbourhood of Arras for three or four weeks, but the town was never the scene of actual hostilities. The enemy hoped to re-capture it, and their forces swayed to and fro in its direction ; sometimes, even, their sallies brought them quite close to it, but there were no combatants in Arras itself. But where the Germans showed a temper of extra-

ordinary malignity was in their conduct when they found themselves finally being pushed away out of the Arras district, in the direction of Vimy and Lens. It was then, and not till then, that they deliberately directed their siege artillery against the city.

It must never be forgotten, in the eternal blazon of Germany's misdeeds, that their army bombarded Arras uselessly, even extravagantly, for no military purpose, but as an act of vengeance in the rage of defeat. On the 6th of October, at 9 A.M., there was not a single soldier of the Allies in any part of Arras. The Germans, although they had nothing to fear and because they had no longer anything to gain, positively delayed their own action in order to indulge their spite. The first shell was deliberately aimed at the majestic Belfry, which soared into the autumn sky, topped with its ducal crown, and on the very summit a colossal ramping lion carrying a pennon. Into the morning air its three great bronze bells were ringing its famous carillon of 1434. Although in its altitude of seventy-five metres, dominating all the country round, the substantial Belfry offered an obvious aim, the German artillery-men failed at first to hit it, and then they turned to the Hôtel de Ville. They soon pierced its roof and smashed the delicate, highly decorated façade. It is said that one thousand shells fell in Arras that first day. The Germans redirected their attention to the Belfry, which long resisted, but fell at the sixty-ninth blow that struck it, and littered the Petite Place with confused ruin. Then the cannonade abruptly ceased, as though upon this act of destruction should follow in the German camp a period of gratulation and rest.

The firing presently began again. The aim of the German guns had now become extremely accurate, and it was quite obvious that they were acting on a deliberate system. They completely destroyed the houses of the Petite Place, and then those of the Grande Place, which were fired at day after day until nothing remained but a shapeless dust-heap. They concentrated their attention on the whole line of the Rue St. Géry and wiped it out of existence. For a week the cannonade did not cease. On the 7th of October, that is to say at the very beginning of the attack, the Bishop reported to the French Government that his cathedral was uninhabitable

and that the church of St. Jean Baptiste was eviscerated Of these buildings, the most notable of an ecclesiastical order in Arras, nothing but unrecognisable rubbish was left a few days later. We must not exaggerate, even in our indignation, and it is impossible to say that art was made much the poorer by the devastation of the churches of Arras. The Cathedral of the Abbey of St. Vaast had, to be frank, no architectural value ; it was built on the site of the cathedral demolished at the Revolution, and 1833 was a bad moment in French architecture. St. Jean Baptiste had been a fine, rather late Gothic church, but had been spoiled by tasteless restoration. On the other hand, the Hôtel de Ville, which was built by Carron at the close of the fifteenth century, was one of the finest edifices of its class in the country. It was extraordinarily rich in surface ornament, which had been effectively restored. As a proof of the way in which Arras was taken by surprise, it is said that no effort had been made to remove to a place of safety the archives of the city, which were stored in the Palais de Saint Vaast. These are understood to be completely destroyed, together with the manuscripts and painted missals, which enjoyed a certain celebrity.

It is worth while to remember that the German general in command, mildly brought to book by some of his own countrymen for his unprovoked outrage on Arras, replied, in 'Der Tag': 'My troops and I owe no explanation to anyone ; we have 'nothing to justify, nothing to excuse.'

The world of Paris nourished a peculiar sentiment of affection for the romantic little town of Senlis, in the Ile de France. 'Ô ma blanche Senlis, la plus douce à nommer,' a French poet has sung, and if any place divided his loyalty with Senlis, it could only be the delicious La Ferté-Milon. But there was really no rival to the Lily of the Ile de France in the hearts of Parisians, who could just include its delicate perfection in the scope of a not too tiring day's excursion. The present writer remembers, in all his manifold wanderings over the fair fields of France, nothing more enchanting, nothing of a more phantasmal beauty, than the ascent of Senlis as one approached it along the straight white road running almost exactly westward from Crépy-en-Valois, the spire of the cathedral soaring in the sunshine. It seemed to spring out of the dark embattled mass of the old Roman ramparts, with their sixteen towers, and

inside the fold of them the Royal Castle of the twelfth century. There was another lightness, another elegance, about the lovely town as it rose before the visitor, when he viewed it from the south across the winding and troubled waters of the Nonette, but from every point of view it was chiefly its incomparable cathedral to which it owed its beauty. It was 'le beau doigt de Senlis,' pointing to the sky, that lifted the heart to ecstasy.

On close inspection, the cathedral lost nothing of its distinctive charm. It dates from the year 1155, and it is acknowledged to be one of the finest examples surviving of Early Gothic. It had been injured, but not spoilt, by some rash reconstruction early in the sixteenth century. The main portal regaled the lingering eye by its extreme richness in strange and violent sculpture. Like so many great churches of its class, a certain awkwardness was inevitable in the inequality of its towers, the right-hand one having never been finished. It was the left-hand tower which commanded the landscape, especially when one came from the direction of Crépy-en-Valois ; it was, and indeed is, a miracle of grace and delicacy, lifting its pinnacle eighty metres from the pavement.

It was from Crépy-en-Valois that the marauding Germans came down upon Senlis. In the beginning of September, the long wave of Teutonic invasion swept over the north-eastern frontier of the Ile de France. They had occupied Lunéville on the 28th of August. Some fighting had already gone on in the neighbourhood of Senlis, when in the early afternoon of the 2nd of September a shell struck the spire of the Cathedral and exploded. The German guns were posted at the outlying hamlet of Chamont, and from that point they poured, for an hour and a half, a shower of shells upon the Cathedral. This bombardment ceased, but the Germans were seen to approach the town along the Crépy-en-Valois road. The mayor, a M. Odent, called his municipal council around him, and then dismissed them, sitting alone in the Town Hall to await the arrival of the enemy. It seems that, Senlis being an open town, and its population entirely inoffensive, the mayor had no serious apprehension of damage. What followed has been variously related, the confusion and terror of the witnesses tending to obscure the sequence of events. But, as usual, a troop of soldier-cyclists seems to have formed the vanguard of

the invaders, and these men immediately seized the archpriest of Senlis, the venerable Abbé Dourlent. They forced him to take them up to the summit of the cathedral, from which they pretended that shots had been fired at them. The Abbé told them that he alone had the key, and that it had not passed out of his possession. Upon this, and in view of this proof of innocence, the Germans proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville, where they found the unfortunate mayor seated, it is said, in the act of writing out a proclamation to the citizens. Him they arrested, and in company with several leading inhabitants, took away to Chamont, where, in the course of the evening, all these innocent civilians were murdered in cold blood at the order of the commanding officer.

The reason of the horrors of Senlis has never been divulged. But the German commander told the Abbé Dourlent,—who was imprisoned at the Hôtel du Grand Cerf and threatened, but whose life was ultimately spared,—that he had been ordered to make of Senlis 'a French Louvain.' 'Senlis 'est condamnée,' he said, 'cette nuit même la ville va être 'entièrement brûlée.' They started systematically with the principal street of the town, the Rue de la République, a thoroughfare containing handsome houses of the eighteenth century, the dwellings of the leading citizens. With the utmost calm, employing all the ingenious incendiary contrivances which they had used in Belgium, the German soldiers passed along the street, house by house, until nearly the whole was destroyed. Then, as is conjectured, other orders must have arrived from head-quarters, for the destruction of Senlis abruptly ceased. It is difficult to divine the reason of the vindictive violence of the officer who directed these outrages. Senlis was absolutely harmless, an open town with no French soldiers in it. It seems to be quite certain that no civilian had made any attack whatever on the invaders. The pretence that there had been firing from the summit of the Cathedral could not be supported in the face of the Abbé Dourlent's explanation, and in fact seems to have been dropped. The murder of the hostages and the burning of the Rue de la République are therefore inexplicable, and in the whole war no crimes have been committed more senseless or more perfidious.

The damage done by shells to the Cathedral was considerable,

especially in the upper regions of the tower. Several of the crockets of the spire, some of the pinnacles, the heads which decorated the bases of these pinnacles, the balustrade above the main façade, a statue, a gargoyle, are mentioned in the official report as having been destroyed. The roof was penetrated at several points, but on the whole there seems to have been nothing accomplished on the surface of the cathedral which careful restoration cannot render invisible. The lovely apparition of Senlis will continue to shine from afar like a lily and like a lamp. Evidently, the conflagration was stopped before it reached the church of St. Vincent ; and no bombs are recorded to have fallen on the Abbey of St. Frambourg, a noble fragment close to the Cathedral. Each of these buildings is of the twelfth century. Moreover, the winding street of precious houses of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, which descends at the south to the waters of the Nonette, appears to be untouched. In short, Senlis, after a terrible alarm, escaped as a brand from the burning.

It is difficult to gain an impression of the present state of Soissons, which has had the misfortune to lie on the exact fighting line at the point where the curve between Noyon and Reims bulges nearest to Paris. Its geographical position on the left bank of the Aisne, has always laid Soissons open to violent attack ; during the Napoleonic wars Blücher's army inflicted serious damage on it, and the Prussians were not easily dislodged. It was besieged again, and occupied by the Russians in 1815. The existing town was laid out, a quadrilateral of streets within ramparts, after the last-mentioned occupation, and it is only the centre of Soissons, where the cathedral is muffled up in ancient houses, which preserves any medieval character. In October 1870 the Germans shelled the town for three successive days, and took it, but the damage done on that occasion was not noticeable a year or two afterwards, except so far as regards the splendid abbey church of St. Jean-des-Vignes, which was severely knocked about. This abbey is of special interest to us English, because Thomas à Becket spent here nine years of his exile. The German bombardment of 1870 wounded the glorious thirteenth-century façade of this monument, but not irreparably.

In the present war, a novel feature of attack was that the ancient monuments, especially all ecclesiastical buildings of

great value, were carefully aimed at by the enemy, which forty-four years earlier had shown some ingenuity in avoiding them. Consequently, when Soissons was first bombarded, on the nights of the 24th and 25th of September 1914, the Cathedral was deliberately aimed at. It was struck at several points, the roofs were pierced, the slates here and there reduced to dust. But much that was injured seems to have been nineteenth-century restoration, and a fragment of the old balustrade of main façade would hardly be mentioned so prominently in the official report if more important parts had been blown up. The injury to St. Jean-des-Vignes was more severe ; each of the spires was mutilated, and some of the delicate carving around the windows chipped. But the bombardment of February 1915 was much more serious. The north side of the Cathedral was badly knocked about, and a shell, penetrating the nave, destroyed a pillar and strewed the interior of the church with debris. Much of the rich thirteenth-century glass, precious as rubies, was smashed. Later attacks and defences can have left Soissons little of its wonderful charm, which M. André Hallays thus immortalised :

'Soissons is a white, peaceful and smiling city, which lifts its tower and its pointed spires by the banks of a lazy river, in the midst of a ring of green hills ; town and landscape alike remind us of the little pictures which the illuminators of our old manuscripts loved to paint. Precious monuments display the whole history of French monarchy, from the Merovingian crypts of the Abbey of St. Médard to the handsome hôtel built just before the Revolution for the governors of the province. In the midst of narrow streets and little gardens, a magnificent cathedral spreads the arms of her great transept ; to the north a straight wall and a vast painted window ; to the south the apse with the delicacy of its marvellous arches.'

It is to be feared that all that will survive of this at the close of the present war will be a recollection of vanished beauty.

Meaux hardly deserves to be called a 'cité meurtrie,' because it escaped serious injury, yet its fate was so romantic and to its terrified inhabitants seemed so miraculous, that it demands particular attention. It was the centre of the wonderful battle of the Marne, and the military critics are not yet in unison as to the reason which led the storming armies of the enemy to pause in their overwhelming charge on Paris, and to swerve aside, to their own undoing, in an attack on Meaux.

The result, at all events, was abundantly to the advantage of the Allies, for Paris was saved and Meaux itself was not sacrificed. We do not propose to examine here in military detail what the French continue to call 'le miracle de la 'Marne,' but we must dwell a little on the imminent danger run by the beautiful cathedral where Bossuet reigned, and by the rare monuments of his city. On the 2nd of September 1914, early in the morning, the town council announced that Meaux would probably be occupied by the Germans in the course of that day, and that the inhabitants would do well to leave. The exodus began at once, and as five-sixths of the French population left, the British army, in retreat from Senlis, entered the town from the opposite side. For seven days and seven nights, as M. Montorgeuil has put it, a 'silent 'and sepulchral Meaux, whose life was represented only by 'duty, charity and self-sacrifice, listened to the beating of its 'own heart, and to the noise of the battle raging around it.'

The peculiar artistic attraction of Meaux consists in its bridge of old flour-mills, which forms a street of marvellous medieval buildings running right across the Marne. These mills, of various height, form and colour, have been cleverly adapted inside to modern commercial purposes, but outside they remain just what they were in Bossuet's time, and long before it. Here the wheat of the golden fields of La Brie is brought to be ground, just as it was in the sixteenth century, and the timbered façades of these great mills, rich in red and russet and cream-colour, are crowned with curious roofs of darker tone, and are poised fantastically on carven piers. Their safety has been preserved by their bridge being used for the traffic of foot-passengers only, the municipality having long ago wisely insisted that the 'Passerelle des Moulins' should be treated as an historical monument, the railway and high road across the Marne being taken over a bridge parallel to and adjoining the Mill Bridge. The danger to those admirable structures last autumn came in the first instance from the British, who blew up the bridges as a strategic precaution. The destruction of the Pont du Marché was very perilous for the mills, since they were peppered with fragments of stone and metal, but happily no positive damage was done. The explosion was more serious in its results to the Cathedral, although this was farther off. It was struck in ten different

places, and a paving-stone hurled through the roof of a chapel smashed in its passage the outer stone balustrade.

Meaux waited for the invader, isolated and without information. It seemed certain that it would be the centre of a battle, in the fluctuation of which enemy and friend alike would contribute to its total desolation. On the 6th of September, the Germans, who were drawn up to the east, at the village of Germigny-l'Evêque, began to bombard the cathedral of Meaux, and already the few persons who still gathered round the intrepid bishop gave up for lost the famous nave which has been called 'le plus lumineux des poèmes 'de pierre que l'architecture du passé ait fait chanter à des 'voûtes.' Next day the bombardment grew more serious, but the cathedral seemed to be protected by a charm ; not a shell touched it. Next day, to the amazement of the beleaguered city, the cannonade ceased ; the battle of the Marne had achieved its purpose, and Meaux, practically uninjured, was left to recover its normal serenity.

The circumstances of the destruction of Gerbéviller, a small town of some 1900 inhabitants, on the road between Lunéville and Nancy, in the Meurthe-et-Moselle, have greatly inflamed French indignation, but the place had no special artistic importance. Gerbéviller was an ancient town much tormented in successive wars. It held rather a strong position on the little river Mortagne, and on the 24th of August 1914 it was gallantly defended by a battalion of French infantry, who barricaded themselves on the bridge and actually held up the advancing Germans for twelve hours. The Bavarian invaders—who are described as horrible to look upon, 'with 'hands and faces tattooed with blue,'—entered the town at last in a fury, and shot down the inhabitants like rabbits. They burned nearly all the town, and when they were turned out again by the French it was found that they had completely destroyed the church, the Castle, the Chapel Palatine and a house of the fifteenth century which was the pride of Gerbéviller. The Castle, built in 1641, was a museum of beautiful objects collected by the Marquis Camille de Lambertye, who was Chamberlain to the King of Poland. A monument known as the Labarum, a cross of stone with two statuettes of saints, stands untouched alone in the midst of the ruins, and this is practically all that survives of Gerbéviller.

We must not forget that Paris itself has not entirely escaped the shell of the marauding vandal. 'That pedantic ferocity 'of scientific cynicism' which Sir Robert Morier perceived, forty years ago, would distinguish German methods in their next great war, was exemplified in the attack on Notre Dame which was made on the 11th of October 1914. This was extremely ingenious, carefully and accurately calculated, and was prevented by a mere accident from being horribly successful. On that Sunday, when the cathedral was crowded with worshippers, a *taube* which had pierced the defensive zone of Paris, proceeded with great audacity to drop several bombs on the building. One of these shells exploded on the west slope of the roof of the north transept, close to the great clock, and did a good deal of mischief. The nearest bell-turret was injured, and a quantity of modern glass was smashed; several jobs were provided for the carpenter, the slater and the glazier; Paris was extremely indignant, but from the artistic point of view no vital injury was done to Notre Dame, although the beautiful fourteenth-century statue of the Virgin was perilously near to the scene of what damage there was. One bomb, which seems to have been aimed at the apse of the church, ricochetted off and exploded in flames in the garden below; another fell plump into the Seine.

It is very difficult—it is in many cases impossible—to learn with any certainty what has been the fate of places and monuments which lie behind the long line of the German trenches. It was long before news reached Paris, and then only by an accident, of the annihilation of Orchies, the cause of which is still very obscure. This was a small ancient town in the department of the Nord, not far from Douai, which the Germans, for some reason at present quite unknown, saw fit to destroy in September of last year. They massacred the inhabitants, and they burned the town, with its interesting Flemish-Spanish Hôtel de Ville, and its fine old church, so comprehensively that it is said that not one single building escaped. Orchies was a town of nearly four thousand inhabitants. It is not possible to conjecture what vindictive acts of this kind the invaders may have perpetrated in the department of the Ardennes, which is the only one which they hold in its entirety. This department had to bear the full brunt of their frenzied advance after Namur and Dinant. No trustworthy news of its

condition has come through the lines to Paris. From the purely æsthetic point of view we may congratulate ourselves that Ardennes is one of the poorest departments of France in historical and artistic monuments. Lovers of the eccentric would regret the very odd Romanesque church of Vouziers, with its beautiful three-portalled façade set in the side of a building of the shape of a portmanteau. The church of St. Nicolas in Rethel has some architectural merit, and we have already spoken of the Flemish Place Ducale of Charleville, but with these exceptions there is little in the Ardennes to be anxious about. According to M. Vachon all that is valuable in Rethel is destroyed, but the curtain which hides these north-eastern towns is scarcely penetrable. Clermont-en-Argonne, where one stone is no longer set upon another, contained in its charming little fifteenth-century church a statue by the great sculptor of the French Renaissance, Ligier Richier. What has become of it? What has been the fate of the unrivalled collection of pastels by Latour which was the pride of the Hôtel de Ville of St. Quentin, a town now far back behind the German trenches?

It appears that Noyon, with its incomparable basilica, though on the very line of war, is still intact. At Compiègne and at Chantilly, occupied in the first week of September, no damage, beyond some pilfering of *bric-à-brac*, was committed. Château-Thierry, though marked out for conflagration, escaped as by a miracle. The total destruction of Sermaize-les-Bains was an act of hideous wickedness, but had no æsthetic significance. The pages of M. Vachon's recital are full of painful detail of the reckless and ruthless incendiarism which has swallowed up scores of small towns and villages in Lorraine, and only now, after more than a year of tyranny, the evil deeds of the invaders are beginning to be recorded. If any one doubts what a martyrdom the fair provinces of the east suffered last autumn, let him but turn to the heart-rending recital of the reports of the Académie des Beaux-Arts de France. Surely there must come a day of reckoning for Germany.

EDMUND GOSSE.

VOLTAIRE AND FREDERICK THE GREAT

1. **Briefwechsel Friedrichs des Grossen mit Voltaire.** Herausgegeben von REINHOLD KOSER und HANS DROSEN. Publikationen aus den K. Preussischen Staatsarchiven. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel. 1908–1911.
2. **Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire: Correspondance.** Paris: Garnier Frères. 1880.
3. **Voltaire et Frédéric.** Par GUSTAVE DESNOIRESTERRES. Paris. 1870.
4. **Voltaire in Frankfurt, 1753.** Von HERMAN HAUPT. Chemnitz und Leipzig. 1909.
5. **The Principle of Least Action.** By PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913.

AT the present time, when it is so difficult to think of anything but of what is and what will be, it may yet be worth while to cast occasionally a glance backward at what was. Such glances may at least prove to have the humble merit of being entertaining: they may even be instructive as well. Certainly it would be a mistake to forget that Frederick the Great once lived in Germany. Nor is it altogether useless to remember that a curious old gentleman, extremely thin, extremely active, and heavily bewigged, once decided that, on the whole, it would be as well for him *not* to live in France. For, just as modern Germany dates from the accession of Frederick to the throne of Prussia, so modern France dates from the establishment of Voltaire on the banks of the Lake of Geneva. The intersection of those two momentous lives forms one of the most curious and one of the most celebrated incidents in history. To English readers it is probably best known through the few brilliant paragraphs devoted to it by Macaulay; though Carlyle's masterly and far more elaborate narrative is familiar to every lover of the 'History of Friedrich II.' Since Carlyle wrote, however, fifty years have passed. New points of view have arisen, and a certain amount of new material—including the valuable edition of the correspondence between Voltaire and Frederick published from the original

documents in the Archives at Berlin—has become available. It seems, therefore, in spite of the familiarity of the main outlines of the story, that another rapid review of it will not be out of place.

Voltaire was forty-two years of age, and already one of the most famous men of the day, when, in August 1736, he received a letter from the Crown Prince of Prussia. This letter was the first in a correspondence which was to last, with a few remarkable intervals, for a space of over forty years. It was written by a young man of twenty-four, of whose personal qualities very little was known, and whose importance seemed to lie simply in the fact that he was the heir-apparent to one of the secondary European monarchies. Voltaire, however, was not the man to turn up his nose at royalty, in whatever form it might present itself; and it was moreover clear that the young Prince had picked up at least a smattering of French culture, that he was genuinely anxious to become acquainted with the tendencies of modern thought, and, above all, that his admiration for the author of the *Henriade* and *Zaïre* was unbounded.

'La douceur et le support,' wrote Frederick, 'que vous marquez pour tous ceux qui se vouent aux arts et aux sciences, me font espérer que vous ne m'exclurez pas du nombre de ceux que vous trouvez dignes de vos instructions. Je nomme ainsi votre commerce de lettres, qui ne peut être que profitable à tout être pensant. J'ose même avancer, sans déroger au mérite d'autrui, que dans l'univers entier il n'y aurait pas d'exception à faire de ceux dont vous ne pourriez être le maître.'

The great man was accordingly delighted; he replied with all that graceful affability of which he was a master, declared that his correspondent was 'un prince philosophe qui rendra 'les hommes heureux,' and showed that he meant business by plunging at once into a discussion of the metaphysical doctrines of 'le sieur Wolf,' whom Frederick had commended as 'le plus célèbre philosophe de nos jours.' For the next four years the correspondence continued on the lines thus laid down. It was a correspondence between a master and a pupil: Frederick, his passions divided between German philosophy and French poetry, poured out with equal copiousness disquisitions upon Free Will and *la raison suffisante*, odes *sur la Flatterie*, and epistles *sur l'Humanité*, while Voltaire kept the ball rolling with no less enormous philosophical replies, together

with minute criticisms of His Royal Highness's mistakes in French metre and French orthography. Thus, though the interest of these early letters must have been intense to the young Prince, they have far too little personal flavour to be anything but extremely tedious to the reader of to-day. Only very occasionally is it possible to detect, amid the long and careful periods, some faint signs of feeling or of character. Voltaire's *empressement* seems to take on, once or twice, the colours of something like a real enthusiasm ; and one notices that, after two years, Frederick's letters begin no longer with 'Monsieur' but with 'Mon cher ami,' which glides at last insensibly into 'Mon cher Voltaire' : though the careful poet continues with his 'Monseigneur' throughout. Then, on one occasion, Frederick makes a little avowal, which reads oddly in the light of future events.

'Souffrez,' he says, 'que je vous fasse mon caractère, afin que vous ne vous y mépreniez plus. . . . J'ai peu de mérite et peu de savoir ; mais j'ai beacoup de bonne volonté, et un fonds inépuisable d'estime et d'amitié pour les personnes d'une vertu distinguée, et avec cela je suis capable de toute la constance que la vraie amitié exige. J'ai assez de jugement pour vous rendre toute la justice que vous méritez ; mais je n'en ai pas assez pour m'empêcher de faire de mauvais vers.'

But this is exceptional ; as a rule, elaborate compliments take the place of personal confessions ; and, while Voltaire is never tired of comparing Frederick to Apollo, Alcibiades, and the youthful Marcus Aurelius, of proclaiming the re-birth of 'les 'talents de Virgile et les vertus d'Auguste,' or of declaring that 'Socrate ne m'est rien, c'est Frédéric que j'aime,' the Crown Prince is on his side ready with an equal flow of protestations, which sometimes rise to singular heights. 'Ne croyez pas,' he says, 'que je pousse mon scepticisme à outrance. . . . 'Je crois, par exemple, qu'il n'y a qu'un Dieu et qu'un Voltaire 'dans le monde ; je crois encore que ce Dieu avait besoin dans 'ce siècle d'un Voltaire pour le rendre aimable.' Decidedly the Prince's compliments were too emphatic, and the poet's too ingenious ; as Voltaire himself said afterwards, 'les 'épithètes ne nous coûtaient rien' : yet neither was without a little residue of sincerity. Frederick's admiration bordered upon the sentimental ; and Voltaire had begun to allow himself to hope that some day, in a provincial German court, there

might be found a crowned head devoting his life to philosophy, good sense, and the love of letters. Both were to receive a curious awakening.

In 1740 Frederick became King of Prussia, and a new epoch in the relations between the two men began. The next ten years were, on both sides, years of growing disillusionment. Voltaire very soon discovered that his phrase about 'un prince 'philosophe qui rendra les hommes heureux' was indeed a phrase and nothing more. His *prince philosophe* started out on a career of conquest, plunged all Europe into war, and turned Prussia into a great military power. Frederick, it appeared, was at once a far more important and a far more dangerous phenomenon than Voltaire had suspected. And, on the other hand, the matured mind of the King was not slow to perceive that the enthusiasm of the Prince needed a good deal of qualification. This change of view was, indeed, remarkably rapid. Nothing is more striking than the alteration of the tone in Frederick's correspondence during the few months which followed his accession: the voice of the raw and inexperienced youth is heard no more, and its place is taken—at once and for ever—by the self-contained and caustic utterance of an embittered man of the world. In this transformation it was only natural that the wondrous figure of Voltaire should lose some of its glitter—especially since Frederick now began to have the opportunity of inspecting that figure in the flesh with his own sharp eyes. The friends met three or four times, and it is noticeable that after each meeting there is a distinct coolness on the part of Frederick. He writes with a sudden brusqueness to accuse Voltaire of showing about his manuscripts, which, he says, had only been sent him on the condition of *un secret inviolable*. He writes to Jordan complaining of Voltaire's avarice in very stringent terms. 'Ton 'avare boira la lie de son insatiable désir de s'enrichir. . . Son apparition de six jours me coûtera par journée cinq cent 'cinquante écus. C'est bien payer un fou; jamais bouffon 'de grand seigneur n'eut de pareils gages.' He declares that 'la cervelle du poète est aussi légère que le style de ses ouvrages,' and remarks sarcastically that he is indeed a man *extraordinaire en tout*.

Yet, while his opinion of Voltaire's character was rapidly growing more and more severe, his admiration of his talents

remained undiminished. For, though he had dropped metaphysics when he came to the throne, Frederick could never drop his passion for French poetry; he recognised in Voltaire the unapproachable master of that absorbing art; and for years he had made up his mind that, some day or other, he would *posséder*—for so he put it—the author of the *Henriade*, would keep him at Berlin as the brightest ornament of his court, and, above all, would have him always ready at hand to put the final polish on his own verses. In the autumn of 1743 it seemed for a moment that his wish would be gratified. Voltaire spent a visit of several weeks in Berlin; he was dazzled by the graciousness of his reception and the splendour of his surroundings; and he began to listen to the honeyed overtures of the Prussian Majesty. The great obstacle to Frederick's desire was Voltaire's relationship with Madame du Châtelet. He had lived with her for more than ten years; he was attached to her by all the ties of friendship and gratitude; he had constantly declared that he would never leave her—no, not for all the seductions of princes. She would, it is true, have been willing to accompany Voltaire to Berlin; but such a solution would by no means have suited Frederick. He was not fond of ladies—even of ladies like Madame du Châtelet—learned enough to translate Newton and to discuss by the hour the niceties of the Leibnitzian philosophy; and he had determined to *posséder* Voltaire either completely or not at all. Voltaire, in spite of repeated temptations, had remained faithful; but now, for the first time, poor Madame du Châtelet began to be seriously alarmed. His letters from Berlin grew fewer and fewer, and more and more ambiguous; she knew nothing of his plans; 'il est ivre absolument' she burst out in her distress to d'Argental, one of his oldest friends. By every post she dreaded to learn at last that he had deserted her for ever. But suddenly Voltaire returned. The spell of Berlin had been broken, and he was at her feet once more.

What had happened was highly characteristic both of the Poet and of the King. Each had tried to play a trick on the other, and each had found the other out. The French Government had been anxious to obtain an insight into the diplomatic intentions of Frederick, in an unofficial way; Voltaire had offered his services, and it had been agreed that he should write to Frederick declaring that he was obliged

to leave France for a time owing to the hostility of a member of the Government, the Bishop of Mirepoix, and asking for Frederick's hospitality. Frederick had not been taken in: though he had not disentangled the whole plot, he had perceived clearly enough that Voltaire's visit was in reality that of an agent of the French Government; he also thought he saw an opportunity of securing the desire of his heart. Voltaire, to give verisimilitude to his story, had, in his letter to Frederick, loaded the Bishop of Mirepoix with ridicule and abuse; and Frederick now secretly sent this letter to Mirepoix himself. His calculation was that Mirepoix would be so outraged that he would make it impossible for Voltaire ever to return to France; and in that case—well, Voltaire would have no other course open to him but to stay where he was, in Berlin, and Madame du Châtelet would have to make the best of it. Of course, Frederick's plan failed, and Voltaire was duly informed by Mirepoix of what had happened. He was naturally very angry. He had been almost induced to stay in Berlin of his own accord, and now he found that his host had been attempting, by means of treachery and intrigue, to force him to stay there whether he liked it or not. It was a long time before he forgave Frederick. But the King was most anxious to patch up the quarrel; he still could not abandon the hope of ultimately securing Voltaire; and besides, he was now possessed by another and a more immediate desire—to be allowed a glimpse of that famous and scandalous work which Voltaire kept locked in the innermost drawer of his cabinet and revealed to none but the most favoured of his intimates—*La Pucelle.*

Accordingly the royal letters became more frequent and more flattering than ever; the royal hand cajoled and implored. 'Ne me faites point injustice sur mon caractère; d'ailleurs il 'vous est permis de badiner sur mon sujet comme il vous 'plaira.' '*La Pucelle! La Pucelle! La Pucelle! La Pucelle!* et 'encore *La Pucelle!*' he exclaims. 'Pour l'amour de Dieu, 'ou plus encore pour l'amour de vous-même, envoyez-la-moi.' And at last Voltaire was softened. He sent off a few fragments of his *Pucelle*—just enough to whet Frederick's appetite—and he declared himself reconciled. 'Je vous ai aimé tendre-'ment,' he wrote in March 1749; 'j'ai été fâché contre vous, 'je vous ai pardonné, et actuellement je vous aime à la folie.' Within a year of this date his situation had undergone a

complete change. Madame du Châtelet was dead; and his position at Versailles, in spite of the friendship of Madame de Pompadour, had become almost as impossible as he had pretended it to have been in 1743. Frederick eagerly repeated his invitation; and this time Voltaire did not refuse. He was careful to make a very good bargain; obliged Frederick to pay for his journey; and arrived at Berlin in July 1750. He was given rooms in the royal palaces both at Berlin and Potsdam; he was made a Court Chamberlain, and received the Order of Merit, together with a pension of £800 a year. These arrangements caused considerable amusement in Paris; and for some days hawkers, carrying prints of Voltaire dressed in furs, and crying 'Voltaire le prussien! Six sols le fameux prussien!' were to be seen walking up and down the Quays.

The curious drama that followed, with its farcical *περιπέτεια* and its tragi-comic *dénouement*, can hardly be understood without a brief consideration of the feelings and intentions of the two chief actors in it. The position of Frederick is comparatively plain. He had now completely thrown aside the last lingering remnants of any esteem which he may once have entertained for the character of Voltaire. He frankly thought him a scoundrel. In September 1749, less than a year before Voltaire's arrival, and at the very period of Frederick's most urgent invitations, we find him using the following language in a letter to Algarotti: 'Voltaire vient de faire un tour qui 'est indigne.' (He had been showing to all his friends a garbled copy of one of Frederick's letters.)

'Il mériterait d'être fleurdelisé au Parnasse. C'est bien dommage qu'une âme aussi lâche soit unie à un aussi beau génie. Il a les gentillesses et les malices d'un singe. Je vous conterai ce que c'est, lorsque je vous reverrai; cependant je ne ferai semblant de rien, car j'en ai besoin pour l'étude de l'élocution française. On peut apprendre de bonnes choses d'un scélérat. Je veux savoir son français; que m'importe sa morale? Cet homme a trouvé le moyen de réunir tous les contraires. On admire son esprit, en même temps qu'on méprise son caractère.'

There is no ambiguity about this. Voltaire was a scoundrel; but he was a scoundrel of genius. He would make the best possible teacher of *l'élocution française*; therefore it was necessary that he should come and live in Berlin. But as for anything more—as for any real interchange of sympathies,

any genuine feeling of friendliness, of respect, or even of regard—all that was utterly out of the question. The avowal is cynical, no doubt ; but it is at any rate straightforward, and above all it is peculiarly devoid of any trace of self-deception. In the face of these trenchant sentences, the view of Frederick's attitude which is suggested so assiduously by Carlyle—that he was the victim of an elevated misapprehension, that he was always hoping for the best, and that, when the explosion came, he was very much surprised and profoundly disappointed—becomes obviously untenable. If any man ever acted with his eyes wide open, it was Frederick when he invited Voltaire to Berlin.

Yet, though that much is clear, the letter to Algarotti betrays, in more than one direction, a very singular state of mind. A warm devotion to *l'élocution française* is easy enough to understand ; but Frederick's devotion was much more than warm ; it was so absorbing and so intense that it left him no rest until, by hook or by crook, by supplication, or by trickery, or by paying down hard cash, he had obtained the close and constant proximity of—what ?—of a man whom he himself described as a ' singe ' and a ' scélérat,' a man of base soul and despicable character. And Frederick appears to see nothing surprising in this. He takes it quite as a matter of course that he should be, not merely willing, but delighted to run all the risks involved by Voltaire's undoubted roguery, so long as he can be sure of benefiting from Voltaire's no less undoubted mastery of French versification. This is certainly strange ; but the explanation of it lies in the extraordinary vogue—a vogue, indeed, so extraordinary that it is very difficult for the modern reader to realise it—enjoyed throughout Europe by French culture and literature during the middle years of the eighteenth century. Frederick was merely an extreme instance of a universal fact. Like all Germans of any education, he habitually wrote and spoke in French ; like every lady and gentleman from Naples to Edinburgh, his life was regulated by the social conventions of France ; like every amateur of letters from Madrid to St. Petersburg, his whole conception of literary taste, his whole standard of literary values, was French. To him, as to the vast majority of his contemporaries, the very essence of civilisation was concentrated in French literature, and especially in French poetry ; and French poetry meant

to him, as to his contemporaries, that particular kind of French poetry which had come into fashion at the court of Louis XIV. For this curious creed was as narrow as it was all-pervading. The *Grand Siècle* was the Church Infallible; and it was heresy to doubt the Gospel of Boileau.

Frederick's library, still preserved at Potsdam, shows us what literature meant in those days to a cultivated man: it is composed entirely of the French Classics, of the works of Voltaire, and of the masterpieces of antiquity translated into eighteenth-century French. But Frederick was not content with mere appreciation; he too would create; he would write Alexandrines on the model of Racine, and madrigals after the manner of Chaulieu; he would press in person into the sacred sanctuary, and burn incense with his own hands upon the inmost shrine. It was true that he was a foreigner; it was true that his knowledge of the French language was incomplete and incorrect; but his sense of his own ability urged him forward, and his indefatigable pertinacity kept him at his strange task throughout the whole of his life. He filled volumes, and the contents of those volumes afford probably the most complete illustration in literature of the very trite proverb—*Poeta nascitur, non fit.* The spectacle of that heavy German Muse, with her feet crammed into pointed slippers, executing, with incredible conscientiousness, now the stately measure of a Versailles minuet, and now the spritely steps of a Parisian jig, would be either ludicrous or pathetic—one hardly knows which—were it not so certainly neither the one nor the other, but simply dreary with an unutterable dreariness, from which the eyes of men avert themselves in shuddering dismay. Frederick himself felt that there was something wrong—something, but not really very much. All that was wanted was a little expert advice; and obviously Voltaire was the man to supply it—Voltaire, the one true heir of the Great Age, the dramatist who had revived the glories of Racine (did not Frederick's tears flow almost as copiously over *Mahomet* as over *Britannicus*?), the epic poet who had eclipsed Homer and Virgil (had not Frederick every right to judge, since he had read the 'Iliad' in French prose and the 'Aeneid' in French verse?), the lyric master whose odes and whose epistles occasionally even surpassed (Frederick confessed it with amazement) those of the Marquis de la Fare. Voltaire, there could be no doubt,

would do just what was needed ; he would know how to squeeze in a little further the waist of the German Calliope, to apply with his deft fingers precisely the right dab of rouge to her cheeks, to instil into her movements the last *nuances* of correct deportment. And, if he did that, of what consequence were the blemishes of his personal character ? ' On peut apprendre de ' bonnes choses d'un scélérat.'

And, besides, though Voltaire might be a rogue, Frederick felt quite convinced that he could keep him in order. A crack or two of the master's whip—a coldness in the royal demeanour, a hint at a stoppage of the pension—and the monkey would put an end to his tricks soon enough. It never seems to have occurred to Frederick that the possession of genius might imply a quality of spirit which was not that of an ordinary man. This was his great, his fundamental error. It was the ingenuous error of a cynic. He knew that he was under no delusion as to Voltaire's faults, and so he supposed that he could be under no delusion as to his merits. He innocently imagined that the capacity for great writing was something that could be as easily separated from the owner of it as a hat or a glove. ' C'est bien ' dommage qu'une âme aussi lâche soit unie à un aussi beau ' génie.' *C'est bien dommage!*—as if there was nothing more extraordinary in such a combination than that of a pretty woman and an ugly dress. And so Frederick held his whip a little tighter, and reminded himself once more that, in spite of that *beau génie*, it was a monkey that he had to deal with. But he was wrong : it was not a monkey ; it was a devil, which is a very different thing.

A devil—or perhaps an angel ? One cannot be quite sure. For, amid the complexities of that extraordinary spirit, where good and evil were so mysteriously interwoven, where the elements of darkness and the elements of light lay crowded together in such ever-deepening ambiguity, fold within fold, the clearer the vision the greater the bewilderment, the more impartial the judgment the profounder the doubt. But one thing at least is certain : that spirit, whether it was admirable or whether it was odious, was moved by a terrific force. Frederick had failed to realise this ; and indeed, though Voltaire was fifty-six when he went to Berlin, and though his whole life had been spent in a blaze of publicity, there was still not one of his contemporaries who understood the true nature

of his genius ; it was perhaps hidden even from himself. He had reached the threshold of old age, and his life's work was still before him ; it was not as a writer of tragedies and epics that he was to take his place in the world. Was he, in the depths of his consciousness, aware that this was so ? Did some obscure instinct urge him forward, at this late hour, to break with the ties of a lifetime, and rush forth into the unknown ?

What his precise motives were in embarking upon the Berlin adventure it is very difficult to say. It is true that he was disgusted with Paris—he was ill-received at Court, and he was pestered by endless literary quarrels and jealousies ; it would be very pleasant to show his countrymen that he had other strings to his bow, that, if they did not appreciate him, Frederick the Great did. It is true, too, that he admired Frederick's intellect, and that he was flattered by his favour. ' Il avait de l'esprit,' he said afterwards, ' des grâces, et, de ' plus, il était roi ; ce qui fait toujours une grande séduction, ' attendu la faiblesse humaine.' His vanity could not resist the prestige of a royal intimacy ; and no doubt he relished to the full even the increased consequence which came to him with his chamberlain's key and his order—to say nothing of the addition of £800 to his income. Yet, on the other hand, he was very well aware that he was exchanging freedom for servitude, and that he was entering into a bargain with a man who would make quite sure that he was getting his money's worth ; and he knew in his heart that he had something better to do than to play, however successfully, the part of a courtier. Nor was he personally attached to Frederick ; he was personally attached to no one on earth. Certainly he had never been a man of feeling, and now that he was old and hardened by the uses of the world he had grown to be completely what in essence he always was—a fighter, without tenderness, without scruples, and without remorse. No, he went to Berlin for his own purposes—however dubious those purposes may have been.

And it is curious to observe that in his correspondence with his niece, Madame Denis, whom he had left behind him at the head of his Paris establishment and in whom he confided —in so far as he can be said to have confided in anyone—he repeatedly states that there is nothing permanent about his visit to Berlin. At first he declares that he is only making

a stay of a few weeks with Frederick, that he is going on to Italy to visit 'sa Sainteté' and to inspect 'la ville souterraine,' that he will be back in Paris in the autumn. The autumn comes, and the roads are too muddy to travel by; he must wait till the winter, when they will be frozen hard. Winter comes, and it is too cold to move; but he will certainly return in the spring. Spring comes, and he is on the point of finishing his *Siècle de Louis XIV.*; he really must wait just a few weeks more. The book is published; but then how can he appear in Paris until he is quite sure of its success? And so he lingers on, delaying and prevaricating, until a whole year has passed, and still he is uncertain, still he is on the point of going, and still he does not go. Meanwhile, to all appearances, he was definitely fixed, a salaried official, at Frederick's court; and he was writing to all his other friends to assure them that he had never been so happy, that he could see no reason why he should ever come away. What were his true intentions? Could he himself have said? Had he perhaps, in some secret corner of his brain, into which even he hardly dared to look, a premonition of the future? At times, in this Berlin adventure, he seems to resemble some great buzzing fly, shooting suddenly into a room through an open window and dashing frantically from side to side; when all at once, as suddenly, he swoops away and out through another window which opens in quite a different direction, towards wide and flowery fields; so that perhaps the reckless creature knew where he was going after all.

In any case, it is evident to the impartial observer that Voltaire's visit could only have ended as it did—in an explosion. The elements of the situation were too combustible for any other conclusion. When two confirmed egotists decide, for purely selfish reasons, to set up house together, everyone knows what will happen. For some time their sense of mutual advantage may induce them to tolerate each other, but sooner or later human nature will assert itself, and the *ménage* will break up. And, with Voltaire and Frederick, the difficulties inherent in all such cases were intensified by the fact that the relationship between them was, in effect, that of servant and master; that Voltaire, under a very thin disguise, was a paid menial, while Frederick, condescend as he might, was an autocrat whose will was law. Thus the two famous and perhaps

mythical sentences, invariably repeated by historians of the incident, about orange-skins and dirty linen, do in fact sum up the gist of the matter. 'When one has sucked the orange, one 'throws away the skin,' somebody told Voltaire that the King had said, on being asked how much longer he would put up with the poet's vagaries. And Frederick, on his side, was informed that Voltaire, when a batch of the royal verses were brought to him for correction, had burst out with 'Does the 'man expect me to go on washing his dirty linen for ever?' Each knew well enough the weak spot in his own position, and each was acutely and uncomfortably conscious that the other knew it too. Thus, but a very few weeks after Voltaire's arrival, little clouds of discord become visible on the horizon; electrical discharges of irritability begin to take place, growing more and more frequent and violent as time goes on; and one can overhear the pot and the kettle, in strictest privacy, calling each other black. 'The monster,' whispers Voltaire to Madame Denis, 'he opens all our letters in the post'—Voltaire, whose light-handedness with other people's correspondence was only too notorious. 'The monkey,' mutters Frederick, 'he shows my private letters to his friends'—Frederick, who had thought nothing of betraying Voltaire's letters to the Bishop of Mirepoix. 'How happy I should be 'here,' exclaims the callous old poet, 'but for one thing—his 'Majesty is utterly heartless!' And meanwhile Frederick, who had never let a farthing escape from his close fist without some very good reason, was busy concocting an epigram upon the avarice of Voltaire.

It was, indeed, Voltaire's passion for money which brought on the first really serious storm. Three months after his arrival in Berlin, the temptation to increase his already considerable fortune by a stroke of illegal stock-jobbing proved too strong for him; he became involved in a series of shady financial transactions with a Jew; he quarrelled with the Jew; there was an acrimonious lawsuit, with charges and countercharges of the most discreditable kind; and, though the Jew lost his case on a technical point, the poet certainly did not leave the court without a stain upon his character. Among other misdemeanours, it is almost certain—the evidence is not quite conclusive—that he committed forgery in order to support a false oath. Frederick was furious, and for a moment was

on the brink of dismissing Voltaire from Berlin. He would have been wise if he had done so. But he could not part with his *beau génie* so soon. He cracked his whip, and, setting the monkey to stand in the corner, contented himself with a shrug of the shoulders and the exclamation 'C'est l'affaire d'un 'fripon qui a voulu tromper un filou.' A few weeks later the royal favour shone forth once more, and Voltaire, who had been hiding himself in a suburban villa, came out and basked again in those refulgent beams.

And the beams were decidedly refulgent—so much so, in fact, that they almost satisfied even the vanity of Voltaire. Almost, but not quite. For, though his glory was great, though he was the centre of all men's admiration, courted by nobles, flattered by princesses—there is a letter from one of them, a sister of Frederick's, still extant, wherein the trembling votaress ventures to praise the great man's works, which, she says, 'vous rendent si célèbre et immortel'—though he had ample leisure for his private activities, though he enjoyed every day the brilliant conversation of the King, though he could often forget for weeks together that he was the paid servant of a jealous despot—yet, in spite of all, there was a crumpled rose-leaf amid the silken sheets, and he lay awake o' nights. He was not the only Frenchman at Frederick's court. That monarch had surrounded himself with a small group of persons—foreigners for the most part—whose business it was to instruct him when he wished to improve his mind, to flatter him when he was out of temper, and to entertain him when he was bored. There was hardly one of them that was not thoroughly second-rate. Algarotti was an elegant dabbler in scientific matters—he had written a book to explain Newton to the ladies; D'Argens was an amiable and erudite writer of a dull free-thinking turn; Chasot was a retired military man with too many debts, and Darget was a good-natured secretary with too many love affairs; La Mettrie was a doctor who had been exiled from France for atheism and bad manners; and Pöllnitz was a decaying baron who, under stress of circumstances, had unfortunately been obliged to change his religion six times.

These were the boon companions among whom Frederick chose to spend his leisure hours. Whenever he had nothing better to do, he would exchange rhymed

epigrams with Algarotti, or discuss the Jewish religion with D'Argens, or write long improper poems about Darget, in the style of *La Pucelle*. Or else he would summon La Mettrie, who would forthwith prove the irrefutability of materialism in a series of wild paradoxes, shout with laughter, suddenly shudder and cross himself on upsetting the salt, and eventually pursue his majesty with his buffooneries into a place where even royal persons are wont to be left alone. At other times Frederick would amuse himself by first cutting down the pension of Pöllnitz, who was at the moment a Lutheran, and then writing long and serious letters to him suggesting that if he would only become a Catholic again he might be made a Silesian Abbot. Strangely enough, Frederick was not popular, and one or other of the inmates of his little menagerie was constantly escaping and running away. Darget and Chasot both succeeded in getting through the wires; they obtained leave to visit Paris, and stayed there. Poor D'Argens often tried to follow their example; more than once he set off for France, secretly vowing never to return; but he had no money, Frederick was blandishing, and the wretch was always lured back to captivity. As for La Mettrie, he made his escape in a different manner—by dying after supper one evening of a surfeit of pheasant pie. 'Jésus! Marie!' he gasped, as he felt the pains of death upon him. 'Ah!' said a priest who had been sent for, 'vous voilà enfin retourné à ces noms 'consolateurs.' La Mettrie, with an oath, expired; and Frederick, on hearing of this unorthodox conclusion, remarked 'J'en suis bien aise, pour le repos de son âme.'

Among this circle of down-at-heel eccentrics there was a single figure whose distinction and respectability stood out in striking contrast with the rest—that of Maupertuis, who had been, since 1745, the President of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin. Maupertuis has had an unfortunate fate: he was first annihilated by the ridicule of Voltaire, and then re-created by the humour of Carlyle; but he was an ambitious man, very anxious to be famous, and his desire has been gratified in overflowing measure. During his life he was chiefly known for his voyage to Lapland, and his observations there, by which he was able to substantiate the Newtonian doctrine of the flatness of the earth at the poles. He possessed considerable scientific attainments, he was honest, he was energetic; he

appeared to be just the man to revive the waning glories of Prussian science; and when Frederick succeeded in inducing him to come to Berlin as President of his Academy the choice seemed amply justified. Maupertuis had, moreover, some pretensions to wit; and in his earlier days his biting and elegant sarcasms had more than once overwhelmed his scientific adversaries. Such accomplishments suited Frederick admirably. Maupertuis, he declared, was an *homme d'esprit*, and the happy President became a constant guest at the royal supper-parties. It was the happy—the too happy—President who was the rose-leaf in the bed of Voltaire. The two men had known each other slightly for many years, and had always expressed the highest admiration for each other; but their mutual amiability was now to be put to a severe test. The sagacious Buffon observed the danger from afar: 'ces deux 'hommes,' he wrote to a friend, 'ne sont pas faits pour demeurer 'ensemble dans la même chambre.' And indeed to the vain and sensitive poet, uncertain of Frederick's cordiality, suspicious of hidden enemies, intensely jealous of possible rivals, the spectacle of Maupertuis at supper, radiant, at his ease, obviously respected, obviously superior to the shady mediocrities who sat around—that sight was gall and wormwood; and he looked closer, with a new malignity; and then those piercing eyes began to make discoveries, and that relentless brain began to do its work.

Maupertuis had very little judgment; so far from attempting to conciliate Voltaire, he was rash enough to provoke hostilities. It was very natural that he should have lost his temper. He had been for five years the dominating figure in the royal circle, and now suddenly he was deprived of his pre-eminence and thrown completely into the shade. Who could attend to Maupertuis while Voltaire was talking?—Voltaire, who as obviously outshone Maupertuis as Maupertuis outshone La Mettrie and Darget and the rest. In his exasperation the President went to the length of openly giving his protection to a disreputable literary man, La Beaumelle, who was a declared enemy of Voltaire. This meant war, and war was not long in coming.

Some years previously Maupertuis had, as he believed, discovered an important mathematical law—the 'principle of 'least action.' The law was, in fact, important, and has had

a fruitful history in the development of mechanical theory; but, as Mr. Jourdain has shown in a recent monograph, Maupertuis enunciated it incorrectly, without realising its true import, and a far more accurate and scientific statement of it was given, within a few months, by Euler. Maupertuis, however, was very proud of his discovery, which, he considered, embodied one of the principal reasons for believing in the existence of God; and he was therefore exceedingly angry when, shortly after Voltaire's arrival in Berlin, a Swiss mathematician, Koenig, published a polite memoir attacking both its accuracy and its originality, and quoted in support of his contention an unpublished letter by Leibnitz in which the law was more exactly expressed. Instead of arguing upon the merits of the case, Maupertuis declared that the letter of Leibnitz was a forgery, and that therefore Koenig's remarks deserved no further consideration. When Koenig expostulated, Maupertuis decided upon a more drastic step. He summoned a meeting of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, of which Koenig was a member, laid the case before it, and moved that it should solemnly pronounce Koenig a forger, and the letter of Leibnitz supposititious and false. The members of the Academy were frightened; their pensions depended upon the President's good will; and even the illustrious Euler was not ashamed to take part in this absurd and disgraceful condemnation.

Voltaire saw at once that his opportunity had come. Maupertuis had put himself utterly and irretrievably in the wrong. He was wrong in attributing to his discovery a value which it did not possess; he was wrong in denying the authenticity of the Leibnitz letter; above all he was wrong in treating a purely scientific question as the proper subject for the disciplinary jurisdiction of an Academy. If Voltaire struck now, he would have his enemy on the hip. There was only one consideration to give him pause, and that was a grave one: to attack Maupertuis upon this matter was, in effect, to attack the King. Not only was Frederick certainly privy to Maupertuis' actions, but he was extremely sensitive of the reputation of his Academy and of its President, and he would certainly consider any interference on the part of Voltaire, who himself drew his wages from the royal purse, as a flagrant act of disloyalty. But Voltaire decided to take the risk. He had now been more than two years in Berlin, and the

atmosphere of a Court was beginning to weigh upon his spirit; he was restless, he was reckless, he was spoiling for a fight; he would take on Maupertuis singly or Maupertuis and Frederick combined—he did not much care which, and in any case he flattered himself that he would settle the hash of the President.

As a preparatory measure, he withdrew all his spare cash from Berlin, and invested it with the Duke of Würtemberg. 'Je mets tout doucement ordre à mes affaires,' he told Madame Denis. Then, on 18th September 1752, there appeared in the papers a short article entitled 'Réponse d'un Académicien de 'Berlin à un Académicien de Paris.' It was a statement, deadly in its bald simplicity, its studied coldness, its concentrated force, of Koenig's case against Maupertuis. The President must have turned pale as he read it; but the King turned crimson. The terrible indictment could, of course, only have been written by one man, and that man was receiving a royal pension of £800 a year and carrying about a Chamberlain's gold key in his pocket. Frederick flew to his writing-table, and composed an indignant pamphlet, which he caused to be published with the Prussian arms on the title-page. It was a feeble work, full of exaggerated praises of Maupertuis, and of clumsy invectives against Voltaire: the President's reputation was gravely compared to that of Homer; the author of the 'Réponse d'un Académicien de Berlin' was declared to be a 'faiseur de libelles sans génie,' an 'imposteur 'effronté,' a 'malheureux écrivain'; while the 'Réponse' itself was a 'grossièreté plate,' whose publication was an 'action malicieuse, lâche, infâme,' a 'brigandage affreux.' The presence of the royal insignia only intensified the futility of the outburst. 'L'aigle, le sceptre, et la couronne,' wrote Voltaire to Madame Denis, 'sont bien étonnés de se trouver 'là.' But one thing was now certain: the King had joined the fray. Voltaire's blood was up, and he was not sorry. A kind of exaltation seized him; from this moment his course was clear—he would do as much damage as he could, and then leave Prussia for ever. And it so happened that just then an unexpected opportunity occurred for one of those furious onslaughts so dear to his heart, with that weapon which he knew so well how to wield. 'Je n'ai point de sceptre,' he ominously shot out to Madame Denis, 'mais j'ai une plume.'

Meanwhile the life of the Court—which passed for the most

part at Potsdam, in the little palace of Sans Souci which Frederick had built for himself—proceeded on its accustomed course. It was a singular life, half military, half monastic, rigid, retired, from which all the ordinary pleasures of society were strictly excluded. 'What do you do here?' one of the royal princes was once asked. 'We conjugate the verb '*s'ennuyer*,' was the reply. But, wherever he might be, that was a verb unknown to Voltaire. Shut up all day in the strange little room, still preserved for the eyes of the curious, with its windows opening on the formal garden, and its yellow walls thickly embossed with the brightly coloured shapes of fruits, flowers, and birds, the indefatigable old man worked away at his histories, his tragedies, his *Pucelle*, and his enormous correspondence. He was, of course, ill—very ill; he was probably, in fact, upon the brink of death; but he had grown accustomed to that situation; and the worse he grew the more furiously he worked. He was a victim, he declared, of erysipelas, dysentery, and scurvy; he was constantly attacked by fever, and all his teeth had fallen out. But he continued to work. On one occasion a friend visited him, and found him in bed. 'J'ai quatre maladies mortelles,' he wailed. 'Pour-'tant,' remarked the friend, 'vous avez l'œil fort bon.' Voltaire leapt up from the pillows: 'Ne savez-vous pas,' he shouted, 'que les scorbutiques meurent l'œil enflammé?' When the evening came it was time to dress, and, in all the pomp of flowing wig and diamond order, to proceed to the little music-room, where his Majesty, after the business of the day, was preparing to relax himself upon the flute. The orchestra was gathered together; the audience was seated; the concerto began. And then the sounds of beauty flowed and trembled, and seemed, for a little space, to triumph over the pains of living and the hard hearts of men; and the royal master poured out his skill in some long and elaborate cadenza, and the adagio came, the marvellous adagio, and the conqueror of Rossbach drew tears from the author of *Candide*. But a moment later it was supper-time; and the night ended in the oval dining-room, amid laughter and champagne, the ejaculations of La Mettrie, the epigrams of Maupertuis, the sarcasms of Frederick, and the devastating coruscations of Voltaire.

Yet, in spite of all the jests and roses, everyone could hear the rumbling of the volcano under the ground. Everyone

could hear, but nobody would listen; the little flames leapt up through the surface, but still the gay life went on; and then the irruption came. Voltaire's enemy had written a book. In the intervals of his more serious labours, the President had put together a series of 'Letters,' in which a number of miscellaneous scientific subjects were treated in a mildly speculative and popular style. The volume was rather dull, and very unimportant; but it happened to appear at this particular moment, and Voltaire pounced upon it with the swift swoop of a hawk on a mouse. The famous 'Diatribe du Docteur 'Akakia' is still fresh with a fiendish gaiety after a hundred and fifty years; but to realise to the full the skill and malice which went to the making of it, one must at least have glanced at the flat insipid production which called it forth, and noted with what a diabolical art the latent absurdities in poor Maupertuis' *rêveries* have been detected, dragged forth into the light of day, and nailed to the pillory of an immortal ridicule. The 'Diatribe,' however, is not all mere laughter; there is real criticism in it, too. For instance, it was not simply a farcical exaggeration to say that Maupertuis had set out to prove the existence of God by 'A plus B divided by Z'; in substance, the charge was both important and well founded. 'Lorsque 'la métaphysique entre dans la géometrie,' Voltaire wrote in a private letter some months afterwards, 'c'est Arimane qui 'entre dans le royaume d'Oromasde, et qui y apporte des 'ténèbres'; and Maupertuis had in fact vitiated his treatment of the 'principle of least action' by his metaphysical preoccupations. Indeed, all through Voltaire's pamphlet, there is an implied appeal to true scientific principles, an underlying assertion of the paramount importance of the experimental method, a consistent attack upon *a priori* reasoning, loose statement, and vague conjecture. But of course, mixed with all this, and covering it all, there is a bubbling, sparkling fountain of effervescent raillery—cruel, personal, insatiable—the raillery of a demon with a grudge. The manuscript was shown to Frederick, who laughed till the tears ran down his cheeks. But, between his gasps, he forbade Voltaire to publish it on pain of his most terrible displeasure. Naturally Voltaire was profuse with promises, and a few days later, under a royal licence obtained for another work, the little book appeared in print. Frederick still managed to keep his

wrath within bounds : he collected all the copies of the edition and had them privately destroyed ; he gave a furious wigging to Voltaire ; and he flattered himself that he had heard the last of the business.

'Ne vous embarrassez de rien, mon cher Maupertuis,' he wrote to the President in his singular orthography; 'l'affaire des libelles est finie. J'ai parlé si vrai à l'hôme, je lui ai lavé si bien la tête que je ne crois pas qu'il y retourne, et je connais son âme lache, incapable de sentiments d'honneur. Je l'ai intimidé du côté de la boursse, ce qui a fait tout l'effet que j'attendais. Je lui ai déclaré enfin nettement que ma maison devait être un sanctuaire et non une retraite de brigands ou de célérats qui distillent des poissons.'

Apparently it did not occur to Frederick that this declaration had come a little late in the day. Meanwhile Maupertuis, overcome by illness and by rage, had taken to his bed. 'Un 'peu trop d'amour-propre,' Frederick wrote to Darget, 'l'a 'rendu trop sensible aux manœuvres d'un singe qu'il devait 'mépriser après qu'on l'avait fouetté.' But now the monkey *had* been whipped, and doubtless all would be well. It seems strange that Frederick should still, after more than two years of close observation, have had no notion of the material he was dealing with. He might as well have supposed that he could stop a mountain torrent in spate with a wave of his hand, as have imagined that he could impose obedience upon Voltaire in such a crisis by means of a lecture and a threat 'du côté de la boursse.' Before the month was out all Germany was swarming with Akakias ; thousands of copies were being printed in Holland ; and editions were going off in Paris like hot cakes. It is difficult to withhold one's admiration from the audacious old spirit who thus, on the mere strength of his mother-wits, dared to defy the enraged master of a powerful state. 'Votre effronterie m'étonne,' fulminated Frederick in a furious note, when he suddenly discovered that all Europe was ringing with the absurdity of the man whom he had chosen to be the President of his favourite Academy, whose cause he had publicly espoused, and whom he had privately assured of his royal protection. 'Ah ! Mon Dieu, Sire,' scribbled Voltaire on the same sheet of paper, 'dans l'état où je suis ! ' He was, of course, once more dying. 'Quoi ! vous me jugeriez sans 'entendre ! Je demande justice et la mort.' Frederick replied by having copies of 'Akakia' burnt by the common

hangman in the streets of Berlin. Voltaire thereupon returned his Order, his gold key, and his pension. It might have been supposed that the final rupture had now really come at last. But three months elapsed before Frederick could bring himself to realise that all was over, and to agree to the departure of his extraordinary guest. Carlyle's suggestion that this last delay arose from the unwillingness of Voltaire to go, rather than from Frederick's desire to keep him, is plainly controverted by the facts. The King not only insisted on Voltaire's accepting once again the honours which he had surrendered, but actually went so far as to write him a letter of forgiveness and reconciliation. But the poet would not relent ; there was a last week of suppers at Potsdam—' soupers de Damoclès ' Voltaire called them ; and then, on 26th March 1753, the two men parted for ever.

The storm seemed to be over ; but the tail of it was still hanging in the wind. Voltaire, on his way to the waters of Plombières, stopped at Leipzig, where he could not resist, in spite of his repeated promises to the contrary, the temptation to bring out a new and enlarged edition of ' Akakia.' Upon this Maupertuis utterly lost his head : he wrote to Voltaire, threatening him with personal chastisement. Voltaire issued yet another edition of ' Akakia,' appended a somewhat unauthorised version of the President's letter, and added that if the dangerous and cruel man really persisted in his threat he would be received with a vigorous discharge from those instruments of intimate utility which figure so freely in the comedies of Molière. This stroke was the *coup de grâce* of Maupertuis. Shattered in body and mind, he dragged himself from Berlin to die at last in Basle under the ministrations of a couple of Capuchins and a Protestant valet reading aloud the Genevan Bible. In the meantime Frederick had decided on a violent measure. He had suddenly remembered that Voltaire had carried off with him one of the very few privately printed copies of those poetical works upon which he had spent so much devoted labour ; it occurred to him that they contained several passages of a highly damaging kind ; and he could feel no certainty that those passages would not be given to the world by the malicious Frenchman. Such, at any rate, were his own excuses for the step which he now took ; but it seems possible that he was at least partly swayed by feelings of resentment

and revenge which had been rendered uncontrollable by the last onslaught upon Maupertuis. Whatever may have been his motives, it is certain that he ordered the Prussian Resident in Frankfort, which was Voltaire's next stopping-place, to hold the poet in arrest until he delivered over the royal volume. A multitude of strange blunders and ludicrous incidents followed, upon which much controversial and patriotic ink has been spilt by a succession of French and German biographers. To an English reader it is clear that in this little comedy of errors none of the parties concerned can escape from blame—that Voltaire was hysterical, undignified, and untruthful, that the Prussian Resident was stupid and domineering, that Frederick was careless in his orders and cynical as to their results. Nor, it is to be hoped, need any Englishman be reminded that the consequences of a system of government in which the arbitrary will of an individual takes the place of the rule of law are apt to be disgraceful and absurd.

After five weeks' detention at Frankfort, Voltaire was free—free in every sense of the word—free from the service of Kings and the clutches of Residents, free in his own mind, free to shape his own destiny. He hesitated for several months, and then settled down by the Lake of Geneva. There the fires, which had lain smouldering so long in the profundities of his spirit, flared up, and flamed over Europe, towering and inextinguishable. In a few years letters began to flow once more to and from Berlin. At first the old grievances still rankled; but in time even the wrongs of Maupertuis and the misadventures of Frankfort were almost forgotten. Twenty years passed, and the King of Prussia was submitting his verses as anxiously as ever to Voltaire, whose compliments and cajoleries were pouring out in their accustomed stream. But their relationship was no longer that of master and pupil, courtier and King; it was that of two independent and equal powers. Even Frederick the Great was forced to see at last in the Patriarch of Ferney something more than a monkey with a genius for French versification. He actually came to respect the author of 'Akakia,' and to cherish his memory. 'Je lui 'fais tous les matins ma prière,' he told D'Alembert, when Voltaire had been two years in the grave; 'je lui dis, Divin 'Voltaire, *ora pro nobis*.'

LYTTON STRACHEY.

THE CROWN COLONIES AND THE WAR

1. **Correspondence relating to Naval and Military Assistance afforded to His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's Oversea Dominions.** Cd. 7607.
2. **Correspondence relating to Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies.** Cd. 7608, Cd. 7647, Cd. 7875.

IN an article on 'The Crown Colonies and Protectorates' in the EDINBURGH REVIEW of April 1914, the present writer urged the importance of a thorough study of the administration of our Crown Colonies, not as isolated adjuncts of our Imperial heritage, but as complementary and indispensable to the other parts of the Empire from an economic point of view and destined to play a very essential part in its development as a whole. That article passed in review the principal economic resources of the Crown Colonies and their uses in the economic life of the other parts of the Empire. It is proposed in the present article to show how the Crown Colonies have willingly shared with the rest of the Empire the common burden of the war, and then to examine the principles and policies which have produced this result.

In the year 1859, at a time when the policy of Parliament was still dominated by the belief that our Colonies and India were commercially useless and politically mischievous, a departmental committee, with Sir Charles Adderley, afterwards Lord Norton, as Chairman, was appointed to inquire into the question of colonial contributions to Imperial Defence. The conclusions of the Committee were summed up in the proposition:

> 'That every part of the Empire should raise its own means of defence at home, and at the sound of danger all should be ready to rally round the threatened point, the ocean being our proper medium of national intercommunication and every enemy being made aware that on his temporary success in any quarter the vengeance of the whole Empire waits.'

It must be admitted that in July 1914 Germany had reason to believe that such a rally was impossible, and that the outbreak of war would serve to precipitate the disintegrating

tendency of events arising out of conflicting political interests, and in particular out of the Home Rule Bill at the centre, and the Union of South Africa Act on the circumference. And yet at the sound of danger the rally was spontaneous and unanimous.

Even before the declaration of war the Dominions of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and South Africa had telegraphed offers of military and naval assistance; Newfoundland followed on August 8th.

A similar spirit was displayed throughout India. The rulers of the Native States, nearly seven hundred in number, were unanimous in the prompt offer of their personal services and the resources of their territories. Before the end of September 70,000 Indian troops had arrived in France, where they have rendered services of which India is proud and for which the Empire is grateful. And not only in France. Indian troops are fighting, or have fought, in the Persian Gulf, on the Suez Canal, in the Dardanelles, in China, and in East Africa.

The spirit shown by the self-governing Dominions and by the princes and peoples of India has been equally displayed by the Crown Colonies. As examples of the effect of the war upon the minds of the non-European populations of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates it is worth while to quote two of the many offers of help that have reached the Colonial Office since the war began. The first is embodied in a petition dated October 14th, 1914, from the Somali Chiefs in Jubaland praying that they may be allowed to fight for England.

'In former days the Somali have fought against the Government. Even lately the Marehan have fought against the Government. Now we have heard that the German Government have declared war on the English Government. Behold our *fitna* against the English Government is finished. As the monsoon wind drives the sand-hills of our coast into new forms, so does this news of German evil-doing drive our hearts and spears into the service of the English Government. . . . We have heard that Indian *askaris* have been sent to fight for us in Europe. Humbly we ask why should not the Somali fight for England also. We beg the Government to allow our warriors to show their loyalty. In former days the Somali tribes made *fitna* against each other. Even now it is so; it is our custom; yet with the Government against the Germans, we are as one, ourselves, our warriors, our women and our children. By God it is so. By God it is so. By God it is so. . . . With all humbleness we desire to beg of the Government to allow our sons

and warriors to take part in this great war against the German evil-doers. They are ready. They are eager. Grant them the boon. God and Mahomed are with us all.'

The second offer is conveyed in fewer words, and the very brevity of this message helps to make it one of the most striking of the many testimonies of loyalty that have reached the Imperial Government from the outlying portions of the Empire. It comes from the little island of Niue, one of the Cook Islands, which has been attached to the Dominion of New Zealand since 1901. This small island forwarded £164 to the Empire Defence Fund and offered to send two hundred young men. The offer was contained in a letter signed by twelve chiefs :

'To King George V., all those in authority, and the brave men who fight. I am the island of Niue, a small child that stands up to help the kingdom of George V. There are two portions we are offering—(1) money ; (2) men.'

Before passing on to record the steps taken by the Crown Colonies to contribute to the defence of the Empire, it is worth while to remind the reader that since the creation of the Imperial Defence Committee there has been elaborated for each of the Crown Colonies a scheme of defence based on the principle that each part of the Empire should raise its own means of defence at home. Those schemes are adapted not only to the geographical position of the Colonies in relation to Imperial Naval and Military bases, but to their constitutional status. In one Colony, at least, provision has been made for compulsory service, should the voluntary system fail to maintain an adequate force. In every case the scheme provides that it shall be brought into operation by proclamation signed by the governor, and, as the necessary proclamation is always prepared in draft, all that has to be done 'at the 'sound of danger ' is to have it set up in type, signed, and published.

It is impossible to give even an approximate estimate of the men contributed by the Crown Colonies to the expeditionary forces of the war. No Parliamentary Paper has been issued on the subject of military assistance given by them, apart from the operations in Africa, and no Asiatic or African contingents have been sent from the Crown Colonies to Europe, although it is possible and even probable that men of colour may be included in contingents for extra-territorial service

raised in British Guiana and the West Indies. Immediately after the declaration of war, on Aug. 12th, 1914, a meeting was held in London, in the rooms of the Rubber Growers' Association, to consider the position as affecting Ceylon, and the possibility of recruiting a Ceylon contingent. Eventually the services of nearly 100 eligible recruits were offered to the War Office. The War Office refused to accept them as a unit, but at once gave commissions to several; all ultimately found engagements. The same policy was adopted in the case of the Straits Settlements, where the passage-money of intending recruits was paid by the Government. Similarly in Fiji large contingents of native forces offered by the provinces were declined, but a fund was created to defray the expenses of sending a picked body of European recruits to form a part of the New Zealand expeditionary force. There can be little doubt that the Roll of Honour of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates will bear honourable comparison with the records of any part of the Empire. In his speech on the Colonial Office Vote on July 21st last Mr. Bonar Law declared that in Nigeria practically the whole white population volunteered, and nearly the whole had joined. In the case of the invasion of Togoland 95 per cent. of the total unofficial European population of the Gold Coast actually took up arms, while among the official population the difficulty was to keep back a sufficient number to enable the administration to be carried on.

In illustration of the schemes of defence of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates the story of the Gold Coast during the period from July 29th to August 29th is instructive. Late at night on July 29th the colony received warning to be ready for a declaration of war. On the following day the proclamation necessary to put in force the scheme of defence was set up in type ready for signature, and steps taken to give effect to its provisions; European volunteers were enrolled and equipped to supplement the existing Volunteer forces, and a meeting of the Legislature was summoned for August 5th to pass any legislation that might be required. At midnight on August 4th news of the declaration of war was received, and the Legislative Council at its meeting next day passed a remarkable volume of Ordinances based on the principles of the Defence

of the Realm Act. On the 6th the Officer Commanding the Forces demanded the surrender of the neighbouring German Colony of Togoland. The military operations that followed, carried out in conjunction with French forces from Dahomey, form a memorable record in the history of our Crown Colonies, and on August 29th the Governor of the Gold Coast was informed of the unconditional surrender of Togoland.

A full and detailed enumeration of what each of the Crown Colonies has done is, of course, impossible. It must suffice to give typical illustrations.

In the West Indian islands, the lead was taken by Barbados. On August 25th the Governor reported by telegram the desire of the House of Assembly to offer a contribution of £20,000. The Home Government, in gratefully appreciating the offer, added that the gift would be welcome in the form of sugar, if practicable. The legislative vote was followed by contributions, collected privately from many sources, to the Prince of Wales's Fund, the Serbian Relief Fund, and the British Red Cross Fund. The other islands quickly followed. Within a few days Grenada and St. Lucia had voted supplies of cocoa and St. Vincent of arrowroot for the Imperial forces. All three had voted contributions to the Prince of Wales's Fund, and in all three the votes of the Legislature had been supplemented by donations in money and kind from planters, associations, and individuals. In the Leeward Islands, grants voted by the Legislatures towards the expenses of the war and its consequences, were similarly supplemented by voluntary subscriptions, while generous private gifts of local fruits and preserves were offered for the use of the forces. In Dominica the Council declared its readiness to devote, if necessary, to Imperial War Funds the whole of the Colony's surplus assets, and included among its contributions the gift of an aeroplane to the Royal Flying Corps. In Trinidad the Legislature voted £40,000 for the purchase of cocoa for the Imperial forces and voluntary donations were made to the Prince of Wales's Fund, the Belgian Relief Fund, and other funds. To these gifts were added large consignments of oranges and other citrus fruits.

In Jamaica the Governor telegraphed on September 1st the unanimous desire of the Colony to contribute to the expenses of the war in some way besides maintaining its own

local defences and offered a contribution of sugar. This was followed by offers from a private firm of a million cigarettes for British troops at the front, and from the Agricultural Society of crops of oranges for wounded soldiers in the military hospitals of the United Kingdom. At the same time Committees were organised to collect funds for the relief of distress arising out of the war, to be allocated to the Prince of Wales's Fund and the Belgian Relief Fund. The contributions of Jamaica were supplemented by grants and gifts from its dependencies—the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands.

In the Bahamas £10,000 was voted by the Legislature and private donations were made to the Prince of Wales's Fund and the Belgian Relief Fund. The Governor, in reporting these facts, observed that in many cases the subscribers had denied themselves not only luxuries but necessities. Seamstresses and workwomen earning a few shillings a week had given two or three shillings. The Colony of Bermuda provided a payment of £3450 *per annum* for fifteen years as approximately equivalent to a contribution of £40,000. It remains only to be added that the contributions from the West Indian Islands transmitted through the local Governments were supplemented, and are being constantly supplemented, by contributions sent through the West Indian Committee. These have included a motor ambulance presented by subscribers in Barbados to the British Red Cross Society for service in France. West Indian ladies have also sent gifts of warm clothing for the army and navy.

The financial position of British Honduras did not justify a contribution from the general revenue of the Colony, but without solicitation small planters, fishermen, sailors, and the labourers of the mahogany camps contributed liberally to the Prince of Wales's Fund and other funds. The contributions of British Guiana were largely dominated by a recognition of the Colony's obligations to the East Indies for the development of its resources. An offer of one thousand tons of sugar was followed by an offer of 500,000 lbs. of rice, grown in the colony by East Indian colonists, to be used for the British Indian forces serving at the front, and the gift was eventually allocated with unanimous approval to the use of wounded Indians in British hospitals.

The Falkland Islands will ever be identified with the naval history of the war, but these remote islands have also an excellent record as contributories to the cost of the war. On September 9th the Legislative Council voted a sum equivalent to £1 per head of the population as a contribution to the Prince of Wales's Fund. Subsequent voluntary subscriptions soon raised the contribution of the Islands to a sum largely in excess of £2 per head of the population.

The military assistance afforded by the Gold Coast Colony has already been dealt with: the assistance given in money or kind is hardly less noteworthy. In December the Legislature passed a resolution to meet all the expenses of the expedition to Togoland, and this vote was followed a few days later by a telegraphic dispatch offering, in addition to the expenses of the Togoland expedition, a sum of £80,000 as a contribution for the year 1915 to the Imperial expenses of the war. At the same time a purely voluntary collection was started on the initiative of native gentlemen, for the creation of a fund called the Gold Coast Imperial War Fund. Europeans as well as natives subscribed.

In Nigeria as soon as the Emirs and native Chiefs heard of the assistance given by the Indian Princes they evinced a keen desire to give some similar proof of their loyalty. By November 4th they had placed at the disposal of the Governor-General a collective contribution of £38,000 from their Native Treasury balances. Two of them had been indefatigable in their endeavours to assist the military operations in Togoland and the Cameroons by supplying transport, mail runners, remounts, escorts and gifts to the troops. A feature of special significance throughout Nigeria was that the Mohammedan population was unaffected by the declaration of war against Turkey and remained devotedly loyal to the British cause. A typical instance of the generosity of African Chiefs may well be recalled. An independent Chief in the Bornu district expressed his desire to give £80 to the Imperial War funds. As his salary was £180 a year the Governor accepted only £10; to which the Chief added presents of cigarettes to the troops operating on the Bantu frontier.

East Africa had to bear heavy war burdens of her own and was therefore not in a position to make contributions to the general cause. For this reason the Colonial

Office declined to accept an offer from the colony of 100 tons of coffee for the use of British troops. These objections however did not apply to a voluntary offer by the Kavirondo Chiefs of 3000 goats, followed by a succession of offers from other Chiefs of bullocks, steers, goats, and sheep for the use of the troops operating in East Africa.

Some mention must be made of those portions of South Africa which are outside the South African Union and are in the position of Protectorates. Rhodesia, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland all subscribed to the Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund and to the British Red Cross Society. In Basutoland one of the Paramount Chiefs offered to raise a fund for relief of war sufferers by a collection of one shilling a head from each of his people. In Rhodesia the British South Africa Company and the planters of Southern Rhodesia presented four million cigarettes and 80,000 tins of tobacco to the War Office for the Expeditionary Forces on the Continent and 80,000 tins of tobacco to the Admiralty for the naval forces.

The French traditions of the Colony of Mauritius give special interest to its contributions to the present war. In 1901 King George, then Duke of Cornwall and York, spoke of this beautiful island as 'proud of its association with naval 'achievements that shed equal glory on England and France.' The phrase was certainly in the minds of the members of the Chamber of Agriculture when they transmitted to the Admiralty a message in these terms :

'Les planteurs Mauriciens sont heureux d'offrir à la valeureuse Marine de sa Majesté Britannique comme un faible tribut de leur admiration et de leur reconnaissance pour la protection si effective qu'elle assure au commerce de l'Empire un million de livres de sucre spécialement fabriqué et forment des vœux bien sincères pour que la Flotte rehausse encore les heroïques traditions qui sont les siennes.'

A similar message was sent to the Secretary of State for War. At the same time the Legislature of the Colony increased the appropriation for the military defence of the island.

In the Seychelles, until recently a dependency of Mauritius, contributions were made to the Red Cross Society and the Prince of Wales's Fund ; while officers and non-commissioned officers of the French Army who had landed in Seychelles to

await transport to Madagascar made a special contribution for the exclusive use of British sick and wounded soldiers.

Passing to Ceylon, it is impossible to give a complete record of the Colony's contributions in men, money or kind, because they include liberal subscriptions from Ceylon planting and commercial companies of which no record is available. The Legislature voted £25,000 for the Prince of Wales's Fund; gifts to the same fund were made by the Sultan of the Maldive Islands and his Ministers and officials, also by members of the Ceylon Association. A committee of Singhalese ladies collected subscriptions to the Belgian Relief Fund. A notable voluntary gift to the Red Cross Fund has been a monthly subscription by the planters of one day's pay, amounting to about £1000 a month. Private gifts of tea rapidly reached an amount of over a quarter of a million pounds.

In Hong Kong the Legislature voted 100,000 dollars to the Prince of Wales's Fund, and large voluntary subscriptions have been made in addition. Among the latter was a Chinese subscription collected by a purely Chinese sub-committee. Donations were also made by the small and relatively very poor Portuguese community.

In the Straits Settlements grants were made to various British Relief Funds and to the Belgian Relief Fund both by the governing authorities and by private individuals. Gifts in kind included consignments from Singapore of over eleven hundred cases of tinned pineapples for British troops.

In Fiji, contributions were raised from every section of a heterogeneous community. Europeans, Indians, Chinese, and Japanese associated themselves in the cause with Fijians, Samoans, Polynesians, and Rotumans. The Governor of Fiji also received, as High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, contributions from the British Solomon Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and the Tongan Islands.

What has been said justifies the claim of the Crown Colonies to be considered not as isolated adjuncts of our imperial heritage but as rivals of the Dominions and India in the ardour of their patriotism and in the energy of their public spirit. It remains to examine the principles and policies of administration which have produced this result.

When Natal was admitted to the status of a British Crown Colony a Proclamation was made by Queen Victoria, declaring

that 'There shall not be in the eye of the law any distinction 'of persons or disqualification of origin, language or creed; 'but the protection of the law in letter and in substance 'shall be extended to all alike.' The obligation thus assumed by the Sovereign of the British Empire is perpetually renewed in the instructions, issued to Governors of Crown Colonies under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, which reserve from their assent any bill whereby persons not of European birth or descent may be subjected to any disability or restriction to which persons of European birth are not also subjected.

To give complete effect to the principle of racial equality the agency of education is of paramount necessity. In planning their educational systems the Crown Colonies have avoided the error of laying stress only on intellectual attainments. They recognise that the formation of character is an essential factor in the civilisation they desire to establish, and they realise the necessity of securing the co-operation of religion. To convert the religions of Christians, Mohammedans, Hindus, Buddhists, and Pagans from disintegrating forces into connecting links is a problem, the difficulties of which will appeal even to those who have never crossed the seas but have realised at home the extent to which religious divisions have cut across the path of patriotism in the United Kingdom. Experience has shown that a connecting link can be found in the consciousness of a clear temporal purpose—the extension of civilisation through economic expansion. On these lines the Crown Colonies are endeavouring to establish everywhere an educational system adequate to qualify the natives of each Colony for service not only in the administrative and judicial departments but also in departments which require special training in science, mechanical engineering, or medicine, such as the departments of Agriculture, Forestry, Public Works, and Public Health. Students trained under this system, who may be unsuccessful candidates for the public service, or who do not desire it, are qualified not only for the so-called learned professions but for employment in every field of industrial and commercial enterprise. And in order that the benefits of the system may be within reach of all, without distinction of creed or race, the Government invites the co-operation, on terms of equality, of every religion in order to secure the perfectly legitimate temporal interests of its members. Grants are available for schools

managed by persons of all creeds and races indifferently, provided that the secular education given is up to the prescribed standard. The educational system may be called a system of three dimensions working by three agencies, Government management, native management, and the management of the Christian Churches. That the native agencies are able and willing to justify the policy is proved by the number and character of the institutions now under their management.

Mr. Chamberlain was the first English statesman to appreciate fully the economic value of our undeveloped estates in the tropics, and to realise that the reason of their not being developed was their unhealthiness. His interest was primarily directed to the case of government officials, especially in West Africa, where administrative efficiency was seriously impeded by the difficulty of finding qualified candidates for employment in regions where even a short period of service brought almost certain sickness and probable death. But Mr. Chamberlain was not long in appreciating the extent to which all the agencies of civilisation in our Crown Colonies—industry, commerce, military and naval defence, and efficient administration—depend on security from tropical disease. In 1898 he sent to the War Office, the Admiralty, the India Office and the Foreign Office, a Circular which he proposed to submit to the General Medical Council and other centres of British medical influence, urging the necessity of attention to tropical diseases in the educational institutions of the country. An immediate and sympathetic response to the Circular enabled Mr. Chamberlain to secure a grant from the Treasury towards the establishment of a School of Tropical Medicine appropriately connected with the Albert Dock Branch of the Seamen's Hospital. This was promptly followed by the no less appropriate establishment of a School of Tropical Medicine in connection with the University of Liverpool, the port of Liverpool being largely interested in trade with the tropics. Within two years the London and Liverpool Schools were in working order, and a Malaria Commission appointed jointly by the Colonial Office and the Royal Society was engaged in research in West Africa.

Under the auspices of the London and Liverpool Schools of Tropical Medicine there have qualified for practice in the tropics many hundreds of students, including medical officers

of the Army and Navy and of the Colonial, Indian and Foreign Office services, missionaries, traders, and representatives of foreign Governments and Universities. It is not too much to claim that our schools have, through these representatives, been contributory to the successful operations of Surgeon-General Gorgas, whose sanitary and administrative work has transformed the region of the Panama Canal from one of the most deadly to one of the healthiest in America. In the interests of research our schools have equipped expeditions to America, Africa, and Asia, which have studied locally every known disease. The establishment of a laboratory for local research at Kuala Lumpur in the Federated Malay States was followed by the equipment of laboratories in Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Mauritius, and it is hoped that before long continuity of research *in situ* will be secured by affiliated or associated institutions in all our Crown Colonies and Protectorates.

The study of local diseases has naturally been accompanied by the study of local remedies. Local herbs and drugs are extensively used by empiric native practitioners, and it must be admitted that Government medical officers have often been as hostile to the use of such remedies as were their predecessors to the use of quinine in the seventeenth century. The question of admitting new drugs of tropical origin into the British Pharmacopœia was one in which Mr. Chamberlain was keenly interested, and he took an active share in the measures which led to the publication of an Indian and Colonial Addendum in 1900. This has been followed by the recent publication of a revised edition of the British Pharmacopœia, which may now justly claim to be an Imperial Pharmacopœia.

Among other questions to which Mr. Chamberlain devoted his attention was the subject of providing for the care of the sick by nurses specially trained for tropical service. On the initiative of ladies interested in the Crown Colonies by reason of personal residence or the official position of their husbands a movement was started which led to the foundation of the Colonial Nursing Association. The last Annual Report shows that during the year ending March 31st last 207 nurses were employed in the Government service of the Crown Colonies. Special mention is made of the nurses recommended for service with the Expeditionary Force in the Cameroons, and splendid tribute is paid to their pluck, endurance, and resource in trying

situations. Similar testimony is borne to the services of the Association's nurses in British East Africa. From Penang have been received not less encouraging accounts of the services of the matron and nursing staff on the occasion of the attack by the 'Emden' on Russian cruisers in Penang harbour, and the rush of work entailed by the admission at a mement's notice of wounded Russians to the Government Hospital. Nurses of the Association have also been engaged in caring for the wounded in Ceylon. At the time of the great naval action off the Falkland Islands the services of the nurses employed in the King Edward VII. Memorial Hospital, placed at the disposal of the naval authorities, received distinguished mention. Two of the Association's nurses were on board the 'Falaba' when she was torpedoed by a German submarine on March 28th. One was drowned; the other returned to England and sailed again for the Cameroons on April 17th for service with the Expeditionary Force.

Within the jurisdiction of our Crown Colonies and Protectorates is to be found a mosaic of legal systems bewildering in their number and complexity, the result of a policy intimately allied with the principle of religious toleration. The essence of this policy has been to adapt itself to the peculiar requirements of every individual accession to the Empire, and our methods have consequently been as various as the communities for whom the legislation was designed. Generally speaking our Crown Colonies may be divided into two classes:—Colonies acquired by conquest or cession from European Powers, and Colonies not so acquired. In the former class our policy has been, in the first instance, to preserve the established law in so far as it was not fundamentally at variance with our conception of justice. In Colonies not acquired by conquest or cession from European Powers, our policy has been based on the principle asserted in the Act of Settlement of William III.; that as the law is the birthright of English subjects, so wherever they go they carry their birthright with them. But an important qualification of this principle must be added, to the effect that such settlers take with them only so much of their laws as is applicable to their own situation and to the conditions of an infant Colony, this reservation leaving the Colony free to develop in the way best suited to its environment and native genius. In either case the Crown Colonies have erected and

are erecting on their fundamental laws a superstructure of local statute law adapted to their requirements, borrowing from the Mother Country and from other Colonies. In this sphere of legislation experience has everywhere taught the lesson of caution in making changes which might come into collision with the usages and prejudices of native communities.

In respect of their legislative constitutions the Crown Colonies and Protectorates are divided into three classes: Colonies which have no Legislative Council, legislative power being delegated to the officer administering the Government; Colonies with Legislatures nominated by the Crown; and Colonies with partly elected Legislatures. The constitutions of all Crown Colony Legislatures, though differing in their component parts, have this in common, that the power of the Crown, if pressed to its extreme limit, must avail to overcome every resistance that can be made to it. For this there are two main grounds. The first is that the Imperial Government is in the last resort responsible for the Colony's financial position; the second, that by the nature of the populations concerned the Crown and its nominees are in effect the representatives of that enormous majority of the people whose interests cannot be secured by the system of election by territorial districts that prevails in the United Kingdom and the Dominions. The grant of representative or responsible Government to Crown Colonies and Protectorates is not a grant of larger liberties to the mass of the community, for only a minority is represented.

Representation is secured by two methods, nomination and election. The system of nomination secures the representation of groups of interests which may be classed generally under three heads—agricultural, commercial, and racial; while the power of the Crown to maintain a fair balance between these interests, and the general interests of efficient administration, is secured by the nomination of heads of principal public departments and other officials. As regards racial interests it may be mentioned by way of illustration that in Ceylon the unofficial nominated members of the Legislature include three representatives of the Singhalese, two of the Tamil, and one of the Mohammedan communities.

There are in one or other of the Crown Colony Legislatures six varieties of relation between members of the Legislature

and the Crown. They were defined in a Colonial Office Circular of August 1868, which in all essentials remains the fundamental law of Crown Colony Government to the present day. There is the Governor, who is bound to obey the Sovereign's commands conveyed to him by the Secretary of State in his legislative as well as in his executive capacity, whether or not the course prescribed accord with his personal opinions. There are *ex officio* members who hold their seats in virtue of appointments they hold under the Crown. They may, if necessary, be required by the Governor to support the Crown in the Legislature or to resign their appointments, but the same implicit obedience is not demanded of them in their legislative as in their executive capacity. Legislation includes within its range questions of religion and others of high moral import in respect of which officers of the Crown may have conscientious scruples, and the Governor is empowered to excuse them from taking part in measures to which they object on these grounds. At the same time an officer whose seat is by law inseparable from his office cannot be continued in his office if his conscience should not permit him to give the Crown such a measure of support as may be necessary to enable the Governor to carry on the business of government in the Legislature on the principles and according to the intention with which the Legislature was constituted.

Then there is the nominee member of the Legislature who, though not taking his seat by virtue of his office, is a salaried servant of the Crown. If not disposed to give a general and effective support, or if on any special occasion on which the Governor has cogent reasons for requiring his support he sees fit to refuse it, he may be allowed to resign his seat. He cannot retain both his office and his seat. The fourth case is that of the nominee member who does not hold any office of emolument under the Crown. He accepts a seat on the express understanding that he will co-operate with the Government in its general policy, and not oppose the Crown on any important occasion without strong reasons, but of the validity of those reasons he is allowed to be himself the judge.

The case of an elected member holding salaried office under the Crown differs in degree rather than in principle from that of a nominated member holding such an office. He has duties to his constituents as well as to the Crown, and if he should

habitually or often, on important questions, be unable to reconcile these different duties the Governor would be justified in requiring him to resign either his office or his seat.

The last case is that of the elected member who does not hold any office of emolument under the Crown. He is at liberty to support or oppose the Government as he sees fit. It is his duty to exercise a vigilant supervision over the measures introduced by the Government. On this point the terms of the Colonial Office Circular are clear and important. They declare that if the elected members should be outvoted in any case in which it appears to them that official interests are prevailing to the prejudice of the public good, it will be their duty to enter a protest setting out the grounds of their objection, and to require of the Governor that he shall transmit it for the consideration of the Secretary of State. The Circular expressly declares :

'It is thus that in communities in which from the absence of constituencies at once large and enlightened the representative element in the Legislature must necessarily rest upon a very narrow basis, the responsibility of the Government can still be made effective ; for the Secretary of State is responsible to Parliament, and Parliament is not slow to listen to any complaints of alleged misgovernment in the Colonies.'

Having thus briefly reviewed the principles and policies of administration which have resulted in the rally of the Crown Colonies to the Empire on the outbreak of war, it will not be out of place to refer to a proposal for the reform of the Colonial Office itself with a view to increase its efficiency and authority. The terms of the Circular of 1868 clearly indicate an anticipation of difficulties arising in the relations between the Colonial Office, the Governor, the local officials, and the elected members of the Legislatures. Experience has justified the anticipation. Grave difficulties have arisen out of questions of creed and colour, the migration of labour and the conditions under which the development of natural resources can best be carried on to the mutual advantage of local communities and the United Kingdom. Soon after his return from Canada, Earl Grey declared that the wants of society can never be adequately met so long as the twin powers of capital and labour are found warring against each other. In the Crown Colonies a particularly dangerous line of cleavage is caused by the fact that as a

rule capital is European and white, labour African or Asiatic and black. Out of these various relations there arise differences which it is the highest function of the Colonial Office to prevent from breaking into conflict by a policy at once continuous and progressive, carried on in a spirit of equal sympathy with local and imperial exigencies. But the adequate discharge of this duty is rendered difficult by the frequency with which the constitutionally responsible Ministers are changed. Within the last ten years the Colonial Office has had five Secretaries of State and seven Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. And when conflicts have become sufficiently serious to attract attention in Parliament, they have much more often been exasperated than permanently composed by the evasive method of reference to an irresponsible Royal Commission.

In view of these difficulties it has of late years been urged that the Secretary of State should have the advantage of an advisory Council to assist him in all matters relating to the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, constituted on the same principles as the Council of the Secretary of State for India. When the proposal was first advocated it was met by an assertion that, so far from there being any likelihood of it being entertained, the India Office was anxious to relieve itself of the incubus of the Council. The advocates of the proposal were therefore cheered and encouraged by the statement of Lord Crewe, when Secretary for India, that it was decided to reconstruct the Council with a view to give it greater efficiency and authority. At the meeting of the Indian National Congress in 1914 it was made clear that such a reconstruction is demanded in India, in order, as was declared, 'to maintain a fair balance 'between the interests involved in the Indian administration, 'and to secure for its decisions that appreciation and willing 'acceptance which are essential to all Governments, especially 'to Governments conducted by an alien bureaucracy.' The accessions to our Crown Colonies and Protectorates arising out of the war strengthen the argument in favour of the proposed Council.

CHARLES BRUCE.

GREEK ATHLETICS AND MILITARY TRAINING

1. **The Renaissance of the Greek Ideal.** By Mrs. Roger Watts. Heinemann. 1914.
2. **Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals.** By E. N. Gardiner. Macmillan. 1910.
3. **The Human Figure.** By E. Bruecke. Translated by W. Anderson. Grevel. 1900.

ATHLETICS, whether ancient or modern, is a wide term covering a large field of bodily activities, while the boundaries between sport and athletics are often hard to fix. But we may safely distinguish four main branches of physical energy.

1. Athletics proper, where the essential feature is the competition with its almost invariable concomitant the prize,—athlon ; the two things going so closely together that, as in the 'Grand Prix,' the same word is used for race and reward.

2. Gymnastics, the training of the body by a system of exercises in which the naked limbs are allowed free play. Competition is here often replaced by united action, and there is a close connexion with the sister arts of music and medicine.

3. Drill, the particular form of bodily training which is necessary to fit a man for the duties of a soldier. It includes all the varieties of military exercise and practice with arms, and differs from athletics and gymnastics in that its formal purpose is purely utilitarian.

4. Games of various kinds, played either singly or in company, and usually requiring some sort of implement, a ball, a stick, or a hoop. The elements of competition and united effort are usually present, but a prize is not essential.

Of these divisions the last is with Englishmen by far the most important, and we have succeeded in making it a real instrument of moral and physical education. On the cricket and the football field our habits of individual initiative and cheerful obedience are developed ; the virtues of courage, endurance, and self-control are fostered. We gain training not

merely for the body but for the mind. But these organised games are very largely an invention of the modern Englishman, and their wide diffusion is synchronous with the great extension of the public-school system which began in the middle of the last century. The public-school virtues are the product of the public-school games.

In ancient Greece, however, games had little athletic importance. Ball play is frequently mentioned in the 'Odyssey'; in real life Alexander the Great enjoyed a game, while Galen wrote a treatise in its praise; in the gymnasium at Delphi there were several open courts, such as we use for fives, and we are told that ball games were very popular in Sparta. But, generally speaking, games were regarded by the Greeks as suitable for children and old men, for barbarians and revellers. Children had their hoops and tug of war, old men their checkers and such dice games as the 'Penelope' described by Athenaeus. The banquet was enlivened by the 'Kottabos,' and from the barbarians came probably the 'Skin and Hatchet' of which Theophrastus speaks, and the various mummers' games of which the Athenians were so fond. All these were mere recreations, and the only evidence for anything more formal comes late in history from Sparta, where two inscriptions tell us that boys and youths were organised in teams to play the games of Platanistas and Kattheratorin, the first something like a rough football scrimmage, the second a form of prisoner's base. In this, however, as in many ways, the Spartans stood apart from the rest of Greece, and it is correct to say that in ancient times organised games did not exist. To play games in Greek is 'paizein,' 'to be a child,' just as in Latin 'ludus' is both the game that children play and the school where children meet.

Neither Greeks nor Romans could conceive that games might be taken seriously by grown men: they were like the young lady aspirant for a scholastic post who, when sternly asked by the athletic head mistress whether she was any good at games, replied with a simper that she was dearly fond of a nice romp at blind man's buff. For them the sports of cock-fighting and chariot racing supplied that mixture of the trivial and the earnest which human nature always so keenly desires.

But if games seemed to a Greek too frivolous and childish to be part of athletics, drill and military training seemed too

serious and important to be part of anything. They were vital functions, as necessary to existence as sleeping, eating and drinking. War was the great sport and the great business of life ; it was every man's duty and every man's pleasure to fight for his native land; even if he wished to shirk his duty he could not. His life and liberty, his children and his wife, all depended on his personal fitness and abilities as a soldier. 'Andreia,' the quality of a man, the Latin 'virtus,' became in both languages synonymous with physical courage ; and if a man did not possess that virtue he had to do the next best thing and pretend that he did. From the time when, as an *ephebe* of eighteen, he was sent to guard the frontier until the day when, a *geron* of sixty, he received his discharge, a Greek was first and foremost a fighting man. Some States, such as Sparta, intensified their war training and lived always under martial law ; Athens, on the other hand, had no very great enthusiasm for land fighting, and went as far as a Greek State could in avoiding the strictest forms of discipline. But in every Greek community military training was the one essential, and to it everything else was made subservient. It was not, properly speaking, an art of life ; it was life itself.

For these reasons then, exactly opposite one to the other, but both equally cogent, we may dismiss both games and drill from the account, and proceed to the remaining sections, athletics and gymnastics.

The history of organised athletics in Greece, as Mr. Gardiner shows, is a very long one, and extends for some twelve hundred years. The Olympic register of winners in the footrace begins 776 B.C., this year being taken as the first Olympiad when, in the third century B.C., the Olympic register came into use as the recognised method of reckoning dates. From 776 B.C. to 217 A.D. the list, as drawn up by Julius Africanus, has been preserved intact for us by Eusebius. In the third century of our era the Roman Empire, attacked by Goths, was forced to call in the Greeks to fight once more for their native land, and even when the invading hordes were repulsed the effects of their ravages were still felt. The Olympic games, as a permanent institution, apparently ceased after the Gothic invasion, and the policy of Constantine hastened the process of decay Christianity, now the official religion, looked with little favour on the ancient festivals, and finally Theodosius I., probably

on the advice of St. Ambrose, in 393 A.D. abolished the games by imperial edict.

There is hardly any other Greek institution with so long a history. Through the centuries, from the age of the tyrants to the great era of the free States ; from the rise of Macedonia to supremacy, through the troubled years of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues ; while Greece lay crushed under the rule of the Roman Senate and while it had its brief revival of prosperity under the Roman Empire ; in spite of every vicissitude of fortune, year by year the Olympic games took place. There is something impressive in this continuity which links together periods otherwise so different, and historians have laid full stress on the services that Olympia rendered in emphasising the sense of national unity and good will. But exaggeration is very possible here, and no one can say that these athletic festivals created or maintained an atmosphere of peace among the constantly warring Greek States, any more than that their recent revival as an international event has succeeded in bringing harmony to our modern empires. The chief benefit of all these gatherings is the stimulus they afford to local and national patriotism ; but whether the dangers of such competitions are not greater than the advantages is a question still undecided, and it may be useful to remember that in Greece, despite the general popularity of athletics, the two leading States, Athens and Sparta, during the greatest period of their history held somewhat aloof. The reasons that actuated them were different : for Athens, athletics were too specialised ; for Sparta, they were not specialised enough. But the fact remains that the two cities which give to us most of what is valuable in Greek culture took but little interest in this particular organisation.

The Athenian, in his indifference, was influenced probably by various currents of thought. There was the old Ionian vein of softness, which made the arduous training of the athlete distasteful and led to the formation of the adjective *athlios*, ' distressful,' from the noun *athlon* ; the spirit that regarded work as a ' plaguey nuisance,' the carrying of burdens as ' vulgar,' and any form of manual labour as beneath the dignity of a gentleman. There was also the finer feeling that the excessive pursuit of athletics tended to coarsen rather than to refine the human body by developing particular muscles at the

expense of general grace, and thus destroying that *eutrapelia*, the ready nimbleness of mind and limb, which the Athenian valued most. Lastly there was the just belief that athletics in themselves are but a means to an end, the health of the body, and that although that end is a desirable one a healthy mind is even more important. This is the point of view that Xenophanes of Colophon (576-480 B.C.) represents when he says: 'It is not right to prefer strength to the blessings of wisdom: 'our wisdom is better than the strength of men and horses. 'It is not speed of foot that gives a city good government; 'nor does it bring fatness into the dark places of a land.'

In the next century Euripides repeats the complaint, and in more bitter language:

'Of all the countless evils in Greece, none is worse than the athlete tribe. Slaves of their belly, they know neither how to make money nor to bear poverty. In early manhood they seem fine fellows and strut about, the darlings of the town; but when old age comes, like worn-out cloaks they are flung aside.'

And for all this mischief the athletic gatherings, with their crowds of useless spectators, are chiefly responsible. The principle of valuation is wrong, for

'Who by skill in wrestling, or by lifting the diskos, or by a shrewd blow on the jaw ever helped his native land, even though he won the prize? Will men fight the foe holding a diskos in both hands, or will they get home with one fist through the foemen's shield? No one thinks of such folly when he is standing near cold steel.'

These last lines, though written by an Athenian poet, represent the Spartan reasons for withdrawal from Olympia. In the early days of the festival—from 720 to 576 B.C.—the number of Spartan victors in the list is very large, and shows, indeed, an undisputed Spartan supremacy. After 576 they cease almost entirely, and the disappearance of Sparta coincides with the specialisation of athletics which then began. At Delphi, Corinth, and Nemea small local games were changed into national festivals which hoped to rival Olympia. Besides the four great festivals, there were countless smaller competitions established—at Athens, for example, at Argos and at Pellene; and the policy of the 'Tyrants' was to encourage all such gatherings as tending to divert the people from political and military union. The first result was a

distinct rise in the standard of athletic performances, so that definite training became necessary to win success. Secondly, people began to attend the meetings purely as spectators, and additional competitions—in music, poetry, even in beauty—were introduced to please an idle audience, with the result that at last these gatherings presented almost as many attractions as a medieval fair. It was against this combination of international merrymaking and individual prize-winning that the Spartan system was a protest. 'Sparta for the Spartans' was the ruling principle of the Spartan State, and aliens who tried to establish themselves at Lacedaemon were removed by somewhat drastic methods. In a State where all personal initiative was discouraged, the international athlete, honoured by poets and sculptors for his mere personal prowess, could have no place. Moreover, athletics, which the Spartans were prepared to support as a useful recreation tending to produce that which alone in their judgment was of importance to a State, good soldiers, had in the sixth century before Christ become an end in themselves, and the gulf between the specialised athlete and the soldier very quickly began to widen. The athlete soon became a professional in fact if not in name, with little time for anything but training. A class of professional instructors arose, and Sparta, after first excluding the trainers, finally forbade her citizens to take part in such competitions. She saw that the spirit of the professional athlete is at enmity with the military ardour which she made it her business to create, and so after the sixth century she practically withdrew from the Olympic festival. It must be noticed finally that athletic competitions seem to have been an Achaean invention. In the brilliant picture of Achaean civilisation which the Homeric poems give us, athletic sports with prizes and rewards play a prominent part, but they made no racial appeal either to the Athenians who prided themselves on being autochthonous, or to the Dorian State which had established itself upon the ruins of Achaean power. Indeed, that Sparta in the eighth and seventh centuries should have won her long succession of athletic triumphs shows an adaptability to changed conditions and a readiness for new adventures which the mechanical system of Lycurgus afterwards stamped out.

For all these causes organised athletics and the athletic festivals were chiefly supported during the great age of Greece

by those Greek communities with which we are comparatively unfamiliar, Corinth, Boeotia, Thessaly, and the Peloponnesians outside Sparta. There were also numerous competitors from States Greek in their origin and politics, many of them indeed founded by Achaeans driven from continental Greece, but standing somewhat remote from the main current of Greek history: from Syracuse, Agrigentum, and the other cities of Sicily; from the great African colony of Cyrene and the island State of Rhodes. Finally there were some small places like Aegina, for whose citizens Pindar wrote no fewer than eleven of the forty-four odes left to us, which seem to have specialised in athletics and gained a disproportionate number of prizes.

From all parts of the Greek world spectators came flocking to the Altis of Olympia, as soon as the sacred truce was proclaimed. The finest horses that the richest citizens of the wealthiest States possessed were sent to compete in the chariot races; while even the smallest cities instructed their representatives to display their resources to the utmost in the various processions and sacrifices with which the five days of the festival were crowded. A love of display was not a common fault in Greece, but it had full scope at Olympia. The two worst defects of the Greek character were also prominent there —a contempt for women which forbade any female even to be present at the games, and an exaggerated idea of racial purity which shut out all competitors except those of undisputed Greek descent. But the spectacle must have been a splendid one, and undoubtedly inspired some of the finest works of Greek art, the statues of Polycleitus and Myron, and the Epinikian odes of Pindar.

Splendour was the ideal alike of the Achaean chieftain, the Corinthian tyrant, and the Olympic judge. But the stern lesson of the Persian Wars led the Greek people in the fifth century to higher things, and the true spirit of athletics was then to be found, not in the magnificent precinct of Olympian Zeus, but in the simple exercising grounds which every town possessed. Olympia and its prizes fell into the hands of professionals; but gymnastics remained an essential part of national education.

The practice of these athletic exercises took place in a gymnasium or a palaestra; the first an open playing field,

the second essentially a building. As shade and water were necessary, the gymnasium was usually a grove beside some stream, and was frequently a common resort for boys and men. The instructors were sometimes provided by the State, sometimes paid privately; the paedotribe gave general instruction in athletics, the gymnast prepared pupils for some particular exercise; discipline was strict and enforced with the rod. The bathing arrangements in the fifth century were, as we see by the vase paintings, extremely simple and quite unlike the luxurious appliances of hot and vapour baths which in later times corrupted manly vigour. Great use was made of the oil flask—*lecythus*—which was as indispensable to a Greek as an umbrella is to a modern Englishman. After arriving at the gymnasium and divesting himself of his clothes, the athlete's first task was to anoint himself with oil and carefully rub the oil into the skin. This was a recognised part of athletic training, as was the sun bath, and the two gave the skin that rich brown tone which the Greeks so greatly admired. For wrestling, sand was used on the hands and body, and after exercise a strigil or flesh-scraper was employed before the cold bath was taken.

In Lucian's dialogue 'Anacharsis,' where the practical aspect of athletics as a training for war is insisted upon, a vivid picture of the wrestling school is given, and Solon describes to the young Scythian the health-giving properties of gymnastics:

> 'When their first pithless tenderness is past, we strip our youths and aim at hardening them to the temperature of the various seasons till heat does not incommode nor frost paralyse them. Then we anoint them with oil by way of softening them into suppleness. It would be absurd that leather, dead stuff as it is, should be made tougher and more lasting by being softened with oil and the living body get no advantage from the same process.'

The athletic exercises practised in the gymnasium fall into three main classes, depending respectively on strength of body, of leg, and of arm. To the first class belong boxing and wrestling, to the second running and jumping, to the third throwing the diskos and the javelin. The last five of these six sports—boxing being excluded—formed the Pentathlon, a combined competition of five events arranged to suit the allround military athlete, for whom Greek athletic training

at its best was especially designed. In such a competition the foot-race probably came first and the wrestling last ; the three middle events—the field events, as we should call them, jumping, throwing the javelin, and hurling the diskos—being those that were particularly identified with the five-sport system which aimed at producing, not a specialised athlete, but a man who combined strength with agility and skill. Victory in the Pentathlon depended, not on success in all events, but on a system of marks ; victory in three of the competitions was sufficient in itself, but if no competitor won three times, and two competitors tied with two victories each, it is highly probable that account was taken of second and third places.

Of the separate exercises, wrestling perhaps was the favourite. It was the oldest of all sports, and to the Greeks one of the most important. To them it was both a science and an art. Theseus, its inventor, was, according to the myth, taught the rules by Athena herself. Victory alone was not sufficient ; the winner must win gracefully and according to the precepts of the schools. It was from wrestling that the palaestra took its name, and the Greek language is full of metaphors and expressions borrowed from the technical phraseology of the ring. The contests between Heracles and Antaeus, and between Atalanta and Peleus, are two of the best known and most frequently depicted episodes of the heroic saga, and wrestling was one of the sports in which women were allowed by some States—by Sparta and Chios, for example—to take part, competing even against men. Instruction was given in the school ; there were separate rules for men and boys, and the different movements, grips, and throws were taught on a system of progressive difficulty ; text-books were used, and fragments of such a manual have recently been found on an Egyptian papyrus. The attitude of a Greek before coming to grips was very similar to that of modern wrestlers, and is beautifully illustrated in the pair of boy statues from Naples which may be seen in the Embankment gardens. Standing square to one another, they endeavoured to get a hold from the front or the side. The defence was often a grip on the opponent's wrist, which might lead to the offensive if his elbow could also be seized and the throw we call 'the flying mare' be then executed. Of front body-holds, the most effective was gained by catching the waist with both

hands and then lifting the opponent off his feet, such a hold as Heracles used against Antaeus. Of side throws the best known was 'the heave,' usually ascribed to Theseus, where one hand was passed round the opponent's back and the other hand slipped underneath him. Another favourite hold was by the neck —a strong neck was essential for a wrestler—and when this was secured a sudden turn of the body would lead to the throw that we call a 'cross-buttock.' In all wrestling, tripping played an important part, and there are a very large number of technical terms in Greek for the different trips that are employed. Every district in Greece had a style of its own, and these diversities of method helped to keep active an interest in wrestling and to preserve it from the disease of professionalism, so that even when other sports had been ruined the wrestling ring still remained a useful and a popular institution.

Boxing, again, always retained its attractiveness, and in its ancient form offers some varieties from modern practice. There were three stages in its history, depending largely upon the instruments of fighting used. Down to the beginning of the fourth century B.C. it was customary to wind soft strips of leather—*meilichai*—round the hands and arms, which served, like our light gloves, to protect the knuckles and so increased the power of attack, but did not in themselves add to the severity of the blow. Early in the fourth century the *meilichai* were superseded by gloves—*sphairai*—made of hard pieces of leather with projecting and cutting edges, real weapons of offence, like our knuckle-dusters. From these the Roman *caestus* was developed, where the glove was weighted with pieces of iron and metal spikes placed in position over the knuckles. Of all these stages we have plentiful evidence both in art and literature, for boxing and its preliminaries are among the favourite subjects of vase-painters, and in ancient poetry there are descriptions of at least three great fights, Odysseus and Irus in the 'Odyssey,' Amycus and Polydeuces in Theocritus, Entellus and Dares in Virgil. In Greek boxing there was no ring and therefore little close fighting; there were no rounds and therefore the pace was slow, for rushing tactics marked the untrained man; lastly there was no classification by weight; the heavier the man the greater his chance of success, so that a meat diet for boxers was almost compulsory, and boxing became practically the monopoly of the

heavy weights. As thongs or gloves were always used on the hands, wrestling was impossible, and in later times at least the defence was all-important. It seems fairly well established that body-hitting was not practised, and in the Hellenistic age a fight was usually decided by a knock-out blow on the jaw. But in the best period the Greek boxer used both his hands freely, was active on his feet, and had a considerable variety of attack. The introduction of heavy gloves vitiated the art, and boxers began to rely merely on their weight and defensive powers. Thus the great fight in Theocritus between Polydeuces and Amycus—a battle as vividly described as the epic contest in the Dell between Lavengro and the Flaming Tinman —is really a fight between the old school of scientific activity and the new method of stolid strength, and our sympathies are at once enlisted upon the side of skill against brute force.

Boxing and wrestling were combined in the pankration and allied with many other devices, such as kicking, strangling, twisting, etc.; it was a versatile performance, the joint invention of Heracles and Theseus, and considered both by Pindar and Philostratus as 'the fairest of all contests.' There was an element of danger, but it was no more brutal than is the almost similar method of jujitsu; moreover, strict rules were enforced by umpires who closely watched the combatants. Biting and gouging were strictly forbidden, although frequently attempted, as for example by Alcibiades. 'You bite like a woman,' cried his opponent. 'No,' said the young Athenian 'like a lion.' Of gouging we have a picture on a cup in the British Museum, where one figure has inserted his finger into his opponent's eye, while the umpire hurries forward with uplifted rod. But nearly every manœuvre of hands, feet, and body was permissible. You might catch your opponent by his foot and throw him backwards; you might seize his heel or ankle, and then, if you could, twist his foot out of its socket; you might kick him violently in the stomach; you might plant your foot against the other man's waist and throw him over your shoulder; you might even stand on your own head, if that position seemed expedient. All these tricks were used in the standing position, but the issue of the combat was usually decided on the ground. There you might twist arm or hand, break fingers and strangle. All neck holds were allowed, but the favourite method of

strangling was known as the 'ladder grip,' in which you mounted your opponent's back and wound your legs round his stomach and your arms round his neck. Ground wrestling was indeed the distinctive feature of the pankration, and the well-known group in the Uffizi palace at Florence represents one of the last stages in such a contest.

Of running and jumping little need be said, for it is very possible that in neither sport had the Greeks much to teach modern athletes. They were a short-legged people, and although they may have had some advantages in long-distance races they probably would be much inferior to our specialised sprint runners: length of leg must tell, and as in horse-racing 'a good big 'un' is better than 'a good little 'un,' so in a short-distance race length of stride ensures victory. But running was very popular in Greece, and of the eight events in the early Olympic games no less than four were foot-races, three for men—at 200 yards, 400 yards and three miles—and one for boys. The running course—the stade—was a straight 200 yards; for the diaulos of 400 yards the runners turned at a post and came back to the starting-point.

The start was marked by two parallel lines, for a Greek runner started in a somewhat cramped position, with the feet close together. The runners ran naked, their bodies carefully oiled, and for each man there was a post at the starting and finishing points to which he ran; there were no dividing strings, nor was there any tape. Vase paintings of runners are very frequent and plainly show the difference of style between the sprinter and the long-distance man; in the early vases a short, thick-set type is common, in the later the thin sprinter is preferred. The most famous names are those of long-distance runners—e.g. Ladas and Pheidippides,—and in these races the Cretans and Arcadians especially excelled, while the Athenians were better at short distances. Besides races proper there were various running contests; for example the race in armour, which was introduced at Olympia towards the close of the sixth century and was the final event of the games, the competitors running in full panoply of shield, helmet, and greaves. Other similar events were the Oschophoria, where youths ran in women's clothes, and the Lampadophoria, in which a lighted torch was carried by single runners or by teams. These latter were very popular at Athens, and they

illustrate the difference between the ancient and modern view of running. They were not serious and specialised enough for a modern athletic meeting, where everything is a matter of record and a fifth of a second is of vital importance.

Jumping, also, was comparatively simple and restricted in its scope. Of high jumping and pole jumping the Greeks had none, for athletics were always practical, and as there were no hedges in Greece for soldiers to jump over it was unnecessary to practise high jumping in the school. Their long jump differed from ours in that it was always performed with the help of jumping weights—*halteres*—things much like our dumb-bells and used in a very similar fashion. With these implements a class of pupils would practise together to the music of the flute. Both standing and running jumps were performed from a take-off into a pit—*skamma*—and jumps of over twenty feet were common ; the fifty-five feet ascribed to Phayllus is an impossible exaggeration.

But if in running and jumping we have little to learn, it is very different in regard to the ' field events,' the throwing of the javelin and the diskos. Here the Greek system of body poise and muscular development gave their athletes an enormous advantage and enabled them easily to perform movements which to our modern bodies seem almost impossible. Both exercises were especially popular at Athens, and were there regarded as part of gymnastics rather than athletics : i.e. they were designed, not as competitive sports, but as means to improve bodily efficiency.

The javelin was a light stick of wood, usually pointless. Distance throwing was far more usual than throwing at a mark, and for this purpose a thong—*amentum*—was used, fastened near the centre of the javelin shaft. Such a thong practically quadruples the range of throw, but the process needs long practice and is of course highly artificial in comparison with the natural use of the spear in hunting or in war. Greek athletics had a definite purpose, and we may be sure that it was not the actual throw but the movements necessary for the throw that gave its value to the exercise. These movements, the short, quick steps before the cast and the sharp turn of the body to the right, are illustrated frequently on the vases ; the throw itself is seldom represented, and then with very poor results. The diskos was a flat and fairly heavy

circle of bronze. It was thrown from behind a line and in a restricted space, a throw of 100 feet being exceptionally good.

In at least three points of physical development, in his skin, in his foot, and in his trunk muscles, the ancient Greek was different from and superior to the modern Englishman. By constant exposure to sun and air, by massage, by regulated exercise, and above all by the use of oil, the Greek gained an elasticity of skin which meant health, vigour, and beauty. As Professor Bruecke says, 'The beauty of a delicate skin 'is the theme of universal praise, but the artist rejoices not 'so much in a delicate as in an elastic skin.' The various diseases and disabilities that come to us from closed pores and flabby skins the Greek escaped, because of the care he gave to the outer surface of his body. Again, in the form and structure of his foot he was different from us. The first three toes, far longer than ours, were thin and nervous like fingers and could get a real hold on the ground; the fourth toe was barely used, the little toe not at all. We are inclined to use our heels as the necessary security for balance, and even in our drill-books the command is that the weight of the body should be evenly distributed between the forepart of the feet and the heels. The Greeks, on the other hand, were trained from childhood in special movements on the ball of the foot, and with them the centre of gravity was just behind the toes instead of under the instep. As regards our feet and knees we have gone back, and are nearer the ape and the savage than were the ancients; the more perfect the human being, the smaller the heel and the little toe, the straighter the knee. Our feet are distorted by shoes whose heels disturb the natural balance; the second joint of the big toe becomes rigid, and then follows a state of paralysis for all the joints that are in line with it. The result is that our soldiers on the drill-ground have to be taught laboriously how to walk, while not one Englishman in ten has naturally a graceful carriage of the body; either he slouches or he is stiff.

But the most vital change of all is the alteration that has taken place in the waist-line and the front muscles of the body. It is at the waist that the lack of muscle tension is with us most apparent, for all the great central muscles of the diaphragm, abdomen, and back are now practically powerless. These are the muscles that Greek gymnastics aimed at develop-

ing by means of jumping, wrestling, and throwing the diskos ; and they became, as they should be, some of the strongest muscles in the human frame. In the present day they are the worst developed of all, and our bodies therefore fail to attain the beauty of the Greeks. It has often been said that the marvellous achievements of Greek sculptors were a result of their daily opportunities of seeing the nude form ; but nudity alone does not suffice. The greatest sculptor of our time has tried the experiment of studying his nude models as they walk to and fro at their ease in his great room at the Hôtel Biron. We see the result : critics accuse him of a love for the grotesque and the uncouth, while Rodin himself is reduced to the theory that for the artist nothing is ugly. The truth is that the naked body of a modern grown man is not beautiful, and therefore a faithful transcription such as Rodin gives cannot be beautiful. But the Greek models were beautiful, because beauty of body had been developed by a system of gymnastics universally applied.

We moderns sit far too much and in wrong positions, while a Greek stood, walked, or lay, but seldom sat, and then never on a backed chair. Our clothing bunches round the waist and impedes the proper play of the muscles ; the Greek loose single garment allowed a free current of air. Our clumsy boots produce clumsy feet. But all these are defects that even under our conditions of life can be largely rectified if once they are recognised and properly treated.

Our present indifference to physical training is a national disgrace. At Athens a law of Solon rendered gymnastic training compulsory for young people, and it was continued until the limit of old age. A good citizen regarded such exercises as a duty to himself and his country, and the wisest of the Greeks could say :

'It is a shameful thing to grow old in neglect, without 'having realised to the utmost such strength and beauty as 'your body is capable of. Strength and beauty will not come 'of themselves : the man who takes no care for them will 'never possess them.'

F. A. Wright.

PATRIOTISM AND AGRICULTURE

Departmental Committee on the Home Production of Food (England and Wales). Interim Report. Cd. 8048. 1915.

AT the present crisis, and for the common good, the nation demands sacrifices from every class in the community. Those who do not respond to the demand fail in their public duty. Are farmers in this sense wanting in patriotism? This is a question which is widely asked, and, as a rule, it is unfavourably answered. A strong impression prevails that, as a class, farmers are not 'pulling their weight,' and that they are contributing to the cost and maintenance of the war less than their proportionate share of money, men, and munitions. A severe indictment is drawn against them. It is frequently said that, though the nation since the Napoleonic Wars has never run greater risks of real scarcity or of famine prices, they make but little effort to increase their production of bread and beef; that, as men of business, they are realising excessive profits out of the war; that, as a privileged class, most of them escape the income-tax on their swollen incomes; that, as parents, they prevent their sons from serving in the military forces of the Crown; that, as employers of labour, in spite of the increased cost of living, they pay inadequate wages to their men.

What is the origin of this widespread impression? Is it well founded? Are the charges true? and, if so, Can the facts be explained, extenuated, or justified? This is the difficult and somewhat delicate subject that it is proposed to discuss in the following pages.

Farming is not philanthropy. It is business. Like similar industrial and productive enterprises, it is a commercial enterprise run for profit. A farmer is a trader whose private capital is embarked in a legitimate and useful trade. He is out for money-making, like any other manufacturer or merchant. He cannot reasonably be expected to sacrifice his livelihood, any more than an artisan can reasonably be asked

to give his labour for nothing. He is only unpatriotic, if he takes an unfair advantage of the national necessities by exacting extortionate profits, or shirks his fair share of the national burdens, or makes an unreasonable use of the land which is not only private property but a national asset. In common fairness, therefore, attention should be at first exclusively concentrated on the business aspects of the discussion. It is only in this way that prejudice can be eliminated, and justice done. Predispositions colour impressions. Many persons who, since the commencement of the war, have completely changed their attitude towards the agricultural industry, resent the slowness with which it adapts itself to their own changed opinions; others are unfavourably influenced by prejudices on the so-called land questions; others, by the political atmosphere of suspicion with which of recent years the farming community has been surrounded. An attempt should at least be made to eliminate these predisposing influences, if we really wish to discover whether the widespread impression of unpatriotic conduct is well or ill founded.

Some part of the unfavourable impression which has been formed of agriculturists is due to impatience that they have not at once realised the complete, though in all probability temporary, change in the national view of British agriculture. Under the stress of circumstances arising out of the war, the country is suddenly demanding from farmers something which it did not want a few months ago. To-day it asks for a large home-production of wheat, though for the last seventy years it has never troubled to consider where its food came from. Yet because there is now a necessary diminution in our exports, farmers are expected to redress the adverse balance of trade by the production of larger supplies at home. It is easy for those who have no financial interests at stake to change their opinions in a hurry on the conduct of any particular industry. But those whose money is in the business affected may well require time to count the cost of the change.

It may, however, be argued that the change is, after all, not so very sudden. For the last few years attention has been increasingly called to the neglected potentialities of British land by two different sections of the community. Before the war, practical agriculturists, who fully realised that higher yields can only be obtained from the land by greater expenditure,

urged that prices were rising to a point when that increased outlay would prove remunerative. The period of depression which justified, and indeed necessitated, the withdrawal of land from arable cultivation and the reduction of expenditure on the area still under the plough, was passing, if it had not passed. The high-farming methods of the early 'seventies would once more pay. But by far the most clamorous demand for the development of all the resources of the soil came from a more numerous body. Their point of view was, in the main, social and political. Their arguments were not based on any possible danger to the food-supplies of the nation, or on any necessity of redressing the balance of trade by increasing the home-production of bread and beef. They advocated the use of the land for the purposes which are best adapted to small holdings and to providing a livelihood from the soil for the largest number of persons. Heaths and moorlands were regarded as potential cornfields without regard to costs of cultivation ; high yields were treated as always profitable ; and the farmer's neglect to raise from the soil the utmost possible amount of produce was said to rob the country of a more abundant supply of food at a less cost both to producer and consumer.

On these and similar grounds the country was ready to think evil of the farmer. The seed-bed, so to speak, had been prepared. It is, therefore, the more essential to call attention to the business propositions involved. The farmer's position should be considered as a manufacturer of produce. From this point of view, the five heads of the indictment against the farming community may be conveniently discussed in the order given in the opening paragraph of this article.

The first count in the indictment is the familiar charge of under-cultivation—aggravated, as it now appears to be in the eyes of the nation, by necessities arising out of the war. Nothing illustrates more forcibly the change in the attitude towards agriculture than the different aspect from which this subject is now regarded. Only a few months ago the substitution of small holdings for large farms was the favourite panacea. The capacity of the land to give employment to a greater number of persons, profitably engaged in raising the minor products of agriculture and in the practice of horticulture, was the point on which attention was then concen-

trated. Now, in the nation's emergency, it is recognised that large farms are the factories in which the staple products of farming can be most economically produced. Little or nothing is heard of the break-up of large holdings. On the contrary, it is mainly to them that the country looks for help on the agricultural side of the difficult transition from a creditor nation to a debtor nation.

That there is under-cultivation is undoubtedly true; that more produce could be raised from the soil, is not disputed. Practical men, conversant with the business of farming, find it easy to fix on the three principal causes of a palpable fact. All other alleged causes are unreal, subsidiary, or relatively insignificant. Apart from seasons, the three causes are personal character, insufficient capital, and the relation between prices and costs of production. Of these the last is the most important, and, as the question is being discussed from a business point of view, it is the only one that requires detailed treatment. It is also the ground which offers farmers the best answer to four out of the five charges made against them. In every trade, there are men of energy and capacity side by side with men who are inferior in ability and enterprise. In this respect agriculturists resemble all other manufacturers. Want of capital, again, affects all industries alike. It cripples cotton-spinners and iron-masters as well as farmers. It is not surprising that money among agriculturists should be scarce. In evidence given before the Eversley Commission, it was computed that in the years 1875–95 landowners and tenant-farmers had lost, through the depression of agriculture, upwards of £830,000,000. They have had little opportunity as yet of replacing their lost capital. At the same time the facilities which tenant-farmers once enjoyed for obtaining credit have been reduced. It is far less easy to borrow capital from a joint-stock bank than from an old county bank, where the personal character of the borrower was known to the lender as an asset. No doubt farmers are better off than they were at the beginning of the present century. But their working capital remains less than it was in the 'seventies.

Prices and costs of production are the chief causes of under-cultivation, whether that takes the form of reducing the area under the plough in order to save expenses, or whether it means raising from the arable land less produce than can,

by a larger outlay, be made to grow. Farmers are manufacturers, and, as such, produce the articles, both in kinds and in quantities, which pay them best. But as regards prices and cost of production there are essential differences between manufacture and agriculture which are often ignored in the discussions of the day. The manufacturing industry is governed by the law of increasing returns. If only a sufficient quantity can be produced, the problem of reducing prices is solved. The larger the output, the smaller in proportion becomes the cost of production and the cheaper the product. Quantity spells cheapness. Thus the interests of producer and consumer are identical. It was on the analogy of manufacture that, sixty years ago, the advocates of high farming preached the doctrine that the true remedy for falling prices was large production. It is on the same analogy that farmers have been, of recent years, condemned for not extracting the highest possible yield from the soil, and for thus depriving the country not only of a more abundant, but, it is argued, of a cheaper, supply of food. But science has proved that the analogy rests on a false basis, because the general law which agriculture obeys is that of diminishing returns. In other words, the remedy for falling prices is not the increase, but the reduction, of expenditure. The larger the output, beyond a point that is soon reached, the greater the cost of production and the dearer the product. Wheat crops cannot be standardised. Hence the farmer is forced to ask himself not 'How much can I make my land produce?' but 'How much can I afford to produce at present prices?'

In agriculture, then, quantity does not spell cheapness either of production to producers or of cost to consumers. Increased production can only be obtained by increased expenditure, and there comes a point when the larger outlay ceases to be remunerative. This point is mainly regulated by the prices obtainable for the produce, and those prices are fixed by countries which work more cheaply than Great Britain. One farmer, for example, may increase the yield of the soil per acre by the frequent working and careful cleaning of his land. But the process entails the employment of plenty of labour, and a heavy wages bill. The costs of production are so great, that, unless prices are fairly high, the result is unprofitable. Even when prices are favourable, the increased

yield, resulting from the constant employment of a large staff of labour, is not so marked as to show any considerable margin of net return in its favour. A neighbour, who spends less in wages, may extract from the soil a smaller yield. But his outlay is so much less that his net income may be the same. So far as actual profits are concerned, the man who farms high is often no better off than the man who farms low. Over a range of varying seasons, at the prices which prevailed before the war, it is doubtful whether the pecuniary advantage would not rest with the latter.

Another method of increasing the yield per acre is the use of fertilisers. Here the limit of profitable production is fixed, partly by prices, partly by the law of diminishing returns. The working of that law may be simply illustrated from the Rothamsted experiments. For twelve successive years different quantities of a complete fertiliser were applied to adjoining areas of land under wheat. The following was the result per acre on the average of the twelve years :

Lbs. of fertiliser applied.	Total yield in bushels.	Increase in bushels.	
		Per acre.	Per 200 lbs.
(*a*) None	18·4	—	—
(*b*) 200	28·4	10·0	10·0
(*c*) 400	36·4	18·0	8·0
(*d*) 600	38·0	19·6	1·6

Similar results followed from the continuance of the experiments for fifty-two years—except that (1) the yield of the unmanured land diminished, and (2) the second and third application of the fertiliser produced a slightly greater result, though the third dose continued to be less effective than the second.

Whether any outlay of capital for manure is made on British land depends on the price of wheat at Chicago. It may be assumed that the cost of the fertiliser is £1 11*s.* 6*d.* Real prices of wheat may be taken at different periods to illustrate the principle. The average price of wheat for the years 1893–94–95 was £1 4*s.* the quarter; in 1908, it was £1 12*s.*; in

February 1915, it was £2 16*s*. In all these cases the straw may be supposed to pay for the marketing.

Applying these figures to the Rothamsted experiment and omitting decimals, we get the following results :—

1. With wheat at 24*s*. the farmer realises
   from (*a*) 18 bushels @ 3*s*. . . = 54*s*.
   ,, (*b*) 28 ,, ,, less 31*s*. 6*d*. = 52*s*. 6*d*.
   ,, (*c*) 36 ,, ,, ,, 63*s*. = 45*s*.
   ,, (*d*) 38 ,, ,, ,, 94*s*. 6*d*. = 19*s*. 6*d*.
2. With wheat at 32*s*. the farmer realises
   from (*a*) 18 bushels @ 4*s*. . . = 72*s*.
   ,, (*b*) 28 ,, ,, less 31*s*. 6*d*. = 80*s*. 6*d*.
   ,, (*c*) 36 ,, ,, ,, 63*s*. = 81*s*.
   ,, (*d*) 38 ,, ,, ,, 94*s*. 6*d*. = 57*s*. 6*d*.
3. With wheat at 56*s*. the farmer realises
   from (*a*) 18 bushels @ 7*s*. . . = 126*s*.
   ,, (*b*) 28 ,, ,, less 31*s*. 6*d*. = 164*s*. 6*d*.
   ,, (*c*) 36 ,, ,, ,, 63*s*. = 189*s*.
   ,, (*d*) 38 ,, ,, ,, 94*s*. 6*d*. = 171*s*. 6*d*.

These figures show conclusively that in farming the interests of producer and consumer, instead of being identical, are, beyond a certain point, antagonistic. With wheat at 24*s*. it pays the farmer best not to apply manure at all, though the potential yield of an acre is reduced by 20 bushels. At 32*s*. it pays to give one dose of manure, but not more ; no business man would lock up 31*s*. 6*d*. for a year in order to make an extra profit of 6*d*. With wheat at 56*s*. two doses are profitable, but not a third. Moreover, the price of the fertiliser would probably have risen from the same causes which sent up the price of wheat. If in 1915 the fertiliser cost 50*s*. then even a second dose would be unprofitable, and it would pay the farmer better to be content with a yield of 28 bushels rather than to aim at 36.

These examples illustrate in a simple way the effect of prices and costs of production in restricting the yield from the soil, through the operation of the law of diminishing returns. No farmer needs to be told that low prices mean low yields, or that increased yields spell increased expenditure. The lesson is one which has been burned into his brain by years of disappointing experience. Men who were in business a

quarter of a century ago have perhaps learned the lesson of caution too well. They hand it on to their successors. Consumers may urge the farmer to extract the *maximum* from the soil in order to make food cheap. But he has an answer which cannot be called unreasonable. He says :

> ' I cannot grow more wheat per acre, unless I spend more money. I cannot charge you what the wheat actually costs me, because I have no control over prices. They are imposed upon me by Chicago, and depend on conditions which are totally different from those in this country. Therefore, the only thing I can do is to produce, not as much as the soil can be made to yield, but as much as I think that I can afford.'

Cheap food is a national boon ; but the price which the nation pays is the under-cultivation of land at home.

Cheapness further restricts production by driving land out of arable cultivation. One of the principal charges against farmers is that they waste potential corn-land by laying it down to grass. The answer lies in the relation between prices and costs of production. At the prices which prevailed ten years before the war, wheat was not a paying crop, except on land which could be cheaply cultivated. Less food per acre is raised on grass. But the smaller quantity of meat or milk costs the farmer so much less to produce that it is equally remunerative. Therefore soils which are expensive under the plough are withdrawn from arable cultivation. Low prices for wheat, high prices for labour, and the strong demand for milk, combine to reduce the arable area and to increase permanent pasture.

The agricultural value of arable land depends on the texture of the soil, which may be light, medium, or heavy. The best soil is the medium. Many gradations in texture are possible. But as land approaches to the extreme either of lightness or of stiffness, it depreciates in value. Heavy clays suffer first and most from a fall in the price of wheat, because the possible range of cropping is small, and wheat is the only crop which on such soils gives a fair yield. They depend greatly on weather. In a rainy season the crops are waterlogged : in a slight drought the soil bakes, cracks, and severs the roots of the plants. If turnips or swedes are grown, they cannot be fed off on the land in wet weather, but must be lifted and carted. Heavy clays cost most to cultivate for any crop, and, in addition, they

often given a bare fallow every fourth or fifth year at a cost of from £6 to £7 an acre. Expenses swallow the profits on the moderate crops which, one year with another, are grown on clay lands. But they have one advantage over light soils. They can generally be laid down to grass, and, if properly treated, will in the course of years make good pasture. Light soils are just as 'catchy' in respect of weather as clays. In a dry season they burn. The cost of manure is heavy, because the thirsty soil cannot retain the fertilising substances long enough for absorption by the plants. But light soils admit of a wider range of cropping, are accessible in all weathers, and, above all, with the exception of the bill for fertilisers, are inexpensive to cultivate. They are also less easy to lay down to grass. For these reasons light lands, though only rich enough for oats or barley, are often retained under the plough, while more expensive clays, with much greater potential capacity for wheat production, are laid down to grass.

From the point of view of the nation's homegrown supply of bread, the withdrawal of possible corn-land from arable cultivation is a waste. It means a diminution of food; but it does not follow that the farmer is unpatriotic. He is engaged in business for his livelihood. He must therefore consider the question of profits. If land which approaches the extreme of stiffness could not be made to pay under the plough at pre-war prices, he was justified in putting it to its most profitable use by laying it down to grass. The nation may have lost a certain amount of food; but it could not expect to be fed at the expense of the farmer. Nor is it reasonable, because the war has suddenly given to home-grown food a new national value, to charge him with want of patriotism.

It may, however, be urged that wheat has now become highly remunerative, and that it is the direct pecuniary interest of farmers to grow it. Undoubtedly this is, at present prices, true. But the question from the business point of view is by no means so simple as it appears. There are two ways in which farmers may increase their area under wheat. The first and most obvious course is to sow more wheat on the existing arable acreage. This means an increase in one special kind of produce by the displacement of other forms of produce. It means the sacrifice of one crop for another. It does not mean any increase in the gross production from the soil. The second

course is to bring more land under the plough, and to transfer to the freshly ploughed land the crops displaced by the additional growth of wheat. It is only by this means that gross production can be substantially increased. The two methods may be briefly examined in their order.

At the outbreak of the present war, farmers were strongly urged to increase their wheat area. There was practically no time to plough up pasture. If any increase was to be made, it must be on the existing arable acreage. Many farmers hesitated. Political hostility was open-mouthed against their industry. Fears were entertained that prices might fall so rapidly that growers would be left in the lurch: or that the rise would be so temporary as not to justify radical changes in the courses of cropping: or that, if prices continued to rise, wheat would be commandeered by the Government at a figure below market rates. Also the season was adverse to agricultural operations. A prolonged drought had baked the land too hard for the immediate use of the plough. When the rain came, it came in torrents, and continued for weeks. Labour was scarce, and threatened to be scarcer, though the shortage has gradually proved to be in most districts less insuperable than was at first anticipated. There were, in fact, difficulties which, in ordinary times, to a generation that has learned by experience to be cautious, might have counselled doing nothing. But farmers rose to the occasion and responded to the appeal more generally than was at once realised. The wheat harvest to-day is being gathered on the largest area which we have had since 1891, though it remains twelve hundred thousand acres short of the acreage of 1871. Probably more than 360,000 acres have been added to the breadth under wheat, or, taking the average of 30 bushels to the acre, a new supply of bread has been added which is approximately sufficient for the yearly wants of 1,800,000 persons. How has this addition been made? The Agricultural Statistics, when published for the year, will show not only details of the change but the counties in which it has been made. Sometimes two wheat crops have been taken in succession; elsewhere wheat has followed other corn crops; or it has displaced barley or oats in the rotations; or it has been substituted for roots: or the temporary grasses and sainfoin have been ploughed up to make room for it, instead of being allowed to remain down

for two, three, or four years. Probably the last two changes have added most substantially to the area of wheat.

Temporary grasses have been of recent years the most profitable crops that farmers can grow on arable land. It is for this reason that their area has been so greatly extended. The outlay involved in their preparation is relatively small. They are the cheapest crop to grow, as well as one of the most remunerative. Sown in barley or oats, the cost of the necessary agricultural operations, including the bill for seeds and the sowing, will be well under £1 an acre. The most expensive item is the cutting, making, carting, and stacking of the crop. The yield of the crop may be expected to be from 2 to 2½ tons per acre, and if the grasses are left down for a second, third, or even a fourth year, they still yield a profit at a minimum expenditure. To plough them up for wheat at the end of the first year is to make some sacrifice, and incur some risk in the face of the uncertainty of prices. It is well that this fact should be borne in mind by those who are suspicious of the conduct of farmers.

On their existing arable area farmers have foregone moderate but certain profits in order to increase their area under wheat. They have accepted the greater risks and gone for the uncertain pounds instead of the safe shillings. Patriotism, as well as business instinct, has influenced them to depart from their usual caution. Wheat at fluctuating prices is always a speculative crop. Though, after it is once sown, it may be left alone till harvest, it is an expensive crop to produce. The actual cost of production is indeed a disputed point, and he would be a rash man who dogmatised on the subject. The expense is greater in some counties and on some soils than on others. For this reason estimates of cost differ widely. The subject was investigated by the Assistant Commissioners to the Richmond Commission of 1879–82, and their statements are thus summarised in the 'Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society 'of England' (vol. lvi. 1895, p. 364): 'The estimates for the 'different counties vary considerably, ranging from £5 an acre 'in Yorkshire to £16 an acre in Surrey. Taking the returns 'for Lincolnshire and Suffolk as those of typical wheat counties, 'the average outlay per acre works out at £7 10s.' These are, however, the figures of forty years ago, when tithes were high, when labour-saving machinery was less effective, when

rents had not been reduced, and when, consequently, assessments were higher for the local rates which were then paid in full on agricultural land. A later estimate (1905) is that of Mr. Prout, whose continuous corn-growing at Sawbridgeworth demonstrated the agricultural possibilities of a clay farm. The cost of production per acre is calculated at £6 8*s*. ('Journal of the R.A.S. of England,' vol. lxvi. 1905, p. 41), or £1 2*s*. per acre less than the average outlay which has been quoted for Suffolk and Lincolnshire thirty years before. Still later is the figure of £5 7*s*. 8*d*. estimated by Mr. Edwin Savill in a paper read by him before the Surveyors' Institution in November 1914 ('Transactions,' vol. xlvii. part ii, p. 51).

But all calculations of the cost of production of wheat as a separate crop are necessarily unsatisfactory. On an ordinary farm, wheat is one of a series of crops grown in rotation, successively occupying different portions of the arable land. The rotations must be taken as a whole. All, in a certain sense, may be regarded as a preparation for the coming wheat crop, up to which they all lead, and the profit or loss on the whole must enter into the calculation. If, for example, a fallow is taken every ninth year, or, on very heavy land, every fifth year, the cost may even rise to £7 an acre. The subsequent crops in the rotation, including wheat, will profit by the expenditure, and some share of the out-of-pocket expenses should be charged against the wheat. So again if, instead of a fallow, roots are taken in the rotation after corn, the crop itself will probably result in a pecuniary loss; but the subsequent crops in the rotation benefit, and the increased number of bushels of wheat to the acre help to restore the money spent on roots to the farmer's pocket. So again, beans, unless the yield is over four quarters to the acre, are not in themselves a profitable crop. They become so as a preparation for the succeeding wheat crop, which ought therefore to be charged with some of the expense. In fact, all the crops included in the whole rotation dovetail so closely into one another that, without a number of more or less unsatisfactory assumptions, no complete and accurate statement of the true cost of production per acre can be presented for any one particular crop.

Besides appropriating to wheat an additional breadth of their land already under the plough, it is urged that farmers

ought also to increase their arable area by ploughing up permanent pasture. This course is undoubtedly recommended by patriotism. It is also dictated by the social advantages of greater employment on the land. The argument that the sacrifice of pasture will reduce the number of live stock is untenable. On the contrary, besides producing an additional amount of human food, a larger head of cattle can be carried on arable land than on grass. That the nation gains is certain. But will that gain be achieved at the expense of the farmer? Is the profit to the producer equally assured? For the present purpose, that is the only question to be asked and answered.

It has been already stated that the withdrawal of arable land from cultivation has been forced upon farmers by the fall of prices below the costs of production. The only remedy which agriculturists can adopt against those conditions is a reduction in expenditure. Compared with forty years ago, the area under the plough in England and Wales in 1913 had decreased by 3,887,767 acres; the number of agricultural labourers by over 300,000; the total head of live stock (cattle, sheep, horses, and pigs) by upwards of 1,500,000; and the selling price of agricultural land by £22 an acre. No part of this decrease can be regarded with satisfaction. Even the fall in value of agricultural land, which in some quarters may be a welcome feature of the change, ceases to be so satisfactory when it is remembered that it means a decrease in taxable and rateable value and in the power of the owners to provide necessary cottage accommodation. Everyone wishes to see the land cultivated to its utmost capacity, more stock kept, more produce raised, and more labourers employed at higher wages. These results can only be attained by increasing arable cultivation. But the prosperity of the 'seventies can only be restored or surpassed, if wheat—the pivot on which arable farming turns—becomes not only temporarily, but for a considerable period, a profitable crop. For the moment the war has made the necessary change. But will the effect last?

The land withdrawn from the plough mainly consists of soils which in texture approach more or less closely to the extremes of lightness or of stiffness. Much of the heavy land which has been laid down to grass has been down for upwards of twenty years. It is now useful pasture. It costs little

in manual labour; it demands little horse-labour and few implements; it needs little capital; it requires no outlay on seed; it is capable of great improvement, as hundreds of farmers have found in recent years, by the liberal use of basic slag; it involves small risk, makes little demand on skill and management, and yields moderate but safe profits by the production of meat and milk. If once it is broken up, it can only be restored to its present condition by time and money, and meanwhile it is a loss. It was originally withdrawn from the plough because of low prices, the cost of cultivation, a series of wet seasons, and, in the northern counties, the high rate of wages. Land of this class will always be expensive to till; the recurrence of wet seasons is certain; the recurrence of low prices is at least possible. Labour difficulties loom in the future. Artificial rates of wages, payable without regard to profits earned or work done, are threatened. On grass land one man is employed to the hundred acres; under the plough four men are needed on the same area. A man of business cannot be blamed because he hesitates to convert his pasture into arable, which is only profitable if wheat prices keep at a remunerative level for a considerable period of years.

It is idle to predict the future course of wheat prices. For some years past they have shown a tendency to rise, mainly because agriculture in the United States is approximating to its condition in old and settled countries. In other words, the yield can only be maintained by increased expenditure. Probabilities, therefore, seem to point to a permanent rise in price, which will keep wheat-growing profitable in this country. Taking long views, the prospect favours those who advocate the extension of arable farming. On the other hand, the immediate future at the conclusion of the war is uncertain. A large area has been added to wheat cultivation in neutral countries to meet the temporary needs of belligerent nations. The restoration of peace will send down freights; the demands of Europe on the wheat supply of the world will speedily resume their normal course; and the increased surplus of wheat-exporting countries will flood the Old World. Other European nations will, as before, protect their home-grown wheat by maintaining prices. This free-trade country, on the contrary, will welcome the additional foreign supply

as a boon to her industrial population, and the cheaper it is the better for the urban wage-earner. But how about the British farmer, who, in the expectation of remunerative wheat-prices and in response to the appeal to patriotism, has ploughed up profitable pasture ? As usual, he goes to the wall. The history of the last forty years may be repeated at his expense. His natural caution has been accentuated by previous experience. Once bitten, twice shy. In the course of a very few years, in every probability, the tendency towards a permanently high level of prices will be renewed. But the farmer who has been ruined in the interval will derive cold comfort from the prospect of future prosperity. He is not building up an hereditary business ; he has no shareholders to divide the loss. It is his own capital that he risks, and, as a man of business, he cannot be charged with want of patriotism because he hesitates to venture his own money in what to him appears to be a doubtful enterprise.

To all the different points contained in the first count of the indictment, farmers, as men of business, can reasonably reply that they must look to their profits, if they do not wish to invite ruin.

The second count in the indictment against farmers is that they are making excessive profits out of the war. It is certainly true that the war has raised the prices at which farmers sell their produce, and that, though the costs of production have also risen, a substantial margin of profit is left. But if the charge means that the rise in prices against the consumer is due to any concerted action by farmers, it is untrue. Without examining every item in the list of farm produce, wheat and meat may be taken as typical examples.

British farmers do not fix the price of wheat in this country. They are powerless to do so, because they grow only one-fifth of the annual home consumption. Their sales consist of a multitude of comparatively small individual transactions, and not of a large mass controlled from any one centre. Prices are really regulated from Chicago. No charge has been even made, much less substantiated, that farmers in this country have combined either to withhold their grain from market or to buy up wheat and hold it for a rise. The history of their dealings in wheat is well known. At the beginning of the war they were advised to sell unusually large quantities of their

new crop at once in order to check panic prices. Almost in the same breath they were urged to retain as much of their wheat as possible till May. Some did one thing, some another. The majority followed the advice to sell. Unusually large quantities of home-grown wheat were sold in the autumn and early winter, and, up to the end of December 1914, the average price for the first five months of war did not exceed 40*s*. After the middle of December continuous rain prevented threshing for the next two months. Meanwhile America controlled the markets of the world. Prices rose rapidly. Whenever the weather allowed, and ploughing and sowing operations permitted, English wheat was threshed out and sold. So far from its being held back in greater quantities than usual, the contrary was the case. The average supply left in the farmers' hands on the first of April is usually 27 per cent. of the crop. On the 1st of April 1915 it was only 18 per cent. That farmers neither made the price of wheat, nor took any steps to raise or maintain it, is a sufficient answer to the charge that they have made exorbitant profits out of the war. The worst that can be said against them is that they had not the superhuman virtue to refuse the price that was offered them, and to insist on selling at a cheaper rate. Even had they exercised this self-denial, it would have been futile. It would not have lowered the price of the quartern loaf to the consumer.

Or take the case of meat. Here again there is no trace of farmers withholding produce in order to raise prices. Therefore the case must be treated on business lines. Throughout the early months of the war, farmers offered all classes of live stock —cattle, sheep, and pigs—so readily that the prices of fresh meat remained low. Ireland was sold out, and the number of animals sent to the butcher excited alarm, lest the reproductive capacity of our flocks and herds should be diminished. It cannot be said, at this period, that farmers were using the war as a means of extorting exorbitant prices. But our overseas supplies began to fail. Chilled and frozen meat was scarce and dear. The rise in prices began not with the British farmer, but with the foreign importer. It affected home produce as well, and was aggravated by the short supply of store stock, the extra cost of labour, and the dearness of all feeding-stuffs, which rose to a phenomenal height and necessarily raised the price of meat. To-day it is the breeder of cattle

who commands the situation. If he is a feeder also, he is probably making handsome profits. Matters will only right themselves in that direction when more men are attracted into the breeding industry. But ordinary farmers are not making large profits out of fattening cattle. Those who have bought cheaply may do well. But the vast majority have bought their stock for feeding at unusually high prices. Their large outlay of capital, combined with the increased cost of feeding-stuffs and the increased labour bill for attendance, will reduce the margin of profit to the narrowest limits. Neither in the case of wheat nor in that of meat does there appear to be any real foundation for the charge that farmers are using the necessities of the war as a means of extorting from consumers exorbitant profits. They have an effective answer in the facts that, as compared with 1913, they have increased their wheat acreage by nearly half a million acres, and their live stock in England and Wales by 350,000 cattle and 450,000 sheep.

The third count in the indictment is that farmers pay no income-tax on their swollen incomes. Few people volunteer to pay any taxes, even in war-time. That the exemptions are what they are, is the fault not of farmers, but of legislators. The yearly profits of farming are taken at one-third of the annual rent. Consequently, as incomes below £160 are exempt, no farmer contributes to the income-tax unless his rent exceeds £480. This is an anomaly which requires correction. But, though the proportion is probably wrong, the practice of assessing farming incomes on the basis of rent, rather than on a statement of profits, is not unreasonable. Agriculture is the most ancient of all employments : but the productive business of a farmer is the reverse of simplicity. In fact it presents more puzzles to the accountant than any other form of productive industry. A system of book-keeping which would supply farmers with the statistical information required by modern manufacturers would be too complicated and intricate for men who cannot afford to employ clerks. Even if the statistics could be furnished, the definite items of sale and purchase would be few, and any statement of cost would largely consist of estimates and apportionments.

So far as the writer's personal knowledge extends, the number of farmers' sons, engaged in helping on their fathers' farms, who have accepted naval or military service falls below the

average in other classes of the community. To that extent the fourth charge in the indictment is true. But, except in Yeomanry regiments, enlistment is difficult for the sons of farmers. Apart from this, the question is too involved to be decided on general lines. Each case should be considered individually. Food is a munition of war, and must be supplied. It cannot, however, be produced without skilled labour. The places of the agricultural labourers who have responded splendidly to the call of patriotism must be filled, or cultivation will cease. They have been taken in many instances by the sons of the farmers, who do the work of two ordinary labourers on the land by putting out their full strength for longer hours than wage-earners will usually endure. The choice between two duties is difficult. It may be regretted that, for the sake of example, the highest choice has not always been made. But if some farmers' sons have not volunteered, at any rate they are neither loafers nor slackers. They are working, not in the service of the Crown, but for objects of national utility, harder than they or most other men have ever worked before.

There remains the charge that as employers of labour farmers, in spite both of their increased profits and of the increased cost of living, pay inadequate wages to the men they employ. No count in the indictment tells more heavily against the farming class. But it must be borne in mind that no recent evidence is forthcoming to support or rebut the charge, and that self-interest predisposes urban wage-earners to believe the worst that is possible.

Agricultural wages have risen continuously since 1896. They have followed, to some extent at least, the advance in prices. The rise has been slow and gradual ; but it has never been interrupted in its upward tendency, and has been won without the losses to masters and men that are consequent on strikes and lockouts. It is known that considerable increases were made in 1912, 1913, and the early part of 1914. Since the war, further increases have been made, often on a higher scale. Unfortunately, the latest Parliamentary Return on the subject is for 1907, and is therefore obsolete. The figures that are annually given in Parliament are founded on returns from, at the most, 156 farms out of the 400,000 holdings into which England and Wales are divided. Their statistical value

is, therefore, small. The absence of any reliable information is the more regrettable, because no charge has been more effective against the farming community than that of gross underpayment of their employees. Probably it was on this very ground that the late Government again and again refused the demand for a complete return. They ran no risk of blunting the edge of their sharpest weapon against the existing land system. In the towns the question has become acute. Attention has been strongly, and rightly, called to the low rates of agricultural wages which prevail in certain districts. At the same time, urban wage-earners have realised that, as the arable area shrinks, employment dwindles, and the labourer, displaced or inadequately paid, becomes a formidable competitor for employment in the labour market of towns. True sympathy and self-interest thus combine, and it is as impossible to divide them as it is to distinguish the meeting-place of day and night in a broad belt of twilight. Pay the agricultural labourer better, employ him shorter hours, give him more holidays, and you will make a better man of him—and, incidentally, he will no longer compete for wages with the artisan.

It is obvious that space prohibits any adequate discussion of agricultural wages. So complicated a subject requires an article to itself. In several counties weekly wages are so low that, even when the total earnings are taken into account, they are inadequate. Farmers in those districts have been too slow to raise wages. That admission fully made, the point may be discussed exclusively as a business question.

Wages are a very important part of costs of production. To a considerable extent, they regulate the method which is adopted of cultivating the soil. But for the rainfall, their influence in dictating the treatment of the land would be still more general. The low-paid counties are, almost without exception, arable and corn-growing. As examples, we may take Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Oxfordshire, and Suffolk. These are the counties which have the greatest breadth under the plough, employ the largest number of men per acre, and, taken as a whole, pay the lowest rates of individual wages. The rates are highest in Lincolnshire, and lowest in Oxfordshire. The counties which are predominantly pasture employ the smallest number of men per acre, but pay the

highest rates of wages to individuals. Cheshire, Cumberland, Derbyshire, Durham, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Northumberland, and Yorkshire may be taken as examples. In the arable group, three and a half men are employed to the hundred acres, and one man on the same area in the pasture group. Taking the rates of weekly cash wages of ordinary agricultural labourers for 1912, as estimated by the Rural Labourers' League, they average 16*s.* 9*d.* in the arable group, and 22*s.* 2*d.* in the pasture counties. Thus the weekly labour bill of the pasture farmer per hundred acres is £1 2*s.*, and of the arable farmer £2 18*s.* 7½*d.*

The difference is striking. High rates of wages in the north have driven out the plough, and, though individual labourers receive more money, fewer men are employed. Similar rates of wages would produce the same results elsewhere. It is only the low wages prevalent in the midland group that have enabled farmers, at pre-war prices, to continue corn-growing, and employ their larger staff of labour. Here, once more, the question of rates of wages and of the number of men employed turns upon the relations between prices and costs of production. The war may for the moment be left out of the calculation. If prices of corn continue to advance, arable farmers will be able to maintain their breadth under the plough, employ their full staff, and raise wages. If, on the other hand, prices recede, then, as wages cannot be reduced, more arable land must be laid down to grass, wherever the soil receives sufficient moisture to render the process practicable and remunerative. Higher wages will be paid to individuals ; but fewer men will be employed, and more agricultural labourers will be displaced, and compelled to compete for employment with wage-earning artisans.

This is the business aspect of a serious question, complicated by social considerations, the discussion of which the scope of the present article forbids. Attention has been throughout concentrated on farming as a business; for, judging of the patriotism of farmers, gross injustice will be done, unless their conduct is regarded from the same point of view as that of other persons engaged in manufacturing industries.

Rowland E. Prothero.

CABINET GOVERNMENT

THAT the country is dissatisfied with its present government may be gathered even more from private conversation than from comments in the public press. Nor is that dissatisfaction in any way due to surviving party animosities. Party feeling has always been a much smaller factor in the mentality of the average Englishman than politicians and political agents are apt to assume. The great strength of the party system in this country does not reside in the supposed hereditary inclinations of the mass of the people enshrined in the well-known but misleading couplet :

> " Every little Briton that is born alive
> Is born a little Liberal or a Conservative."

It is maintained by the solid pecuniary interests which have grown up around the accidental division of the governing classes into Whigs and Tories two hundred years ago. At the summit we have prominent politicians competing for well-paid and much-respected offices of State ; at the base we have in every constituency little groups of wirepullers and political agents whose chance of local distinction and modest remuneration would disappear if the conflict between the two political parties came to an end. The prominent politicians are dependent upon the zeal and activity of these humble agents, and the latter in turn are dependent upon the artificial rivalry of the prominent politicians. But the normal attitude of the normal Englishman is one of indifference, leaning towards contempt. ' A plague of both your parties,' he constantly says, and, except at election times, sincerely wishes. When an election is on foot the situation is slightly modified. An appreciable section of the population—but probably less than half, even then—gets caught with election fever, and in that diseased mental condition shouts itself hoarse with the repetition of party cries which it understands no more than the people who invented them. To secure this simulacrum of enthusiasm is the work of the local wirepullers and agents.

It is for this that some of them receive regular salaries from the prominent, or would-be prominent, politicians, while the rest are rewarded with various douceurs in the shape of factory inspectorships, and seats on the local bench of magistrates. That is the party system in its reality, and the main body of the nation has little interest in it. Consequently, the formation of a Coalition Cabinet was everywhere welcomed except by the professional politicians, and the present dissatisfaction with that Cabinet is due to popular disappointment, not to political regrets.

That disappointment arises from an instinctive feeling that the Cabinet is lacking in courage. In war, courage is the first essential of success. The soldier who lacks courage cannot do his duty, and ends in the worst cases by being shot for cowardice. No one believes that the bulk of our soldiers have failed in this respect. They have gone to death in their country's defence with a smile on their faces and a joke on their lips. On the other hand, the statesmen who rule over us seem every moment to be trembling lest their political lives should be imperilled, and are afraid to take any step that might conceivably bring them within the political danger zone. Yet man for man our politicians are humanly as courageous as our soldiers. Several members of Parliament are engaged in active military service; some have already given their lives for their country. There is no reason to believe that others would hold back if the call or the opportunity came to them. Nor is it justifiable to assume that members of the Cabinet are individually in any way lacking in public spirit, or less inclined than other men to make personal sacrifices for the public good. It is not the men themselves that are to blame, but the system that binds them.

It is indeed an impossible task which a succession of accidents—historical, political, international—has imposed upon this committee of twenty-two gentlemen called the Cabinet. The public, ever impressed by names, is half inclined to imagine that the mere fact of calling a committee a Cabinet endows it with semi-divine attributes. But the members of that committee remain human, whatever they are collectively called. Some of them are men of extraordinary ability; others are about the average of leading Englishmen in the professional and commercial classes; but they are all human.

Let any man whom fate has condemned to sit frequently on committees ask himself whether he would care to trust his private fortune to the control of a committee, meeting about twice a week and composed of twenty-two men—all of them with a multitude of duties to perform, several of them temperamentally obstinate, and a considerable number habitually loquacious. It is true that the whole work of the Cabinet is not done when it is sitting. Confidential papers printed under conditions of extreme secrecy are daily—sometimes almost hourly—circulated to the members of the Cabinet. These they are supposed to study, so that they may bring to the council a matured judgment. In practice, it is doubtful whether any Cabinet minister ever succeeds in getting a real grip of all the important papers circulated, and it may safely be said that some ministers rarely read half of what they receive. No blame attaches to them for such apparent neglect. Each of the twenty-two (with two or three exceptions) has, in addition to his advisory duties as a member of the Cabinet, very important executive duties as the head of a government department. These latter he cannot neglect; for, as regards them, his responsibility is individual and direct. Moreover, if he fails to keep in touch with the work of his department he will be at a disadvantage in relation to his colleagues when any question affecting that department comes before the Cabinet.

It has to be realised that the necessary division of the government of the country into a multitude of separate departments creates a feeling of departmental *esprit de corps* which is quite as strong as the *esprit de corps* in any British regiment. The permanent officials in each department look upon their department as the one perfect unit of administration in the whole British Empire. Anything which diminishes the importance of that department is an outrage to be attacked with all the resources of a well-organised bureaucracy; anything which adds to the status of the department by increasing the number of officials employed or the scale of salaries paid is a reform to be welcomed, even though it may involve unnecessary expenditure to the nation or direct injury to some other department. The distinguished politician, whoever he be, who is placed at the head of a department very quickly discovers that if he wishes for a peaceful

or even a tolerable life he must fall in with the sentiment of the office which he is supposed to control. If he fails to fight for its interests it will ruthlessly, by a dozen subtle devices, revenge itself on him. Therefore, the first business of a minister is to establish and maintain harmonious relations with his own department. What time remains can be given to preparing for his duties as a Cabinet minister, unless it happens to be wanted for preparing political speeches, or for wrestling with deputations, or for the relaxation of the golf-course.

Even if the issues which the Cabinet has to decide were few and simple, it would be very difficult indeed to obtain a satisfactory decision from a committee of twenty-two gentlemen whose minds are so filled with other duties. But the issues which come before the Cabinet are neither few nor simple. The Cabinet is the final governing authority, and whenever any departmental question arises which might lead to trouble with the House of Commons or with the Press, or which might provoke a conflict between two departments, it goes to the Cabinet for decision, even though it may be quite a trivial matter from the national point of view. Multitudes of such questions constantly come before the Cabinet. Doubtless most of them can be quickly disposed of, but at any moment some trivial point may involve a time-wasting wrangle between two equally headstrong ministers, ending in a compromise which satisfies neither and may be positively injurious to the public service.

Beyond such relative trivialities, which waste both time and temper, there are the really important national issues upon which the country looks to the Cabinet for guidance and decision. In dealing with these the weaknesses of a committee of twenty-two members are even more emphasised. For many of the issues to be decided involve problems which require for their solution both an intimate acquaintance with complex facts and the gift of estimating the probable sequence of coming events. No minister whose mind is absorbed with departmental duties is likely to be well equipped in either of these respects. He has no time for the profound study of any question, and the daily routine of his office gets him into the habit of feeling that only the events of to-day matter.

Moreover, the Cabinet may sometimes find its liberty of

decision impaired by the previous actions of an impulsive minister. There is good reason to believe that this has happened more than once since the present war began—not always with satisfactory results. Yet it is difficult altogether to blame a minister who, realising the importance of prompt action, prefers to take the matter into his own hands rather than to wait to discuss it in all its bearings with a score of colleagues with some of whom he has only a limited intellectual sympathy. In such an event the strictly regular course for the Cabinet would be to insist on the resignation of the offending minister; but in practice that course is generally impossible because of the political disturbance that it would create. Thus a departmental minister, who is unscrupulously playing for his own hand or is honestly impatient with the slowness of his colleagues, may commit the government to steps of the utmost importance before the Cabinet has had an opportunity of even considering the matter.

These are evils which are inherent in our Cabinet system as it at present exists, and no mere change of personnel will get rid of them. They exist quite as much in a party Cabinet as in a Coalition Cabinet. The somewhat naive idea of the public that the members of one political party, incorporated in a Cabinet, work together with one heart and mind has, needless to say, no foundation in fact. The energy with which members of opposing political parties attack one another in public is only surpassed by the vigour with which members of the same party criticise one another in private. They would hardly be human were it otherwise, and they would certainly not be worth their salaries. For if any twenty men succeed in maintaining permanent unanimity, at least nineteen of them must be mentally deficient. Nor is it the failure to agree on all points that matters. When men are working together each must occasionally yield his judgment to the judgment of others. The trouble is that the means for arriving at a sound collective judgment are barred by the character of the Cabinet. It is in the first place too large for that intimate interchange of thoughts, and half-thoughts, which takes place when three or four men are bending their minds together to the solution of a difficult problem. In the second place, the heavy departmental duties of the majority of ministers render it impossible for them to give adequate consideration to the questions that the Cabinet has to decide.

In practice some mitigation of the Cabinet system is constantly sought by the creation of sub-committees to deal with particular problems. But this device does not meet the difficulty that most departmental ministers are already overworked; nor does it absolve the Cabinet from its collective responsibility. No proposal that a committee of the Cabinet may make can be put into operation without the approval of the Cabinet as a whole, and if a committee makes proposals which for any reason are contentious in character the battle has to be fought out in full council.

Another device which was employed, it is alleged, to a large extent when Mr. Balfour was prime minister is the establishment of what is known as an 'Inner Cabinet,' consisting of the four or five men who are most influential and whose will in effect dominates that of all the rest. The objection to this device is that it is haphazard in character and uncertain in operation. In addition, it is humiliating to those Cabinet ministers who are left out in the cold. As Cabinet ministers, they are all equally the 'servants of the King,' sworn to give their best counsel to him. It is not fair to ask them to cover with their names decisions about which they have never been consulted, and the best type of Englishman would decline to accept such a rôle. Therefore the device of an informal Inner Cabinet must always be liable to break down in practice. Nor does it in the least deal with the difficulty that ministers who are heavily weighted with departmental duties cannot give their minds with sufficient freedom to the general problems of government.

Take, for example, Lord Kitchener's position. Lord Kitchener is not only a soldier and a military administrator of the very first order, but he has also had immense experience in problems of civil administration and in the great underlying problem of handling men. No man commands greater respect among his fellow countrymen; in no man's judgment is the country more willing to place unhesitating confidence. Whether Lord Kitchener is best employed in deciding the important departmental problems arising daily within the War Office, or in helping to decide the broader national problems which the Cabinet must finally settle, is a question on which no opinion is here suggested. The point is that Lord Kitchener cannot efficiently discharge both duties. The same consideration applies with varying degrees of force to other

Cabinet ministers. In effect, we are asking our Cabinet ministers to discharge duties which are beyond human strength, and therefore are not in reality discharged.

Before considering what possibilities of reform lie open to us, it is desirable briefly to take note of the conditions which have led to the present situation. The Cabinets of the eighteenth and the earlier years of the nineteenth century differed in two important respects from the Cabinets of the twentieth century. In the first place they were smaller; in the second place the departmental duties of Cabinet ministers were much lighter. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the number of ministers in a Cabinet began to be expressed in two figures; while in the earlier part of the century the activities of some departments were so small that a minister could afford time himself to open letters addressed to his department and to deal with them personally. To-day in most departments a special staff is employed merely to open letters and to distribute them to the different clerks who have charge of the subjects involved. During the years that have elapsed since the middle of the nineteenth century the growing activity of all departments of State has been met, excusably enough, not by re-designing the machinery of government but by duplicating or triplicating the existing mechanism. As each important new office has been created the minister appointed to that office has been held to be entitled to a seat in the Cabinet, so that the number of Cabinet ministers has steadily grown.

It may fairly be asked whether it was not possible, while admitting new ministers to the Cabinet because they represented new functions, to get rid of some of the old ministerial offices which were no longer of any real administrative importance. For example, the Cabinet still contains a Lord President of the Council, a Lord Privy Seal, and a Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. These are offices that have come down from a period when the whole construction of the government was totally different from that which now exists. Their survival is partly due to the inherent conservatism of the English mind, but still more to considerations arising out of our party system of government. Every Prime Minister is under the obligation of finding office of some kind for prominent supporters whom he cannot afford to offend. The above-mentioned offices, to which no particular duties of importance are attached, exactly

serve the purpose of providing niches for men whom it might otherwise—in view either of their personalities or of conflicting claims—be difficult to place. Consequently, these old offices have been continued, while new Cabinet offices have been created to deal with new functions.

Incidentally, it is desirable here to refer to one of the most curious and most regrettable consequences of the influence of bygone conditions upon the present composition of the British Cabinet. When the government of England was in substance and fact, as well as in name, the King's Government, it was natural and reasonable that the Lord High Chancellor, as the head of the judicial system of the kingdom, should have a place in the council that advised the King. At present, in normal periods, the government of the United Kingdom is a party clique existing primarily for party ends. Incidentally, this clique may in general govern the country and guide the Empire in ways which it honestly believes to be best for the nation. But with more or less frequency issues arise which provoke a conflict between party interests and national interests; and in such cases it rarely happens that a Cabinet, dependent for existence upon party support, can venture to sacrifice the party for the sake of the country. And even if this conflict never arose, it would still be highly inconvenient that the clear distinction between executive and judicial functions, which is one of the cardinal principles of our modern system of government, should be ignored in the supreme governing council of the kingdom.

The Lord Chancellor is a judge—the first judge of the Realm. As such, he ought to be able to approach his grave duties without any prepossession due either to the influence of party politics or to a feeling of loyalty to colleagues with whom he has shared responsibility for executive and legislative proposals. We rightly assume that all our judges, from the Lord Chancellor downwards, are honest in intention; but it is not fair to any man to ask him to interpret, as a judge, an Act of Parliament which has been the subject of keen controversy, especially when he, as a politician, has taken part in that controversy; or, again, when his decision may affect the political interests of the Cabinet of which he is a member, and thus conceivably imperil his own tenure of one of the most distinguished offices under the Crown. In the case of all other judges, law and custom provide that they shall hold

office for life, so that no personal consideration may affect their impartiality. Yet the highest judgeship of all is deliberately treated as a political office, to be vacated with every change of the ministry. One of the minor evils of this indefensible system is the expense involved; for every ex-Chancellor is entitled to a life pension of £5000 a year, even if he has only held office for a day. At the present moment the country is liable to a charge of £10,000 a year as salary for one Lord Chancellor and £15,000 a year for pensions for his three immediate predecessors. The Irish Lord Chancellorship is subject to the same rules and involves similar extravagant expenditure, though the amounts involved are slightly smaller.

Even if no other reform is made in our Cabinet system the practice of treating the Lord Chancellorship as a political office ought to cease. It cannot be argued that the presence of the Lord Chancellor in the Cabinet is necessary to enable his colleagues to have the advantage of his legal advice. A considerable proportion of the members of every Cabinet are lawyers, and it is more or less a matter of chance which one of these lawyers is appointed to the Woolsack. The present Prime Minister might have become Lord Chancellor at any time, in recent years, had he wished to do so. If a Unionist ministry had been in power Sir Edward Carson, who is also a member of the present Cabinet, would probably have been made Lord Chancellor; while rumour says that the present Home Secretary was offered and refused the Woolsack. It is impossible to contend that the legal ability of these three distinguished lawyers has been so impaired by the mere fact that they are not sitting on the Woolsack that they require the constant presence of the actual occupant of that seat to guide them on points of law. As a matter of fact, special provision is made for securing regular legal advice for the Cabinet by the appointment of two law officers, who are paid upon a scale which even surpasses the liberality of the Lord Chancellor's remuneration. The real reason for maintaining the Lord Chancellorship as a political office is that each party in turn wishes to keep this great plum of the legal profession as a reward for one of its partisans.

In passing, it may be pointed out that the inclusion of all this mass of highly paid legal talent in the Government does not apparently suffice to keep the Cabinet straight even on

fairly obvious legal points. For example, we were told on the authority of the Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons on the 30th of September, that the Budget, as introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, represented 'the 'unanimous judgment of a united Cabinet.' Yet that Budget included a proposal to tax currants, which had to be abandoned because Great Britain is bound by a convention with Greece not to increase the tax on Greek currants except after one year's notice. Again, the procedure proposed by the Government for authorising the Budget included a resolution in Committee of Ways and Means affecting postal charges, which the Speaker ruled to be not only superfluous but probably inconsistent with the provisions of the Parliament Act. The preparation of this resolution was doubtless not the result of the 'unanimous judgment of a united Cabinet,' but was due to some subordinate member of the government. Yet when the country pays enormous sums to so many lawyers it might be imagined that they would keep their colleagues from making such obvious blunders. The excessive lawyer element in the government is ultimately due to the same causes that have led to the overgrowth of the Cabinet. Lawyers predominate in the House of Commons, and our political system requires that places should be found for those who render important services to their party.

This is the root of the evil, and as long as the party system continues there is little hope of a reduction of the highly salaried posts which are emptied and refilled every time that a new ministry comes into office. In addition to the twenty-two members of the Cabinet there are about thirty other ministers—including the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and the Irish Lord Chancellor—and some fourteen ministers of the Royal Household. With two or three exceptions these removable ministers are all paid. Their salaries range from £702 a year for a Lord-in-Waiting to £20,000 a year for the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. The Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, in addition to salaries of £7000 and £6000 a year respectively, get more than as much again in fees. The aggregate sum divisible among the sixty-six ministers of various kinds who go out of office at a change of government is something between £170,000 and £180,000 a year or an average of about £2700 a year each. In addition, several ministers have houses provided by the State, including

the provision of lighting, heating, and furniture. There is neither political, nor social, nor economic, justification for the maintenance of such an enormously expensive system of government. Both the number of ministers and the scale of ministerial salaries ought to be cut down. That a salary of £5000 is not an imperative necessity for a Cabinet minister is sufficiently proved by the fact that several Cabinet ministers only draw £2000 a year. Many of the junior ministers receive only £1000 or £1200; yet there is active competition among members of Parliament for these minor posts. The whole scale of salaries, both for political and for judicial services in England, is far in excess of that which obtains in either France or Germany, or even in the United States. In Switzerland a Cabinet minister draws £400 a year.

If this enormous expenditure conduced to efficiency, the money would not be grudged; but it does not, it only conduces to further extravagance by setting an extravagant standard. Throughout the government services the scale of the ministerial salaries influences the scale of the salaries of permanent civil servants. In an office presided over by a minister drawing £5000 a year the civil servants obtain higher salaries than in an office where the minister's salary is only £2000, although the work is identical in character. Moreover, ministers who are themselves lavishly paid are inclined to look with a tolerant eye upon lavishness elsewhere. Thus from no minister has there come any protest against the notorious scandal that a large number of retired military officers are being employed in the War Office upon routine work and are drawing not only the full pay of their rank but also their pensions.

That is one amongst a thousand examples which might be given of the inefficiency of our present system of Cabinet government. There is no co-ordinating authority with sufficient detachment to be able to maintain an effective control over individual ministers. The ministers themselves compose the authority which ought to control them, and as a result they are not controlled. For reasons which are both human and obvious no minister cares to direct the attention of the Cabinet to the way in which another department is being managed by its head, who is also a member of the Cabinet. Retaliation would be instant and unpleasant.

Dimly realising these difficulties, a section of the public has clamoured for a dictatorship. The idea is impossible. There

is no man in the United Kingdom whom the country would accept as a dictator, and the whole conception of a dictatorship is foreign to our English traditions and habits. For good or for evil the committee method of government is part of our blood and bone. All that we ask for is a committee so constituted that it has a reasonable chance of being able to do the work entrusted to it. The Cabinet, as at present constituted, has no such chance: first because it is too large, and secondly because it includes the very ministers whose work it ought to control.

Neither defect has any legal sanction behind it. The Cabinet is a committee composed of members of the Privy Council nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the King. No law prescribes how many members of the Privy Council shall sit on this committee, nor is there any necessary connexion between membership of the Privy Council and ministerial office. On the contrary most of the present members of the Privy Council are not ministers. There is nothing to prevent the Prime Minister, with the approval of the King, from limiting the Cabinet to five Privy Councillors, none of whom should hold ministerial office.

The double effect of this change would be to relieve the members of the Cabinet of departmental duties, and at the same time to reduce the departments to effective subordination to the Cabinet. It would still be necessary to appoint a dozen or more ministers to take charge of the principal departments of State, and they would be appointed as now from among prominent politicians. One of the most satisfactory features of our system of government is the combination of the temporary politician with the permanent civil servant. Each tends to correct the vices of the other. But in order to secure the full advantages of this happy combination, it is essential that there should be above all the departments a supreme controlling council independent of the ministers that it has to control. It is hardly necessary to add that the proposed Cabinet, while remaining itself a non-ministerial body, would always be free to invite to its councils any minister or any permanent official whom it wished on occasion to consult.

EDITOR.

No. 455 will be published in January 1916.

INDEX

Titles of Articles are printed in heavy type.

Abdul Hamid, 235
Aerenthal, Baron von, 238, 239, 240
Agricultural War Book, 186
Agriculture, Patriotism and, 406
Archer, William, **A German Naval Historian**, 173
Army, the Expeditionary Force, 274
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., *The War: Its Causes and its Message*, 273
Australian Commonwealth, 282, 285
Austria, The Quintessence of, 225; the Englishman's idea of Austria, 225; the difficulty of understanding Austria, 226–7; the Austrian political vocabulary, 227; the Austro-Hungarian catalogue, 227; illusory character of Austro-Hungarian questions, 228; the power of the Crown, 228, 229, 233; Oriental character of some of the Hapsburg peoples, 228–9; the 'Austrian' atmosphere, 229; pride, the essence of the Austrian character, 229–30, 231; a characteristic of the dynasty, 230–1; attitude to the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs, 231; and Serbia, 232, 235; dynastic character of policy, 232–3; relations of Austria and Hungary, 232–5; the policy of Magyarisation after the *Ausgleich*, 233; German policy and the Eastern Question, 235, 236, 241; Austria's forward policy in the Balkans, 236; the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 234, 238; efforts to inflame Serbian resentment, 238–9; policy of aggression against Serbia 240 *et seq. passim*; the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 237–8, 239, 240; the German Emperor at Eckartsau, 239; the diplomatic capitulation of Russia: the 'shining armour' episode, 239; German grip on Austria, 239; the illness of the Archduke, 240, 242; the Archduke's reconstruction policy, 242–3; the tragedy of Serajevo, 240, 243–6; no evidence to implicate the Serbian Government, 245; the European conflagration, 240–1, 246; the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy indispensable in the reconstitution of Europe by the Allies, 234–5, 246–7.
Austria and the Balkan States, 65

Bagehot, Walter, Works and Life of, 1
Baghdad railway enterprise, the, 235
Bailey, John, **Meredith's Odes on France**, 135
Balkans, the, 71, 231 *et seq. passim*
Bastardy, Marriage and the Law of, 155
Batiffol, Mgr. Pierre, *A un Neutre Catholique*, 294, 309, 310
Belgian neutrality, 184
Berchtold, Count, 240
Bismarck, 149, 174
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 184, 231, 232, 234, 238
Botrel, Théodore, *Les Chants du Bivouac*, 78, 89, 90, 95
British Imperialism and the Ultimate Problems of Peace, 41; definition of the word Imperialism, 41–2; race mysticism, 42–3; Teutonic development of race mysticism, 43; Pan-Slavism, 42, 43; Pan-Germanism, 43; British Imperialism, 43 *et seq.*; the headship of the Crown, 43; the growth of the British Empire by the expansion of England, 44; the lesson of the revolt of the American Colonies, 44–5, 54; a great

commonwealth of free states, 45–6; the aim of the British Empire-builders, 46–8, 51; international character of all federations, 48; British Imperialism differentiated from Pan-Germanism, 48 *et seq.*; German attitude to British Imperialism, 48 *et seq.*, 58; the British Empire not the outcome of a great policy, 51; influence of the Empire upon the English mind, 51; Imperial conscience, 52, 54; the 'Reason of State' and the new sense of nationality in Germany, 53; sense of duty in British Imperialism, 54–5; the part of British Imperialism in the settlement after the war, 55, 57; British consciousness of a community of interests between the nations, 55, 56; principle of action a hundred years ago, 56; the binding force of international law, 56–7; principle of nationality and a cosmopolitan system, 57; motive force of British Imperialism, 58; Great Britain as a military power, 59

Bruce, Sir Charles, **The Crown Colonies and the War, 374**

Bruecke, E., *The Human Figure*, 391, 404

Bulgaria, and Austrian schemes in the Balkans, 239; in the second Balkan War, 241

Burns, C. Delisle, *Political Ideals*, 41, 42, 47

Cabinet Government, 426; strength of the party system in this country, 426; normal attitude of the normal Englishman, 426; dissatisfaction with the Coalition Cabinet, 427; members of the Cabinet, 427; work of the Cabinet, 428 *et seq.*; *esprit de corps* in Government departments, 428–9; evils inherent in our Cabinet system, 429–30, 433, 436; sub-committees, 431; establishment of an 'Inner Cabinet,' 431; ministers and departmental duties, 431; conditions which have led to the present situation, 432; possibilities of reform, 432 *et seq.*; abolition of some old ministerial offices suggested, 432; the Lord Chancellorship, 433; salaries to Cabinet members, 435; influence on salaries of Civil servants, 436; lack of co-ordinating authority and control, 436; idea of a dictatorship impossible, 436–7

Canada in War-time, 186; survey of the measures taken between August 3–18, 1914...186–9; statements in the House of Commons, 189–90; the political truce, 189, 193; financial measures, 190 *et seq.*; the war budget, 190–2; depression in trade and decrease in revenue, 191; new stamp duties and increased tariff schedules, 193; statement concerning mobilisation, 193–4; Canadian Patriotic Fund, 194–5; separation allowances, 195–6; railway and other undertakings in hand on the outbreak of war, 196–7; immigration, 197–9, 200; unemployment during the winters of 1912–1915...200; reorganisation of immigration propaganda needed, 200; food prices, 201; reserve of food-stuffs, 201 *and note*; Government appeal to grain-growers and farmers, 202, 203; the crop of 1914...202–3; increase of land under grain as result of Government appeal, 203; speculation as to yield of wheat in 1915, 203

Capital, **The Outlook for, 1, 3, 4, 20–1**; dearness of capital before the war, 1–2; dated and undated stocks, 3–4; the term 'capital,' 4 *et seq.*; the price of money, 4–6; the Bank of England's holding of securities, 7; the Government and artificially created credit, 8; the creation of capital, 9–10; connexion between goods and capital, 10–12; securities, 10–11; the credit of France and England, 11; destruction of capital owing to the war, 12; payment for war by sale of foreign securities, 13–14, 19; payment for the war out of income, 14–15, 17–18; economy and the individual, 15; saving, since the war, 15–17; the three ways in which the war can be paid for, 18–19; taxation for war purposes, 19–20; the position of Germany: enforced economy, 20; position of England: effect on capital, 20–1; advantages of neutrals, 21

Capital and Labour and 'compulsory service, 285

Chamberlain, Joseph, 45, 178, 179, 183, 384
Chisholm, John, *Encyclopaedia of Scots Law*, 155
Chivalry and Civilisation, 118; the death of the Chevalier Bayard, 118, 128; significance of chivalry in the evolution of society, 119; utilitarianism and idealism in conflict, 119; Eastern Mediterranean the place of struggle, 119–20; the passing of Knossos and the entry of chivalry, 120–1; Greek materialism, 121–2; the new idealism in Rome, 122–3; the Eastern Empire, 123; Christianity and the spirituality of the East, 123; chivalry not identified with Christianity, 124–5; idealism the underlying spring of chivalry, 125; Christianity and idealism, 125; the attitude towards womanhood, 125–6; chivalry the protest against the degradation of woman, 126; the attitude to slavery, 126; chivalry and materialism, 127; past and present meaning of chivalry, 127; chivalrous figures and traditions of chivalry amongst Britons, 128; chivalric education, 129; a practical institution as well as an ideal, 130; decay and resurrection of chivalry, 130–1; Don Quijote, 131; Cervantes and the new chivalry, 131; heroism in the present war, 132–3; heroism not necessarily chivalry, 133; German materialism, 133; the test to come for the Allied forces, 133; England and materialism, 133–4
Christianity and the War, 294; the association of fighting and praying, 294; the renewal of religious belief brought about by the war, 294–5, 298; political and religious aspects of the war, 295; M. Loisy's views as to the value and future of Christianity, 296–7; contradiction between the spiritual demands of Christianity and the practical exigencies of human life, 296–8; inadequacy of our religious conceptions, 299; the 'impartiality' of the Holy See in this war, 300 *et seq.*; the moral question: Christianity and the ethics of patriotism, 304 *et seq.*; the religion of patriotism, 308; war cannot be Christianised, 307–10; yet it is consonant with Christian faith and aspirations, 310; the warfare of Christianity, 310; the crusade within the Church, 311
Clyde Engineers' strike, 262 *et seq.*
Cole, G. D. H., *Labour in War Time*, 248, 251 *et seq.*, 263
Conybeare, Edward, *Alfred in the Chronicles*, 118
Cox, Harold, **Cabinet Government**, 426; **Economic Endurance**, 204
Cramb, Professor, quoted, 50, 58
Cromer, Lord, quoted, 46, 47, 58
Crown Colonies and the War, The, 374; the rally of the Colonies, 374–5, 389; offers of military and naval assistance, 375; India, 375; the self-governing Dominions, 375; the Somali Chiefs in Jubaland, 375; the offer from Niue, 376; Crown Colonies scheme of defence, 376, 377; extent of military assistance from Crown Colonies, 377; Gold Coast and surrender of Togoland, 377–8, 380; contributions by the West Indian Islands, 378; contributions in kind, 378–9; Falkland Islands, 380; Nigeria, 380; East Africa, 380; Rhodesia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, 381; Mauritius, 381; the Seychelles, 381–2; Ceylon, 382; Hong Kong, 382; Straits Settlements, 382; Fiji, 382; racial equality in Crown Colonies, 383–4; establishment of Schools of Tropical Medicine, 384–5; drugs of tropical origin admitted in the British Pharmacopœia, 385; Colonial Nursing Association, 385; legal systems of Crown Colonies and Protectorates, 386–7; legislative constitutions, 387; representation, 387; relations between Legislatures and the Crown, 387–9; proposal for reform of the Colonial Office, 389–90

De la Tour, P. I., *L'Opinion Catholique et la Guerre*, 294, 301
Delbrück, H., *Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit*, 22
Delorme, Hugues, poems, 78
Democracy, Diplomacy, and War, 273: the change in popular opinion regarding the war, 273–6; diplomacy and military administration, 274, 281; the failure in the organisation of industry, 275; the nation's indictment against itself, 275–6; indictment of the

methods of 'Democracy,' 277–9, 281, 283; the present war in effect a war against democracy, 278–9; the importance of the form of Government, 279 *et seq.*, 286; contrast between English and Swiss democracy, 282; the Swiss Confederation and the Australian Commonwealth, 282, 285; manhood suffrage and manhood service, 282–3, 285; the Trades Union Congress and 'compulsory' service, 283–4; functions of the State in war, 286; the problem: to find the man, 286; the appeal to history, 286 *et seq.*; England and international wars, 287; diplomacy and war under aristocratic rule, 287–91, 293; the crisis of 1756–7...288–9; Pitt's 'dictatorship,' 289–90; black hours in periods marked by great triumphs, 288, 290–1; our military unpreparedness, 291; the capacity for the production of leaders, 291; weakness and peculiarity of democracy, 292–3; democracy *versus* military autocracy in the present struggle, 293

de Montmorency, J. E. G., Chivalry and Civilisation, 118

Déroulède, Paul, *Chants du Soldat*, 78

Desecration of French Monuments, The, 330; the Cathedral of Reims, 331–6; Louvain and Reims, 331, 332; French national sentiment about Reims, 332–3; damage to the city of Reims, 336–7; the Reims Tapestries, 336–7; M. Henri Jadart's diary, 337–8; Arras, 338, 339–42; Charleville, 338–9, 350; Senlis, 342–5; Soissons, 345–6; Meaux, 346–8; Gerbéviller, 348–9; Paris: Notre Dame, 349; Orchies, 349; the Ardennes, 349–50; Noyon, and the towns behind the German line, 350

Diplomacy. *See* Democracy, Diplomacy, and War.

Don Quijote de la Mancha, 118, 130, 131

Economic Endurance, 204; comparison of the German and British economic position, 204–6; Germany's advantage of preparation, 205; the British public and 'business as usual,' 205–6; the new popularity of the gospel of thrift, 206; the need to economise our resources, 207; economy by persuasion, 207–8; the war loan, 208, 217; the appeal to patriotism, 208–9; the possibilities of taxation, 209 *et seq.*; need of economy in the Government service, 209 *et seq.*; Road Improvement Fund, 210; Land Valuation Department, 210–12; payment to members of Parliament, 212–13; ministerial salaries, 213; economy in Civil administration, 214; the question of local expenditure, 214–15; threefold character of the problem of economic endurance, 215; the covering of war liabilities, 215 *et seq.*; present economic position wholly artificial, 216–18; reduction in yield of revenue after the war, 218; new taxation, 218–20; readjustment of postal charges, 220–1; excise duties, 221–3; income-tax and wages tax, 223–4; national obligation to contribute more, 224

Entretiens des Non-Combattants durant la Guerre, 294

Eversley, W. P., and Craies, W. F., *The Marriage Laws of the British Empire*, 155

Faguet, Émile, *The Cult of Incompetence*, 273

Fort, Paul, *Poèmes de France*, 78, 94–5, 333

Fouquier, M. and Duchêne, *Des Divers Styles de Jardins*, 98, 99

France, War Poetry in, 78.

Fraser, Hon. Lord, *The Law of Scotland relative to Parent and Child*, 155

Frederick the Great, Voltaire and, 351. *See under* Voltaire.

French Monuments, The Desecration of, 330

Frick, Louis de Gonzague, *Trèfles à Quatres Feuilles*, 78

Gardening, Nationality in, 98.

Gardiner, E. N., *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals*, 391, 393

George, D. Lloyd, 263 *et seq. passim*; *Through Terror to Triumph*, 248

German diplomacy, 83

German Emperor, the, 238, 239

German Naval Historian, A, 173: Count Reventlow on Germany's Foreign Policy, 173; Germany, England and the relative growth of naval power, 173; British and German relations during the 'eighties, 173–5; the Kaiser's resolve on a strong German navy, 174; British proposal to lease part of Belgian Congo, 175; the Kruger telegram, 175; Germany in the Far East: seizure of Kiow-Chow, 175–6; on British jealousy of German commercial competition, 176; the purpose of the German navy, 177, 179, 180; the Boer War, 177, 178–9; German hatred of England, 177, 178, 179, 181; the Naval Laws, 179; England's endeavours to bring about improved relations, 179, 180; the Yangtse Treaty, 180; British alarm, 180; testimony as to German ground of complaint against Britain, 181; British rapprochement with France, 181; Morocco, 181–2; Mr. Lloyd George's speech of July 21, 1911... 182; the parting of the ways, 182–3; the Hague Conference, 1907... 183; German world ambitions and British command of the sea, 183–4; views at the time of the Bosnian crisis, 184; Germany and the small nations, 184; jealousy of Great Britain's sea power, 184; summary, 184–5

German War and Catholicism, The, 294, 299, 301

German War Book, The, 312, 323, 324

German War Literature, 22; newspapers, 22–3; pamphlets and books, 23; the German people and the war, 23–4; volunteers in Germany, 24; characteristics of German war literature, 25–7, 28; the excessive self-esteem of the Germans, 27 *et seq.*; Dr. Adolf Lasson on *Deutsche Art und Deutsche Bildung*, 28–30, 37; Dr. Ernst Schultze, *Was verbürgt den Sieg?* 30–2 36; Herr Willy Helm, *Warum wir siegen müssen!* 32–3; Dr. Jacob Rieszer on economics and finance, 33; the threefold defence against the charge of outrages, 34; inconsistencies of the German apologists, 34–6, 38; general attitude of Germans to neutral countries, 36; Germans' explanation of their own unpopularity, 36, 37; admission of weakness in diplomacy, 36; views as to the origin of the war, 37–9; German views of the future 'after the war,' 39–40; 'the English world yoke,' 39–40; indemnification, 40; the end of the war, 40

Germany's Violation of the Laws of War, 312

Godfrey, W. W., *Gardens in the Making*, 98

Gosse, Edmund, **The Desecration of French Monuments**, 330; **War Poetry in France**, 78

Greek Athletics and Military Training, 391; distinction between the four main branches of physical energy, 391; organised games and the public school system, 392; games in Ancient Greece, 392; drill and military training in Greece, 393; history of organised athletics in Greece, 393; the Olympic games, 393 *et seq.*; indifference of Athens and Sparta, 394–5; Sparta's withdrawal from Olympia, 395, 396; specialisation of athletics, 395, 396; the spectacle of Olympia, 397; the gymnasium and the palaestra, 397–8; the use of the oil-flask—*lecythus*, 398; the athletic exercises, 398 *et seq.*; wrestling, 399; boxing, 400; the pankration, 401–2; running and jumping, 402–3; the throwing of the javelin and diskos, 403; Greek superiority in physical development compared with the Englishman, 404–5; present indifference to physical training, 405

Grey, Sir Edward, 281

Halsbury, Lord, *The Laws of England*, 155

Hannay, David, **The Humanity of Modern Warfare**, 312

Heligoland, 174

Helm, Willy, *Warum wir siegen müssen*, 22

Hobson, J. A., *The Problem of the Unemployed*, 1, 2

Hopkins, J. Castell, *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 186

Humanity of Modern Warfare, The, 312: the Mahratta fort at Talnêr, 312–13, 314; the Duke of Wellington's exposition of doctrine,

313 *et seq.*; Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, 313–14; General Suchet at the taking of Lérida, 315–16, 324–5; Napier quoted on the siege of Lérida, 315–16; Wolfe and the disorders in the Highlands, 316; Cromwell and the royalist prisoners, 316–17; brutalising effects of invasion, 317; ransom of prisoners, 318–19; the relations of the soldier and the peasant, 319; relations between professional soldiers, 319–20; the irregular fighters or 'Parisans,' 320; the guerrillero, 320–1; internment of enemy aliens, 321; exchange of prisoners, 321–2; terrorism in war, 322–3; moral sentiments in war, 323–4; effects of pedantry and sentimentality, 325; modern weapons, 325–7; scientific ingenuity and humanity, 327; exploding and poisonous gases, 327, 328; torpedo war and submarine explosions, 327–8; aircraft, 329; the present war and 'militarism,' 329

Illegitimacy. *See under* Marriage.
Immigration Facts and Figures, 186
Imperialism, British, and the Ultimate Problems of Peace, 41
Income-tax and wages tax, 223–4
Irmer, G., *Zwischen Krieg und Frieden*, 22
Italia irredenta, 61, 64
Italy and the European Conflict, 60; the Triple Alliance, 60–3, 64, 70, 71; the Libyan war, 61, 65, 67; attitude to the aspirations of Serbia, 61; relations with Great Britain, 62; international position of Italy on the outbreak of war, 62; declaration of neutrality, 62, 63, 70; the aspirations of Italy, 64–5; the Irredentist question, 61, 64; the participation of Turkey an incentive for intervention, 65; public opinion during the period of neutrality, 65–70; efforts of the Central Empires to influence Italian opinion, 68–9; propaganda by the Entente Powers, 69–70; policy of the Government during the first months of the war, 70; the Salandra Cabinet and Baron Sonnino, 70 *et seq.*, 76; attitude in regard to the Balkan *status quo* and the Austrian attack on Serbia, 71; Austria's proposals 71; Italy's demands, 72; German attitude, 73, 74, 75; denunciation of the Austro-Italian alliance, 73, 74; Signor Giolitti, 73–5, 76; last efforts of the Central Empires, 76; war declared against Austria, 76; attitude of the Italian people to the war, 77; position as to Germany, 77
Italy declines Austria's suggestion for a 'defensive' war against Serbia, 242

Jadart, Henri, *Journal d'un Renois*, 330, 337–8
Jameson raid, 175
Jourdain, P. E. B., *The Principle of Least Action*, 351, 367

Kitchener, Lord, 274, 431

Labour and the War. *See under* Workshops.
Land Valuation Department, 210–12
Lawson, W. R., *British War Finance*, 204
Literature, German War, 22
Loisy, Alfred, *Guerre et Religion*, 294, 295, 296, 300, 308
Lowell, Laurence A., *The Government of England*, 277
Lucas, Sir Charles P., *The British Empire*, 41

Macalister, R. A. Stewart, *The Philistines, their History and Civilisation*, 118, 120
Mallet, Bernard, *British Budgets*, 204
Marriage and the Law of Bastardy, 155; individualism and traditional influence in the English character, 155; English social morality, 156; freedom of English home life and the influence of tradition, 156; the legitimacy of children, 157; legal disabilities of the illegitimate child, 157; the law of bastardy, 157, 169; unions under early Roman law, 157–8; the Western codes, 158; Canon law of marriage, 158–9; doctrine of legitimation, 159, 161–2, 168 *et seq.*, 170–1; position in England, 158, 159 *et seq.*; doctrine of nullity, 160; possessory marriage, 160; English medieval law before the Statute of Merton,

160–1; legal position to-day of an illegitimate child, 162 *et seq.*; relations of father and illegitimate child, 163–4; the mother's duties and rights, 164–5; rights and duties of the child, 165; the problem of illicit unions in the conditions of war time, 166; suggestions for further amelioration of the position of the illegitimate child, 166 *et seq.*; suggested incorporation into our law of the doctrine of legitimation, 168 *et seq.*; current practice in Scotland, 170–1; law in the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and the British Dominions, 171–2

Marriott, J. A. R., Democracy, Diplomacy, and War, 273

Meredith, George. *Odes in Contribution to the Song of French History*, 135

Meredith's Odes on France, 135 *et seq.*; Meredith's love of France, 137, 149; *The Revolution*, 139 *et seq.*; the Napoleon ode, 141–5; the central doctrine of the odes, 145; *France, December* 1870... 145–9; France and the present war, 150; *Alsace-Lorraine*, 150–3; the vision of the new France, 152–3; the lesson offered for the warning of Germany, 153

Modern Warfare, The Humanity of. *See under* Humanity.

Money, Sir L. G. Chiozza, *The Nation's Wealth*, 1

Morocco crisis 1912, 38

Nationality in Gardening 98: modern literature on the subject of gardening, 98; the debt to the East, 99; Egyptian gardens, 99; the gardens of the Assyrians and Persians, 99; a Greek garden, 99–100; gardens of the Eastern world shown to-day in the gardens of Rajputana and Northern India, 100–1, 104; early Roman gardens, 101–2; Christian influence on art in the time of Constantine, 103; the garden paramount throughout Moslem art, 103; Spanish Moslem water gardens, 104, 105, 111; the Spanish 'patio,' 106; the northern garden of Charlemagne, 106; the medieval monks and gardening, 106–7 *and note*; influence of the Crusades, 107; symbolism of flowers, 107–8; the castle 'verger' in Provence, 108; gardens of the Italian Renaissance 109–10; French gardening, 110–11; gardening in the Low Countries, 111–12; the tulip craze in Holland, 112; Continental influence on English gardening, 113–14; the Gothic revival in England, 114; Victorian 'Italian Gardens,' 114; influence of Chinese and Japanese gardening, 115; 'rock-gardening,' 115; progress in horticulture leading to a renewed study of design, 115; the English public garden, 116; Ayscoughfee Manor, 116–17

Nicholson, J. Shield, *Life and Genius of Ariosto*, 118, 130

Oliver, F. S., *Ordeal by Battle*, 273, 276 *et seq. passim.*

Patriotism and Agriculture, 406; the indictment against the farmers, 406–8; influence of the change in the national view of British Agriculture, 407; the business propositions involved, 408 *et seq.*, 420; the charge of under-cultivation, 408–9, 413; want of capital as a factor, 409; prices and costs of production: effect of, in limiting the yield, 409, 412, 425; essential differences between manufacture and agriculture, 410; increased production means increased expenditure, 410 *et seq.*; use of fertilisers, 411 *et seq.*; influence of the price of wheat at Chicago, 411 *et seq.*, 420; cheapness drives land out of arable cultivation, 413; agricultural value of arable land, 413; increase of area of wheat grown, 415; temporary grasses, 416; cost of production of the wheat crop, 416–17; increase of arable, 418–19; agricultural statistics: decreased returns in 1913...418; future course of wheat prices, 419; as to excessive profits out of the war, 420–2; wheat and meat, 421–2; farmers and the income-tax, 422; farmers contribution in aid of the naval and military services, 422; payment of inadequate wages, 423; agricultural wages since 1896, 423–5

Peace, Ultimate Problems of, 41
Petre, M. D., Christianity and War, 294
Phillips, Prof., W. A., British Imperialism and the Ultimate Problems of Peace, 41
Poètes de la Guerre, Les, 78, 92–3
Poetry, War Poetry in France, 78
Pope, the, and the war, 300 *et seq.*
Porritt, Edward, Canada in Wartime, 186
Prothero, R. E., Patriotism and Agriculture, 406

Reventlow, Graf Ernst zu, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, 173 *et seq.*
Rhodes, Cecil, 42
Road Improvement Fund, 210
Rohrbach, P., 38; *Der Deutsche Krieg*, 22; *Zum Weltvolk Hindurch!* 22; *Der Deutsche Gedanke*, 49, 53*n*.

Schofield, W. H., *Chivalry in English Literature*, 118, 130
Seillière, E., *The German Doctrine of Conquest*, 41, 42
Serbia, 61, 71; Austrian attitude to, 231 *et seq.*; 238 *et seq. passim*
Seton-Watson, Dr., *cited*, 232
Shadwell, Dr. A., German War Literature, 22
Southern Slav question, 230, 231, 243
Steed, Henry Wickham, The Quintessence of Austria, 225
Strachey, Lytton, Voltaire and Frederick the Great, 351

Taxation, new, for the war, 19–20, 209, 218 *et seq.*
Tharaud, Jérome et Jean, *Paul Déroulède*, 78, 81, 82, 83, 87
Tolstoi, Leo, *quoted*, 297, 308
Trade Unionism attitude of, to 'compulsory' service, 283–7
Trades Union Congress, 249, 266
Triggs, H. Inigo, *Garden Craft in Europe*, 98
Torpedo war, 327–8
Triple Alliance, 60–71 *passim*
Tropical Medicine, study of, 384 *et seq.*
Turkey, 65, 225; establishment of German diplomatic preponderance, 235
Tyrrell, George, *Essays on Faith and Immortality*, 294, 309,

Unemployment. *See under* Workshops.

Villiers-Stuart, Mrs. C. M., Nationality in Gardening, 98
Voltaire and Frederick the Great, 351: the first years of the correspondence, 352–4; Frederick becomes King, 354; change in his opinion of Voltaire's character, 354–5, 357; plot to keep Voltaire in Berlin, 355–6; Madame du Chatelet, 355; the King endeavours to patch the quarrel, 356; *La Pucelle*, 356; 'Voltaire le prussien!' 357, 361; Frederick's devotion to *l'élocution française*, 358, 359; the vogue of French literature in the eighteenth century, 358–9; Frederick the *littérateur*, 359–60; failure to understand the spirit of Voltaire, 360–1; Voltaire's motives for the Berlin adventure, 361–2; clouds of discord, 363; Voltaire's illegal stock-jobbing, 363–4; the group of eccentrics at the Court of Frederick, 364–5; Maupertius, 365 *et seq.*; the life of the Court, 368–9; the *Diatribe du Docteur Akakia*, 370 *et seq.*; Voltaire's departure from Berlin, 372; detention in Frankfort, 373; settles down by the Lake of Geneva, 373; reconciliation, 373

War, Crown Colonies and the, 374. *See under* Crown.
War, Democracy, Diplomacy and, *See under* Democracy.
War Literature, German, 22
War Poetry in France, 78: a characteristic of war poetry, 7–8 9, 93; the *Chants du Soldat*, 79, 83; attitude of literary critics to Déroulède's work, 79–80, 83; peculiarity of Déroulède's attitude, 80, 85; his life, 81–4, 85–6, 87; apparent incoherence and inconsistency, 82–3, 85, 86; analysis of the character of Déroulède's poems, 84, 88; Mme. Henri Thénard, 86; Théodore Botrel, poet-laureate to the armies of France, 87–90; M. Miguel Zamacoïs, 90, 91; fugitive war poems in France and England, 92; collections of poems, 92–3; *Les Poètes de la Guerre*, 92–4; M.

Paul Fort: *Poèmes de France*, 94–7; unanimity of sentiment in France, 97
War, Workshops and the, 248
Warfare, Modern, The Humanity of, 312
Weaver, Lawrence, *Houses and Gardens by E. L. Lutyens*, 98
Welsh Miners' Strike, 252, 262
Withers, Hartley, *War and Lombard Street*, 1; *Poverty and Waste*, 204
Workshops and the War, The, 248; public ignorance of the position of affairs, 249; the school of military 'experts,' 250; quasi-military writers, 250; the teaching of the social school, 251 *et seq.*; the phrase 'after the war,' 251; Mr. Cole's book *Labour in War Time*, 251 *et seq.*; effect of the war on industry and the labour market, 253–7, 258; practical disappearance of unemployment, 254–5, 261; rise in rates of wages, 255–6; signs of abounding prosperity, 256–7; rise in the cost of living, 257, 261; failure to estimate the material required for the war, 258–60; multiplicity of the requirements of the fighting forces, 259; other sources of difficulty, 260; the political and industrial truce, 260; Clyde engineers' strike, 261, 262, 265, 266; causes of the change in the attitude of the workmen, 261–2; Welsh miners' strike, 262–4; the Government's blunder in South Wales, 263–4; the hindrance in the workshops, 264 *et seq.*; Committee of Production appointed, 265; suspensions of all restrictions to output urged, 266; Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Bangor, 266; Trades Union Congress, 266; events since the reorganisation and extension of resources, 266; Government takes power to commandeer factories for war purposes, 266; conference of labour organisations at the Treasury, 266–7; Board of Control formed, 267; measures against drink, 267; Armaments Committee established in Newcastle, 267; the great shell controversy, 267; Ministry of Munitions created, 268; Munitions Act, 268; limitation of war profits, 268; trade union obstructions, 268–9; German calculations on the co-operation of British workmen, 269; the workmen's attitude, 269–70; propaganda to belittle the war, 270; increasing production, 271; Sunday labour, 271; danger to trade unionism, 271–2
Wright, F. A., Greek Athletics and Military Training, 374.

Young, Hilton, *The System of National Finance*, 204

University of Toronto
Library

DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU

Author Edin. Review
Title 222. 1915
P
LE
E